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Abstract 
This dissertation is a comprehensive study of the new legal framework for the long-term 
care (LTC) sector (also known as nursing homes) in Ontario, Canada. The research sought to 
answer the following question: What are the potential implications for persons with disabilities 
of the changes made by the Government of Ontario between 2004 and 2018 to the legislation and 
governance of treatment, care and living circumstances within LTC homes?   
LTC is where many older women with disabilities and serious illnesses experience care. 
This study brings a gendered disability perspective to a public policy issue that is usually 
singularly associated with aging. To theorize the regulation and provision of care in LTC, the 
author situates LTC research within debates about care in disability scholarship. The concept of 
“caring relationships” is used to draw out tensions inherent in receiving and delivering care. 
Caring relationships are shaped by, among other political and market forces, the legal and 
administrative structure of a benefit scheme or a regulatory regime. The New Governance 
literature is employed to describe and examine new processes and procedures that shape caring 
relationships in LTC. 
To create a more comprehensive account of the changes, the research methods used were 
document review, legal analysis and key informant interviews. The feminist political economy 
literature was relied upon to draw out critical insights about the LTC sector. The majority of 
changes identified in the review were the creation of new or the strengthening of existing 
processes. The few substantive changes can be described as fragmented efforts to reduce risks to 
the safety, physical survival and security of individual residents. These changes – if properly 
understood and implemented – are significant in that they afford more procedural protections to 
residents in caring relationships and allow residents to make claims for inclusion and 
participation in making care decisions and in influencing conditions within the home. However, 
the mechanisms were designed without careful consideration of how the actual circumstances of 
residents, connected to the intermeshing of disability, gender and age, will impact their proper 
implementation. Consequently, some LTC applicants and residents cannot benefit from the 
protections offered by the law.      
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1 
1 Introduction  
Prologue 
In the wake of the murders of eight long-term care (LTC) home residents in Southern 
Ontario by a single caregiver,1 Ontarians were forced to confront a series of perplexing and 
uncomfortable questions that had no simple answers. Why did someone in a caring profession 
decide to commit the ultimate breach of trust? Is it even possible to eliminate potential risk of 
grievous harm to residents in institutional care? What is the government’s appropriate role in 
“caring for” some of the most vulnerable citizens in our society? Does receiving care as currently 
conceived in our health and social services system inevitably mean living a life that is short, 
nasty and brutish? These questions inform my own examination and re-examination of some of 
the tensions and contradictions inherent in LTC. This dissertation engages scholarly research that 
is pertinent to answering these questions and offers an empirical account of LTC in Ontario that 
explains the regulatory context in which these criminal cases occurred. However, I reluctantly 
decided to put aside the grim details of these criminal cases and focus on the less sensational, 
more mundane reality of care in LTC homes. The responses – in the legal and political systems – 
to the tragic deaths are still unfolding at the time of writing. Some of these responses have been 
incorporated into this dissertation; others will have to be unpacked in a different project. To be 
certain, the recent Public Inquiry into the Safety and Security of Residents in the Long-Term 
Care Homes System2 is worthy of eventual critical examination. It is my hope that by taking a 
small step back from the latest (but probably not the last) crisis in LTC, this research project will 
be part of a longer view of LTC in Ontario.          
 
1 Government of Ontario, Statement from Attorney General and Minister of Health and Long-Term Care on a Public 
Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Elizabeth Wettlaufer Case (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 2017). Elizabeth 
Wettlaufer was convicted of eight counts of first-degree murder, four counts of attempted murder, and two counts of 
aggravated assault. 
2 The Long-Term Care Homes Public Inquiry Report was released on July 31, 2019. Honourable Eileen E Gillese, 
Report of the Public Inquiry into the Safety and Security of Residents in the Long-Term Care Homes System 
(Toronto: Long-Term Care Homes Public Inquiry, 2019). 
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1.1 Research question and the aim of the research   
My interest in regulation and governance grew out of a health context but has expanded 
to a broader context.  This dissertation concerns potential implications of changes to regulation 
and governance from the standpoint of vulnerable groups and individuals.  My inquiry into the 
potential implications will involve the use of a case study.  According to Robert Yin, case studies 
are the preferred strategy when “why” or “how” types of research questions are being posed, 
when the researcher has little control over behavioural events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real life context.3   The case study that I have chosen is 
the LTC home sector (commonly known as residential care or nursing homes) in Ontario.   
My research question is as follows: What are the potential implications for persons with 
disabilities of the changes made by the Government of Ontario between 2004 and 2018 to the 
legislation and governance of treatment, care and living circumstances within LTC homes? In 
this dissertation, I use ‘persons with disabilities’ and ‘disabled persons’ interchangeably because 
both terms are used in disability studies. 
The governance and regulation of treatment, care and living circumstances – institutional 
or community-based – appears to be a “logical” field through which to examine a variety of 
issues related to disability.  In chapter 2, I will explain the concept of disability in more detail. 
For now, suffice it to say that I have adopted a relational account of disability wherein disability 
is understood as the dynamic interaction of an individual with an impairment or health condition 
and the physical, social and political environment in which he or she is located.4 However, 
because the concept of disability has traditionally been linked to care, welfare and charity,5 
regulation and governance have been put in place to control the provision of services and support 
to persons with disabilities.  If we follow Julia Black’s definition of regulation as “the intentional 
use of authority to affect behaviour of a different party according to set standards, involving 
instruments of information gathering and behaviour modification”6, then the settlements with 
 
3 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 5th ed (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014). 
4 Tom Shakespeare, “Still a Health Issue” (2012) 5 Disability and Health Journal 129. 
5 Bernadette McSherry and Ian Freckelton, “Coercive Care: Rights, Law and Policy” in Bernadette McSherry & Ian 
Freckelton eds, Coercive Care: Rights, Law and Policy (New York: Routledge, 2013) 3 at 4. 
6Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54:1 Curr Leg Probs 103. 
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former residents of institutions for adults with developmental disabilities 7 are grim examples of 
harm suffered by persons with disabilities when the “intentional use of authority” had clearly 
failed to affect the behaviours of those in charge of providing care and treatment; indeed, it 
appears to have permitted their harmful behaviours.  Accordingly, regulation and governance 
may be studied in terms of the law’s impact on the lives of persons of disability, for example, the 
quantity and quality of support provided by a public benefit scheme from a distributive justice 
perspective.  When doing so, scholars and policy makers may discover that the law is too 
fragmented, too cumbersome or too complex to be implemented on the ground.8   As well, 
solutions may be proposed to achieve a variety of policy outcomes, such as cost-effectiveness, 
“red-tape” reduction and client satisfaction. However, this project is not about improving the 
techniques of regulating LTC as a social policy for those who experience the effects of aging and 
disabilities.    
I choose disability as my “lens” not because I equate disability with care, welfare and 
charity.  Nor do I object to reform efforts to reduce fragmentation or enhance the consistency of 
laws governing care, treatment and living circumstances.  Rather, I am concerned about the 
invisibility of disability in the regulation and governance of care, treatment and living 
circumstances.   In my view, although the exclusionary practices of sweeping persons with 
disability from public view9 may belong to old statute books, persons with disabilities continue 
to be invisible in the sense that their differences, needs and diversity are not recognized and 
acknowledged in regulation and governance.   Manifestation of such invisibility may take many 
forms: the Supreme Court’s formal approach to equality,10 lack of consideration of the needs and 
 
7 On December 9, 2013, Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne delivered a formal apology in the legislature to former 
residents of regional centres for people with developmental disabilities.  Huronia provided supports, services and 
residential care to people with developmental disabilities until it closed in 2009.  The $35 million settlement will 
provide compensation to those people who were residents of Huronia between 1945 – 2009 and suffered harm.  See 
online:<http://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2013/12/settlement-reached-in-huronia-class-action-lawsuit.html>.   Rideau 
Regional Centre closed in 2009 and Southwestern Regional Centre closed in 2008.  The combined value of the 
Rideau Regional Centre and Southwestern Regional Centre settlements is $32.7 million.  
Online:<http://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2014/02/settlements-reached-in-rideau-and-southwestern-regional-centres-
class-actions.html>.  See also Ontario Ombudsman, Nowhere to Turn: Investigation into the Province’s Services for 
Adults with Developmental Disabilities Who Are in Crisis Situations (Toronto: Ontario Ombudsman, 2016). 
8 For example, see Law Commission of Ontario, The Law as it Affects Persons with Disabilities: Consultation Paper 
(Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2011). 
9 Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, “Contingent Participation and Coercive Care” in Bernadette McSherry & 
Ian Freckelton, eds, Coercive Care: Rights, Law and Policy (New York: Routledge, 2013) 31 at 40. 
10 For example, see Dianne Pothier, “Equality as a Comparative Concept: Mirror Mirror on the Wall, What’s the 
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experiences of persons with disabilities in the design of programs11 or drafting of legislation12, 
breach of confidentiality and disclosure of personal health information,13 and involuntary 
treatment and substitute decision-making.14   
To consider how persons with disabilities will be affected by changes to legislation and 
governance, their differences, needs and diversity must be purposively addressed.  Even changes 
to legislation and governance that appear to be applicable to everyone may have a 
disproportionately negative impact on persons with disabilities or exclude them from the full 
enjoyment of the changes through which benefits are supposed to materialize.  Further, without 
understanding why decisions were made without the “disability lens” in the first place, the 
danger is that the differences posed by disability will continue to be unaccounted for or 
overlooked.   To put it differently, persons with disabilities could simply be ignored.  The 
potential consequences of such invisibility mean persons with disabilities continue to be 
excluded from full political, social and economic participation – despite the formal equality 
guarantee under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.15 David Lepofsky 
and Randal Graham express this succinctly: “Those who design, draft, or implement legislation 
have a fundamental duty to ensure that persons with disabilities can fully participate in and enjoy 
the rights, duties, and benefits that the legislation creates.”16  
1.2 Relevance, contributions and the expected benefits   
Before explaining the relevance of this case study, it is important to situate myself in 
relation to this research. Prior to my doctoral work, I have been (and still am) a “policy wonk” 
 
Fairest of Them All?’ (2006) 2 SCLR 135. 
11Law Commission of Ontario, The Law as it Affects Persons with Disabilities: Consultation Paper (Toronto: Law 
Commission of Ontario, 2011) at 8.  
12M David Lepofsky & Randal N M Graham, “Universal Design in Legislation: Eliminating Barriers for People with 
Disabilities” (2009) 30:2 Statute Law Rev 97. 
13 Catherine Frazee, Joan Gilmour & Roxanne Mykitiuk “Now You See Her, Now You Don't: How Law Shapes 
Disabled Women's Experience of Exposure, Surveillance, and Assessment in the Clinical Encounter” in Dianne 
Pothier & Richard Devlin eds, Critical Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy and Law 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 223. 
14 For example, see Marcia Rioux, Joan Gilmour & Natalia Angel-Cabo, “Negotiated Capacity: Legally Constructed 
Entitlement and Protection” in Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton, eds, Coercive Care: Rights, Law and Policy 
(New York: Rouledge, 2013) 51. C Tess Sheldon, Karen R Spector & Mercedes Perez, “Re-Centering Equality: The 
Interplay Between Sections 7 and 15 of the Charter in Challenges to Psychiatric Detention” (2016) 35 NJCL 193. 
15 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11. 
16 Lepofsky & Graham, supra note 12 at 98. 
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for many years. I am part of a policy generation that has lived through the upheavals brought on 
by New Public Management and other “flavour of the month” public management techniques. 
Despite changes in techniques, paradigms, and people, a common thread across time and subject 
matters is the pervasiveness of regulation. Regulation – especially in the form of black letter law 
– remains an important tool in the policy toolbox and I have attempted to use it to solve many 
pressing (and not so pressing) public policy problems. Over the years, I have contemplated why 
we choose to regulate certain behaviours and not others and the implications of such choices. 
Although this dissertation is by no means a much longer version of my day job, it is reflective of 
my own experiences in encountering regulation in Ontario. I also acknowledge that I am part of 
the governmental machinery that contributes directly or indirectly to the regulatory picture that I 
am trying to present here. As such, I do not claim to be neutral in the sense of not having a 
vested interest in the status quo or being free from any preconceived notions about what the most 
pressing public policy problems are. Rather, I draw upon my own observations, unanswered 
questions, conflicting opinions and even hunches developed through many different projects over 
the years to inform my research methodology and interpretation of research findings. 
One of the questions that has always troubled me is how do we know the effect of a new 
or amended regulation a priori. Most certainly, one could do jurisdictional research, develop 
sophisticated economic models, or simply ask those who will be affected by the proposed 
regulation. The latter is rather tricky. We do not always know how to identify correctly who will 
be affected, how and when. This problem can be partially solved if there are well-positioned 
stakeholders who would not hesitate to share their thoughts about a proposed initiative. 
However, I have come to realize that the bigger problem is that the impact of law is mediated by 
social locations such disability, gender, age, immigration status and race and we do not pay 
enough attention to how the law affects different people differently in order to design regulation 
that is more sensitive to the intersection of privileges and disadvantages.  We may not even know 
the impact ex-poste because the most marginalized groups are least likely to be well-represented 
– legally and politically – so that their concerns can be heard. Accordingly, the promise and 
limitations of regulation (by way of law) as a means of addressing public policy problems are not 
really well understood from a practical perspective – until it is too late. A case in point is the 
various seemingly benevolent social policies tailored for disabled people, such as 
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institutionalization of people with intellectual disabilities.17 It was this sense of a real world 
puzzle that motivated me to undertake this project. This comprehensive study of the new legal 
framework for the LTC sector will be relevant to policy makers, advocacy groups, industry 
associations and unions. The research findings will generate benefits in three main areas.                            
First, this dissertation aims to advance an understanding of how regulation and 
governance of a public benefit scheme affect its beneficiaries as well as others involved, such as 
the workers who implement the scheme and the families and friends of the beneficiaries of the 
scheme. As well, in addition to addressing questions of entitlement (such as who is entitled to 
which benefits for what duration), regulation and governance also directly construct other 
aspects of a benefit scheme, such as the responsibilities and rights of the state and service 
providers. I attend to other aspects of a public benefit scheme that have received less attention in 
the disability and the law literature and I borrow from the regulation and governance literature, 
which includes debates about legally mandated participatory mechanisms as well as compliance 
and enforcement. The research aims to be meaningful to the users of public benefit schemes that 
are intended to mitigate the effects of disability in a society where the perception of whether 
disabled people are “deserving”18 of state support continues to evolve. 
Next, this research will be also valuable in instrumental terms as the case study includes 
examples of regulatory tools commonly used, such as increasing transparency, promoting 
capacity for users / consumers seeking redress, and more generally clarifying accountability 
relationships and responsibilities.19 As regulation is used increasingly to pursue welfare goals,20 
there is a need to examine whether such techniques have anything to offer contemporary public 
benefit schemes. I agree with Cass Sunstein that the experience of the regulatory state includes 
 
17 Dorothy M Griffiths, Frances Owen & Rosemary A Condillac, eds, A Difficult Dream: Ending Institutionalization 
for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities with Complex Needs (Kingston, New York: National Association for the 
Dually Diagnosed, 2016); Kelley Johnson & Rannveig Traustadottir, Deinstitutionalization and People with 
Intellectual Disabilities: In and Out of Institutions (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2005); Karen Watchman, 
“The Intersectionality of Intellectual Disability and Ageing” in Sue Westwood, ed, Ageing, Diversity and Equality: 
Social Justice Perspectives (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019) 245; Harvey G Simmons, From 
Asylum to Welfare: The Evolution of Mental Retardation Policy in Ontario from 1831 to 1980 (Toronto: National 
Institute on Mental Retardation, 1982). 
18 Bill Hughes, “Disabled People as Counterfeit Citizens: The Politics of Resentment Past and Present” (2015) 30:7 
Disability & Society 991. 
19 Colin Scott, “From Welfare State to Regulatory State: Meta-Regulation and Beyond” (2014) 11 University of 
Tokyo Journal of Law and Politics 159. 
20 David Levi-Faur, “The Welfare State: A Regulatory Perspective” (2014) 92:3 Public Administration 599. 
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many self-defeating regulatory strategies, which are “strategies that achieve an end precisely 
opposite to the one intended, or to the only public-regarding justification that can be brought 
forward in their support.”21 Problems created by either government regulation or private markets 
are too particular and too dependent on the context of the problems they purport to solve. It is far 
more helpful to rely on particularized understandings of how both markets and regulation tend to 
break down in proposing reforms for the regulatory state.22 This dissertation will be of particular 
interest to those who are interested in both normative and empirical questions about regulation. 
Public administrators, poverty law lawyers, and advocacy groups will find the discussion about 
the tools used in governing the LTC sector to be relevant to other public benefit schemes.     
Finally, this dissertation helps to illuminate the range of Canada’s policy responses to an 
aging population.  Aging is both a biological and a socio-cultural process, primarily measured in 
chronological years and coupled with age-based expectations.23  It is a “problem” because of the 
extensive health care (and other) resources required by older adults.24 Similar to other OECD 
countries, Canada is aging25 and there is no shortage of responses to that from governments, 
think tanks, academics and so forth.  Public and media commentary tends to rely on the imagery 
of “silver tsunami” to convey the challenges related to an aging population.26 But scholars have 
challenged alarmist predictions about the growth and potential implications of population aging. 
Nonetheless, there is also agreement that population aging will require increased government 
spending, especially in such policy fields as health care, home care and public pensions.27  For 
the group of older adults who are perceived to be located outside of the “successful aging” 
 
21 Cass Sunstein, “Paradoxes of the Regulatory State” (1990) 57 U Chi L Rev 407 at 407. 
22 Ibid at 441. 
23 Amanda Grenier, Meredith Griffin & Colleen McGrath, “Aging and Disability: The Paradoxical Positions of the 
Chronological Life Course” (2016) 12:2–3 Review of Disability Studies: An International Journal 11 at 12–13. For a 
discussion on attempts to identify a demographic marker as the basis for a socially and legally recognizable status of 
old age, see Margaret Isabel Hall, “Old Age (or, Do We Need a Critical Theory of Law and Aging) Special Topic: 
Aging: Discussion Piece” (2014) 35 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 1. 
24 For example see Katie Aubrecht & Tamara Krawchenko, “Disability & Aging: International Perspective” (2016) 
12:2–3 Review of Disability Studies: An International Journal 1. 
25 Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report (Senior Women) (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada, 2016). 
26 Kenneth Kernaghan, “Serving Seniors: Innovation and Public Sector Service Delivery” (2015) 20:1 The 
Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal Article 3. 
27 Also for a discussion on funding for LTC (in community and institution) see Sharon Vanin & Owen Adams, 
“Funding Long-Term Care In Canada: Issues and Options” (2016) 15:4 HealthcarePapers 7; Sharon Vanin & Owen 
Adams, “It’s Time for a National Conversation about Long-Term Care Funding” (2016) 15:4 HealthcarePapers 55; 
Kernaghan, supra note 26.  
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paradigm, “which emphasizes health and functionality, absence of diseases and disability, and 
active engagement”,28 their apparent dependency is constantly being scrutinized and measured in 
financial terms. Gender analysis, Charmaine Spencer and Ann Soden argue, needs to consider 
the short and long-term impact of policies and trends across the lifespan, the cumulative impact 
of discrete government policies, as well as the differential impact of policies on older couples 
and unattached older persons.29 In light of the reality that most older adults, as well as those who 
care for them, are women, it is critical that scholars examine and expose the legal frameworks 
that define the personal, health, and income security of older adults. Law reform must take 
account of this reality and ensure that such “reform” does not exacerbate existing discrimination 
against and injustice towards older as well as younger women.30 As Spencer and Soden observe, 
there is strong need for critical legal analysis in the areas of law affecting older adults since the 
law is rarely neutral or objective in its application to the lives of older adults. Analysis will need 
to examine the intersection of aging, gender, ability, race and other statuses in the context of 
social policy and law.31 
This dissertation contributes to a broader debate about our collective responsibilities to 
those who require more resources for a variety of reasons, many of them older women with 
disabilities and diagnoses of serious illnesses. LTC is perceived to be a resource-intensive type 
of care and is often positioned as a last resort for those who could not remain in the community. 
By taking a critical look at LTC as an example of a policy response related to aging, this 
dissertation will have practical value to those who are interested in using law to recognize and 
respond to differences associated with (though not exclusively attributed to) aging.32           
1.3 Hypothesis 
The changes to regulation and governance of LTC homes in Ontario made between 2004 
and 2018 – if properly understood and implemented – are significant for persons with 
 
28 Hailee M Gibbons, “Compulsory Youthfulness: Intersections of Ableism and Ageism in ‘Successful Aging’ 
Discourses” (2016) 12:2–3 Review of Disability Studies: An International Journal 70. 
29 Charmaine Spencer & Ann Soden, “A Softly Greying Nation: Law, Ageing and Policy in Canada” (2007) 2 J Int’l 
Aging L & Pol’y 1 at 6. 
30 A Kimberley Dayton, “Chapter 4 A Feminist Approach to Elder Law” in Israel Doron, ed, Theories on Law and 
Aging: The Jurisprudence of Elder Law (Berlin: Springer, 2009) 45. 
31 Spencer & Soden, supra note 29 at 29. 
32For example see  Hall, supra note 23. 
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disabilities.   The substantive changes can be explained as fragmented efforts to improve the 
safety, physical survival and security of individual residents, premised on the medical model of 
disability and presumed gender neutrality.  Part of my hypothesis is that these changes are also 
about strengthening or creating additional processes and procedures for participants – homes, 
residents, families, advocacy groups, industry organizations and government - to problem-solve 
challenges in the sector.  I contend that while these procedures may not fundamentally improve 
the provisions of care, they may present themselves as opportunities for residents with 
disabilities to make claims on the larger society for inclusion and participation in making 
decisions about regulatory regimes or public benefit schemes.   However, these processes and 
procedures are more likely to create an appearance of legitimacy of decisions – often made 
without adequate consideration of gendered disability. The result is a gap between the promise of 
the law and the reality of those who cannot enjoy its protections and benefits unless the 
appropriate supports are put in place. 
1.4 Scope of the dissertation  
Before I expand on how this dissertation will proceed, I should clarify the scope of this 
project. The boundary of what constitutes “regulation and governance” is difficult to pin down as 
many scholarly definitions and categorizations exist. This project concerns the tangible 
instruments through which the provincial government governs and regulates the LTC sector. 
Obviously, law found in statutes and in judicial decisions is an important instrument.  But this is 
still too broad for my project given length limitations. I restrict my research to statutes enacted 
by the province and related soft law. With respect to the scope of judicial decisions, this research 
project does not include criminal law judicial decisions (such as homicide, murder, assault and 
sexual assault), private law judicial decisions (such as tort and contract) related to care, and 
decisions of regulatory colleges.  
1.5 Roadmap of the dissertation  
In Chapter 2, I engage the literature on regulation and governance as well as disability 
studies to set out the key definitions used in this dissertation. The chapter then engages the 
powerful criticisms of “care” in order to illustrate tensions inherent in LTC from a disability 
perspective. I make the case for advancing our understanding of caring relationships in the LTC 
context as a way to move away from dichotomies such as helper / helped. Caring relationships 
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are shaped by, among other political and market forces, the legal and administrative structure of 
a benefit scheme or a regulatory regime. The changes to regulation and governance of LTC 
homes in Ontario can be accounted for by the New Governance literature. The methodology 
chapter (Chapter 3) will outline the research methods used: document review, legal analysis and 
key informant interviews.  
Then I move on to the empirical chapters of this dissertation. Chapter 4 provides the 
background and context of analysis including the themes in LTC research grounded in the 
feminist political economy tradition. These themes provide constructive criticisms of LTC as 
currently conceived and suggest gaps in current research. The next four chapters present a 
comparison of the new and previous regimes in order to identify the recent changes to the 
regulation and governance of LTC in Ontario between 2004 and 2018: Chapter 5 explores what 
care means in LTC and how the law constructs care; Chapter 6 is devoted to describing how the 
notion of safety and security of the person is reflected in the regulatory changes; Chapter 7 
interrogates participation and inclusion of residents and families in LTC homes; and Chapter 8 
turns to the broader structural issues of the LTC sector and how law is implicated in those 
changes.  In Chapter 9, I contend that many of the changes actually have taken into account 
criticisms of care, including the harm that can result from care. The main problem, I argue, is 
that the legal mechanisms are designed without careful consideration of how the actual 
circumstances of residents, connected to the intermeshing of disability, gender and age, will 
impact their proper implementation. The result is that some LTC applicants and residents cannot 
benefit from the protections offered by law. I demonstrate that the effectiveness of legally-
enabled participation – for residents as well as families - is contingent upon having the necessary 
supports in place. The supports must go beyond reasonable accommodation of the physical 
impairments of residents. The necessary supports must also respect the autonomy of residents 
and need to be understood within the context of relationships in a home.  Chapter 9 ends with a 
summary of the theoretical contributions of this dissertation. The final chapter summarizes the 
limitations of the research – doctrinal and methodological – and proposes directions for future 
research.   
11 
2 Literature Review: Theorizing the Regulation and Provision of Care    
2.1 Introduction 
The scholarly debates outlined in this chapter are intended to reflect the dual purposes of 
the contemporary LTC home program in Ontario.  My starting point is that the program is a 
public benefit scheme as well as a regulatory regime.  It is a public benefit scheme in that it 
confers rights, benefits and entitlements to residents according to a set of criteria in law.  It is a 
regulatory regime, in that it also prescribes requirements and standards for those involved in the 
provision of care and treatment in LTC homes.  The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to 
identify the definitional issues and to situate my research in relation to existing scholarly debates. 
This chapter engages debates in the regulation and governance literature and disability 
studies and it explains how these two bodies of work are brought together. The first section 
presents key definitions and assumptions used in this dissertation. In the second section, I draw 
on the criticisms of the concept of care to illustrate the theoretical considerations about studying 
LTC from a disability perspective. It is tempting to concede that the concept of “care” cannot be 
rescued from the legacy of institutionalization and the harmful impact of the “caring for” 
attitude. However, I contend that an unequivocal rejection of the concept of care is not necessary. 
In fact, an exploration of the competing understandings of “care” in disability studies and care 
research respectively can provide the basis for a richer and more comprehensive account of care 
in LTC. Indeed, caring relationships can be the conceptual bridge between disability studies and 
care research. I make the case for advancing our understanding of caring relationships in the 
LTC context as a way to move away from dichotomies such as helper / helped.33 The focus of 
my research is on the law and caring relationships. Caring relationships are shaped by, among 
other political and market forces, the legal and administrative structures of a benefit scheme or a 
regulatory regime. To evaluate the changes to regulation and governance of LTC homes 
introduced between 2004 and 2018 in Ontario, I attend to aspects of the New Governance 
literature in an attempt to tease out the themes of negotiating tensions and contradictions in LTC 
and inclusion and meaningful participation opportunities for persons with disabilities.  
 
33 I thank Linda Steele for a discussion about how to move away from dichotomies such as “offender/victim” and 
“helper/helped”.   
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The conceptualization of care that I offer here can be summarized as follows. First, care 
is grounded in caring relationships and is fundamentally important for human survival; that care 
embodies intermingled needs and interests of all involved in caring relationships but must also 
recognize the actual and potentials for harm in caring. Second, caring relationships are 
constructed by law in many different ways and the promotion of caring relationships is 
simultaneously limited by current legal tools such as “rights”. Third, caring relationships are 
shaped by the administrative processes and legal structures of public benefit schemes and 
regulatory regimes, many of which are indicative of the role of the state in supporting or 
neglecting care regardless of the setting in which care occurs.             
The themes discussed in this chapter contribute to the unpacking of the complexity of 
tensions inherent in a legislative scheme that is closely connected to disability, gender and age. 
This discussion provides a foundation for describing and evaluating the changes in the regulation 
and governance of LTC. I will return to theoretical debates more specifically on LTC in Chapter 
4 “Background” where I will draw on the themes in the feminist political economy literature.  
2.2 Definitions of key terms and assumptions used in this 
dissertation  
In this section, I will present the definitions and assumptions used in this dissertation. I 
will begin with key concepts used in the regulation literature to illustrate the debate about the 
tendency to deploy and privilege regulation. Then I will examine some of the concepts used in 
the disability studies literature that will guide my understanding of the case study (i.e., LTC in 
Ontario).  Together the definitions in both fields provide a language to engage the theoretical 
debates and later the case study. 
2.2.1 Governance through regulation 
This dissertation concerns a case study that illustrates changes to “regulation” and 
“governance”. The concepts of “regulation” and “governance” are both contested and used 
inconsistently across a broad range of academic disciplines as well as within policy / political 
discourses.  This brief section does not intend to match the breadth and depth of debates about 
definitions of these concepts in academic writings; rather, it aims to present my working 
definitions in order to illustrate the study focus of my research question.   
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2.2.1.1 The rise of the regulatory state  
In this research project, the gradual expansion of the reach of regulation (especially in the 
form of law) is conceived as part of larger phenomenon – the rise of the regulatory state. The 
most obvious starting point for this discussion is the emergence of two modes of governance: the 
“old” post-war welfare state, distinguished from the regulatory state, which is something 
“new”34. Here the term ‘welfare state’ refers to an ideal - or at least acceptable - political and 
social compromise by proponents of egalitarian social policies. The term welfare state is used as 
an indication of the growth of the functions and capacities of the state within the social policy 
realm.35 The welfare state is frequently associated with fiscal transfer, such as taxation and 
spending, as its choice of instrument.36 More recently, one could speak of the rise of the 
regulatory state,37 which is identified with the “application of informal and formal bureaucratic 
rule making, rule monitoring, and rule enforcement.”38 The rise of regulation and the regulatory 
state reflects the tendency to deploy and privilege regulation. In a nutshell, the regulatory state is 
a state that specializes in control via rules (rather than only in taxation and service provision).39   
David Levi-Faur’s view is that the regulatory state and the welfare state can coexist, and 
that the regulatory state may strengthen the welfare state.40 To be certain, Levi-Faur is not 
suggesting that coexistence is necessarily always more progressive, egalitarian, or welfare 
maximizing. In fact, the most useful insight for this case study is his characterization of the 
choice between social regulation and social expenditures. By presenting nine different possible 
combinations of social regulation and fiscal expenditures using examples of  rent control, 
parental leave and tax expenditures, Levi-Faur argues that the state can retrench, stagnate, and 
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expand with the retrenchment, stagnation, and expansion of each of the instruments (i.e., 
regulation and fiscal transfers) independently.41  Accordingly, it makes more sense to describe 
welfare as a desired aim and regulation as an instrument. They should be brought together, not as 
a trade-off but as mutually constitutive.42 As such, the application of regulatory instruments and 
fiscal transfers are political options rather than guarantees of a certain policy outcome.43  Levi-
Faur invites us to “identify the various ways in which fiscal and regulatory instruments are used 
and mixed in the design of a welfare regime”.44 
The notion of governance here is understood as “the changing boundaries between the 
public, private and voluntary sectors, and the changing role of the state”45, as articulated by Rod 
Rhodes.  To be certain, this understanding of governance appears to be transitional, contingent 
and contentious in nature.46  This may be attributed to Peer Zumbansen’s observation that 
governance illustrates the tension between state and non-state based conceptualization of 
political and social order.47  In law, references to “governance” point to the “transformational 
character of existing institutional frameworks of order.”48  Further, in the public law context, 
governance “carries the burden of being the construction site for an encompassing 
reconsideration of the particular “public” nature of legislation, administration and 
adjudication.”49  “Public governance” is the manner, method, or system by which a particular 
society is steered or directed. Although public governance generally gives government a 
privileged role, this does not mean that government is the only institution steering or directing 
society.50 
The “relative openness of the concept”51 of governance debate raises the question of 
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whether the concepts of regulation and governance can be used interchangeably.  I adopt Julia 
Black’s position that the concept of “regulation” is distinct from the governance debate.52   Black 
reflects on the ever-expanding nature of “regulation”53 and argues that a more fruitful task of the 
concept of “regulation” is to enable us “to see control, power, and ordering in unsuspected 
places, and as affected by unsuspected actors.”54  Accordingly, Black’s articulation of the 
concept of regulation puts an emphasis on what the concept is intended to do: “regulation is a 
process involving the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to 
defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly defined outcome or 
outcomes.”55  In sum, regulation is defined as an instrument of control.56 An important point 
about this definition is that the activity of regulation (i.e., activity of attempting to control) can 
be de-coupled from the activities of governmental actors.57  The decoupling of regulation from 
governmental actors is tied to the use of the concept of de-centring.  While it encompasses many 
notions, de-centring is often used to express the observation that governments do not, and the 
proposition that they should not, have a monopoly over regulation.58 Rather, regulation is 
occurring within and between other social actors such as associations and professional 
organizations – without the government's involvement or indeed formal approval.59  While there 
are other uses of the concept of de-centring,60 this use is particularly relevant to my research 
question because regulation in the health care sector often involves other non-governmental 
actors with formal legal authority, such as regulatory colleges61 as well as those without formal 
legal authority, such as professional associations.  
Another point about regulation that is relevant for this research is that regulation should 
not be treated as an undifferentiated whole and can be distinguished according to function.62  The 
inquiry into regulatory functions is a normative inquiry into “what sort of problem the statute is 
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most sensibly understood as addressing, and how the problem can most sensibly be resolved”.63  
Sunstein proposes that statutes may be categorized as responses to the following: market failures, 
public-interested redistribution, collective desires and aspirations, diverse expectations and 
preference formations, social subordination, endogenous preferences, the problem of 
irreversibility, and finally interest group transfers and rent-seeking.64   The “problem-solving” 
nature of regulatory inquiry points to the possibility of multiple functions that any regulation 
may serve.  This informs how I interpret the regulatory changes in my case study.      
Finally, I understand regulation in a substantive sense,65 and therefore, adopt the position 
that the content of regulation has distributive and redistributive implications.66  More 
specifically, regulation is not necessarily regressive nor the opposite of egalitarian: it all depends 
on how, when and to what end a regulation is put to use.67  Following this line of reasoning, 
scholars must identify “the ways in which regulatory solutions that were intended to promote 
social justice are, in fact, experienced in people’s lives as new sources of unequal and unjust 
power and difference.”68 This invites us to study empirically how regulatory effects occur and 
why they succeed or fail.  As such, any endorsement or defense of government regulation should 
be balanced with a discussion of the instances in which regulation has failed.69  
2.2.1.2 Who regulates and how? 
A good starting point is to identify the conventional categories of regulation as 
instrument. At one end of the spectrum is the so-called “command and control” regulation, which 
is also known as “direct regulation”. Behaviours expected of regulated entities can be specified 
with considerable clarity, making it relatively straightforward to identify breaches of legal 
standard and to enforce the law in the event of a breach. However, command-and-control 
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regulation has also been criticized as being rigid, unresponsive and prescriptive.70 At the other 
end of spectrum is self-regulation, where regulated entities themselves are responsible for 
developing and implementing the regulatory regime.71 It is argued that self-regulation offers a 
number of strengths: greater speed, sensitivity to market circumstances, efficiency, and less 
government intervention. However, self-regulation may operate in service of the private interests 
of those who develop and implement it.72 Between these two extremes, there are a variety of 
ways to account for how regulatory instruments are understood and used.  Three concepts are 
particularly useful for my research: co-regulation, risk-based regulation and social regulation.      
Co-regulation        
The concept of co-regulation eloquently captures the phenomenon that numerous actors 
are involved in regulation, not just the government. According to Eric Windholz, co-regulation is 
situated between the extremes of government regulation and self-regulation and promises the 
best of the two extremes, while minimizing the disadvantages of each.73 Co-regulation exists 
where government and regulated entities co-operate in the development and implementation of 
the regulatory regime.74 Regulatory capture occurs when regulatory officials who are responsible 
for promoting collective welfare develop such close relationships with regulated entities that they 
promote the interests of this group instead of the public interest of the broader community.75 The 
promise of co-regulation is that regulation is better targeted, more flexible, less burdensome and 
more effective than government regulation, but has the benefit of government involvement, 
which protects against the system being captured, compromised or manipulated. To be effective, 
co-regulation requires regulated entities to take responsibility for their own performance, and 
government to actively monitor how they discharge those responsibilities.76 Four common 
models of co-regulation – facilitated co-regulation, devolved co-regulation, delegated co-
regulation and enforced co-regulation – are used to illustrate the level of government 
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involvement.  The scope of co-operation may vary as long as the regulatory arrangements are 
grounded in co-operative techniques and the legitimacy of the regime rests partly on public-
private cooperation.77  
Risk-based regulation  
Listing which parties are involved in regulation tells us little about how regulation occurs. 
There is a rich literature on regulatory approaches and here I will just refer to one that is relevant 
to the case study. Risk, as Michael Moran puts it, has increasingly come to assume a central 
place in the analysis of the regulatory state.78 In particular, a common account of what is shaping 
the regulatory state is that “risk and its management are critical social processes determining 
both the generation of regulatory failures and expansion of regulatory spheres.”79 The rise of 
risk-based regulation is part of broader efforts to make regulations more rational, analytical and 
orderly.80 Scholars such as Eric Windolz, Julia Black, Martin Lodge, Paul Almond and Mike 
Esbester have traced how risk-based regulation  is becoming a familiar regulatory strategy across 
a wide range of areas – from occupational health and safety to financial management – across the 
globe. Generally, systematic risk management has come to be used as a means of ensuring 
sustainable “good” governance.81  “Risk”, understood as the likelihood and seriousness of a 
particular harm, guides decisions about resource-allocation.82 The core principle of risk-based 
regulation is deceptively simple: regulators should focus their efforts on the most serious risks 
that they face in achieving their objectives.”83  Such an approach admits to the existence of 
issues that are deemed to be low-risk i.e., issues that the regulator has chosen not to address.84 
Voluntary and self-regulatory methods are used if there is sufficient capacity and motivation to 
suggest that acceptable levels of compliance can be sustained via less intrusive means than state-
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led inspection. But identification, selection and prioritization of risks inevitably involve 
normative and political choices.85 
Social regulation 
Finally, the term “social regulation” is also relevant to this project.  Traditionally, 
“social” and “economic” regulation have been conceptualized as contrasting policy pairs: 
economic regulation is designed to improve economic and market efficiency, while social 
regulation is designed to produce socially desirable outcomes either by correcting for the 
damaging effects of economic activity or by producing outcomes different to and better than 
those produced by efficiently operating markets.86  However, the distinction between social 
regulation and economic regulation tends to be rigid, as increasingly, governments are using 
regulation to deliver social goals traditionally delivered through direct government action and 
using economically-based regulatory techniques to define and solve social problems.87 Eric 
Windholz and Graeme Hodge are correct to point out that regulation is underpinned by a mix of 
interconnected and interdependent social and economic values. The distinction between social 
and economic regulation resides in the primacy of the values each is designed to advance while 
recognizing the presence of secondary values in defining the boundaries and providing the 
foundations for the stability and legitimacy of the regulatory regime.88 For this reason, it is 
important that regulators acknowledge and substantively address the implicit role that 
“supporting values” play in their work.89  For social policy such as LTC, regulators are also 
concerned about values such as efficiency and competition.  I suggest that we need to go beyond 
the social values that regulators purport to support and unpack the secondary values.  Equally 
important, it should be no surprise that economic regulation such as those related to corporate 
governance, securities law, and competition law affect the delivery of social policies.   
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Law is central to regulation and governance.90 As Almond and Esbester explain: “The 
regulation of conduct via law is a key mechanism through which broader social meanings are 
negotiated and expressed.”91 To understand the law’s role in regulation and governance, I pay 
attention to law’s content as well as different forms of law.92 In this dissertation, I focus on what 
law does rather than what it is in some philosophical sense. The definition of law is as follows: 
“law is a system of rules to govern behavior enforced through institutions created for that 
purpose.”93 In other words, this definition is instrumental in nature.  One could speak of the 
functional and expressive roles of law. With respect to the functional role, the law shapes 
behavior, facilitates certain arrangements or functions, and adjudicates disputes. The law’s 
expressive role refers to how the law discharges these functions and how it gives expression to 
important constitutional, democratic, ethical and shared societal values.94   
One such value expressed in law is equality. The Supreme Court of Canada has noted that 
the equality guarantee is “perhaps the Charter’s most conceptually difficult provision.”95 Legal 
scholars have written extensively on s.15 jurisprudence and attended to the challenges of 
equality-seeking or equity-seeking groups. The inclusion of disability as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination in the Charter was the result of a long political struggle of Canadian disability 
organizations and activists. To understand the legal, social and political significance of disability 
within the context of equality-seeking, I now turn to the theorization of disability.   
2.2.2 Disability: Beyond Barriers and Oppression   
The field of disability studies is now established to the extent that it is populated with 
many theoretical perspectives and subsequent self-criticisms of those perspectives. For many 
activists and scholars, the departure point of disability politics and critical analysis is the social 
model of disability, which is a model based on the radical social interpretation of disability 
introduced by disabled activists such as Paul Hunt and Vic Finkelstein in the 1970s.96  The 
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original model (which has been subject to revisions and contestation97) suggests that limitations 
on activity experienced by disabled people are social in origin (not attributable to impairment 
such as blindness or deafness) and constitute a form of oppression (i.e., disablism).  Thus, limits 
on activity imposed by disablism can be removed through social change.98  In other words, the 
social model stands for the proposition that structural barriers – physical as well as attitudinal – 
lie at the root of the marginalization of disabled people.99  For that reason, “the focus of analysis 
and action is on the state and ruling practices rather than solely or even primarily on individuals 
with disabilities and their families.”100 
But for the purpose of my case study, I take a different path to interpret the meaning and 
significance of disability. The main reason for not putting the social model at the centre of my 
theorization of LTC is that for many LTC residents, the health dimension of disability101 is an 
important part of their lived experience at their stage of the life course. As well, removal of 
barriers (especially those identified and emphasized by early activists) will not be enough for 
LTC residents in order to address their disadvantages and difficulties. Oppression is not the sole 
explanation for all of the policy, financial and legal choices that created the current legal 
framework for LTC. It is more fruitful to engage the subsequent debates in disability that do not 
focus exclusively on barriers and oppression. I will present some of the concepts used in the 
disability scholarship that will guide my understanding of the debates about “care” in LTC, 
which will be presented later in this chapter. The interactional model of disability as proposed by 
Tom Shakespeare is used in this dissertation.  I will make the case for connecting this approach 
with insights from feminist disability studies. This connection will lead us to the debate about 
care, which will be further linked to the feminist political economy literature (see chapter 4). 
Earlier scholars such as Jenny Morris, Adrienne Asch and Michele Fine brought forward some of 
the issues that most affected disabled women who were often at a relative disadvantage to both 
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disabled men and non-disabled women, and that their specific issues and experiences remained 
invisible. These scholars direct our attention to the fact that historically, disabled women have 
had difficulty having their points of view acknowledged – both in the mainstream feminist 
movement and in the disabled people’s movement.102      
2.2.2.1 Impairment, disability and impairment effects  
For disability activists and scholars, the distinction between impairment and disability has 
been crucial in the debate about transforming disabilities as private problems to public issues.103 
The term impairment refers to those variations in body and mind that biomedicine has classified 
as degrees of abnormality, whether life-long or acquired.104  It follows that impairment is not the 
same as disability. For Carol Thomas, this distinction means “disability is first and foremost 
about the disadvantaged social status and inequitable life opportunities experienced by people 
whose bodies and minds are designated impaired by representatives of scientific medicine and 
other professions.”105 This definition reveals a key premise in the social model: disability is 
oppression.106 Although Shakespeare does not agree that disability is oppression, he accepts the 
contextual nature of impairment. The key point is that impairments are never experienced 
abstractly; it is the social context - particular environments, value systems, and social relations - 
that can turn impairment into disadvantage.107 I will return to the definition of disability later. 
An important insight for my case study is the recognition that impairments often 
contribute to the disadvantage and difficulties experienced by persons with disabilities.108 The 
significance of the personal and the experiential is a major contribution of Thomas. In particular, 
Thomas coins the term impairment effect to illustrate manifestation of impairment and 
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embodiment: “the direct and unavoidable impacts that 'impairments' (physical, sensory, 
intellectual, emotional) have on individuals' embodied functioning in the social world. 
Impairments and impairment effects are always bio-social and culturally constructed in 
character, and may occur at any stage in the life course.”109 She remarks that it is a hopeless 
quest to attempt to eclipse impairment effects by arguing that all restrictions of activity 
associated with being impaired have 'nothing to do with the body'.110  However, she cautions not 
to mistake impairment effects for what are, in fact, disabilities.111 Recognition of impairment and 
impairment effect has implications for theorizing supports and accommodations for disabled 
people. Although the provision of social support may mitigate the effects of many disabilities, it 
is impossible to completely eradicate the impact of serious disabilities, whatever services are 
provided.112  Accordingly, the disability phenomenon cannot simply be reduced to barriers and 
oppression.113  Furthermore, it is argued that it is often impossible to separate the impact of 
physical or mental impairments from the impact of disabilities caused by social barriers in real 
life.114 Their impairments mean disabled people are to some extent, always already 
disadvantaged.115 This poses a challenge for any theory of citizenship if the disadvantages of 
disabled people are to be removed at the structural level in order to achieve their full inclusion in 
all realms of our society.     
2.2.2.2 Citizenship, Equality and Disablism  
The notion of ‘citizenship’ or ‘citizen’ is frequently invoked in studies about public 
policy issues relevant to disabled people to illustrate how exclusion and the quest for inclusion in 
the social, economic and political realms of our society are constructed.116 My research builds on 
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Michael Prince’s insights into the concepts of citizenship, inclusion and participation, as 
explained in Absent Citizens: Disability Politics and Policy in Canada.  By way of background, 
citizenship is a leading discourse and a central target of policy reform in contemporary disability 
politics. Disability groups seek to achieve equality of status through full citizenship as well as to 
alter the language of the social policy community and wider society.117 Framing disability in 
terms of citizenship is intended to accomplish the following: 
It offers a normative benchmark for evaluating existing services and benefits in terms of 
enabling or restricting the dignity and self-determination of persons with disabilities, and 
thus, by extension, advocating for reforms. It places responsibility on governments to 
respond to claims for equal status in the democratic community by committing public 
resources for promoting and protecting human rights. It argues for consulting with 
persons with disabilities as citizens on a host of policy areas, and for supporting a vibrant 
network of disability organizations at the national and local levels. It can draw these 
issues to the attention of wider publics and connect them to other equality seeking 
groups.118 
Within Canadian disability policy and politics, the following elements of citizenship are 
particularly significant: the discourse of citizenship; legal and equality rights; democratic and 
political rights; fiscal and social entitlements; and economic integration.119  Of particular interest 
to this project are legal rights, which are the first generation of citizenship rights in that they 
were the initial ones enacted by governments.120 In law, substantive equality (as opposed to 
formal equality) continues to be the guarantee under s.15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.121 According to Carissima Mathen, formal equality requires that similar cases be 
treated according to similar principles. The formal aspect of equality incorporates the rule of law 
requirement against arbitrary treatment and is paramount in a just society.122 In contrast, 
substantive equality requires taking into account of the social and economic context in which a 
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claim of inequality arises and the outcomes of a challenged law or action.123 Thus, the concept of 
substantive equality calls for tailoring of institutional supports and resources to the different 
needs of individuals and groups.124 Equality and inclusion are principles frequently invoked to 
legitimize claims for human rights, social acceptance, public participation, and an array of 
material benefits.125 Later in this chapter, I will expand on the meanings of participation and 
inclusion in the literature.   
The struggle for full citizenship can be linked to another concept deployed in disability 
studies: disablism. If disabled citizens remain outside of social, political and economic realms, it 
follows that an important line of inquiry in disability research is how restrictions or barriers are 
imposed on those categorized as disabled. The concept of disablism is closely associated with the 
relational nature of disability. The focus is on “the existence of relationships (at individual and 
institutional scales) between those designated normal and those designated disabled in any social 
arena. The non-disabled occupy positions of relative power and authority, for example within 
family settings, health and social services, workplaces, institutions of governance, or leisure 
arenas.”126 Accordingly, disablism refers to the social imposition of avoidable restrictions on the 
life activities, aspirations and psycho-emotional well-being of people categorised as 'impaired' by 
those deemed 'normal'. Disablism constitutes a form of social oppression in contemporary 
society - alongside sexism, racism, ageism, and homophobia.127 Finally, disablism operates in 
numerous ways in the realms of ‘‘the private’’ and ‘‘the personal’’, not just in the public sphere 
‘‘out there’’ in employment, education, housing, transport, and so on.128 
2.2.2.3 Interactional or multi-factorial approach to disability 
Disability’s significance is in the “interactions between bodies and their social and 
material environments”.129 Few scholars would reject the relational nature of disability but they 
differ in how to reconcile it with the social model. Shakespeare rejects the social model and 
instead looks for ways to overcome such a strong emphasis on the structural aspects of 
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restrictions and exclusions experienced by disabled people. An interactional approach (also 
known as a relational understanding of or multi-factorial approach) to disability acknowledges 
the importance of environments and contexts, including discrimination and prejudice, but does 
not simply define disability as the external disabling barriers or oppression as proposed by the 
social model.130 Shakespeare asserts that the experience of a disabled person results from the 
relationship between factors intrinsic to the individual (e.g., nature of impairment, personality, 
motivation, and attitudes) and extrinsic factors (e.g., environment, support system, and 
oppression). Contextual factors will also influence these intrinsic factors. He is careful to point 
out that contextual factors will influence these intrinsic factors: “impairment may be caused by 
poverty or war; personality may be caused by upbringing and culture etc”.131  One of the key 
strengths of the interactional model is that it highlights the various ways in which improvements 
to the situation of disabled people can be made, from medical interventions that restore 
functioning to anti-discrimination and attitudinal changes.132 The issue is which approach is the 
most appropriate or cost effective for different impairments or specific individuals.133 
The relevance of the interactional approach for understanding disability, gender and 
aging is that this approach pushes us to see that the term disability covers a multitude of 
conditions and states of being within those conditions.134 And this approach will be even more 
powerful if it is linked with insights from feminist disability studies135 (or feminist disability 
theory)136, as termed by Rosemarie Garland-Thompson. Sources of human variations include but 
are not limited to different impairments, gender, sexuality, social class and stages of life.137  The 
challenge is to account for the range and diversity of disability experience138 but at the same 
time, not to treat differences such as gender in simple, additive terms.139   Garland-Thompson 
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challenges us to scrutinize differences:  social labels such as “disabled” and “people of colour” 
capture the single, reductive, exclusionary social category that conflates and stigmatizes a range 
of differences.140  Thomas argues that the social forces and processes that construct and give 
shape to both gender and disability are closely intermeshed.141  She points out the complexity of 
“intermeshing”:  
Of course, when we add other dimensions of social exclusion and ‘‘difference’’ into the 
equation ‘‘race’’ and ethnicity, sexuality, age and class then the picture becomes more 
complex.  Disablism intersects with racism, homophobia, ageism and socio-economic 
stratification to generate intricate webs of disadvantage and exclusion. This gives rise to 
multiple and intertwined strands in our identities, and warns against bracketing disabled 
women or men into undifferentiated or fixed social groupings.142 
One way to probe “intermeshing” is through the issue of health / illnesses and aging. This 
is important because as we will see in Chapter 4, the acuity of LTC residents has increased year-
over-year and there is a need to theorize the health needs of residents using concepts in disability 
scholarship. This is challenging because the health needs of disabled people are rarely taken into 
consideration in disability studies.143  Failure to meet general or impairment-related health needs 
is itself a disabling barrier; enabling better access to healthcare will enable individuals with 
impairments to be less excluded and have better quality of life.144  One explanation of 
downplaying the health dimension of disability is that the field has tended to uncritically accept 
dualistic and opposing notions of health and illness.145 There are exceptions to this tendency; one 
promising trend is research on theorizing chronic illnesses as disability.146 But addressing the 
issue of health clearly requires careful consideration of gender and age. The conflation of 
impairment, age, and disability in late life occurs through attention to the biological realities of 
aging, and the socio-cultural narratives of decline and dependence.147  Such conflation is resisted 
by scholars such as Ruth Bartlett and colleagues. Bartlett et al take up the issue of health by 
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considering the gendered nature of lived experiences of dementia.148 Gender, as well as age, will 
inevitably be a factor in structuring the lives of those living with dementia.149  They argue that 
while there is increased critical attention on older women, gender is a neglected dimension in 
public discourse about dementia.150   They also emphasize that one social identity can intersect 
with another to create disadvantage.151  Their critical review of existing research shows that most 
of the existing work fails to address the marginalisation of people living with dementia.  
Questions about how to address inequalities and promote citizenship remain unanswered.152 
2.2.3 Summary  
The terms ‘regulation’ and ‘governance’ have become widely used in disciplines such as 
law and political science as well as in public discourses. From a legal research and analysis 
perspective, the concepts of regulation, governance, the regulatory state, co-regulation, risk-
based regulation and social regulation provide a solid foundation for describing the subjects of 
my case study. The concepts used in the disability scholarship - impairment, disability and 
impairment effects, citizen and disablism - will guide my understanding of the debates about 
“care” in LTC. The interactional model of disability provides the language to discuss a particular 
place where care happens in relation to impairment and other differences such as gender and age.  
Thinking through disability as a multi-factorial concept brings out important questions about 
impairment, gender and health. The debate about ‘care’ is illustrative of the tensions around 
these concepts. The debates about care offer valuable concepts relevant to explaining LTC within 
a broader dialogue between disability scholars and care scholars.   
2.3 Reconceptualization of care  
At first blush, incorporating a disability perspective into the study of LTC homes seems 
to be improbable. As Lisa Schur et al argue, one of the most blatant forms of social exclusion is 
to segregate disabled people by putting them into institutions such as asylums and nursing 
homes.153 Disability activists have argued that living in institutions threatens their fundamental 
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right to autonomy.154 As a concept, “care” is frequently positioned as a complex form of 
oppression155 and rejected by critical disability researchers.156   As well, institutionalization 
invokes painful memories and reminds us of the potential for abuse of people with disabilities.157   
Further, impairments experienced by LTC residents are the result of illnesses frequently 
associated with aging, and therefore LTC research is suspect for “conflating disability with 
illness”.158  In this section, I propose that although LTC today is in many ways different from 
large institutions such as Huronia, Rideau and Southwestern, it is imperative to situate LTC 
research within debates about care.  We cannot make complete sense of the debate about care 
without understanding the past and current resistance to institutionalization (or “incarceration” as 
some disability studies scholar would argue159). To this end, I will first explain the legacy of 
institutionalization and then more recent debates about deinstitutionalization. Then I will briefly 
introduce care research as the opposite of disability studies. The criticisms of feminist disability 
scholars such as Carol Thomas and Jenny Morris will inform our understanding of why care is so 
problematic but also illustrate why there is a pressing need to continue to study care. In essence, 
I do not believe that the obvious tension between the aspirations of the disability movement and 
care is so great that a scholarly dialogue about law reform of care is not possible. To bridge the 
disability perspective on the one side and the reality of older women in need of institutional care 
and the (younger) women who care for them on the other, I suggest the emphasis should be on 
caring relationships and the law. This section will conclude with remarks about the possibility of 
restructuring bureaucratic decision-making to better achieve the promotion of autonomy.      
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2.3.1 Legacy of institutionalization and more recent debates about 
deinstitutionalization 
To understand objections to “caring” within institutions such as LTC homes, Erving 
Goffman’s concept of “total institution” is a good starting point. In Asylums, a total institution is 
defined as a “place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut 
off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally 
administered round of life”.160  One type of total institution is for those who are considered 
incapable and harmless e.g., nursing homes.161 Despite the differences across the five types of 
institutions identified by Goffman, the common characteristics of a total institution are: “(1) the 
daily round now entirely transpires ‘in the same place and under the same authority’; (2) 
activities are carried out in the company of a batch of like-situated others; (3) activities are 
timetabled and sequenced by clear rules and a class of officials; and (4) all of the scheduled 
activities are part of a plan designed to realize the goals of the institution”.162 As the feminist 
political literature (see Chapter 4) will show, LTC homes today still retain some of the 
characteristics of the “total institution”, as reflected in the high degree of regimentation in terms 
of organization of frontline personal care within homes.163  
For over a century, institutions would figure prominently in many governments’ response 
to disability.164 Many institutions would eventually close permanently in the period between the 
1970s and the 1990s.165 Since 1830s, “mental retardation policy” (as used at that time) in Ontario 
has tried to achieve four major objectives: 1) to provide asylum for “mentally retarded” people 
who could not physically survive in the community without government help 2) to educate 
“mentally retarded” people defined as being educable 3) to impose some kind of social control 
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on “mentally retarded” people who are defined (or labeled) as delinquent or immoral 4) to 
provide social welfare for “mentally retarded” people who have been physically capable of 
surviving in the community but could not do so because of lack of employment, because they 
had personality or behavioural traits which led the community to reject them, or because of the 
absence of a social service infrastructure appropriate to their needs.166 The first large-scale 
residential institution built for individuals with developmental disabilities opened in Orillia, 
Ontario in 1876.167 In the 1950s and 1960s, concerns emerged over the overcrowded and 
deteriorated conditions in Ontario’s residential institutions. The “community living” movement 
was also spreading across North America.168 In 1977, the Ontario government launched its first 
multi-year plan to increase community supports and decrease reliance on institutional care. In 
1987, the Ministry of Community and Social Services announced that within 25 years, it planned 
to shutter all of the remaining residential facilities. The last provincially-operated residential 
facility for individuals with developmental disabilities was closed in 2009.169  
Although the last institutions were formally closed, their legal consequences continue to 
unfold. The two class actions, Dolmage v. HMQ, and McKillop and Bechard v. HMQ,170 relate to 
Huronia Regional Centre (“Huronia”), Rideau Regional Centre (“Rideau”) and Southwestern 
Regional Centre (“Southwestern”). In each action, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant (the 
“Crown”) was negligent and breached its fiduciary duties in the funding, operation, management, 
administration, supervision and control of the facility. The parties settled the actions. These 
actions are useful reminders that scholarly research on institutions and institutionalization will 
continue to be necessary.  
It is probably not controversial to suggest that the potential for legal challenges against 
homes and the provincial government is very limited. As I will explain in Chapter 7, “Inclusion 
and Participation”, residents and/or their substitute decision-makers may decide to challenge the 
decisions of their respective homes and/or the provincial government. The small number of 
judicial and tribunal decisions is indicative of the practical difficulties of using litigation to 
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influence the delivery and receipt of care in institutions (see chapter 9 “Discussion and 
Analysis”). It is important to remember that these cases do not necessarily mean the plaintiffs 
reject institutional care.        
Deinstitutionalization is often presented as an ‘ideal’ policy strategy that benefits all: it is 
intended to promote the self-determination of service users and to reduce care costs.171 Scholars 
are now reviewing the current directions of deinstitutionalization.172 One theme is how 
deinstitutionalization does not equal inclusion173 and how some disabled people still have to 
confront isolation and exclusion from “real” community life.174 This may be due to a variety of 
barriers to accessing home and community-based services in place of institutional care175 and in 
some cases, even exposure to hate crimes and violence.176 Others examine institutionalization as 
incarceration and explore abolition as a useful strategy for resistance to all forms of 
incarceration.177 Another strand of research is to investigate the impact of the 
deinstitutionalization process and what constitutes a good quality of life in the community.178 
The more recent research related to deinstitutionalization draws our attention to how exclusion 
can be experienced in all types of settings – even in the community.179 Unpacking the care 
practices that undermine individual autonomy and self-determination in different settings can be 
a shared ground for inquiry to both care research and disability studies.   
My research also contributes to the debate about institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization in three principle ways. The focus here is how the law including 
substantive and procedural protections shapes the experiences of those living in institutions. First 
of all, my research includes empirical evidence on how a small group of younger disabled people 
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become institutionalized or re-institutionalized. I extend the debate by considering how aging 
affects the relationships of younger disabled people’s ‘choices’ in the context of our existing 
laws on consent and capacity. Second, the variations in institutions today including LTC call for 
a more nuanced exploration of the living circumstances of those living in institutions and an 
explanation why such variations exist. My research shows how a group of younger disabled 
people become mismatched in a particular institutional setting. Third, the increasing demand for 
LTC in aging societies such as Canada presents a theoretical dilemma to the ideal of 
deinstitutionalization. The care required by those who experience multiple impairments and have 
extremely high needs is only available in institutional settings at this juncture. Despite the 
rhetoric of “aging at home” or “aging in place” (see Chapter 4), institutional care is the reality of 
many individuals with cognitive and other impairments. I extend the debate by drawing on the 
critiques of disability scholarship to analyze the enabling as well as disabling relationships in 
LTC care today in order to shed light on the lived experience of older disabled people in 
institutions.               
2.3.2 “We do not need care”: Feminist disability scholars’ criticisms of 
care 
One strand of disability scholarship is devoted to theorizing the experience of disabled 
women. Earlier in this chapter, I described feminist disabled scholars’ concerns and viewpoints 
about how the intersection of different categories influence the lives of disabled women.  Their 
powerful criticisms of the concept of care are still relevant for our understanding of LTC. At the 
heart of the debate is the strong emphasis on the demands of care on (non-disabled) women as 
carers while disregarding the perspectives and needs of care recipients. The debate about “care” 
highlighted some feminist scholars’ uncritical acceptance of constructions that “disability equals 
dependency” and thus made disabled women invisible / needy as they were simply a “burden of 
care” or mere “passive recipients of care”.180  This lack of acknowledgement of disabled women 
could be traced to the perception of disabled women as childlike, helpless, and victimized.181  To 
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advance more powerful, competent, and appealing female icons, non-disabled feminists have 
disconnected disabled women from the sisterhood.182 
2.3.2.1 Objections to “care” and “caring for” 
To understand the contested nature of “care”, it is necessary to take a step back and 
briefly explain the field of care research. The discussion here is intended to contextualize the 
issues to which disability scholars have been reacting. Teppo Kröger notes that care research 
continues to expand as care is becoming a burning policy issue in almost every society.183  The 
sudden interest in care, as Jonathan Herring suggests, is largely driven by economics: the cost of 
care on the state and on individuals are huge.184 But even in its early days, care research was 
more than “just about personal relationships” or emotions. In a 1993 article that explores the 
problematic nature of the concept of care in sociological research, Thomas helpfully points out 
the significance of care research in relation to policy-related and academic agendas: “Care 
research is also a route to the politics of welfare and to sociological/policy analysis of the welfare 
state, its ideologies and systems.”185 In essence, care research has highlighted that care is 
ultimately gendered due to the fact that care - both unpaid and paid - is performed 
overwhelmingly by women. As well, since traditionally caring has been understood to be a 
‘natural female activity’, social esteem and remuneration levels of caring have remained low.186 
Evidently, the nature and impact of care on the lives of women also vary due to race, class and 
sexuality187 – a recurrent theme in the feminist political economy literature to be explored further 
in Chapter 4.  
A key concept in care research is the “ethics of care”, which is advanced by scholars such 
as Joan Tronto and Selma Sevenhuijsen.188 Feminists are divided on the value of an ethics of 
care; the issue of contention is about the connection between care and women’s oppression.189 
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To make a case for legal reform based on an ethics of care, Herring summarizes the six themes in 
ethics of care. First, care is part of being human: we are either being cared for by or caring for 
another at every point in life - often both at the same time.190 Second, care is a good part of 
life.191 Third, emotions are central to good care.192 Fourth, the ethics of care is based on the 
belief that people understand themselves in terms of their relationships.193 Fifth, the ethics of 
care emphasizes the importance of responsibilities within caring relationships. Supporters are 
wary of the danger that rights are used in an individualistic way. Instead, the law should enable 
people to fulfil their responsibilities.194 Sixth, an ethics of care approach starts with the context 
and concrete reality of a particular situation and the individuals in it and their relationships and 
characteristics. In other words, supporters reject abstract moral rules.195 
Not surprisingly, disability scholars have raised objections to the assumptions and more 
importantly, the intended and unintended implications of care research for disabled people. Here 
is a summary of critiques relevant to my case study. First, care is defined in relation to 
dependency in many cases, especially in earlier studies. People who need and get support in their 
everyday lives are regularly referred to as ‘the cared-for’, ‘care-takers’ or ‘care receivers’.196 In a 
frequently cited 1997 article about a care researcher’s analysis of direct payments legislation in 
the UK, Morris advances the position of “throw[ing] off the ideology of caring which is a form 
of oppression and an expression of prejudice.”197 She explains that in the second half of the 
twentieth century, care “has come to mean not caring about someone but caring for in the sense 
of taking responsibility for.”198 In many studies of “informal carers” and the role of “caring”, the 
rights of disabled and older people to adequate support has been obscured.199 The conclusion is 
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that “[o]ne cannot, therefore, have care and empowerment, for it is the ideology and the practice 
of caring which has led to the perception of disabled people as powerless.”200 
Second, the focus on formal and informal carer presents another set of knotty questions 
for disability scholars. It is argued that references to the interests or rights of carers negate the 
rights and needs of disabled people, either at the individual level or as a collective. For Geraldine 
Boyle, whilst feminist debate on caregiving has highlighted the need for the autonomy of carers, 
little attention has been paid in such debate to older care recipients’ needs for autonomy.201 The 
attention on carers can be seen as an attack on disabled people’s hard-won struggle for adequate 
support. As Herring explains, a common strategy of organisations promoting the interests of 
carers is to emphasise the burdens and disadvantages that carers suffer because of their work. 
This unintentionally paints the disabled person as the cause of disadvantages: disability is 'a 
problem', which carers pay the cost of solving.202 Similarly, Karen Soldatic and Helen Meekosha 
are also critical of the carers’ rights movement, which has a predominantly female membership 
and leadership, in many Western liberal democratic countries.203 The range of supports and 
legislative measures of informal carers’ of disabled people have largely been incorporated in 
state plans to reduce public expenditure on disability social provisioning measures. Such 
measures would absolve the state of its responsibilities to a class of citizens because these 
measures attempt to privatize the right of disabled people to personal support assistance. This 
results in reinforcement of disabled people’s historical oppression and stigmatization of disabled 
people’s subjective experience of the self and the body.204 
Third, and closely related to the previous criticism, most of this (early) research on 
informal caregivers explicitly separates out nondisabled women from disabled women.205 One 
manifestation of this separation is particularly relevant to us. Some early feminist researchers 
take the position that residential care for older and disabled people is preferred on the grounds 
that this is the only way to prevent the exploitation of women as informal carers.206 For Morris, 
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such position is indicative of the failure of feminist researchers to include the subjective 
experience of disabled and older people and consider their opposition to institutional care.207 To 
put it bluntly, these feminist researchers completely ignore the interests of disabled and older 
women who actually made up the majority of the so-called ‘‘cared for”.208  
The last group of criticisms concern the “dark side of care”. The harmful effects of care 
on disabled people are frequently in the background (if not foreground) of almost any disability 
research. For Christine Kelly, “Care is positioned as a layered form of oppression that includes 
abuse, coercion, a history of physical and metaphorical institutionalization, and a denial of 
agency often signified by excluding disabled people from research.  The potential for daily 
practices of care to veer into pain and oppression is high.”209  It should be noted that the harm of 
care can occur inside and outside of institutions.210 However, scholars continue to advance the 
right of living in the community and identify barriers to community living, such as accessing 
primary care.211 The case for living in the community is supported by research on harms in 
institutional care. One of the harms is lack of autonomy in LTC.212 
To conclude the discussion on care, I will briefly explain the significance of the concepts 
of independence, choice and control from a disability perspective. These concepts are conceived 
as the opposite of care. For earlier scholars such as Barnes and Oliver, there is a lack of control 
over the disabled individuals’ own lives and a lack of opportunity to participate in family and 
social life in a way that other people take for granted. It is argued that as a result, the civil and 
human rights of disabled people are being violated.213 Accordingly, independence does not refer 
to self-sufficiency or to the capability to do everything themselves. Rather, independence refers 
to having choice and control over how the necessary help is provided.214 Mark C. Weber 
captures the significance of “having control one’s life” well: “Paternalism is a particularly acute 
 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid; Bê, supra note 102 at 183. 
209 Kelly, Disability Politics,  supra note 155 at 29. 
210 For example, see Morris, supra note 205 at 65–66. 
211 John A Ford et al, “Access to Primary Care for Socio-Economically Disadvantaged Older People in Rural Areas: 
A Qualitative Study” (2018) 13:3 PLOS ONE e0193952. 
212 For example, see Boyle, supra note 154; Geraldine Boyle, “Social Policy for People with Dementia in England: 
Promoting Human Rights?” (2010) 18:5 Health & Social Care in the Community 511. 
213 Kröger, supra note 156 at 405. 
214 Ibid. 
38 
problem for people with disabilities, but no man or woman is or should aspire to be an island. 
Independence should be less important than control over one's life, something that is not 
necessarily incompatible with dependence on others for a range of activities.”215 Thus, an 
important strand in the disability research is to examine how disabled people’s control (or lack of 
it) over their own lives (including their bodies) is manifested in government policies and law, 
such as direct payment,216 contractual capacity,217 medicine and female bodies,218 and 
administration of social programs.219   
This understanding of independence in disability studies stands in contrast to how 
independence is portrayed in public discourses. Independence and self-sufficiency, Bernhard 
Weicht argues, are constructed as ideals for human existence.220 It follows that “those being 
dependent on others are constructed as morally inferior to the idealized independent person.”221 
One site where the dominance of independence is produced and reproduced is in discourse on 
care and older people.222 Care is established as a dichotomy between the young, active, 
independent actor and the old, passive, dependent non-actor.223 And the (old, vulnerable) body is 
the physical expression of dependency, both representing the absence of individual choice and 
autonomy.224 Choices and decisions taken by oneself are often presented in opposition to an 
image of old age, in which older people are dependent, passive, infantilized and vulnerable to 
abuse and neglect.225 I now turn to scholarly work that examines older people, especially older 
women, in the context of care.  
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2.3.2.2 Locating “older women” in our language    
Any study about a gendered space such as a LTC facility should address the question of 
how this group of residents is described. A common characteristics is the chronological age of 
residents. In other words, they are old. Age is not just a number. I adopt Margaret Hall’s position 
that it is important to see the difference of old age, and the social impact of that difference.226 I 
have decided to use the comparative term “older” rather than old, recognizing that it is not 
without difficulties. As Isabel Grant and Janine Benedet point out, “older” defines those who are 
old only in comparison to those who are not, and one could be seen as implying that “younger” is 
the norm.227 Hall observes that old age happens at different times for different people. And it is 
experienced on the corporal and social levels.228 Indeed, what constitutes older is highly 
gendered, and women are constructed as older at a younger age than men.229 The point at which 
one is labelled as older will vary depending on other intersecting inequalities, such as disability, 
gender, class, and race230 and disadvantages and privileges accumulated over a lifetime. For 
instance, disabled persons are more likely to be labelled as older at a younger age than those 
without an identifiable disability.231 If we borrow chronological age as a lens to describe aging, 
then in the LTC context, female residents are in general older compared to the general population 
(the life expectancy of a Canadian woman is 83) and older compared to the male residents. I am 
using the term “older” to acknowledge that this group of women may be impacted by different 
kinds of inequality over the life course, and how they arrive at LTC and how they experience 
LTC may be shaped by those inequalities.  
The challenge is to put older women at the centre of the analysis of social policies such as 
LTC without reducing them to mere “objects of care” or “recipients of other people’s 
responsibilities”.232 In a paper about older care recipients’ needs for autonomy in LTC (in 
community or institution), Boyle argues that recent debate has been dominated by the need for 
equality by younger disabled people and by women as carers, rather than by older people with 
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support needs.233 For instance, although constraints associated with caregiving on the autonomy 
of women have been a key emphasis in feminist debate, there has been little regard to the 
possible constraints on the autonomy of older people associated with receiving care. Likewise, 
although research has pointed to the negative mental health effects associated with caring (and 
with constraints on carers’ autonomy), little consideration has been given to the possible mental 
ill health experienced by older people as a result of receiving care which constrains their 
autonomy.234 
Jane Aronson’s work is an example that takes gender, age, and disability into account. 
She observes that political decisions to make health and social services scarcer and to ration 
them meagerly are often accompanied and justified by talks of enhancing customer satisfaction 
and the choice of service consumers. The rhetoric of consumer participation associated with the 
new managerialism conceals the fundamental disempowerment of being managed. Elderly 
people being managed are subject to thin definitions of need (as used by Nancy Fraser235) 
determined by professionals through standardized assessment procedures.236 Aronson explores 
possible interpretations and images of elderly women as care recipients in their own homes or in 
the vaguely defined community: being managed, managing, and making demands.237 These 
images present very different practical possibilities. They also lead to differences in LTC policies 
and service providers’ practices. For example, the managerial framing of frail elderly women and 
their needs, which dominates LTC policies, leads to the meager allocation of resources and 
service practices that objectify and isolate recipients.238 
It would be a mistake to assume that common theoretical ground between disabilities and 
care research is impossible. Disability scholars continue to look for bridges that connect the 
concerns of both fields. Scholars such as Sally Chivers continue to engage the concept of care 
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critically239 by exploring LTC from multiple perspectives. In Care Home Stories: Aging, 
Disability, and Long-Term Residential Care, Sally Chivers and Ulla Kriebernegg consider 
various kinds of stories told about institutional care for older adults.240 The contributors in that 
volume write about many different ways in which LTC in late life could become something 
desirable rather than necessary.241 Some scholars look for common policy issues that affect 
disabled people and those who provide care, such as decent wages and working conditions for 
personal assistants.242 Others look for concepts or models that can address the tensions of both 
fields, such as conceptualization of ‘needscapes’ which incorporate interdependence and needs 
interpretation.243 At the heart of these attempts is a rejection of binary categorization such as 
helper / helped. Next I will turn to the idea of “caring relationships” in order to draw attention of 
the complexities of caring and care.   
2.3.3 Explaining the reality of older women in need of institutional care and 
the women who care for them 
Disability scholars such as Carol Thomas and Jenny Morris have proposed powerful 
critiques of care. I do not claim to be able to resolve the tensions in these scholarly debates. 
However, I build on existing work that sees the potential to reconcile the tensions and offer 
suggestions here to bridge these perspectives in order to avoid a binary understanding of 
“helper/helped” and “carer / recipient”. While many scholars have utilized the concept of caring 
relationship, this dissertation is concerned with law and how it shapes the caring relationship. It 
is not possible to talk about relationships without exploring law’s assumptions about individuals. 
A good place to start is to explain how the notion of self is reflected in law. 
2.3.3.1 The legal conception of the self 
Unpacking the challenges of allowing caring relationships to flourish requires a brief 
explanation about the ‘isolated individual’ in law. The “traditional liberal self” is seen as 
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“rational, self-maximizing, economic man, plucked out of his social context, abstracted from his 
social relations, implausibly independent, intent on pursuing his personal preferences”.244  This 
image of self is reflected in law and has great significance to what kind of law we have:  
The law is built around the ideal of legal personhood: a man who is autonomous, self-
sufficient, in control, capacitous, and independent. For such a man the law gives the legal 
tools he needs to maintain his status: the rights of autonomy, privacy, liberty, and 
freedom from state interference. For him, legal rights are designed to keep him free from 
intrusion. Rights are designed to keep people apart, to give people their space.245 
With respect to how the law protects the ‘able, autonomous and unattached adult’,246 
Jennifer Nedelsky provides an insightful account in Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of 
Self, Autonomy and Law.247  More specifically, within the Anglo-American liberal tradition, one 
of the most important functions of rights has been to define the legitimate scope of the state.248 
The image (or metaphor) of protective boundaries as essential to the integrity and autonomy of 
the self is deep and pervasive in Western culture.249 Nedelsky discusses the pervasiveness of the 
boundary metaphor not only in law (with specific examples in the areas of property and 
privacy)250 but in other domains as well (such as sexual relations).251 The boundary metaphor 
“invites us to imagine that the self to be protected is, in some crucial sense, insular and that what 
is most important to the preservation of such a self is drawing boundaries around it that will 
protect it from invasion (or at least that is the most crucial thing the law can do).”252 In other 
words, the most autonomous person is the one with the strongest right to exclude others from 
one’s person (including body) and property (i.e., to secure separation from others).253 Not 
surprisingly the centrality of boundary is rejected by Nedelsky but she is also careful to point out 
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that boundaries do protect people from certain kinds of threats.254 Law (in its ideal liberal form) 
in turn protects the autonomous selves from harm by each other and by the state.255 But crucially 
the boundary metaphor “consistently misdirects attention away from the relationships actually 
necessary to achieve values such as freedom and autonomy.”256 Nedelsky’s criticisms of the 
metaphor of boundary paves the way for an alternative language for the self, autonomy, and the 
rights that are designed to protect them.257 
2.3.3.2 Relational conception of rights and autonomy in the context of law 
The alternative to the traditionally individualistic conception of the self starts with a basic 
assumption which is that each individual is constituted by networks of relationships of which 
they are a part, such as intimate relationships, being participants in a global economy, and so 
forth.258 Relationships are not always enabling or even benign: Nedelsky’s conception of human 
selfhood as constituted by relationship “has nothing warm, mushy, or romantic about it.”259 One 
of Nedelsky’s claims – and there are many in the book - is that rights, self, and autonomy should 
be framed in relational terms.260  
It is hard to disagree with Nedelsky’s observation that “rights structure relations of 
power, trust, responsibility, and care.”261 Nedelsky begins with a commitment to equality and 
makes a compelling claim that a relational approach helps us determine ways to ensure that 
inevitable hierarchies of power (and the advantages of unequal strengths and talents) do not 
become relations of domination. Law and rights should be understood in terms of the relations 
they structure and how those relations can foster core values, such as autonomy.262 A relational 
approach always directs attention to the difference that context makes, and to how the law affects 
different people in different circumstances.263 Further, relations structured by law often serve to 
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hide power and the role of the state in that power. An example is the “market” where the role of 
the law in constructing the basic terms (property and contract) is also often invisible, allowing 
“the market” to be presented as a “nonstate” alternative to state regulation.264 It is important to 
note that although law can restructure relations of power and responsibility, this approach does 
not always call for more law or state power.265 
Nedelsky holds the view that rights can be rescued from their long association with 
individualistic theory and practice.266 The key is to recognize the relational nature of rights and 
to ensure that their relational nature becomes a regular tool of analysis in rights debates.267 To 
summarize, the relational approach to rights invites us to ask the following questions in 
examining rights disputes: 1) What is structuring the relations that have generated the problem? 
In a legal case, how is law structuring the relevant relations, and how is that structuring related to 
the conflict? 2) What are the values at stake? 3) What kinds of relationships would foster those 
values? 4) How would competing versions of a right structure relations differently?268 
The value that is important for my project is autonomy, which is a key concept in 
disability studies. Nedelsky’s inquiry into the meaning of autonomy is relevant for my project 
because it is guided by both feminist objectives and the challenges of the modern welfare state 
and regulatory state.269 In Nedelsky’s view, autonomy is not to be equated with independence.270 
Equally important, she rejects the language of control as a synonym for choice: “our lives 
involve other people, and control is not a respectful relation to other autonomous beings. . . The 
effort at control almost always involves some form of domination.”271 Further, autonomy is 
made possible by constructive relationships. The purpose of a relational approach is to 
understand all the different dimensions of human relationships—including their interaction with 
ideas, institutions and personal practices—that foster autonomy. It is not to yield simplistic 
conclusions that people in destructive relationships—whether intimate, institutional, or 
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cultural—must be without autonomy.272 In other words, for Nedelsky both selves and autonomy 
are constitutively relational.273 
Nedelsky’s work influences my research and analysis in the following ways. It provides a 
foundation through which to analyze the current rights and entitlements of those in LTC and 
points to possible ways to move forward with explaining why those rights do not always help 
advance values such as autonomy in real life. Further, the relational approach to autonomy 
allows me to probe more deeply into the relationships that impact residents’ autonomy and to 
consider what autonomy means in LTC. Next, I bring Nedelsky’s relational approach together 
with Herring’s work on caring relationships in order to propose a way to analyze care in LTC.  
My approach of integrating the work of Nedelsky and Herring is similar to some of the recent 
care-related research in socio-legal studies such as examining the role of relationships in 
fostering or undermining mental capacity274 and the impact of legal and regulatory regimes on 
the everyday lives of carers of people with dementia.275    
2.3.3.3 Caring relationships and the law  
One way to illustrate the complex ways in which power relations may be exhibited in 
relationships (not just in a dichotomous and unidirectional sense) is to interrogate the “care” 
relationship. As discussed earlier, I have chosen the care relationship in part to avoid replicating 
the dichotomy between people with and without disabilities and attempt to attend to the debates 
about “care” in the feminist and disability scholarship. My starting point is that the role of law, 
as Ngaire Naffine states, is not to ward relations off: law is intended to ensure that relations run 
smoothly and that they neither oppress nor harm us.276 In his book Caring and the Law, Jonathan 
Herring builds on the debates about ethics of care and objections from disability scholars, 
advancing the idea of making caring the principle of the law.277 In a more recent book, 
Vulnerable Adults and the Law, Herring builds on some of his ideas about our relational self and 
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considers how vulnerability operates within specific areas of law and how a vulnerability 
analysis might improve our understanding of those areas.278 
Care is an act and should not be treated simply as a series of tasks.279 Instead of adopting 
a simple definition of care, Herring proposes that there are four key markers of care: meeting 
needs, respect, responsibility and relationality. These markers may be exhibited in various 
degrees and indicate the extent to which an activity is or is not care.280 Of particular relevance to 
this research is relationality. He explains that caring is about relationships and that individual 
acts of care can only be understood in the context of the relationship between the parties.281  In a 
caring relationship, the interests and identities of the two people become intermingled.  Thus, it 
becomes impossible to consider the welfare or rights of any one party in isolation.  The focus 
must be on the relationship, rather than the individuals.282  Further, the values of autonomy, 
freedom, and justice need to be used to enable and support caring of dependents.283  In this vein, 
our identities, values, and well-being are tied up with our relationships and the responsibilities 
that come with them.284  Accordingly, the main argument is that rather than promoting 'care', we 
should promote 'caring relationships'. By using this terminology of ‘caring relationships’, it is 
argued that the contributions of both parties would be recognised.285  
Having established that our society should encourage and promote caring relationships, 
Herring argues that we need a legal system that acknowledges our responsibilities to those we 
are in relationships with and others in our society.286 Traditionally, our legal and ethical tools 
have been built on an individualistic model.287 Herring’s vision for radical change is as follows: 
“A legal system that is designed around relational people, dependent on others to meet their 
needs and one whose key values are not autonomy, freedom, and privacy but mutuality, 
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interdependence, and relational responsibilities.”288 In a nutshell, legal rights should be designed 
to enable us to undertake our caring relationships.289 Equally important, it is argued that a 
responsibility to ensure we do not exploit each other’s vulnerability should govern our 
interactions with each other.290 
This dissertation adopts Herring’s categorization of care and the claim that the identities 
and interests of those in caring relationships are inter-mingled. My approach to analyzing care in 
LTC is informed by Herring’s contributions in the following specific ways. First, although a 
strong emphasis on relationships is not new in the literature about care, the clear connection 
made between key concepts such as dependency and relationality on the one hand and law on the 
other is a major step forward. But Charles Foster and Jonathan Herring are also careful to 
emphasize that the law can play only a small part in promoting and protecting a care-valuing 
ethos. Nonetheless, law can send important messages about the standards of behaviours 
expected.291 Herring’s contribution is that he provides specific examples of how caring 
relationships are accommodated (or not) in law.292 For example, in the chapter about caring and 
medical law, he advances the claim that medical law is grounded in highly individualized 
concepts of what are people, what are bodies and what our rights are.293 His questions about the 
place of carers in medical law will guide my own questions about the role and responsibilities of 
families and friends of LTC residents. Equally important, his work acknowledges the dark side 
of caring, including abuse, and makes the case for the need for protection of those in caring 
relationships in the form of legal response.294  
Herring is correct to argue that the legal and social responses to different caring 
relationships should not be the same.295 I extend the debate in two ways. First, this research will 
extend the debate by examining concrete legal interventions that support or regulate different 
caring relationships in LTC homes. My analysis looks at interventions at the macro level 
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(structural issues in the sector such as the system’s capacity to meet the demands for care) as 
well as at the micro level (such as how care relationships are defined in the home).  Looking at 
how the state is accountable for its support for (or neglect of) care is an important part of this 
dissertation.  In Chapter 4, I will explain in more detail how the provincial government is 
involved in LTC, mainly by provision of funding, licensing and regulation of homes. If its 
involvement has expanded over time, one could ask how the provincial government is held 
accountable for its involvement. Secondly, similar to Herring, I attend to the responsibilities that 
public authorities have towards those who may be considered vulnerable296 by looking at the 
state’s responsibility towards its citizens. in the context of compliance and enforcement. Herring 
remarks since we are profoundly dependent on others and on a range of social provisions, it 
follows that compliance with legal norms (or the cost of complying with them) very much 
depends on the particular circumstances an individual is in. Thus, it requires a sensitivity to the 
individual’s circumstances – something which is often lacking in our current legal system.297 
This point will be investigated further in my study as I consider how those in caring relationships 
in LTC – residents, care providers, homes – interpret and comply with legal rules.  
My approach is also different from Herring’s in the sense that unlike Herring I have not 
completely abandoned concepts such as autonomy. Drawing on feminist critiques of the ideal of 
autonomy, Susan Sherwin provides a thoughtful summary of the linkage between uncritical 
acceptance of complete independence and autonomy.298 I share Sherwin’s view that “autonomy 
often appears to be a goal that is primarily of interest to – and accessible by – those with 
privilege and power.”299 However, Sherwin has not abandoned the concept entirely. For some 
feminist health activists, appealing to the ideal of autonomy allows them to secure greater power 
for women to determine the course of their health care and, especially, their reproductive lives.300 
For me, the importance of the concept of autonomy in the disability scholarship (to be discussed 
below) and activism is the main reason why I have not abandoned it. Autonomy is still an 
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important concept in our legal system and it is more fruitful to use Nedelsky’s approach in the 
context of decision-making and to try to place autonomy in an appropriate place in relation to 
other values. 
2.3.4 Autonomy and dependence in the modern state  
 In the context of care, the role of the state is an important area of contention.301  Of 
particular relevance for my research is the relationship between public benefit scheme recipients 
and the state.  Jennifer Nedelsky’s work on the concept of relational autonomy and bureaucratic 
state is particularly helpful in illuminating this relationship.  In Law's Relations: a Relational 
Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law, Nedelsky argues that the characteristic problem of autonomy 
in the modern state is to ensure the autonomy of individuals when they are within the many 
spheres of collective power.302 For many people, their most direct encounter with state power is 
as recipients of state services or benefits (public education, health care, pensions, employment 
insurance and so forth) and subjects of regulation (licenses, health and safety regulation, zoning, 
securities regulations).  “Dependence is a reality, and will be a reality in any society based on 
collective responsibility for the material well-being of some or all of its members. The problem 
is to avoid making autonomy a casualty of such collective responsibility.”303  Thus, the problem 
of interdependence, individual autonomy, and collective power assumes its current form in the 
relations between administrative bodies and those subject to their decisions.304  Accordingly, the 
nature of people's interactions with bureaucratic decision making may be just as important as 
legislative policy-making in determining whether people are autonomous members of a 
democratic society or dependent objects of collective control. The task is to render autonomy 
compatible with the interdependence that collective power (properly used) expresses.305 
Earlier in this section, I outline the relational approach to rights and autonomy. Adopting 
Nedelsky’s relational approach, autonomy requires constructive relationships throughout a 
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person's life.  Autonomy can thrive or wither in adults depending on the structures of relationship 
they are embedded in.  Even relations of dependence and hierarchies of power can be structured 
in ways that foster rather than undermine autonomy. Understanding how to structure such 
dependence is essential to the protection of autonomy.306  In framing autonomy and dependency 
this way, there is recognition that power imbalances are not necessarily incompatible with 
autonomy.  This suggests that there is possibility of contributing to the on-going discussion about 
restructuring bureaucratic decision-making to better achieve the promotion of autonomy.  This 
provides an additional dimension i.e., autonomy, by which to evaluate the implication of changes 
to regulation and governance in the LTC home sector.   
Therefore, this research provides an opportunity to generate new questions about how 
dependence on the state is exemplified in processes established by the state around different 
types of decisions related to a public benefit scheme. One could argue that the protection of 
individual autonomy is a responsibility of the state in terms of making available the necessary 
mechanisms to challenge decisions made by others when an individual is deemed incapable. 
Recall that professionals’ control over disabled people’s lives is a theme in disability studies. 
The legal processes around capacity for decision-making such as LTC admission are concrete 
expressions of how autonomy is interpreted legally and, on the ground, as well as how autonomy 
is (or is not) protected. In particular, I will analyze health care consent decisions, supplemented 
by data from the Consent and Capacity Board and key informant interviews. This approach 
allows me to explore the power dynamics within the context of bureaucratic decision-making. 
Not all relationships are enabling – whether it is between a health care provider and a resident or 
between a home and resident – and bureaucratic decision-making can be a venue to sever those 
disabling relationships.   
2.3.5 Summary  
This research responds to the call in the more recent literature for developing a more 
nuanced theoretical understanding of those involved in caring relationships. Of particular 
relevance to this research is the attitude towards care in disability studies. The legacy of 
institutionalization is always in the background (if not the foreground) of scholarly work on care 
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– in institutions or in the community. There is a real danger of care conceptualized as an activity 
done by one person to another (passive) person. However, the literature surveyed shows that it is 
not necessary to reject care and still incorporate the criticisms of disability studies. Here I push 
back a little against scholars who reject care completely and avoid discussions about reforming 
institutional care altogether. The result of a lack of disability perspective on law reform in the 
LTC sector is that critical analysis is left to other disciplines (such as gerontology and sociology) 
which may not see the variety of ways in which disablism operates in the legal and other realms. 
I make the claim that the emphasis on caring relationships allows us to move beyond binary 
understanding of caregiver / recipient and helper/ helped while attending to the objections to care 
articulated by disability scholars. 
The idea that the interests and identities of the two or more people in a caring relationship 
become intermingled is crucial to my research. In Chapter 4, I will pick up this theme again 
when I explore the themes of LTC research in the feminist political economy literature. For now, 
it suffice to say that caring relationships in turn are shaped by, among other political and market 
forces, the legal and administrative structure of a benefit scheme or regulatory regime. I now turn 
to the negotiation of tensions and contradictions in public benefit schemes as a way to link the 
debate about care with the regulation and governance literature.    
2.4 Negotiating Tensions and Contradictions in Public Benefit 
Schemes  
The purpose here is to identify the key issues that are pertinent to explaining the changes 
to regulation and governance in LTC, which in turn shape care and caring relationships. The 
claim here is that many of the regulation and governance changes are best described as a hybrid 
of a more flexible, informal approach with command-and-control regulation. Providing an 
empirical account of the changes is important for the theorization of care and caring relationships 
because care is a public or collective responsibility although many activities associated with care 
may occur in private and individuals assume responsibilities for such activities. Such an account 
will provide insights into the state / citizen relationships. In doing so, I will introduce the New 
Governance literature. As a school of legal thought, the New Governance literature is used 
primarily to gain insight into the techniques and instruments of regulating and governing – both 
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on empirical and normative bases307 – the care, treatments and living circumstances provided in 
LTC homes. I choose to explore the New Governance literature because the issues in the LTC 
home sector do not fit into the “oppositional orthodoxies of regulation and deregulation.”308  
Some scholars present New Governance as a third-way approach.309 I will first present the 
tensions and contradictions in public benefit schemes. 
2.4.1 Tensions and Contradictions in Public Benefit Schemes 
I will first map out the inherent tensions and contradictions in public benefit schemes: 
medical versus social model of disability, formal equality versus recognition of complexity of 
disability in everyday life, physical survival versus exercise of citizenship and deserving versus 
undeserving.   Then the discussion will shift to the negotiation of tensions and contradictions as 
an on-going problem-solving process, followed by a brief overview of New Governance 
approaches.  As I will explain, these New Governance approaches co-exist with more traditional 
forms of legal regulation and there is a debate about traditional law / New Governance hybrids.   
A common theme in the analysis of public benefit schemes in the literature is the 
presence of tensions and contradictions in the foundations of such schemes.  In a study of 
American welfare programs for people with disabilities, Weber argues that the civil rights 
approach, when thoughtfully applied, supports continued disability-specific welfare programs, 
and various improvements in the law of public welfare.310  For Weber, disability-related welfare 
relies heavily on medical model ideas and may conjure images of charity and pity,311  which is 
inconsistent with a social model or civil rights approach to disability.  Through an in-depth 
review of the Federal Court of Appeal decision Harris v Canada (Minister of Human Resources 
and Skills Development), Nancy Hansen and Lorna Turnbull argue that the Canada Pension Plan 
(CPP) rules made Harris (a woman who became unable to work because of multiple sclerosis) 
invisible.  Similar to Weber, Hansen and Turnbull identify a tension in the CPP: its formalistic 
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approach to equality is in contrast to a broad and contextual approach which recognizes the 
diversity and complexity of disability in everyday life312.   In a qualitative study of home support 
services in British Columbia, Kari Krogh and Jon Johnson examine the negative effects changes 
to services have had on the lives of people with disabilities.313  Their findings point to the home 
support administrators’ view that home support should focus on providing services that are 
essential to the physical survival of users.314  This view competes with the notion of home 
support as a citizenship service, which advances the stance that home support services can enable 
individuals with disabilities to live their lives as full and active citizens.315  Finally, Bill Hughes 
examines how the disabled identity has been transformed from deserving citizens into scroungers 
by right-wing ‘workfare’ discourse.316 Austerity has made disabled people its scapegoat: disabled 
people are being represented as parasites by a populist politics of resentment.317 There is a 
tension between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ (counterfeit citizenship) implied in 
modern welfare systems.318    
The four sets of tensions and contradictions identified here - medical versus social 
models of disability, formal equality versus recognition of complexity of disability in everyday 
life, physical survival versus exercise of citizenship and deserving vs. undeserving - are helpful 
for contextualizing my study within the broader debates concerning assumptions about and 
objectives of public benefit schemes, especially those schemes grounded in a medical model of 
disability.   This is important for the purpose of locating my case study within a body of work 
that questions current conceptions of public benefit schemes from a disability perspective. These 
authors’ recognition of the tensions in the respective benefit schemes opens up a new question: 
how is the co-existence of theoretical and/or doctrinal tensions reflected in the on-going 
regulation and governance of a benefit scheme?  My study also involves the identification of the 
underlying tensions that are specific to the LTC home scheme, such as safety versus autonomy 
and medical versus social care, and I extend this analysis by illustrating how these tensions are 
 
312 Nancy Hansen & Lorna Turnbull, “Disability and Care: Still Not ‘Getting It’” (2013) 25:1 Canadian Journal of 
Women and the Law 111 at 125.  
313Krogh & Johnson, supra note 219 at 152. 
314Ibid at 160.  
315Ibid at 168. 
316 Hughes, supra note 18 at 992. 
317 Ibid at 991. 
318 Ibid at 1001–1002. 
54 
negotiated when program changes are contemplated, contested and implemented.  Understanding 
program changes requires an analysis of the substance of the changes (in law, for example) as 
well as the deliberations and decisions that led to those changes.  This analysis will contribute to 
critical assessment of New Governance’s claim that it is an entirely “new” regime that will have 
the built-in ability to innovate and constantly reinvent itself.319  
2.4.2 Law Conceptualized as Problem-Solving 
The negotiation of tensions and contradictions in the LTC home sector is conceptualized 
as an on-going problem-solving process.  For the purpose of this dissertation, I adopt the New 
Governance’s approach to law as “problem-solving involving institutional experimentation in a 
pragmatist sense.”320  In an article that explains the pragmatist approach with a discussion of two 
case studies - one of drug courts and one of employment discrimination remedies,321 William H. 
Simon asserts that Pragmatism resists approaches to legal issues that rely primarily on abstract 
analytical schemes and methods.322  The Pragmatist objects to the liberal idea of rights 
enforcement as the elaboration of a pre-existing moral consensus.323  More specifically, “rights 
are analytical, individualistic, categorical, judicially enforceable, and corrective.  Rights are 
derived analytically by the application of legal reasoning to authoritative sources.”324 In sum, 
solutions to public problems cannot be derived analytically, therefore, instead of relying on 
abstract analytical schemes and methods, these solutions are best derived deliberatively and 
experimentally.325   
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Simon further explains that pragmatist practice is problem solving326 and elaborates the 
concept of problem-solving as follows: 
The rhetoric of problems and solutions suggests common interests, rather than the 
notion connoted by the idea of rights of individual interests competing with group 
interests.  Problem solving connotes the possibility of mutually beneficial 
outcomes. It treats issues as neither purely distributive nor involving categorical 
choices between mutually exclusive positions.327 
Simon is careful to point out that this approach “does not ignore conflicting interests or 
value dissensus.”328  However, neither the individual nor the community can know what their 
interests are prior to entering a properly designed process.  As all parties may learn things in the 
process about the possibilities for realizing their own goals, the conceptions of those goals may 
change in the course of the process.329 Every discussion needs starting points; however, these 
starting points are usually indeterminate, and should be regarded as provisional.330  Finally, 
problem-solving is a continuous or recursive activity: every resolution is provisional and 
incorporates assumptions about its evolution and potential transformation.331   
Before addressing the approaches used within the context of New Governance, it is 
necessary to scrutinize some of the assumptions implicit in the concept of problem-solving.  An 
implicit underlying assumption is that all parties are autonomous and are capable of sharing and 
processing information and engaging in problem-solving.  This may be attributed to the fact that 
pragmatism distinguishes itself from legal liberalism.  One of the basic premises of legal 
liberalism is victimhood, which connotes weakness, passivity, and self-absorption.332  In contrast 
to victimhood, “citizenship connotes interest in and capacity for active participation in decision 
making and at least moderate sensitivity to public values.”333  For the LTC home sector, would 
some residents, for example those with cognitive impairments, need support in order to 
participate in any problem-solving process?  This is an important question to ask if we want a 
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truly inclusive process that can accommodate different capabilities and needs of residents.  I will 
return to the matter of participation in the next section.  As well, Simon’s appeal to “mutually 
beneficial outcomes” partly depends on the assumption that at the very least, all parties can agree 
to the definition of the problem at some point and there are indeed possibilities for realizing their 
goals.  This ignores how lived experiences are shaped by constructions of gender, disability and 
other factors and such experiences affect problem definition and resolution. These questions will 
guide my own construction of the problem-solving process within the LTC sector by identifying 
some of the assumptions used in the literature which may be speculative and require critical 
assessment.   
New Governance covers a wide variety of processes being used to establish norms and 
standards, regulate behavior, solve problems, and resolve disputes.  These governance 
innovations include a family of approaches such as public-private partnership, devolution, 
decentralization, enforced self-regulation, and stakeholder collaboration and proponents offer a 
variety of definitions of these approaches.334 According to Grainne de Burca, the rise of New 
Governance can be viewed as a response to two kinds of impetus or background conditions: 
strategic uncertainty and interdependence.335 The former refers to “the need to address complex 
policy problems which have not shown themselves to be readily amenable to resolution whether 
through hierarchy, market, or otherwise.”336 The latter refers to “the need to manage 
interdependence where divergent regulatory regimes affect one other to varying degrees, creating 
externalities, giving rise to conflict, or hindering transactional or personal mobility.”337 
The common thread in these diverse approaches in New Governance is that they all differ 
in some significant way from conventional legal institutions and procedures yet at the same time 
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appear to be playing roles similar to those notionally performed by the law.338 A commonality is 
that they all differ to some degree from top-down, rule-based, command-and-control 
regulation.339 The critiques to the ‘old’ system are numerous340 but can be summarized as 
follows. It is argued that the old model of regulation was ineffective and failed to promote broad 
public participation. In particular, regulatory laws could not easily respond to uncertainty or 
adapt to change. Regulatory solutions were also ineffective because they were devised with 
limited information and generated by bureaucratic experts or technocrats, rather than by 
individuals and institutions involved in implementation on the ground.341 Scholars emphasize the 
need for ‘third-way’ approaches between market and state in complex modern economies.342 In 
fact, New Governance scholars also accept the role of an active state in a democracy: “In their 
willingness to synthesize an emerging social vision, progressive reformers can move beyond 
entrenched and failed government structures while resisting flat attacks on the affirmative 
state.”343 
At the heart of New Governance scholarship is the notion of experimentalism. According 
to New Governance scholars, such as Charles Sable and William Simon, experimentalism aims 
to “accommodate the continuous change and variation that we see as the most pervasive 
challenge of current public problems.”344 Experimentalism can be defined “as a recursive process 
of provisional goal-setting and revision, based on learning from review of implementation 
experience in different settings.”345 The appeal of experimentalism is its capacity for learning 
and adaptation. The basic architecture involves a “center”, which could be the national 
government, and a set of “local units”, which could be states or municipalities. In experimentalist 
regimes, central institutions explicitly give autonomy to local ones to pursue framework goals 
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(such as “adequate education”). The centre then monitors local performance, pools information 
in disciplined comparisons, and creates services and inducements that facilitate this disciplined 
comparison. The achievement of learning and coordination is through deliberative engagement 
among officials and stakeholders.346 Instead of being a centralized rule-maker, the government 
acts as a facilitator of the experimentalist enterprise.347 Finally, the framework goals, 
performance measures, and decision-making procedures are also regularly revised, and the cycle 
repeats.348  
There is much debate about the nature and desirability of the changes that are 
occurring.349 New Governance experiments have occurred in a variety of policy areas, such as 
public housing, poverty law, post- secondary education, financial services, food safety, drugs, 
health care, environment and social policy co-ordination.350 For some, the impact of New 
Governance is a positive development, expanding law's capacities and enhancing its legitimacy. 
Accordingly, one strand of the New Governance scholarship is to investigate the success stories 
of New Governance.351 For others, these developments may undermine law and the values 
associated with it. Therefore, another strand of the literature seeks to investigate the failures of 
New Governance.352 Lisa Alexander observes that scholars view a New Governance experiment 
as promising or troubling because it either enhances or diminishes participation and 
redistribution.353 New Governance proponents are interested in exploring the conditions that are 
necessary for the successful implementation of New Governance approaches. Equally important, 
the failures also expose the weaknesses and limitations of these approaches. A theme that 
emerges in critiques of New Governance approaches is the practical difficulties of stakeholder 
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collaboration under conditions of intense social conflicts that originated from power dynamics of 
race, class, gender, religion and sexual orientation.354 This point will be explored further in 
section 2.5.2 “Theorizing Participation in New Governance”. But the policy prescription is not 
necessarily a return to a ‘command-and-control’ approach. Rather, the debate is about how to 
create a hybrid of some of the elements of the old, such as a healthy balance between traditional 
public law protections and New Governance.355 In the next section, I will elaborate on the debate 
about the relationship between law and New Governance in order to address the question of 
whether we can harness the promise of New Governance approaches and incorporate traditional 
legal values into those concepts in the regulation of care.  
2.4.3 Co-existence of Legal Regulation and New Governance Approaches 
One of the debates in the literature is the actual as well as the potential nature and role of 
law in New Governance.356 There is a shared concern within the literature about how New 
Governance transforms how we think of law.  Of particular relevance to my case study is how 
law and legal processes are implicated in the operation of new regulatory approaches.357  
Drawing from examples from the European Union and the U.S., David Trubek and Louise 
Trubek describe three varieties of co-existence of New Governance and “law”: 1) 
complementarity (two systems working for common goals); 2) rivalry (two systems competing 
for dominance); and 3) transformation or hybridity (systems merge into new hybrid process).358   
Three factors have been proposed to help explain the success of efforts to yoke New Governance 
processes and traditional legal regulation in areas that have previously been regulated by 
command and control systems.359   These are: inclusion of key stakeholders in new participatory 
mechanisms, genuine and effective commitment to social objectives, and maintenance of legal 
remedies as a default position.360  Finally, proponents argue that the most interesting area of co-
existence is when law is transformed by its relationship with New Governance.  Such 
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constellations may happen when law creates New Governance procedures and mandates 
parameters.  This is linked to a shift to “proceduralism” in which law simply creates procedures 
for conflict resolution and problem-solving.361  This transformation thesis can be summarized as 
follows: “Law, as a social phenomenon, is necessarily shaped and informed by the practices and 
characteristics of New Governance, and New Governance both generates and operates within the 
context of a normative order of law.”362 
Scholars respond to hybridity with some understandable anxiety.363For some, it is 
important to carefully discern the power dynamics among participants in a New Governance 
experiment.364 Alexander argues that approaches which give primacy to traditional legal 
elements such as legal rights and entitlements should be used in New Governance experiments 
involving traditionally marginalized groups. More specifically, for any participating lawyer to 
advance an equitable distribution of the benefits of reform, a robust role for both procedural and 
substantive rights may be necessary in New Governance regimes that involve traditionally 
marginalized groups.365 On the other hand, when similarly situated professionals are 
participating, or when parties are equally dependent upon one another, legal rules are applicable 
only when the reform experiment fails to conform to its stated demands and goals so that 
meaningful and equal deliberation is possible.366 
This leads to a broader question of the role of a hybrid model in implementing changes in 
order to respond to problems that are “uncertain and interdependent”, as explained by de Burca. 
The transformation thesis is a promising line of inquiry to follow up on in my own research.  As 
I will argue in subsequent chapters, many of the New Governance approaches in the LTC sector 
are created and sustained by law but at the same time, for practical and conceptual purposes, the 
nature of law may be understood differently in the shadow of New Governance. In my view, 
there is little dispute that we need a more thorough understanding of this transformed legal order 
as New Governance approaches will only be more common in the future if the New Governance 
scholars are correct.   
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This study seeks to further our understanding of the co-existence of the more traditional 
forms of legal regulation and New Governance approaches by focusing on a small sub-set of 
legal concepts and norms relevant to the LTC home sector.   For example, is it possible to seek to 
combine elements of a rights model with New Governance approaches?  The current legal 
framework provides recourses for residents and their families, as well as homes, through reviews 
and appeals to the Consent and Capacity Board and Health Services Appeal and Review 
Board.367   As well, the Human Rights Code and the Charter guarantee equality rights to be free 
from discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental 
or physical disability.  These mechanisms are believed to be critical to protecting the rights and 
entitlement of LTC residents.  The question that needs to be asked is whether we can harness the 
promises of New Governance approaches and incorporate traditional legal values into them.   
Alternatively, we can look at the ways in which the substantive content of certain legal norms or 
concepts is transformed by New Governance approaches.368      
2.4.4 Summary  
How the tensions and contradictions inherent in the LTC sector are negotiated using New 
Governance approaches may be the most challenging type of problem-solving, as these tensions 
and contradictions are intertwined with normative issues.  My research will highlight the New 
Governance approaches that can be observed in the changes to legislation and governance and 
link them to those tensions and contradictions.   I will also summarize changes that cannot be 
explained by New Governance in order to raise questions about the explanatory power of New 
Governance scholarship.  In other words, this analysis is a systematic way to begin to theorize 
the changes to legislation and governance that are procedural in nature but may have significant 
impact for how problems in the LTC home sector are solved in the future. The debate about a 
hybrid approach that gives primacy to some traditional and substantive rights-claiming strategies 
points to the potential perils of New Governance experiments in some contexts. In sum, the 
debates referenced above provide a language that I can use to articulate the transformation of the 
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nature of law and New Governance in the LTC home sector.    
2.5 Inclusion and Meaningful Participation Opportunities for Persons 
with Disabilities 
In my earlier discussion about Prince’s work on disability politics in Canada, recall that 
citizenship places responsibility on the government to consult with persons with disabilities as 
citizens on a host of policy areas. As well, the criticisms about care bring forward the claim that 
without adequate support disabled people are not able to participate in different aspects of life 
that other people have taken for granted. It follows that debates about inclusion and opportunities 
for meaningful participation for disabled people are important issues in disability research. In 
modern welfare states, inevitably care is mingled with health and social policies. Administration 
of social policies such as different types of social security and support programs has attracted 
intense scholarly attention. These programs (and the ways in which they operate) can indeed be 
disabling.369 I make the case for an empirical study of processes and procedures – many of them 
mandated by law - that purport to promote inclusion and participation of disabled people and 
their families and friends. This dissertation’s contribution is expanding our understanding of the 
meaning of participation outside of the employment setting. Here I argue that participation can 
be analyzed at the individual and collective levels. I apply theories about participation from the 
New Governance literature in order to examine techniques purported to promote inclusion and 
participation in the LTC sector. This analysis is intended to extend the debate in the disability 
studies literature by attending to the regulation aspects of participation.  
2.5.1 “Nothing about us without us” in Social Policies 
The principle of user involvement is fundamental in disability advocacy and resistance.370 
To put it simply, disabled people should, wherever possible, decide for themselves.371 This 
principle is important in social services. Hearing from the people directly affected should mean 
services are more appropriate and effective. People should use their own lived experience to 
determine the shape of service provision i.e., expertise by experience. While specialist expertise 
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is still required, this should not mean professionals have all the powers while disabled people 
have none.372  
It follows that social programs can be constructed in an enabling way: by designing social 
programs to achieve larger objectives such as inclusion and equality on the one hand, and by 
building in mechanisms for participation in program administration or operation on the other. It 
is a policy, legal, and fiscal choice and therefore requires close study. The seemingly broad 
acceptance of the notion of participation in policy discourses373 does not always correspond to 
the reality of disabled people. Weber as well as Hansen and Turnbull argue persuasively for 
participation and inclusion for persons with disabilities.  In particular, these scholars assess how 
persons with disabilities participate in the benefits of various programs and draw the link 
between such participation and paid employment.  For example, Turnbull and Hansen write: 
Lack of assistance with basic domestic labour often prevents disabled women 
from accessing the paid labour market.  In addition, to be able to function fully, 
disabled women rely upon the assistance of personal attendants or carers. Cynthia 
Harris might well have been able to function in the workplace with such 
assistance and with similar assistance at home or in the school to help meet 
Bradley's needs. The fit between the world of work and the world of care is poor 
for women, and it is poor for persons with a disability.374 
In some regard, one view is that paid employment is a form of participation and inclusion.  In an 
article about the collective goals, working assumptions, and points of view of the Canadian 
disability movement, Prince explains the Canadian disability movement’s recognition of the 
importance of access to paid labour as one of the dimensions of citizenship:  “Disability activists 
recognize the importance of work incentives in social policy and condemn the work 
disincentives embedded in various income programs and public services.”375  Further, the 
Canadian disability movement strives for greater participation of individuals with physical and 
mental impairments in the mainstream paid labour market.376  This recognition exists in parallel 
with the policy priority given by governments to the employability of adults with disabilities, 
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which is tied to the discourse of economy.377   
This begs the question: what do “participation” and “inclusion” mean for persons with 
disabilities who cannot participate in paid employment, for example, due to advanced age and 
illness?  This is an important area of research because according to Émilie Raymond and 
Amanda Grenier, recent discourses on aging emphasize the value of older people’s social 
participation.378 Although various definitions and interpretations of participation exist in social 
gerontology, the most common appears to be that of participation as a daily and social activity.379 
Results from a critical discourse analysis on aging policy conducted in Quebec between 2005 
and 2011 indicate that over time, participation increasingly came to be defined as productivity. 
The participation context also changed from collective responsibility to community adjustment 
and personal choice. Further, policy texts reflected a polarization between activity and a loss of 
autonomy that linked participation with health status: “With participation and health portrayed as 
intricately linked features of the new aging lifestyle, participation is considered to produce 
health, and health to generate participation – impairment and disability become relegated to the 
margins, invisible, or unvoiced.”380 This draws our attention to the danger of uncritical 
acceptance of “participation” as it can exclude those who are deemed outside of the new aging 
lifestyle.  
 A gap in the literature surveyed is that it is short on prescriptions for participation 
techniques. Hansen and Turnbull did not elaborate concepts such as participation or explain 
precisely how to move forward: “Inclusion requires the ability to see the ways in which our 
current social structures contribute to excluding some individuals among us and the creativity to 
imagine ways to challenge those structures through the participation of all people.”381  Even if 
there is increased participation, would such increased participation “correct or simply reinforce 
existing imbalance of power”382?  This is a promising direction for further research but the 
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analyses will need to be framed with explicit acknowledgement to the “struggle for full 
citizenship” (as termed by Prince) in order to give sufficient attention to the normative aspects of 
participation. 
In particular, this inquiry should be situated within a broader discussion about disability 
organizations engaging in policy development processes.383  This is an important area for close 
examination because fiscal and social benefits are especially critical for overcoming obstacles in 
achieving full membership and participation within Canadian society.  In other words, they can 
be concrete expressions of social citizenship.384  Regrettably, disabled people have often found 
that they lack authority over and within welfare programs and have little control of the 
predominantly nondisabled personnel who manage and operate those programs.  It is argued that 
in any helper-helped relationship, the "helpers” by dint of their super-ordinate position, are able 
to exercise greater influence over defining the problem to be solved.385  In the Krogh and 
Johnson study of home care, it is argued that a community coalition (Home Support Action 
Group) had limited success in influencing home support policy and administration.386  This study 
draws attention to the perils of the appearance of “increased user participation” and “work in 
collaboration”387 – the policy outcome (inadequate home support) remains the same for people 
with disabilities.   
Thus, there is a case for close examination of the techniques used to promote inclusion 
and participation as well as the purposes of and meanings attributed to such techniques.  This in 
turn calls for greater attention to the theoretical justifications for and empirical assessments of 
participation.  Accordingly, I will further the scholarly debate by considering whether there are 
meaningful opportunities for persons with disabilities to participate in making decisions –
individually and collectively – within a benefit scheme or regulatory regime.  My research will 
borrow the techniques and instruments referenced in the New Governance literature, in particular 
the principles of stakeholder participation, decentralization and collaborative process, to analyze 
opportunities for residents in the LTC home sector setting.  This is not an attempt to argue that 
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New Governance is the only possible theoretical approach to explain participation mechanisms 
in the LTC sector or to relate these mechanisms to other health sector reforms.  For example, 
there is a rich and growing body of literature about public and patient engagement.388 The New 
Governance literature provides a useful way to describe how changes in hard and soft law relate 
to participation mechanisms and support required (such as legal representation).  The analyses 
will also be informed by Prince’s discussion of social inclusion in order to properly contextualize 
my case study within the broader struggles of the Canadian disability movement.    
2.5.2 Theorizing Participation in New Governance 
Participation is an important theme in the New Governance literature.  “The goal of New 
Governance theory is to get a broad range of stakeholders involved, including regulated entities, 
private interest groups, government enforcement agencies, and the class of people that the law is 
intended to benefit.”389  As I indicated earlier, one branch of the literature can be described as 
success stories of New Governance, with an emphasis on illustrating the instrumentality of 
participation and other New Governance techniques.390   Scholars envision two crucial roles for 
democratic participation.  First, participation results in better, more responsive programs. 
Second, beyond its instrumental value, participation deepens democracy by conceptualizing a far 
more robust role for stakeholders in the creation of public policy.391  New Governance 
scholarship emphasizes increased participation of non-state actors because it challenges 
conventional assumptions that the regulatory policymaking powers of administrative agencies 
are based on their superior knowledge, information, and expertise.392   New Governance 
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diversifies the types of expertise and experience that new actors bring to the table.393  
Participation has included sharing tasks and responsibilities with the private sector, which creates 
more interdependence between government and the market.  As a result, the boundaries between 
private and public become more fluid and permeable.394   
While there are strong theoretical arguments for participation, one of the debates within 
New Governance scholarship is about the realization of the above-mentioned participatory 
ideals.  The point of contention in the literature is the limits of participation in practice from the 
perspective of outsiders.  Even scholars who advocate forcefully New Governance approaches 
recognize criticisms about grassroot and outsider participation.  A common theme in this debate 
is the conditions necessary for New Governance approaches to be effective. This theme is 
closely related to my earlier discussion about the role of law in New Governance.  
In an article about advancing workplace equity through institutional transformation, 
Susan Sturm summarizes the skepticism about legitimacy and feasibility of grass roots 
participation in New Governance deliberations.395  One of the challenges is developing outsider 
groups' capacity to engage effectively and thus participate as "equals" in the deliberative 
process.396  Also, it is said that there is the challenge of constructing effective processes that 
enable meaningful participation by disempowered groups, and that do not simply privilege 
experts.397  Further, reliance on grass roots organizations in third party monitoring depends on 
strategies for enabling these groups to participate effectively, which are still lacking in the 
literature.  Without attention to these questions, grass roots organizations find it difficult to 
sustain their involvement over time. They also are limited to the relatively rare situations where 
outsiders have already organized sufficiently to engage in effective collective action.398   
In this regard, empirical studies of New Governance approaches in social policies are 
particularly relevant.  Instead of examining success stories, scholars such as Lisa T. Alexander, 
Douglas NeJaime and Wendy Bach critically evaluate instances where New Governance 
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approaches could not deliver concrete outcomes for outsiders.  They challenge the claims made 
by Orly Lobel, Simon, Trubek and other New Governance scholars.  They provide a set of 
questions concerning the potential negative impact of participation in governance that will be a 
useful guide to my analysis of the LTC home sector. 
In a study about implementation of participatory democracy mechanisms in the context of 
poverty law, Wendy Bach suggests that participatory structures, as currently constituted, are 
likely to lead to little more than tokenism.399  More specifically, she acknowledges that the legal 
structures mandating and implementing participation played a crucial role in rendering 
participatory governance endeavors more robust.400  As well, administrative discretion in the 
implementation of the legal mandate was also important.401  However, she raises the issue of 
whether New Governance programs that focus only on participation inside a governing structure 
would be ineffective in achieving robust participation.   She concludes that New Governance 
must allow for additional means to augment and support participation, for example, by providing 
support to independent organizations.402   
NeJaime’s work contributes to our understanding of the limitations of New Governance 
by challenging the New Governance scholarship’s faith in process to engage stakeholders in 
collaborative deliberation in situations lacking strong shared substantive commitments.403  He 
observes that much of the collaborative governance scholarship has been applied in situations 
where some shared ground and commitments exist instead of those characterized by 
diametrically opposed views and constituencies.404 In gender-based advocacy and other identity-
based projects, divergent commitments and intense disagreement regarding baseline norms are 
most likely.405  In a case study about sex education curriculum in Maryland, he illustrates that 
intensely adversarial legal and political relationship between the Christian Right and gay rights 
movements poses an insurmountable challenge to the consensus norm that New Governance 
trusts to defuse adversarial interactions and to expose win-win solutions.  The community indeed 
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attempted a New Governance strategy, using stakeholder participation to revise the curriculum in 
a collaborative process but the parties returned to litigation.406 
Finally, NeJaime contends that effective participation in New Governance collaboration 
means participation that has real implications for process and outcomes and requires a 
meaningful seat at the proverbial table. Access by outsider groups must be meaningful in the 
sense that such groups can actually affect decision making.407  He illustrates how a sham process 
failed to instigate changes in an employment equity context.  The now-dissolved international 
law firm Heller Ehrman LLP sought to address the under-representation of women in partnership 
through the Opt-In Project, which purported to include stakeholders and offer solutions. Heller's 
effort, however, produced little change on the ground and largely ignored the unique situation of 
women of colour.408  In sum, attempts at New Governance participatory structures may 
rhetorically include disempowered stakeholders but actually cede little or no power.409   
2.5.3 New Governance and Health Care  
While there are many articles about the various tools of governance in the health care 
setting,410 I will focus on the issue of participation.  The notion of patient / consumer 
participation has been studied in the New Governance literature.  For example, in an article about 
three health care reforms in the U.S. — achieving universal coverage, embedding technology 
into health care delivery and attaining high quality care for all —Louise Trubek describes the 
processes used to tackle these reforms.411  Trubek discussed how stakeholder groups - 
physicians, health care providers, business, government, consumers/patients, and technology 
experts and entrepreneurs – become reformers of the health care system. Here I will focus on 
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consumers.412 Trubek associates the rise of consumers as key players in health care to the use of 
markets in health care to controlling costs and the increase in patient involvement to control 
chronic disease.413  Consider New Governance’s portrait of the patient / consumer: “The patient 
and consumer are envisioned as independent actors who can influence outcomes at the clinical 
and policy level.”414  Justification for participation seems to originate from what consumers can 
do for the health care system: if consumers and patients are provided information or economic 
incentives, they can influence the system as well as obtain better, less expensive care.415  
Trubek’s discussion puts an emphasis on consumer and patient participation in health care 
reform:  
The consumers are considered essential to the functioning health care 
improvement processes; the voice of consumers and patients is essential for 
deliberation. The voices of the consumers and patients can be provided through 
groups of consumers, such as disease groups, and lawyers who represent 
disadvantaged groups, including racial and ethnic minorities.416   
Trubek’s assumption seems to ignore the information imbalance between consumer / 
patient and health care providers.  At the same time, Trubek seems to recognize the limitation of 
the independent consumer / patient: “While educated patients can be effective at the patient-
physician level, representatives of the interests of the disadvantaged groups are essential at the 
institutional and policy level.”417 Further, “on the institutional and policy level, the knowledge 
required for intervention is often sophisticated and requires skills such as accessing institutional 
policies, locating statutes and court cases, and discovering the places where intervention will be 
useful.”418  This begs the question as to why some consumers are better represented than others. 
Yet my study differs from Trubek’s work in the sense that disability and gender will be 
integrated into my analysis of patient / consumer participation.  A limitation of Trubek’s work is 
that the casting of patient / consumer participation as “consumerist” or “market-oriented” 
assumes a market solution to an equality problem without much substantiation.  To be clear, 
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Trubek’s work originates in part from an interest in eliminating racial and ethnic disparities in 
health care treatment.  It is said that civil rights litigation model has not been successful in 
eliminating such disparities.419  Trubek acknowledges that in order to be legitimate, the 
governance process must include participation of the underrepresented and under-organized 
groups.420  She makes a few helpful suggestions about the techniques of including those groups, 
including explicit measurement of the participation of disadvantaged groups, provision of a 
process where groups who view themselves as excluded can challenge the transparency and 
effectiveness of the governance scheme, and sanctions for those actors who refuse to collaborate 
in new alliances.421  A gap in the literature is that there is little elaboration concerning how 
gender, disability, race, class and other differences are factored into explaining the causality 
between New Governance participatory approaches and their outcomes.  This gap will be 
addressed in my study in two ways. 
First of all, the conversation about patient / consumer participation needs to be extended 
beyond questions about techniques to ask whether user participation could actually influence 
how problems and solutions are defined.  More precisely, New Governance is at best vague at 
explaining how problems may be defined differently by health care consumers due to gender, 
age, race, class and other differences.  It should be clear from the gendered disability perspective 
that women may define health system outcomes differently from dominant policy discourses.  
For example, in a series of focus groups across Canada, Pat Armstrong et al asked how women 
defined quality in health care and concluded that the women interviewed said time in and for 
care are critical components of quality.422 This understanding of quality may not be reflected in 
themes in research literature and policy fields: quality is defined in terms of hospitalization rates 
and of patients’ satisfaction with services.423  The point is that much remains to be studied about 
neglected aspects of consumer / patient participation, such as the lived experience of female 
users of the health care systems.  The gap in the New Governance literature is that increased 
participation of non-state actors appears to be gender-neutral, and it is not clear how gender 
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might mediate the effect of its realization.  More empirical research is needed to demonstrate 
whether user participation could actually influence how problems and solutions are defined in 
specific contexts. 
Secondly, to push this line of thought further, Prince’s observation about placing 
individuals within a larger societal context is particularly useful in avoiding the pitfall of 
reducing consumers / patients to unconnected and undifferentiated individuals.  “Disability 
groups often focus on individuals and their needs, but the general emphasis is not individualistic; 
individuals are interdependent and interconnected through myriad networks of roles, structures, 
and relationships, some of which are enabling, and many others, over the life-course, 
disabling.”424  This research project is intended to move beyond an “individualistic” 
understanding of participation by examining how the law creates and maintains mechanisms for 
individuals as well as groups to participate on an on-going basis.  In particular, one possible line 
of inquiry is to examine participation of LTC residents and their families in influencing the 
operation of the homes through legally mandated participatory mechanisms, for example, 
through Residents’ Councils and Family Councils.425   The literature has not provided many 
examples of on-going collective participation mechanisms that allow consumers/patients and 
families to access decision-making in health facilities.  This line of inquiry addresses the gap in 
the New Governance literature by interrogating participation in decision-making at the LTC 
home level.   
2.5.4 Summary  
Having established that the concept of hybridity (more flexible, informal approach 
combined with traditional law) is a promising way to describe and explain many of the 
regulation and governance changes, here I concentrate on one of the “new” approaches: 
participation. In light of the significance assigned to the concept of “inclusion” from a disability 
perspective, this research aims to better understand participation outside of employment context 
and more specifically, in decision-making opportunities – individually or collectively - in public 
benefit schemes and regulatory regimes.  The New Governance literature informs my own 
theorization of participation and provides a set of issues to consider in my case study: means to 
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augment and support participation, lack of strong shared substantive commitments, access by 
outsider groups to decision-making power, and individualistic understanding of patient / 
consumer participation.  A gap in the literature is that there is little elaboration concerning how 
gender, disability, race, class and differences are factored into explaining the causality between 
New Governance participatory approaches and their outcomes.  My study will extend existing 
analysis by focusing on whether participation could actually influence how problems and 
solutions are defined, based on the assumption that gender needs to be taken into account.  My 
case study could be used to compare with other examples of inclusion and participation in the 
social and political realm in order to contribute to debates about the disconnect between 
theoretical justifications of participation mechanisms and empirical realities of disempowered 
groups and outsiders in social policy.        
2.6 Summary of theoretical contributions of the research and 
conclusion 
To conclude, I will briefly summarize the theoretical contributions of my research. First, 
care, in particular institutional care, is not a new problem in disability studies but I am offering 
new ways of studying the problem. To this end, I build on more recent research that attends to 
the possibility of being inclusive of the disability studies’ critiques of care and the gendered 
nature of care. What this research adds to the conversation about care is a more comprehensive 
analysis of the legal aspects of institutional care today. Drawing on insights from feminist 
disability scholars such as Jenny Morris and Carol Thomas about why care is so problematic for 
disabled women, I theorize on the one hand, how law, including substantive and procedural 
protections offered by law, has shaped the lived experience of those living in institutions today; 
on the other hand, how law reflects meanings of and assumptions about disability. The linkage 
between disability critique of care and the gendered nature of care is made by Herring’s work on 
care and caring relationships. To extend debate about the caring relationship, my analysis will 
incorporate the work of Nedelsky on relational approach to law, rights and autonomy. Following 
Nedelsky, I will turn my attention to the difference context makes (in my case, disability, gender 
and age) and ask how existing laws and rights may have helped to construct the current problems 
in LTC and justifications for solutions as proposed by the government. This will lead to a 
broader discussion about state support for care and what such discussion can tell us about state / 
citizen relationship.   
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Secondly, I apply concepts in the New Governance scholarship in order to provide an 
empirical account of changes to the regulation and governance in the LTC sector, which in turn 
shape care and care relationships. New Governance scholars argue persuasively that law is 
problem-solving involving institutional experimentation in a pragmatist sense. I incorporate the 
notion of problem-solving and delve into the tensions inherent in the LTC sector and ask how 
such tensions are negotiated using New Governance approaches. The analysis will include an 
assessment of the regulation and governance changes in terms of how they measure up to New 
Governance approaches. I will also provide an account of changes that do not fit into New 
Governance. This will fill a gap in the New Governance scholarship because there are relatively 
fewer studies devoted to social policies and in the Canadian context.  The “care” relationships 
provide a novel context through which to study the implementation of New Governance 
approaches in parallel with so-called command-and-control regulation. My research also differs 
from many of the existing studies because it will yield a deeper understanding of how disability, 
gender and age mediate the impact of New Governance.  
Thirdly, my research will further the scholarly debate about participation and inclusion of 
persons with disabilities by considering whether there are meaningful opportunities for users to 
participate in making decisions – individually and collectively – within a benefit scheme or 
regulatory regime.  If we accept that care, including care that is provided as part of a government 
scheme, must be understood in its relational context, it follows that measures that influence the 
interactions of those involved in caring relationships such as participation mechanisms, are 
worthy of critical inquiry. In doing so, New Governance’s work on the normative and 
instrumental value of different forms of participation complement theorization about exclusion 
of disabled people in different settings. I seek to contribute to the literature by moving beyond an 
“individualistic” understanding of participation by examining how the law creates mechanisms 
for individuals as well as groups to participate on an on-going basis.  Again, since the scope of 
my research includes different parties in a caring relationship, I will also consider participation 
of families and friends in the operation of LTC homes. The conditions necessary for meaningful 
participation, not just law, will be explored in order to articulate theoretical justifications for 
support to those who may not be able to participate in more conventional ways. My research 
could be used to compare with other examples of participation and inclusion in the social and 
political realms.      
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3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The following research methods were employed in this dissertation: 1) detailed 
examination of the contents of publicly available government reports; 2) legislation (statutes, 
regulation and “soft law”) and case law; and 3) key informant interviews.   Informed by the 
literature review, I combined these methods to create a more comprehensive and reliable account 
of the changes to the legislation and governance of treatment, care and living circumstances 
within long-term care homes in Ontario between 2004 and June 2018.426  This chapter describes 
each method and its respective justification in the order that the methods were carried out.  
But before proceeding to the discussion of research methods, I want to take a step back 
and consider the question of “who legal research is done for”.427 Desmond Manderson and 
Richard Mohr argue that legal research is informed by understandings of the question and role of 
law in society.428   As a process of debating between outcomes, law offers a language for 
articulating issues of morality and justice.429   In explaining the inherent tension between legal 
practice and legal scholarship, they maintain that an ethics of law understands legal argument as 
a way of helping us to differentiate between alternative outcomes rather than simply dictate the 
shortest way to a predetermined goal.   Further, to move to an ethically prudent approach - which 
recognises alternative outcomes - is to recognise alternative reference groups. Hence, legal 
research needs to be comprehended and approached as continuous with the purposes of law, in 
other words, with legal ethics.430 According to Manderson and Mohr: 
. . . we first recognised that 'discovering the law' was inadequate for any but the most 
limited view of vocational legal research. Broadening our perspective, we now propose 
that research is defined not only by its objects of inquiry (statutes or society), but also the 
interests it serves. To recognise this is not simply to take different sides in a traditional 
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adversarial contest, but to identify new sources guiding our inquiries and their purposes. 
Legal research must refresh itself not by a divorce from interests (or advocacy) but by a 
diversification of and problematising of those interests.431  
By identifying alternative interest groups – in this case, people with disabilities and older 
women – I hope to find “alternative standpoints from which to take a fresh look at the social and 
moral world”432  (or at least the world of regulation and governance).  To put it differently, the 
incorporation of disability and gender into this research can also be justified from a 
methodological perspective.        
3.2 Review of Government Documents 
Review of government documents was the first phase of my research in part to reflect the 
“law in context” tradition.433   More specifically, the starting point is not law but rather problems 
in society which are likely to be generalized or generalizable.  Thus, law becomes problematic in 
two ways: it may be a contributor or cause of a problem and may provide a solution or be part of 
a solution.  Of the latter, other non-law solutions, including social and political arrangements, are 
not precluded and may indeed be preferred.434   Accordingly, the primary purpose of document 
review for this study was to ascertain how public bodies (units of government) and their 
relationships with the LTC system shaped the specific policy questions about health, illness, 
disability and health care that were being asked in that period.  The assumption here was that 
identifying the key concepts or ideas embedded in these public documents would reveal the 
perceptions or understanding of problems regarding long-term care homes.  The content of some 
of these documents helped me to contextualize and explain the legislative and regulatory changes 
(the next research phase). 
The first task was to locate the relevant public bodies and to determine their respective 
significance in this study.  To reflect the multiple locations of the exercise of power and control 
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in the sector, it is imperative to consider “where and how deliberations and decision making 
occurs.”   Below is a list of provincial public bodies whose documents I reviewed as these are the 
bodies that carry out deliberations and /or make decisions about long-term care home issues in 
Ontario: 
• Auditor General 
• Ombudsman 
• Standing Committee on Social Policy 
• Standing Committee on Public Account 
• Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) 
• Chief Coroner for Ontario   
• Geriatric and Long Term Care Review Committee (Chief Coroner) 
• Local Health System Integration Networks (LHINs) 
• Health Quality Ontario (HQO) 
The decision to examine only publicly available documents was based on the following 
considerations. The potential costs and time required to submit Freedom of Information requests 
make it impractical to include internal documents. As well, such requests are unlikely to generate 
useful documents because internal documents are likely to be subject to various exemptions and 
privileges such as solicitor-client privilege and Advice to Cabinet. Further, even if documents are 
released, they are most likely to be early drafts of publicly available documents or internal 
decision documents that confirm decisions that would be announced later.   
To locate publicly available documents, I visited the website of each of these bodies and 
searched for reports that are related to long-term care homes.  More specifically, I looked for 
reports, plans and documents under the headings of “seniors”, “Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care”, “long-term care homes”, “health care” or “long-term care”.  This search also 
included news releases and other communication materials that accompany the release of these 
documents.  Last but not least, I also contacted the clerks of the Standing Committees to request 
documents that are relevant to my case study, such as the government’s responses to 
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recommendations of Standing Committees. These are the core documents. The documents used 
in this dissertation were published between 2004 and 2018. 
I also reviewed government documents that could inform me of policy directions that are 
relevant to my case study (the supplementary documents).  The first set of documents concern 
background about the health care sector generally and funding information including government 
investment in the LTC sector, such as the annual provincial budget, mandate letters and strategy 
documents.  The second set of documents concern policy areas that are related to my topic, such 
as consultation papers related to the Accessibility of Ontarians with Disabilities Act (AODA), 
and reports about income security issued by Statistics Canada. The third group of documents that 
I consulted are documents that illuminate the complex formal and informal relationships among 
these bodies as well as with groups that are active in the sector.  These documents included 
memorandum of understanding, annual reports, strategic plans and so forth.  I chose Health 
Quality Ontario and one of the LHINs (Toronto Central) because they both have accountability 
relationships with LTC homes and these documents help me to understand the context in which 
the LHINs and Health Quality Ontario attempt to influence the behaviours of homes.   
My analysis of government documents (the core documents) was mostly inductive as this 
was done at the beginning of the research project where I was in the exploratory and discovery 
stage.   The purpose was to allow understanding of critical themes and issues to emerge from 
close study of texts.435    The review of government reports was done in two stages:  each report 
was reviewed and analyzed separately and then all the analyses were summarized to identify 
common themes.  To ensure the document review was done consistently, I undertook a 
preliminary review of a sample of documents, for example, one document from each body, and 
then developed a template for tracking my analysis.  The template specified the key issues, 
concepts, approaches, and official positions.  I then conducted a comprehensive review of all of 
the documents using the template.  In other words, I continually wrote down my thoughts about 
what I was reading and these thoughts and observations became analysis about how the themes 
 
435 H Russell Bernard, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 2nd ed (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2013) at 524–525. Bernard discusses two epistemological approaches for all research: induction 
and deduction.  All research is ultimately a combination of inductive and deductive efforts.  He argues that the work 
is mostly inductive when the researcher is in the exploratory and discovery stage of any research project.  In 
contrast, the work is mostly deductive when the researcher is in the confirmatory stage of any research project. 
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are connected to each other in a theoretical way.436   As well, I identified and recorded any other 
official reports that were released during this period but missed during the initial search.   These 
reports were reviewed following the same process. 
3.3 Legislation (statutes, regulation, “soft law”) and case law 
While this dissertation draws on theories from outside of legal scholarship (particularly 
from the fields of disability studies and feminist political economy) in order to tease out the 
meanings of the changes, the bulk of my analysis is fundamentally rooted in a study of law. But 
the question of “what is the law” is not a straightforward question. Health law, where regulation 
of LTC homes belongs, covers a variety of provincial and federal statutes, interwoven with 
common law and constitutional law principles. This is complicated by the existence of a variety 
of guidelines of various degrees of legal formality applicable to the sector. In other words, the 
health law researcher inevitably has to make choices about which law is the most relevant to the 
subject i.e., LTC homes.    
3.3.1 Hard Law  
According to Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, doctrinal research (or the “black-
letter” law approach) relies heavily on using court judgements and statutes to explain law.   This 
type of research aims to systematize, rectify and clarify the law on any particular topic through a 
distinctive mode of analysis of authoritative texts that include primary and secondary sources. 437  
One of its assumptions is that the character of legal scholarship is derived from the law itself.438    
In recent years, pure doctrinal analysis has been criticised for its intellectually rigid, inflexible 
and inward-looking approach to understanding the law and the operation of the legal system.439  
Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns argue that doctrinal research is a process of selecting and 
 
436 Ibid at 530. Bernard discusses “memoing”: the researcher continually writes down his / her thoughts about what 
he / she is reading.  These thoughts become information on which to develop theories.  Memoing is taking “field 
notes” on observations about texts.  The observations can be about the themes emerging or ideas about how the 
themes are connected. 
437 Chui & McConville, supra note 433 at 3–4. 
438 Ibid at 4. 
439 Ibid. 
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weighting materials taking into account hierarchy and authority as well as understanding social 
context and interpretation.440 
This study does include typical doctrinal research as described by McConville and Chui.  
For this study, the purpose of doctrinal research is to identify legislation that is applicable to the 
circumstances around treatment, care and living circumstances within LTC homes. 441  The 
typology of “hard law” and “soft law” is useful here.442 In addition to the statutes and 
regulations, guidelines and agreements that impose requirements on LTC homes or offer 
guidance on compliance are also within the scope of my research.  For those guidelines that are 
referenced in statutes or published by the government, I consider them to be part of the formal 
legal regime. To identify the relevant statutes, regulations and “soft law”, I reviewed the web 
content of MOHLTC.  In particular, I reviewed the list of statutes introduced or amended during 
the period of 2004 and 2018 (under the heading of “Legislation” on MOHLTC’s website).  I also 
reviewed the Legislative Assembly’s website for omnibus bills such as budget bills and good 
government bills (which may include amendments to statutes administered by the Minister of 
Health).  As well, I identified changes to regulations made by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-
Council (Cabinet) or the Minister of Health by reviewing the web content of Ontario’s 
Regulatory Registry443 and E-Law.  
Since my research question (“what are the changes”) encompasses a comparison of the 
current and previous legal regimes governing the LTC sector, I used the implementation of the 
LTCHA as the beginning of the current regime. The previous regime was composed of three 
statutes: Nursing Homes Act, Homes for the Aged and Rest Homes Act and the Charitable 
Institutions Act. The three previous statutes were similar but not identical. In terms of structure, 
all three statutes covered important topics such as Residents’ Councils, Residents’ Bill of Rights, 
 
440 Ian Dobson & Francis Johns, “Qualitative Legal Research” in Mike McConville & Wing Hong Chui, eds, 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2017) 18 at 21–22. 
441   Ibid at 22–23.   Dobinson and Johns note that law is reasoned and not found.  Law cannot be objectively isolated 
and the aim is to establish a doctrinal legal research methodology which takes into account of the nature of law. 
442 Robin Creyke & John McMillan, “Soft Law v Hard Law” in Linda Pearson, Carol Harlow & Mark Tushnet, eds, 
Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson (Oxford; Portland, OR: Hart 
Publishing, 2008) 377. 
443 ServiceOntario, “Ontario’s Regulatory Registry”, (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 2018), online: 
<http://www.ontariocanada.com/registry/>. The Registry is a source for information on new proposed regulatory 
initiatives that could affect Ontario businesses as well as recently approved regulations that affect businesses. 
81 
Admission and Eligibility requirements and Inspection. There were also some key differences 
among these statutes. However, a comparison of all three previous statutes with the new LTCHA 
would be repetitive. The Nursing Homes Act was chosen because, at the time of transition to the 
new legal framework (2010), more than half of the LTC beds were operated by the private sector 
(see Chapter 4) and were subject to the Nursing Homes Act. The Homes for the Aged and Rest 
Homes Act was applicable to municipal homes while the Charitable Institutions Act was 
applicable to non-profit homes. The table in Appendix A illustrates the current and previous 
regulatory regimes specific to LTC in Ontario. 
On February 26, 2019, the Ontario government introduced The People’s Health Care Act, 
2019 (Bill 74). The Bill received Royal Assent on April 18, 2019.444 The Bill would consolidate 
multiple health care agencies and organizations within a single agency - Ontario Health.445 Once 
the relevant provisions of Bill 74 become effective, the Local Health System Integration Act and 
its regulations would be repealed in stages. The 14 local health integration networks and their 
functions would be reorganized.446 Bill 74 would make consequential amendments to a number 
of statutes, including the Excellent Care for All Act, 2010 and Long-Term Care Homes Act, 
2007.447 These statutes are within the scope of my doctrinal research. The legislative changes 
provided for by Bill 74 would come into effect at different dates.448 However, at the time of 
writing, the changes are not in effect yet. Therefore, the comparison of the previous and current 
regulatory regimes described in Chapters 5 to 8 is still relevant. This dissertation does not 
address the Bill 74 changes.   
Another important legislative development is Bill 100, Protecting What Matters Most Act 
(Budget Measures), 2019.449 Introduced for First Reading on April 11, 2019, Bill 100 affects 
statutes within the scope of this research (such as the Excellent Care for All Act and Substitute 
Decisions Act) and introduces a new statute. Schedule 17 of Bill 100 repealed the Proceedings 
 
444 Bill 74, The People’s Health Care Act, 2019, 1st session, 42nd Leg, Ontario, 2019 (assented to 18 April 2019), SO 
2019, c.5. 
445 Bill 74 would enact the Connecting Care Act, 2019, SO 2019, c.5, Sched 1. 
446 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Building a Connected Public Health Care System for the Patient 
(Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2019). 
447 The People’s Health Care Act, 2019, supra note 444. See schedule 3. 
448 Ibid, s 2. 
449 Bill 100, Protecting What Matters Most Act (Budget Measures), 2019, 1st session, 42nd Leg, Ontario, 2019 
(assented to 29 May 2019), SO 2019, c.7. 
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Against the Crown Act and replaced it with the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.450 
The new Act came into force on July 1, 2019 with retroactive effects. It addresses Crown 
liability, including the limits on it, and sets out the procedural rules that apply in proceedings 
against the Crown and, in some cases, proceedings to which the Crown is a party. The new Act 
could affect the ability of residents and/or their family members to bring forward certain types of 
actions (e.g. tort) against the provincial government and transfer payment recipients such as LTC 
homes. This act is excluded from the scope of my review. 
Other laws of general application are relevant to the regulation and governance of LTC 
sector in Ontario and are included in the review. However, changes to these laws are best 
described as incremental in nature rather than a complete “overhaul”. Table 1 lists the laws of 
general application included in my review.  
Table 1: Laws of General Application 
Constitutional 
and quasi-
constitutional  
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11. 
 
Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19 
 
Disability  Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005, SO 2005, c 11.  
 
O Reg 191/11 
 
Health care 
related  
Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 2. 
 
O Reg 104/96 
 
Substitute Decisions Act, SO 1992, c 30.  
 
O Reg 460/05 
 
Guidelines for Conducting Assessments of Capacity (incorporated by 
reference in O Reg 460/05) 
 
To ensure the consistency of the review, a template was developed to summarize the 
comparison.  The template tracked my close textual reading of the statutes listed above, the 
legislative intent and nature of the changes, linkages to government documents, and deliberations 
 
450 Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, SO 2019, c. 7, Sched. 17. 
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and decisions associated with the changes. The comparison of old and new was informed by the 
key issues identified in the document review. The headings in a statute also helped me to tease 
out the key topics. However, the comparison was not exhaustive (i.e., not a section by section 
comparison).  For example, consequential amendments (e.g. updating the French version of a 
statute) were excluded. Also, issues that are not “live” are excluded. For example, I did not 
address smoking in LTC homes because of the passing of the Smoke Free Ontario Act. A 
synthesis of all of the material I collected allowed me to make statements about what the law is 
on primary authority.   
3.3.2 Soft law  
According to Robin Creyke and John McMillian, a distinguishing feature of soft law is 
that it is intended to influence behaviour.451 This intention is supported by some of the legal 
enforceability mechanisms.452 It is argued that businesses, individuals and governments are 
willing to trade off the certainty and authoritative effect of legal rules for more flexible and 
adaptable soft law regulation.453  
In the health sector, there are many guidelines issued by various bodies. Some are 
explicitly linked to formal law (for example, a regulatory college’s code of practice) while some 
are completely voluntary (for example, guideline issued by a research institute). It is not possible 
to include all guidelines applicable to LTC in Ontario in this research, so I included a sample. 
Only a small number of organizations (nine) were included but they represented a diverse range 
of soft law applicable to the LTC sector (specifically those of regulatory colleges, professional 
associations, established knowledge transfer organizations and an accreditation agency). Some 
organizations also issued a considerable number of guidelines, however not all of them are 
relevant. By way of example, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) has 
guidelines pertaining to the operation of independent health facilities. Such guidelines were 
excluded from my review. I included guidelines that explicitly mention long-term care, or care 
for illnesses that are prevalent in the sector such as dementia, or issues known to require further 
guidance such as use of physical restraints. I also sought out guidelines that could illuminate 
 
451 Creyke & McMillan, supra note 442 at 379. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Ibid at 404. 
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concepts in statutes, such as “consent” and “patient-centred care”.  Finally, since my project is 
about changes, I included guidelines that were introduced or amended during this period.  
 
Table 2: Soft Law 
Organization  Number of 
documents 
reviewed  
College of Physicians and Surgeons and Ontario (CPSO)  9 
College of Nurses of Ontario (CNO) 6  
College of Dietitians of Ontario 1 
Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) 1  
Health Quality Ontario  1 
Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario (RNAO)  12 
Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI) 2  
Accreditation Canada 1  
Choose Wisely Canada 1 
 
This study is not only about “finding the law”.  It also concerns the question of law as a 
contributor to and/or solution to social problems.  Therefore, this research also attempts to attend 
to decisions and deliberations that may lead us to ask “how things get to be called law, or how 
they are experienced as such, and with what effects.”454  To this end, I focused on the Standing 
Committees that considered LTCHA and other health-related statutes. In particular, I reviewed 
compendia, stakeholder submissions to Standing Committees, research products of the 
Legislative Assembly Library Services and clause-by-clause debates. They were useful for 
understanding the government’s interpretation of the LTCHA including its legislative intent. 
 
454 Manderson & Mohr, supra note 427 at 160. 
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3.3.3 Case law  
It is also essential to check judicial consideration of the statutes and regulations I was 
reviewing against my own assumptions about interpretation or application. 455  The difficulty is 
that the LTCHA is a relatively new statute (effective July 2010) and there are very few cases that 
cite the LTCHA (outside of proceedings pursuant to the Labour Relations Act such as 
disciplinary decisions concerning long-term care home employees).  Since the Health Services 
Appeal and Review Board (HSARB)  hears appeals related to matters pursuant to the LTCHA, a 
search of these cases was undertaken on CanLII. I also checked whether any of these cases was 
appealed to the Superior Court. 
The next group of cases was those brought under the Health Care Consent Act. The 
Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) hears appeals about incapacity findings regarding treatment, 
LTC admission and personal assistance.  A search of these cases was done on CanLII.456 I also 
checked whether any of these cases were appealed to the Superior Court, the Court of Appeal 
and then the Supreme Court of Canada. For CCB cases, I concentrated on cases where the 
appellants were deemed to be incapable of making decisions about LTC admission or where 
family members made applications to be appointed as representatives of incapable persons for 
LTC admission purpose.  
The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario is another forum where residents or applicants 
may assert their rights under the Ontario Human Rights Code.  A search was done on CanLII to 
determine if any cases were brought forward by LTC residents or applicants or their family 
members (or litigation guardian). 
The AODA is different from the statutes mentioned above in the sense that it is not a 
right conferring statute. There is no appeal mechanism for those who feel that an organization 
has not met the accessibility standards established under the AODA when they receive services.  
Rather, the AODA allows for appeals to the Licence Appeal Tribunal related to enforcement 
actions, such as administrative penalties imposed by the Director of the Accessibility Directorate 
of Ontario for non-compliance of filing requirements.  I found only four cases when I performed 
 
455 Dobson & Johns, supra note 440 at 27. 
456 The CCB does not publish all decisions, only those decisions with written reasons. Any party of a particular case 
can request written reasons. 
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my search and they could not tell us very much about the interpretation of the AODA. I also 
searched for court cases that refer to the AODA in order to get a sense of how the AODA is 
interpreted by the courts and the context in which disability issues may come up. These cases are 
not related to LTC. 
Regarding equality cases, I started by reviewing the recent issues of leading journals, 
including the Supreme Court Law Review, Review of Constitutional Studies and National 
Journal of Constitutional Law.  I also consulted the Canadian Journal of Disability Studies and 
Canadian Journal of Women and Law for articles about relevant cases that are related disability 
and gender.  This literature review helped me to identify three leading cases: Withler v. Canada 
(Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 396, Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 
5, and R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483.  
I also reviewed cases that engage care issues that may come up in the LTC home sector.  
I relied on my knowledge about the health care system. These are well-known cases.  The cases 
are purposely chosen because they can inform me of matters that are relevant to the case study. 
For example, I reviewed the class actions related to Huronia, Rideau and Southwestern457 
because although they were settled, they still provide a glimpse of the harms of institutional care 
and give a sense of the arguments advanced by the government about state responsibility (or the 
lack thereof) towards those being “cared for” in institutions operated by the government.         
Table 3: Summary of Judicial Decisions Reviewed 
Type of decisions  Forum  # of cases  
Appeals related to the LTCHA HSARB 
Superior Court  
4 
1 
Consent – LTC admission  CCB  
Superior Court  
10 
3 
Consent – personal assistance 
services 
CCB  
 
 
4 
 
457 Dolmage v. Ontario, supra note 170; McKillop and Bechard v. HMQ, supra note 170. 
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Type of decisions  Forum  # of cases  
Consent – treatment  CCB  
Superior Court 
7 
5 
AODA  LAT 4 
AODA – other  small claims court, Superior 
Court, law society discipline 
hearings, WSIAT etc.   
8 
Human Rights  Human Rights Tribunal of 
Ontario 
3 (but 
each case has 
multiple 
decisions)  
Equality  Supreme Court of Canada 3 
Other care cases  Federal Court, Supreme Court of 
Canada and Superior Court  
8 (each 
may have 
multiple 
decisions) 
  
3.4 Key informant Interviews  
Although this project is predominantly based on legal analysis, I contend that the themes 
in the interviews assist in filling the gaps in the research.  
In the final stage of my research, I identified and interviewed key informants. The key 
informant interview is a research method commonly used by ethnographers and is a type of 
individual interview that involves forming a relationship over time.458   Key informants are 
individuals who possess special knowledge, position in a culture or status, or communication 
skills.  They have access to perspectives and or observations that would otherwise be denied to 
 
458 Valerie J Gilchrist & Robert L Williams, “Key Informant Interviews” in Benjamin F Crabtree & William L 
Miller, eds, Doing Qualitative Research, 2nd ed (Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications, 1999) 71 at 71. 
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the researcher. Most importantly, they are willing to share their knowledge and skills with the 
researcher.459   The selection of key informants is not based on a random sampling; rather, it 
represents a non-probability sampling, known as purposeful, strategic or information rich 
sampling.460   Two sets of criteria can be used in finding key informants: 1) the type of 
information being sought, either based on a theoretical perspective or is data driven; 2) 
compatibility for on-going relationship.461  This results in a small number of informants who are 
willing and able to work with the researcher.462  
I used multiple methods to select potential interviewees.  To identify which advocacy 
groups may have been able to assist with filling in the information gaps, my first step was be to 
identify groups that had presented at public hearings when the LTCHA was at the Standing 
Committee Stage in 2007.  In addition, I reviewed official reports (identified in phase one) to 
locate advocacy groups that had participated in advisory groups, committees, taskforces or 
roundtables.  As well, I checked the agendas of industry conferences, lists of researchers for 
projects commissioned by the Law Commission of Ontario463 and faculty lists for professional 
development sessions. I reviewed the methodology sections of articles regarding LTC to identify 
groups that had been involved in previous relevant research projects.464 The groups I identified 
had participated in multiple consultations, or maintained on-going relationships with the Ministry 
or have on-going involvement in LTC issues. The selection of potential respondents was also 
informed by reviewing the literature on Canadian disability movement and other social 
movements. Over the course of my research, I developed contacts with various organizations 
associated or familiar with various disability issues. Finally, as a former employee of the 
MOHLTC, I drew on my own understanding of stakeholders in the health care sector.            
The Human Participants Review Sub-Committee reviewed and approved this project 
(STU 2015 – 154).  The last approval was for the period November 2017 to November 2018.   
 
459 Ibid at 72. 
460 Ibid at 75–76. 
461 Ibid at 76. 
462 Ibid at 77. 
463 The Law Commission of Ontario had completed a number of projects that are relevant to my research: Legal 
Capacity, Decision‐Making and Guardianship, The Law as it Affects Persons with Disabilities and the Law as it 
Affects Older Adults.  
464 For example see Rachel Barken & Pat Armstrong, “Skills of Workers in Long-Term Residential Care: Exploring 
Complexities, Challenges, and Opportunities” (2018) 43:1 Ageing Int 110. 
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A total of 15 interviews were conducted with 18 individuals. Five interviews were 
conducted on a “with attribution” basis and ten were conducted on a “without attribution” 
(anonymous) basis. The small number of interviews is justified by the diversity of perspectives 
represented: residents and families, homes and unions. Of the 18 interviewees, the four lawyers 
provided insights from a legal perspective that are not always present in recent social science and 
health policy research on LTC. One notable perspective missing here is the provincial 
government’s perspective. I was not able to secure an interview with any representative from the 
Long-Term Care Home Division of the MOHLTC or Health Quality Ontario.  The extensive 
document review partially compensated for the lack of provincial interviewees. Below is a list of 
the organizations and individuals interviewed:  
Table 4: Interviewees 
Interviewee  Description 
1 Health Law lawyer (anonymous)  
2 Lorraine Purdon, Executive Director, Family Councils Ontario 
3 Samantha Peck, Director, Communications and Education, Family Councils Ontario 
4 Dr. Fred Mather, President, Ontario Long-Term Care Clinicians 
5 Lois Dent, Board Member, Concerned Friends of Ontario Citizens in Care Facilities 
6 
Jordanne Holland, Board Member, Concerned Friends of Ontario Citizens in Care 
Facilities 
7 Keith Dee, Director of Membership, Community Living Ontario 
8 Gord Kyle, Director of Policy, Community Living Ontario  
9 Union representative (anonymous)  
10 Industry association representative (anonymous) 
11 Beverly Mathers, Chief Executive Officer, Ontario Nurses’ Association  
12 Judith Wahl, Elder Law Lawyer  
13 Disability Rights Lawyer (anonymous) 
14 Dee Lender, Executive Director, Ontario Association of Residents’ Councils 
15 Andy Savela, Director of Health Care, Unifor  
16 Industry association representative (anonymous) 
17 Michael Jacek, Senior Advisor, Association of Municipalities of Ontario 
18  Lisa Corrente, Partner, Torkin Manes LLP 
 
Interviewees were asked different types of questions because each possessed specific area 
of knowledge or experience in relation to the research topic (with some overlap if they were 
positioned to address similar concerns).  The interview questions were developed after my 
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analysis of government reports and legislation was complete. Prior to and during the interview 
stage of the research, I reviewed the more recent research in the feminist political economy 
literature in order to re-visit emerging issues in the literature. Prior to the interviews, I had also 
reviewed publicly available ‘grey literature’ such as technical reports, position papers, 
background briefings and written submissions to government produced by these groups to gather 
as much background information as possible. If there was not enough information about a 
particular interviewee or organization, a newspaper search was conducted using names of the 
interviewees or their organizations. I did not collect detailed demographic information about 
participants. The list of topics for each interviewee is in Appendix B.    
Key informant interviews were conducted between September 2017 and February 2018 
and then in August 2018. All interviews were conducted in Toronto. The interviews – either by 
phone or in person - ranged between 45 minutes to almost two hours in length, with the majority 
of the interviews being completed in approximately one hour.  In advance of the interviews, I 
drafted and forwarded to participants a list of broad topics in advance, and if requested by an 
interviewee, I provided more detailed questions, however, ultimately I structured each interview 
as a conversation, rather than as a series of carefully worded questions. In some cases, 
interviewees introduced additional topics or issues that they believed to be relevant to my 
project. Fourteen interviews were taped with the permission of the interviewees and then 
transcribed.  The transcripts were then uploaded into the qualitative analysis software package 
NVivo (http://www.qsrinternational.com/product) for the purpose of managing and coding the 
data. 
The analysis of text in the transcript is based on thematic analysis. “Thematic analysis is 
a data reduction and analysis strategy by which qualitative data are segmented, categorized, 
summarized, and reconstructed in a way that captures the important concepts within the data 
set.”465 The first stage of the analysis involved closely reading a total of 14 interview transcripts 
by reading each transcript twice.466  As Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman state, 
“Reading, re-reading and reading once more forces the researcher to become intimately familiar 
 
465 Lioness Ayres, “Thematic Coding and Analysis” in Lisa Given, ed, The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative 
Research Methods (Thousand Oaks California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008) 868. 
466 Gery Ryan & H Bernard, “Techniques to Identify Themes” (2003) 15:1 Field Methods 85 at 89. One interview 
was not recorded and transcribed at the request of the interviewee. 
91 
with those data.”467 The next phase is generating categories and themes.468 Categories may be 
theory-driven or data-driven, derived from research literature, or based on intuition.469 My 
analysis is informed by Gery Ryan and H Russell Bernard’s observation that themes come both 
from the data (an inductive approach) and from the investigator’s prior theoretical understanding 
of the phenomenon under study (an a priori approach).470 Some themes would be anticipated in 
the text due to the topics or questions that I asked the interviewees.  The first attempt at 
generating themes often comes from the interview questions.471 But of course, one cannot 
anticipate all the themes that will arise before analyzing the data and therefore themes are partly 
empirical.472 Ryan and Bernard suggest that themes and subthemes may be discovered using a 
number of techniques. Repetition is one of the easiest ways to identify themes.473 An example of 
code is “caring conditions”, which is a theme in the feminist political economy literature to 
describe conditions necessary for good care, such as working conditions (see Chapter 4). Using 
the “node” function of NVivo, I created nodes and then child nodes to represent the themes and 
sub-themes. An example of a child node under “caring conditions” is “violence and safety”, 
which is a much debated issue in the literature and covers matters such as assaults experienced 
by workers and theoretical accounts of such assaults. The nodes and child nodes I generated are 
listed in Appendix C. Then I coded the transcripts according to the child nodes and read the text 
in each child node. A short summary of the content of each child node was prepared as the 
“analytic memo”. 
My final comment is about the trustworthiness and rigour of the data collection. For 
Paulette Rothbauer, triangulation means a multi-method approach to data collection and data 
analysis. The underpinning idea of triangulation is that the phenomena under study can be 
understood best when approached with a variety or a combination of research methods.474  
 
467 Catherine Marshall & Gretchen B Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE 
Publications, 2014) at 158. 
468 Ibid at 156. 
469 Sharon Lockyer, “Coding Qualitative Data” in Michael Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman & Tim Futing Liao, eds, The 
SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2004) 
138. 
470 Ryan & Bernard, supra note 466 at 88. 
471 Ibid; Ayres, supra note 465. 
472 Ryan & Bernard, supra note 466 at 88. 
473 Ibid at 89. 
474 Paulette M Rothbauer, “Triangulation” in Lisa Given, ed, The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research 
Methods (Thousand Oaks California: SAGE Publications, 2008) 893. 
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Where possible, I used two or more methods to confirm my understanding of a particular issue. 
For example, to understand workplace violence issues in LTC, I relied on document review and 
interviews with union representatives. For this project, triangulation is also made possible when 
the same question was asked of more than one interviewee who could speak knowledgeably 
about a particular topic. But this was not always feasible. For example, there was only one 
provincial association representing the Residents’ Councils. I could not find another provincial 
organization that could speak from the perspective of Residents’ Councils to triangulate multiple 
perspectives.      
3.5 Conclusion 
This dissertation adopted multiple methods of data collection and analysis to investigate 
the implications of the changes to the regulation and governance of the LTC sector in Ontario 
between 2004 and 2018. This is a dissertation primarily rooted in law, therefore includes details 
of the relevant legislation, case law and materials for interpreting law that inform this research 
question. But it also expands beyond doctrinal analysis and includes the methods of document 
review and key informant interviews. In the next chapter, I will shift from a theoretical 
perspective to an empirical account of regulation and governance of LTC in Ontario. 
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4 Background and Themes in LTC Research 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will set the scene for an empirical account of the regulatory changes in the 
sector in subsequent chapters.  As I set out in Chapter 2, the concept of care is fraught with 
tension and some disability studies scholars have tried to create new paths forward in order to be 
inclusive of the perspectives of those in caring relationships. Since the state has a critical role to 
play in shaping caring relationships, I sketch out some of the tensions and contradictions inherent 
to public benefit schemes and regulatory regimes when considered through a disability studies 
lens. Here, the negotiation of tensions and contradictions in the long-term care home sector is 
conceptualized as an on-going problem-solving process.  In Chapter 3, I explained the 
methodology I used in order to paint a more comprehensive picture of changes to regulation and 
governance relevant to the LTC sector in Ontario from 2004 to 2018. This chapter will show, in 
practical terms, how care is provided in a contemporary institutional setting constructed by law. I 
will explore how the evolution of the regulatory framework is the result of a combination of 
factors inside and outside of LTC.  
The chapter will begin by situating LTC policy within health and social policies. It will 
then provide background information on the sector in Ontario: what are these homes (e.g. 
ownership structures, funding arrangements, industry associations and advocacy groups in the 
sector), what types of care / services are provided in the homes and who lives in the homes.  
Although my focus is the period between 2004 and 2018, a brief regulatory history (from post-
war to early 2000s) will be included.  I will also explain the context in which the new legal 
framework was developed and implemented. In the final section, I will outline the key themes of 
debates in the feminist political economy literature and explain how this research fills some of 
the gaps in our knowledge base.   
4.2 Situating LTC policy in health and social policies  
The emphasis of this section is on situating this inquiry of the LTC home sector in 
Ontario within the broader context of the functions of the welfare state, and law’s gate-keeping 
functions in social policy. In Chapter 2, law is defined as a system of rules to govern behaviour 
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enforced through institutions created for that purpose.475 This discussion provides a foundation 
for understanding the legal specifics of the LTC home sector. I intend to show that to make sense 
of LTC today, it is necessary to think of the LTC as being part of a basket of entitlements offered 
by the welfare state. The governance and regulation of LTC inevitably is part of a long-term 
trend of greater complexity of law governing a variety of programs and schemes offered by the 
welfare state.  
4.2.1 LTC as a late comer to the welfare state  
Care of children, the elderly, and people with disabilities is frequently associated with 
one of the typical functions of the welfare state, which is to: “support a reasonable level of social 
reproduction”.476 LTC is a latecomer to the welfare state.477 In general, LTC includes a range of 
personal care services, as well as basic medical services, nursing care, prevention, rehabilitation, 
or palliative care. It may also include housekeeping and assistance with administrative tasks.478 
In many OECD countries (other than some Nordic countries) into the 1980s and beyond, LTC 
was characterized by fragmentation and residualism. Limited support was found in diverse 
policy areas, including health, pension, disability, or housing. Over the past 20 years, welfare 
states have begun to implement, or at least to consider, more comprehensive policy approaches 
in response to factors such as growing care needs, changes in the socio‐economic context and in  
understanding of individual, family, and public responsibility.479  
There are significant variations in whether and how people’s needs are met across OECD 
countries.480 The sharing of responsibilities regarding care for dependent older adults between 
the state, the market and the family depends on a combination of factors such as tradition, legal 
responsibilities, health and social policy, and the economic context.481 In care regimes 
characterized by mixed public / private responsibilities, the state provides limited access to 
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formal care, with no intention of completely substituting formal for informal care provisions.482 
Demands for publicly funded care also depend on the eligibility criteria for public support 
including any means test.483 Relatively less generous public funding for care in turn is likely to 
encourage greater reliance on private purchase of care and support for those able to afford it, or 
greater use of unpaid informal care for those with family carers.484  
Ontario is best described as a mixed public / private LTC regime. In Ontario, institutional 
care for older adults (and in some cases younger disabled adults) is called LTC homes in law, so 
for the purposes of consistency, I will use the term LTC to describe Ontario’s institutional care 
throughout the dissertation. Services provided in the community such as private dwellings are 
generally called home care. LTC and home care are regulated under separate statutes.485   
Since Ontario’s LTC regime is partially supported by public funding, issues about 
affordability, access and eligibility need to be addressed in the program design. Obviously 
funding level plays an important role in determining who can access LTC, how and when. In 
social policies, the program design reflects a host of financial as well as legal considerations. 
Law also plays a critical part in creating and maintaining social policies (such as LTC).  Law is 
used to allow or deny individuals access to benefits and entitlements and to describe the 
conditions necessary for such access. In other words, law plays several gate-keeping functions in 
social policies.           
4.2.2 Law’s gate-keeping functions in social policies  
To Deborah Mabbett, regulatory techniques shape how social policy problems are 
defined, in particular, by emphasizing efficiency goals, and also through the international 
dissemination of norms, including rights.486 Here I will simply highlight three perspectives 
related to law’s gate-keeping functions in social policies, recognizing that other public law topics 
are also relevant but are excluded from the discussion here due to space considerations.487   First 
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of all, law can invoke a standard or paradigm for categorizing people as “disabled” for a 
particular purpose, such as to determine eligibility for services.488  As I will show later in the 
dissertation, an important function of the regulatory framework is to determine who is “disabled 
enough” to be eligible for admission. Secondly, law may determine eligibility or ineligibility for 
certain functions and roles,489 for example the Health Care Consent Act, 1996490 (HCCA) 
governs consent to treatment for capable and incapable persons in all settings. Finally, law can 
also remove barriers to accessing services provided by public benefit schemes, or at least 
mitigate the effects of those barriers.  For example, in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General),491 the question was whether the BC government’s lack of funding for sign language 
interpreters in a hospital setting violated s. 15(1) of the Charter.492  A brief account of s.15 
jurisprudence on disability will be provided.  I will also examine the Ontario Human Rights 
Code493 requirements pertaining to disability and gender.  The significance of the Convention of 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities494 will be briefly noted because Canada has signed and 
ratified the Convention, however, the details of the Convention are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.      
4.2.3 Legal complexity and the modern welfare state  
Using the concept of complexity provides an alternative lens with which to view the 
regulatory regime in the LTC sector.  The work that I rely on deals with the issue of complexity 
more generally and in relation to the welfare state.  The topic of legal complexity (which will be 
defined shortly) has generated interest from practicing lawyers as well as legal scholars.  
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Scholars are interested in the causes or origins of complexity, its consequences and how to 
reduce it.  At one end of the spectrum, scholars integrate the notion of complexity into a very 
specific existing legal debate, for example, rules vs. standards.495  At the other end, scholars 
address complexity at a more abstract level, for example, analysis of the legal system using 
“complexity theory”.496   
In this dissertation, I use Peter Schuck’s definition of legal complexity.  He correctly 
points out that legal complexity can only be located on a continuum that ranges from extreme 
simplicity at one end to extreme complexity at the other.  Thus, a legal rule, process, or 
institution is only more or less simple or complex compared to some other actual or ideal one. It 
is neither possible nor desirable to attempt to classify something precisely as simple or 
complex.497  The definition is a composite of four variables: “a legal system is complex to the 
extent that its rules, processes, institutions, and supporting culture possess four features: density, 
technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy or uncertainty.”498 
Although Schuck’s main argument centres on the claim that legal complexity is 
increasing and this is problematic for a system of justice, his work also provides an important 
caveat about simplicity and simplification.  Simpler law is not always better law; complexity can 
be both a weakness and a strength.499  Indeed, legal complexity sometimes creates fairer, more 
refined, more efficient, even more certain forms of social control.500  The critical question that 
one must ask is: All things considered, are the benefits of a given level of complexity worth the 
costs?501  A kind of structural imbalance is created when the lawmaking process presses the law 
towards greater complexity with little regard as to whether any particular complexity is worth its 
costs.502 Generally speaking, complexity-induced costs can be both inefficient and unfair,503 and 
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more importantly, can stultify a society that often depends on vigorous action in problem-solving 
because complexity promotes passivity and entrenches the status quo.504   
The proliferation of rules in the LTC sector can also be explained by the more general 
trend of greater complexity of law governing the welfare state.  Neville Harris explores 
complexity as a dominant characteristic of the modern welfare system in the United Kingdom 
and elsewhere, including Australia, New Zealand, Germany and Sweden.505 According to Harris, 
“The law is perhaps the greatest source of complexity in the welfare system.”506 He concludes 
that law and structure of the modern welfare state must continue to reflect the welfare system’s 
role in identifying and responding to diverse social circumstances and individual needs while 
also advancing various social and economic policy agendas.  As a result, the complexities are 
inevitable and they can only be reduced, not eliminated.507  But simplification is a worthy goal, 
particularly if it helps ensure that individuals have access to their proper entitlement, and if it 
supports the accepted value of the benefit system and its rules.508    
The strength of Harris’ book is that it expands the range of theoretical and practical 
considerations that one may take into account when assessing complexity.  He considers the 
question of whether complexity is also defensible.  One of the main supporting arguments for 
complexity rests on the desirability of ensuring that entitlement closely matches the diverse 
requirements of each individual or family unit that the welfare system seeks to support.509  By 
contrast, rules that apply relatively simple criteria to entitlement may offer a somewhat crude 
response to social needs.  For example, simpler rules (age thresholds for certain entitlements) 
may be predicated on broad and simplistic assumptions about how people do or should live their 
lives; unfairness may result from such rules.510         
Another way of defending complexity is to attend to the need for continual adjustments in 
the face of social and economic trends, policy shifts, and the impact of judicial decisions.511  
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Within the British welfare system, there are a range of programs designed to respond to the 
transitions in people's lives. It is assumed that citizens want the welfare system to help insulate 
individuals from the financial effects of various circumstances, such as reaching the end of 
working life due to old age or infirmity. At the same time, citizens expect benefits to be targeted 
only to those considered to have real needs, and they want consistent treatment.  Equally 
important, citizens want decisions to be accurate, with an effective process for correcting 
erroneous decisions.  A system designed to meet all these objectives is not going to be simple.512  
Law is used to establish control and certainty, but it is also expected to be adaptive as new or 
unpredicted situations arise. As a result, frequent limited amendments are made to the law to 
reflect minor policy shifts and to respond to loopholes or unpredicted outcomes that arise during 
application.513 
4.2.4 Summary   
It can fairly be said that despite its late arrival, LTC now occupies an important place in 
the study of social policies. I argue here that generally speaking, law governing the modern 
welfare state is increasingly complex and the regulation and governance of LTC is likely to be a 
part of this trend. Indeed, increasing legal complexity can be problematic for a system of justice. 
However, simpler law is not always better law. Situating the issue of regulation of care within 
the context of legal developments within the welfare state allows us to have a more precise 
language to describe the LTC sector as “heavily or highly regulated”. 
4.3 A Primer on Ontario’s LTC sector 
The purpose of this section is to provide the background and context of regulatory 
changes in the LTC sector in Ontario. Feminist political economy scholars have commented that 
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LTC is a heavily regulated sector in Canada514 and elsewhere.515The account that follows is not 
intended to match the depth and breadth of existing work on the history of the sector.516 It will 
start by presenting a brief history of the key legal and regulatory milestones between the 1940s 
and 2003. Then I will turn to the contemporary LTC sector in Ontario: detailing who lives in 
LTC homes, how the homes are governed, regulated and funded, and the broader changes in the 
health sector that affect the LTC sector.    
4.3.1 Brief regulatory history of the LTC sector in Ontario (key legal / 
regulatory milestones from post-war to 2003) 
All LTC homes in Ontario now operate under the same statute but this has not always 
been the case. Prior to July 1, 2010, there were three types of LTC facilities in Ontario operating 
under separate statutory authority: nursing homes, municipal homes for the aged and charitable 
homes for the aged. Nursing homes (profit and non-profit) were licensed by the province and 
operated under the Nursing Homes Act. Municipal homes (non-profit) were operated by 
municipalities under the Homes for the Aged and Rest Homes Act. Charitable homes are operated 
by non-profit organizations under the Charitable Institutions Act. I will outline the regulatory 
history by focusing on the following milestones from the 1940s to 2003: the post-war period 
(beginning of regulation), 1993 (Bill 101) and early 2000s (bankruptcy of the Royal Crest).  
4.3.1.1 Post-war period: Beginning of regulation  
The Homes for the Aged Act, 1949 had its roots in the previous Homes for the Aged Act, 
1947 and the Houses of Refuge Act; the latter could be found as early as in the 1914 Revised 
 
514 Banerjee, supra note 301; Albert Banerjee & Pat Armstrong, “Centring Care: Explaining Regulatory Tensions in 
Residential Care for Older Persons” (2015) 95 Studies in Political Economy 7; Donna Baines & Tamara Daly, 
“Resisting Regulatory Rigidities: Lessons from Front-Line Care Work” (2015) 95 Studies in Political Economy; 
Tamara Daly, “Dancing the Two-Step in Ontario’s Long-Term Care Sector: Deterrence Regulation = Consolidation” 
(2015) 95 Studies in Political Economy 29; Armstrong & Daly, supra note 163; Donna Baines & Pat Armstrong, 
“Promising Practices in Long Term Care: Can Work Organisation Treat Both Residents and Providers with Dignity 
and Respect?” (2018) 1:001 Social Work and Policy Studies: Social Justice, Practice and Theory 1. 
515 John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, “The Politics of Legalism : Rules Versus Standards in Nursing-Home 
Regulation” (1995) 4:3 Social & Legal Studies 307; Jacqueline A Choiniere et al, “Mapping Nursing Home 
Inspections & Audits in Six Countries” (2016) 41:1 Ageing Int 40; Charlene Harrington et al, “Comparison of 
Nursing Home Financial Transparency and Accountability in Four Locations” (2016) 41:1 Ageing Int 17. 
516 Daly, supra note 514; James Struthers, “Reluctant Partners: State Regulation of Private Nursing Homes in 
Ontario, 1941-72” in Raymond Blake et al, eds, The Welfare State in Canada: Past, Present, and Future (Concord, 
Ont: Irwin Pub., 1997) 171; James Struthers, “Home, Hotel, Hospital, Hospice Conflicting Images of Long-Term 
Residential Care in Ontario, Canada” in Sally Chivers & Ulla Kriebernegg, eds, Care Home Stories: Aging, 
Disability, and Long-Term Residential Care (Transcript-Verlag, 2018) 283. 
101 
Statutes of Ontario. It is evident that the scope of the 1949 Act was intended to include not just 
older adults but also the younger disabled. Unlike the 1947 Act, the 1949 Act specifically 
referred to the older adults when it described who was eligible: 
(a) anyone over the age of sixty years who is incapable of supporting himself, or unable 
to care properly for himself; 
(b) anyone who is mentally incompetent and ineligible for committal to an institution 
under The Mental Hospitals Act, who requires care, supervision and control for his 
protection; 
(c) anyone over the age of sixty years who is confined to bed but does not require care in 
a public hospital or hospital for incurables; or 
(d) anyone under the age of sixty years who because of special circumstances cannot be 
cared for adequately elsewhere when his admission has been approved by the Minister.517 
The 1949 Act addressed matters such as the scope of powers of the board of management for 
the rest home,518 water, sewage and electricity,519 handicrafts and work of residents,520 
authority for committal to home,521 requirements for admission,522 and provincial subsidies.523 
Little attention had been paid to address delivery of care other than appointment of staff524 and 
regulation-making authority with respect to rules governing the homes, the residents and the 
staff,525 as well as medical care to be provided.526 The Homes for the Aged Amendment Act, 
1966527 changed the title of the Act to The Homes for the Aged and Rest Homes Act and made 
other amendments. 
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Although the Charitable Institutions Act can be traced back to the 1930s,528 the 
Charitable Institutions Act, 1956529 most resembled the final version (repealed in 2010).  Section 
1(a) stated that “charitable institution means a building maintained and operated by a charitable 
organization for persons requiring sheltered care”.530 The 1956 Act specified matters such as 
approval of by-laws,531 approval of plans for new sites,532 provincial subsidies533 and annual 
inspections.534 Similar to the Homes for the Aged Act, 1949, the Charitable Institutions Act, 1956 
said little about how care was to be delivered although Cabinet could make regulations about 
charges, medical services to be provided, qualifications and the powers and duties of staff and 
rules governing all or specified charitable institutions and the conduct and discipline of persons 
who are cared for and the staffs.535 
In 1966, An Act to Provide for the Licensing and Regulation of Nursing Homes (The 
Nursing Homes Act) came into effective. Section 1 of the Act stated that “ ‘nursing home’ means 
any premises maintained and operated for persons requiring nursing care”.536 In other words, 
there was no specific reference to older adults or the disabled. The 1966 Act, as the long title 
implied, provided for the licensing of nursing homes: specifically for the issuance, transfer and 
revocation of licences.537 The Act specified that the Minister of Health was responsible for the 
administration and enforcement of the Act and that the Minister’s powers and duties may be 
delegated.538 Not surprisingly, the 1966 Act said little about delivery of care, other than 
inspections,539 conditions for revocation of licence540 and regulation-making authority about 
matters such as “respecting the admission, treatment, care, conduct, discipline and discharge of 
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residents of nursing homes”.541  It should be noted that there was no reference to provincial 
subsidies.     
In sum, the provincial government began to regulate different parts of the LTC sector (as 
we know it today) at different points in time. The three statutes are closer to the simplicity end of 
the legal complexity continuum. The first versions of the Homes for the Aged Act and Charitable 
Institutions Act looked similar in the sense that they both provided the bare minimum legal 
authority and administrative requirements to establish those facilities. The Nursing Homes Act 
was denser and more technical because it provided a licensing scheme. Their respective 
legislative intents were fairly simple and straight-forward. What is common among these three 
statutes is that they did not really prescribe how care should be delivered in those facilities 
(although there was the necessary regulation-making authority) and that they envisioned a very 
limited role for the provincial government. Not surprisingly, the subjects addressed in the 
original acts would continue to be covered in subsequent versions. However, as I will 
demonstrate in the next section and then subsequent chapters, how care was to be delivered and 
paid for would be prescribed in a much more detailed manner in subsequent versions of the three 
statutes, and later, in the Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007. Additional social and economic 
objectives were supposed to be accomplished by these statutes. In other words, as time 
progresses, they all moved closer to the complexity end of the continuum.      
4.3.1.2 Long-Term Care Statute Law Amendment Act in 1993 (Bill 101) 
Much of the content of these three Acts was updated and standardized with the passage of 
the Long-Term Care Statute Law Amendment Act in 1993 (Bill 101).542 The then Minister of 
Health, Hon. Frances Lankin, explained the need for government action at that time and stressed 
that Bill 101 was the beginning of a major transformation in LTC:  
Bill 101 is an amending statute and it is the beginning of a reform process that will result 
in major restructuring of long-term care and support services for elderly persons, adults 
with physical disabilities and people who need health services at home. The amendments 
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will . . . correct several long-standing deficiencies in services for elderly persons 
requiring residential care and the range of independent living options for adults with 
physical disabilities . . . this is only part of the overall policy response to the redirection 
of long-term care that the government will be bringing forward.543  
Further, the then Minister highlighted the importance of consistent treatment of all homes 
and their residents. The Bill would: 
change substantially the accountability relationship that the home has with the residents 
and their families or representatives, and with government. The amendments will 
introduce for the first time in Ontario a consistent framework for accountability in all 
three types of homes and enable us to achieve our objective of enhanced accountability to 
facility residents and the taxpayers of Ontario.544  
The 1993 bill introduced a consistent funding mechanism (funding based on the nursing 
and personal care needs of residents) and a new accountability structure. Under the 
accountability structure at the time, all LTC facilities were required to sign an annual service 
agreement and to comply with legislation, regulations and Ministry policies and standards.  
Other changes included: a new resident payment policy, a province-wide system for managing 
access to LTC and a consistent Resident Bill of Rights for all three types of facilities.545  The 
Program Manual was also released in 1993 to present the expectations of the government for 
facility services.546 
The significance of Bill 101 was how the funding parity issue was dealt with. Municipal 
and nonprofit homes that provided custodial and nursing home care were entitled to access more 
public funds.547 This was due to the fact that in contrast to the nursing homes, which operated 
under the Ministry of Health, for other institutions the funding model followed a “deficit 
funding” budget-based system—70 percent of the funding came from the provincial Ministry of 
Community and Social Services, and 30 percent came from the municipalities. Any deficits were 
covered by governments according to their allotted 70/30 budget share.548 
 
543 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl, 2nd Sess (1 February 1993). 
544 Ibid. 
545 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Long-Term Care Homes Program Manual (Toronto: Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, 2007) at Tab 0401-01 and 0701-01; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 542 
at 122. 
546 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0402-01, page 3. 
547 Daly, supra note 514 at 42. 
548 Ibid. 
105 
4.3.1.3 Early 2000s: Bankruptcy of the Royal Crest Lifecare Group  
In the 1990s, the LTC sector continued to struggle with proper oversight and 
accountability and with scandals that compromised the public’s confidence in the government’s 
ability to govern and regulate the sector. The bankruptcy of the Royal Crest Lifecare Group Inc. 
(Royal Crest) represented another point of crisis in the regulatory history of LTC in Ontario. The 
company operated five nursing homes, six retirement homes and six mixed care (nursing and 
retirement) homes in southern Ontario, employing some 2500 employees and providing 
accommodation for some 2250 residents.549 Royal Crest had a long history of financial 
difficulties, such as failure to remit to the proper authorities more than $11 million in 
contributions for pension plan, vacation pay and benefits plans, licensing problems with the 
Ministry of Health apparently arising from corner-cutting; and inability to arrange a refinancing 
with its bankers.550 By late 2002, Royal Crest was in serious financial difficulty: it owed its 
creditors, mostly banks, in excess of $128 million and was in default under its loan 
agreements.551 After its short-lived protection under the Companies Creditors Arrangement 
Act552 was terminated, Royal Crest was petitioned into bankruptcy in January 2003.553 
The bankruptcy of Royal Crest prompted questions about the proper role of the 
government in overseeing the operation of LTC homes, in particular, the financial aspects of 
facility management.  The courts assigned responsibility for the failure of the Royal Crest to its 
owners: “I agree with the Trustee that each brother had a significant hand, as owner, and also as 
manager, in the failure of Royal Crest. It was not all the fault of the greedy bank; it took years for 
the financial problems to develop to the point that the company could not be saved.”554 However, 
there were demands from unions and others to have an inquiry about how the Ontario 
 
549 Re Martino (2004), 2004 CanLII 17978 (ON SC) at para 1 [Martino]. Canadian Union of Public Employees v 
Royal Crest Lifecare Group Inc, 2004 CanLII 19809 (ON CA) at para 7. Aldo Anthony Martino and Giovanni 
(John) Martino operated Royal Crest and other companies in the nursing, residential and retirement home industry. 
550 Martino, supra note 549, at para 2. 
551 Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Royal Crest Lifecare Group Inc., supra note 549, at para 8. 
552 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36. 
553 Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Royal Crest Lifecare Group Inc. 2004, supra note 549, at paras 9-10. 
Ernst & Young was appointed as trustee and receiver. 
554 Martino, supra note 549, at para 12. 
106 
government dealt with the Royal Crest matter.555 In the years that followed, the government 
creditors including the MOHLTC and others tried to collect money owed.556 Coincidentally, the 
Auditor General’s 2002 and 2004 reports concluded that the Ministry did not have all of the 
necessary procedures in place to ensure that LTC resources were managed with due regard for 
economy and efficiency.557 Accordingly, it makes sense that in drafting the LTCHA, the 
government would put more emphasis on financial accountability, corporate governance and 
regular monitoring of homes.       
This has been a relatively brief exploration of the regulatory history of the intersections 
between command and control regulation on the one hand and market forces on the other. It is 
sufficient, however, to make some broad observations. First, there is an uneasy relationship 
between the expansion of government oversight and the autonomous day-to-day operations of 
homes which are not owned or directly operated by the government. Second, there is a tension 
between having a consistent regulatory framework so that all residents are subject to the same 
protections on the one hand while at the same time having the flexibility to be responsive to the 
specific challenges of different types of homes on the other. Third, the regulatory framework is 
intended to serve multiple social and economic objectives, with the emphasis on financial 
accountability becoming more prominent overtime. Before I turn to an account of the 
contemporary LTC sector, it is important to understand who lives in LTC homes in Ontario. 
4.3.2 A Profile of LTC residents in Ontario 
A cursory review of newspaper articles will create the impression that LTC residents 
comprise a very homogeneous group. Despite the sensational images of older, frail and passive 
residents in the media, the picture of LTC residents is actually a lot more complex. In Chapter 2, 
I make the case for applying an interactional model of disability, as articulated by Tom 
Shakespeare, in the study of LTC sector. It follows that the intrinsic factors of residents matter in 
the discussion about their experiences with care and caring relationships. Another way of 
 
555 David Mckie, “Advocates demand inquiry into Ontario’s costly handling of Royal Crest nursing-home failure”, 
CBC News (23 March 2009), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/advocates-demand-inquiry-into-ontario-s-
costly-handling-of-royal-crest-nursing-home-failure-1.791359>. 
556 Ibid. see also Royal Crest Lifecare Group Inc v Ontario (Health and Long Term Care), 2009 ONCA 397, 53 
CBR (5th) 44. 
557 Auditor General of Ontario, 2004 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario (Toronto: 
Auditor General of Ontario, 2004) at 381. 
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understanding LTC residents is to consider how they (along with their families – if any) arrive at 
LTC. 
4.3.2.1 Impairments in old(er) age  
Most residents are older females; female residents also tend to be older than male 
residents (the averages are 85 and 80, respectively).558 However, the proportion of female 
residents is also slowly decreasing.    Even in terms of chronological age of residents, there is 
great variation: although 43.9% of residents are between the ages of 85 and 94, 6.6% of residents 
are 64 or younger and 10.8% are 95 or older559 i.e., there is at least a 30-year age difference 
between the youngest and oldest groups of residents.  The table below presents a simplified 
profile of LTC residents in terms of age and gender in from 2012-13 to 2017–18:560 
 
Table 5: Profile of LTC residents in Ontario 
   2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 
Number of 
residents 112,621 113,424 115,715 114,082 115,120 115,224 
Average age 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Younger 
than 65 (%) 6.6 6.6 6.8 6.9 6.7 6.6 
85 and older 
(%) 53.0 53.3 53.9 54.2 54.6 54.7 
Female (%) 68.0 67.7 67.5 67.4 67.1 66.9 
Although disability cannot be reduced to or equated with impairment or health condition, 
we cannot understand care in LTC without referring to the health conditions and impairments as 
experienced by residents.  To put it differently, I adopt Shakespeare’s position that failure to 
meet health needs constitutes an important aspect of the discrimination faced by people with 
disabilities.561  From a medical or clinical perspective, residents are entering homes older and 
 
558 Canadian Institute for Health Information, CCRS Quick Stats, 2017–2018 (Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, 2018). As of September 27, 2019, the 2017-18 data is not available. 
559 Ibid. 
560 Canadian Institute for Health Information. I extracted the information from each year’s quick stats.  
561 Shakespeare, supra note 106 at 88–105. 
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with increasingly complex needs.562 The needs of residents—if narrowly defined by their clinical 
profiles—also help explain the care they need to receive. In general, residents tend to face 
several challenges, including diagnoses of dementia (63.9%), severe cognitive impairments 
(32.5%), depression (32.5%), some aggressive behaviour (45%) and bladder incontinence 
(48.3%), and they require assistance with activities of daily living (ADL) (11.8% = total 
dependence).563 These biomedical characteristics by no means should explain disability, gender, 
and aging in totality, but they are more than just neutral human variations (or differences). As we 
will see in subsequent chapters, these not-so-neutral bio-medical characteristics shape the content 
of care regulation, which in turn may advance or undermine the quality of life of residents. 
4.3.2.2 Impairments in young(er) age  
It should be noted that increasingly, LTC is also being used to address the needs of 
younger people with various types of disabilities.564  In Chapter 2, the significance of de-
institutionalization was briefly outlined. One way, albeit arbitrary, to estimate the extent of the 
problem is to use chronological age and diseases diagnosis. In 2016-17, about 6.7% of residents 
(7,735) were under the age of 65 and within this age group there were slightly more females than 
males (3,985 females compared to 3,710 males). The illnesses reported and their corresponding 
numbers in the whole LTC population may also give us some indication of the circumstances 
that bring younger people into LTC: Cerebral palsy (677), Multiple sclerosis (1407), Paraplegia 
(491), and Quadriplegia (390).565  These health conditions are not generally associated with the 
process of aging. It is possible that older residents also live with these conditions and that as they 
age, new illnesses and disabilities develop. Media reports also illustrate the circumstances of 
these younger residents.566  
 
562 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Living Longer, Living Well: Report Submitted to the Minister of Health 
and Long-Term Care and the Minister Responsible for Seniors on Recommendations to Inform a Seniors Strategy 
for Ontario by Dr. Samir K. Sinha (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2012) at 178; Long Term 
Care Task Force on Resident Care and Safety, An Action Plan to Address Abuse and Neglect in Long-Term Care 
Homes (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2012). 
563 Canadian Institute for Health Information, supra note 558. 
564 However, this is not a new issue. See Lisa Priest, “Nursing Homes No Answer for the Young”, The Globe and 
Mail (18 December 2004), online: <https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/nursing-homes-no-answer-for-
the-young/article1008752/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&>.  
565 Canadian Institute for Health Information, supra note 558. 
566 Peter Goffin, “Thousands of Under-65 Adults with Physical Disabilities Are Being Forced into Ontario Nursing 
Homes: Ministry Data”, Toronto Star (9 July 2017), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2017/07/09/thousands-of-under-65-adults-with-physical-disabilities-are-being-
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The reasons for their admission may be simple enough: they have nowhere else to go.  In 
2016, the Ombudsman of Ontario put a spotlight on people with developmental disabilities in 
crisis.  In Nowhere to Turn, the Ombudsman reports on his office’s investigation of more than 
1,400 complaints from families of adults with developmental disabilities who are in crisis 
situations.567  The report notes that “the lack of appropriate residential resources in the 
community has, by default, resulted in many adults with developmental disabilities being 
inappropriately housed in hospitals, long-term care homes and even in jails, for prolonged 
periods.”568 The lack of meaningful housing and care options is echoed in the key informant 
interviews.  Several interviewees commented on the fact that LTC homes also house individuals 
with intellectual disability.569 The significance of the presence of this group of residents is that 
the LTC home environment is not designed to meet the medical, social and other needs 
associated with certain types of disability. A closer look at the regulatory regime will reveal how 
LTC reflects assumptions about disability. I will return to this issue in Chapter 9. 
4.3.2.3 Admission wait times: becoming LTC residents  
LTC is available to those who are deemed eligible according to criteria established by the 
province. The eligibility criteria are prescribed and the application process has been standardized 
across Ontario. Chapter 8 will address the issue of admission in greater detail. For now, I will 
note that the process of entering LTC is not straightforward at all. Consider the story of AM. 
AM570 was a 68-year-old widow who lived in her family home in Toronto. She suffered from 
late early stages of Alzheimer's disease. AM’s preference was to live in one of the two Italian 
LTC facilities. The difficulty facing AM was the extensive wait time for a bed to become 
available in those facilities. A non-Italian oriented home had a bed that became available, 
 
forced-into-ontario-nursing-homes-ministry-data.html>.  This is also happening in other provinces. For example see 
Jennifer Quesnel, “Active man with Down syndrome being diapered and spoon-fed in long-term care but needs 
group home, sister says”, CBC (11 January 2018), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatoon/he-needs-a-
home-sister-of-man-with-down-syndrome-says-long-term-care-is-wrong-place-for-him-1.4482193>. 
567 Ontario Ombudsman, “Ontario Ombudsman - Adults with developmental disabilities in crisis”, online: 
<https://www.ombudsman.on.ca/Investigations/SORT-Investigations/Completed/Adults-with-developmental-
disabilities-in-crisis.aspx>. Andrea Gordon & Laurie Monsebraaten, “A Promise to Fix Disability Crisis: 
Ombudsman’s Scathing Report on Disabled Adults Sparks Minister’s Apology and Vow to Make It Right”, Toronto 
Star (25 August 2016) A.1. 
568 Ontario Ombudsman, supra note 7. 
569 Interviewees #10 (2017), #13 (2017) and #15 (2017). 
570 AM (Re), 2010 CanLII 48694 (ON CCB). 
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however AM and her family decided not to take that placement.571 AM’s son applied to the 
Consent and Capacity Board to have himself appointed as the representative of AM who was 
found incapable with respect to admission to a care facility, to give or refuse consent on behalf of 
AM.572   
A few questions arise from AM’s story. Why did AM prefer an Italian home? Why are 
those beds in short supply? How did AM and her family decide? Does the government have the 
right – or even obligation - to force someone who cannot stay in his/her own private dwelling to 
accept any LTC bed?  Is it reasonable to expect (or demand) a publicly-funded system to respond 
to needs unrelated to the physical survival of residents? Did AM and her family have meaningful 
choices? Chapters 5 and 8 will explain how the law contributes to these problems and to the 
experience of AM. In the meantime, the statistics about LTC admission help us to understand the 
situation of AM (and many like AM).   
Despite the expansion in capacity (see the next section) of LTC in Ontario in the 2000s, 
there are indications that the needs of older Ontarians who require LTC are not adequately met 
by the sector for a variety of reasons. One indication is the gap between the supply of and the 
demand for LTC.573 The wait time for a bed has been subject to intense media scrutiny and has 
prompted calls for more beds.574 This is not a new problem. The 2012 Auditor General report 
remarks: “The median wait times have almost tripled from 36 days in the 2004/05 fiscal year to 
98 days in the 2011/12 fiscal year. An increase in the number of LTC home beds of 3% during 
that period has not kept pace with the rising demand from an aging population”.575  
The table below illustrates the median number of days people waited to move into a LTC 
home in Ontario by fiscal year between 2012 and 2018. Health Quality Ontario presents wait 
times by prior location (i.e., hospital or community) or by region (i.e., LHINs).  
 
571 Ibid at 4.  
572 Ibid at 5. 
573 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 562 at 131. 
574 Ibid at 133. 
575 Auditor General of Ontario, 2012 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario (Section 3.8 
Long-term-care Home Placement Process) (Toronto: Auditor General of Ontario, 2012) at 200. 
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Table 6: Median number of days people waited to move in a LTC home, in Ontario, by 
prior location576 
Fiscal Year  All (Days)  Community (Days)  Hospital (Days) 
2012-13 133 165 77 
2013-14 126 154 72 
2014-15 111 135 60 
2015-16 113 132 70 
2016-17 133 149 92 
2017-18 146 163 94 
 
It is obvious that despite modest improvements in 2013-14 and 2014-15, wait times for 
LTC homes are getting longer, and vary by prior location. The median wait time for people who 
were living in the community was even longer, reaching 163 days in 2017-18. It should be 
emphasized that wait times also depend on a variety of factors, such as bed availability, choice, 
and priority.577  
However, the picture is even more complex than Table 6 conveys, as median wait times 
can be presented in different ways, which may illustrate other factors contributing to longer wait 
times. The tables below present median wait times by gender, bed type, and by priority 
category:578   
Table 7: Median wait time (number of days) by gender 
 
 
 
576 The Health Quality Ontario website allows the general public to search for LTC wait times. Wait times for 
admission to long-term care homes is one of the indicators of the performance of the LTC system tracked by Health 
Quality Ontario. The data in the table is pulled from the HQO website. Health Quality Ontario, “Wait Times for 
Long-Term Care Homes”, (2019), online: <https://www.hqontario.ca/System-Performance/Long-Term-Care-Home-
Performance/Wait-Times>.  
577 Health Quality Ontario, Measuring up 2016: A Yearly Report on How Ontario’s Health System Is Performing 
(Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2016) at 84. 
578 The author requested the information from the MOHLTC (Request # IMSC – 000006303). The data was received 
on March 6, 2017. 
Gender
2004-
2005
2005-
2006
2006-
2007
2007-
2008
2008-
2009
2009-
2010
2010-
2011
2011-
2012
2012-
2013
2013-
2014
2014-
2015
2015-
2016
Female 37 40 62 83 102 108.5 102 92 139 132 116 113
Male 33 36 56 73 92 96 96 84 126 119 102 112.5
Difference 4 4 6 10 10 12.5 6 8 13 13 14 0.5
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Table 8: Median wait time (number of days) by bed type 
 
(Note: data by bed type is not available after 2011–12) 
Table 9: Median wait time (number of days) by priority category under the previous 
regimes  
 
Table 10: Median wait time (number of days) by priority category under the current 
regime 
 
In sum, while wait times for LTC beds increased until 2012–13 and then gradually 
decreased for a few years (but are still higher than the 2005–06 level), there are a few interesting 
trends at the provincial level that are of note: 
 The median wait time for women was higher than men every year until 2015–16. 
 The median wait time for non-crisis applicants for religious, cultural, or ethic homes 
(3A and 3B) has consistently increased since 2010. 
 The longest median wait time was for private accommodation (up to 2011-12).  
Bed Type
2004-
2005
2005-
2006
2006-
2007
2007-
2008
2008-
2009
2009-
2010
2010-
2011
2011-
2012
Basic 35 35 56 75 102 103 108 90
Private 38 46 70 91 110 120 108 100
Semi-Private 32 35 46 60 67 70 66 63
Priority Category
2004-
2005
2005-
2006
2006-
2007
2007-
2008
2008-
2009
2009-
2010
Crisis (1) 17 21 40 58 75 78
Non-Crisis (1B) 121 83 160 190 247.5 262
Non-Crisis (2) 34 38 60 81 101 108
Non-Crisis (3) 64 72 100 123 182 180.5
Spousal Reunification (2) 41 58 82 94 105 105
Priority Category
2010-
2011
2011-
2012
2012-
2013
2013-
2014
2014-
2015
2015-
2016
Crisis (1) 77 64 98 97 90 92
Non-Crisis (3A) 219 238 318 311 300 258
Non-Crisis (3B) 294.5 484 210 179 173 133
Non-Crisis (4A) 110 95 139 136 116 122
Non-Crisis (4B) 134.5 88 120 88.5 103 89.5
Spousal Reunification (2) 93 75 119 105 90.5 90
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This brief discussion of wait times raises a number of questions. First, as applicants wait 
longer (on average) in the community, how much support do they and their informal carers (if 
any) receive? Second, as wait times are longest for non-crisis cultural and religious placements, 
what can we say about availability of choices of LTC in Ontario? Third, as wait times vary 
considerably across categories, what is the role of the government in managing the capacity of 
the system?  These issues also emerge from the feminist political economy literature. Addressing 
these questions requires an understanding of the regulation, governance and funding of the 
sector.   
4.3.3 How the LTC sector in Ontario is regulated, governed and funded  
Recall that co-regulation occurs when government and regulated entities co-operate in the 
development and implementation of a regulatory regime.579 The concept of co-regulation is 
useful here to describe how the sector is regulated. In Canada, the regulation and governance of 
LTC homes is predominantly a provincial and territorial responsibility. The Canada Health 
Act580 makes reference to “extended health care services”, which includes “nursing home 
intermediary care service”.581   Many scholars have pointed out the lack of federal role in LTC 
provision in Canada,582 however the federal government does influence homes through the role it 
plays at the international level and through the ways it shapes ideas about responsibility, 
ownership, and care.583 An example of such influence is the making of immigration policy, 
which shapes the LTC workforce.584 Other limited federal responsibilities are related to veterans 
who need LTC585, the regulation of drug and health products including medical devices,586 and 
 
579 Windholz, supra note 50 at 162–164. 
580 Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C-46.  The CHA requires only first-dollar public coverage of all hospital and 
physician services defined as “medically necessary.” 
581 Ibid, s.2.  
582 Saskia N Sivananthan, Malcolm Doupe & Margaret J McGregor, “Exploring the Ecology of Canada’s Publicly 
Funded Residential Long-Term Care Bed Supply” (2015) 34:1 Can J Aging 60 at 62. 
583 Armstrong, Armstrong & Daly, supra note 163 at 51. 
584 For example, see Sharon Roseman, Pauline Gardiner Barber & Barbara Neis, “Towards a Feminist Political 
Economy Framework for Analyzing Employment-Related Geographical Mobility” (2015) 95 Studies in Political 
Economy 175. 
585 Veterans Affairs Canada, “Long Term Care - Health and well being - Services - Veterans Affairs Canada”, (15 
December 2014), online: <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/services/health/long-term-care>. 
586 Food and Drugs Act, RSC 1985, c F-27. 
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the use of quasi-criminal and criminal sanction power.587 The discussion here focuses on the 
provincial role.  
4.3.3.1 Ontario’s authority over the LTC sector  
Illustration 1: Selected key organizations in Ontario LTC System and their functions  
 
A number of provincial bodies are involved in the regulation and governance of the 
sector (see illustration 1). MOHLTC is a key governmental actor and its powers in the sector are 
defined by a number of statutes and agreements.  Powers are usually allocated to the Minister, 
the director of the long-term care program and Ministry inspectors. A good place to start is a 
review of the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Act. Section 6(2) of the Ministry of Health 
and Long Term Care Act states:  
It is the function of the Minister and he or she has power to carry out the 
following duties:  
 
587 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
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… 
To be responsible for the development, co-ordination and maintenance of 
comprehensive health services and a balanced and integrated system of hospitals, long-
term care homes, laboratories, ambulances and other health facilities in Ontario.” 
…. 
To authorize and provide financial support, alone or in co-operation with one or 
more persons or organizations, on a periodic basis or otherwise, for the establishment and 
operation of …  long-term care homes and enter into agreements necessary therefor, … 
with … long-term care homes and … on such terms and conditions and for such periods 
as the Minister considers advisable to assist in financing all or any part of the cost of such 
centralized services and commodities or for any other purpose incidental to the 
foregoing.588 
 
The MOHLTC is responsible for regulating the sector, which it does in two key ways: 1) through 
its enforcement and compliance program, MOHLTC ensures LTC homes are compliant with the 
applicable law, and 2) through its agency in charge of the quality of the health care system 
(called Health Quality Ontario), MOHLTC influences the delivery of care (see Excellent Care 
for All Act).  As well, other provincial bodies including Office of the Fire Marshal, Office of the 
Chief Coroner and Public Health Ontario are involved in regulating the sector by enforcing their 
applicable acts, issuing guidelines and imposing reporting requirements. The regulatory colleges 
established under the Regulated Health Professions Act589 and the individual health profession 
acts regulate professionals who work in the sector, such as physicians, registered nurses, 
registered practical nurses, dietitians, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, social workers, 
and pharmacists. It should also be noted that the professional associations of these regulated 
professionals may also influence the behavior of their members by issuing practice guidelines 
and distributing best practices more generally. Last but not least, LTC homes may be accredited 
by Accreditation Canada or by CARF Canada, and therefore must comply with their respective 
service standards if they wish to attain or maintain accreditation status.590 See Illustration 2 for 
 
588 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Act, RSO 1990, c M.26, ss 6(1)2, 6(2)9. 
589 Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, supra note 61. The list of self-governing health professions is included 
in Schedule 1 of the RHPA. Although the colleges are self-regulatory organizations, the government (Cabinet) can 
appoint a college supervisor pursuant to s.5.0.1 of the RHPA.   
590 I thank Professor Arie Freiberg for pointing out the variety of bodies involved in the health sector. 
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an overview of the bodies that are involved in the regulation (as understood using Julia Black’s 
definition) of the sector. 
4.3.3.2 Funding the LTC sector in Ontario  
The MOHLTC is both the regulator and primary funder of the LTC sector and regulation 
and funding are intertwined.  MOHLTC transfers funding to regional health authorities (called 
Local Health Integration Networks), which in turn establish accountability agreements with the 
LTC homes in their regions and provide funding in accordance with such agreements (called the 
Long-Term Care Home Service Accountability Agreement). “Where a local health integration 
network proposes to provide funding to a health service provider or amend a service 
accountability agreement with a health service provider, the network and the provider shall enter 
into a service accountability agreement or amend such an agreement in accordance with this 
section.”591  These agreements are also regulatory tools because they establish performance 
indicators and sometimes targets and standards592 and they impose reporting requirements that 
supplement statutory requirements, such as compliance declaration.593 In other words, the 
LHINS are also involved in enforcing compliance of homes with provincial requirements.  I will 
elaborate on this point in Chapter 8. 
  
 
591 Local Health System Integration Act, 2006, SO 2006, c. 4. 
592 For example, in “Schedule D – Performance” of the agreement, there are three types of indicators: 1) 
Organizational Health and Financial, 2) Coordination and Access and 3) Quality and Resident Safety.  
593 See Long-Term Care Service Accountability Agreements (L-SAA)(2016-2019) at Schedule C-Reporting 
Requirements.  
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Illustration 2: Public bodies that are involved in the funding and regulation of LTC homes 
 
Similar to other provinces, the LTC sector in Ontario includes private, non-profit and 
municipal homes. The difference is that Ontario has a higher proportion of private homes.594 In 
an earlier study based on results from a Statistics Canada survey,595 commercialization was most 
widespread in Ontario with respect to the percentage share of the sector owned by proprietary 
 
594 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Health Spending - Nursing Homes (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for 
Health Information, 2014) at 2. According to CIHI, the 2012 Statistic Canada data (except Quebec) showed that in 
Canada the public sector operated 27% of homes. Private for-profit and non-profit facilities operated 44% and 29% 
of homes, respectively.  
595 The Residential Care Facilities Survey collected data from residential care facilities across Canada. The survey 
has been cancelled. According to Statistics Canada, the term "residential care facilities" refers to facilities which 
have four beds or more and which are approved, funded or licensed by provincial/territorial departments of health 
and/or social services. Among the facilities included are homes for the aged, persons with physical or developmental 
disabilities, persons with psychiatric disabilities, persons with alcohol and drug problems, emotionally disturbed 
children, transients, young offenders and others. Provincial and territorial ministries of health and/or social 
services are annually requested to update the inventory of residential care facilities. See infra note 597. 
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operators.596 The table below summarizes the breakdown of homes for the aged as of 2009-10, 
categorized by size and ownership. 
Table 11: Number of homes for the aged by size and ownership 2009-10 (Ontario) 597 
 Size of facility  Proprietary Religious  Lay  Municipal Provincial  
1 to 19 beds  11 1 2 1 0 
20 to 49 beds  58 5 12 1 3 
50 to 99 beds  189 12 34 14 1 
100 beds or more 224 21 60 88 1 
Total  482 39 108 104 5 
 
Currently, of the 625 LTC homes, 58% of homes are privately owned, 23% are non-
profit/charitable, and 16% are municipal. About 40% of long-term care homes are small, with 96 
or fewer beds. Of these small homes, about 47% are located in rural communities that often have 
limited home care or retirement home options.598 The top four private LTC providers in Ontario 
are Revera, Extendicare, Leisureworld and Chartwell.  These companies also operate – to various 
degrees - in other jurisdictions (other Canadian provinces and in the U.S.). With the exception of 
Revera, all are publicly traded companies.   As well, these corporations are not just LTC beds 
providers, they are also involved in the delivery of other health-related services, such as home 
care and retirement homes.   In other words, the scope of the long-term care sector is actually 
broader than the operation of long-term care beds. 
The Ontario LTC sector went through a phase of rapid expansion between the late 1990s 
and 2014.599  One way of describing the expansion is to assess the capacity of the sector in terms 
 
596 Daly, supra note 514 at 34. 
597 The data is pulled from Statistics Canada, Residential Care Facilities 2009/2010 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 
2011) at 26–27. 
598 Ontario Long-Term Care Association, “About Long-Term Care in Ontario: Facts and Figures”, (2018), online: 
<https://www.oltca.com/oltca/OLTCA/Public/LongTermCare/FactsFigures.aspx#Ontario's%20long-
term%20care%20homes%20(June%202017)>. 
599 In 1998, the Conservative government announced an eight-year plan to provide 20,000 new long-term care beds 
and to renovate non-compliant homes containing 13,583 beds. In March 1999, it announced that the new beds would 
be completed by 2004. The number of beds to be renovated by 2006 was later revised to 15,835. See Legislative 
Assembly Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Long-Term Care Facilities Activity (Section 4.04, 2004 Annual 
Report of the Provincial Auditor) (Toronto: Legislative Assembly. Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 2005) 
at 2. 
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of quantity of care. The number of beds increased from 57,000 in 1998 to 74,000 in 2005,600 and 
to 78,000 (including short-stay beds) in 2014. This increase in the number of beds inevitably 
required corresponding year-over-year increases to the MOHLTC budget.601 The increase in 
funding paid not only for the operating costs of those beds, but also for other initiatives intended 
to improve the experiences of residents, such as increased funding for Resident and Family 
Councils.602 The table below illustrates government spending on the sector in Ontario between 
2004-05 and 2016-17.603 
Table 12: Government funding 
Year  
2004–
05 
2005–
06 
2006–
07 
2007–
08 
2008–
09 
2009–
10 
2010–
11 
2011–
12 
2012–
13 
2013–
14 
2014–
15 
2015–
16 
2016-
17 
Expenditure 
($ – in 
billions)  2.5 2.68 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.22 3.5 3.61 3.71 3.83 3.9 
 
3.97 4.05 
Increase 
from 
previous 
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Regardless of ownership type or geographic location, homes receive government funding for raw 
food, nursing care, social programs, and so forth. The provincial funding (provincial subsidy) for 
each home is divided into four “envelopes”: (a) the “Nursing and Personal Care” envelope which 
may be adjusted for acuity; (b) the “Program and Support Services” envelope; (c) the “Raw 
 
600Ontario, Legislative Assembly (Standing Committee on Public Accounts), Official Report Journal of Debates 
(Hansard), 38th Parl, 1st Sess, (May 5, 2005) at 379. 
601 Ibid at P-389. 
602 Ibid at P-380. 
603 The figures are from the government’s annual planning document (Results-Based Planning Briefing Book). The 
government does not always state the expenditure figures explicitly and the author calculates some of the figures.  
For example, in the 2010-11 planning document, it is noted that “During fiscal 2009-10, LTC funding was increased 
$124 million, compared to the previous year.” The author calculates the 2009-10 figure by adding $124 million to 
the 2008-09 figure, which was $3.1 billion (from the 2009-10 planning document). Statistics Canada calculates 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) based on calendar year. However, government expenditure is based on fiscal year 
(April 1 to March 31). In terms of time period, the change in CPI does not correspond perfectly to the change in 
expenditure. Statistics Canada, Table  18-10-0005-01 Consumer Price Index, annual average, not seasonally 
adjusted. 
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Food” envelope; and (d) the “Other Accommodation” envelope.604 The LHINs fund homes for 
every bed in the home (i.e., on a per diem basis).605 There are rules about how a home is 
supposed to spend the funding606 and corresponding reporting requirements, including 
completion of the Long-term Care Home Annual Report and, the In-Year Revenue/Occupancy 
Report.607 Provincial funding for long-term care in 2019 is as follows: 
 Approximately $100.26 per day for nursing and personal care (such as assistance with 
personal hygiene, bathing, eating, and toileting) 
 $12.06 per day for specialized therapies, recreational programs, and support services 
 $9.54 per day for raw food  
 $56.16 for other accommodations (such as laundry and linen, general and administrative 
services, and facility costs) 
 $1.77 global per diem increase 
 Top-up funding for various types of bed (e.g. Behavioral Specialized Unit Beds). 608 
Since LTC is publicly funded on a cost-shared basis with residents, residents have to pay 
a portion of their “room and board” to their homes.609 LTC home residents must make a co-
payment of $1,892 to $2,702 per month (set by the MOHLTC by regulation), depending on the 
type of accommodations (single room vs. shared room). Homes retain the co-payments; these 
payments are what long-term care homes use to make a return on their investment.610 Residents 
may also elect to pay for extra services, such as hairdressing, cable TV, and telephone services. 
Those who do not have adequate income to pay the basic rates may apply for a rate reduction 
 
604 Accountability Agreement, supra note 593 at Schedule B, s. 2.0. 
605 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, LTCH Level-of-Care Per Diem Funding Policy (Toronto: Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care, 2017) at 1. Funding is subject to the conditions set out in various funding and financial 
management policies, applicable law, and the service accountability agreement between the LHIN and the homes 
606 Accountability Agreement, supra note 593 at Schedule B, 4.0. For example, section 4.2 states that the home 
“shall not transfer any portion of the Estimated Provincial Subsidy in the “Raw Food” Envelope to any other 
Envelope”. See also Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 605. 
607 Accountability Agreement, supra note 593 at Schedule B, s. 2.0. 
608 The total of the four amounts is called current base Level of Care (LOC) per diem funding. See Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care, Policy: LTCH Level-of-Care Per Diem Funding Summary (Toronto: Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care, 2019). See also Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 605. These rates 
are effective August 1, 2019. 
609 Ontario Long-Term Care Association, supra note 598. 
610 Ibid. 
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(government subsidy).  However, they are not eligible for semi-private or private rooms.611  
Residents also pay out-of-pocket for any medications or other services not covered by their 
private insurance plans or by the provincial drug benefit program.612    
In addition to operating funding, capital funding may be available to homes. Under the 
Enhanced Long-Term Care Home Renewal Strategy, the Ministry is supporting the 
redevelopment of more than 30,000 LTC beds in over 300 LTC homes to meet current design 
standards by 2025.613 The government also provides a LTC Construction Funding Subsidy (CFS) 
on a per bed per day basis (per diem), to support the costs of developing or redeveloping an 
eligible LTC home.614 The per diem is paid to the home on a monthly basis for a period of 25 
consecutive years, provided that the home meets the requirements and conditions set by the 
Ministry.615 The CFS Per Diem ranges from $16.65 to $23.03, depending on various 
adjustments, such as home size and Ratio of Basic Accommodation.616 In addition, for eligible 
non-profit homes only, a one-time grant of $250,000 is provided to assist in planning and 
organizing for redevelopment.617 Homes may receive funding of $300 per bed, per move to cover 
incidental, non-construction related costs associated with relocating residents and equipment.618 
It should be noted that the CFS Per Diem must be used to repay any loans or other financing 
arrangements for the construction, and only after the home has paid any current amounts owing 
in respect of such repayments, may the home use the remaining amounts for other purposes.619      
 Finally, the not-for-profit homes, through municipal contributions and charitable 
donations, typically contribute additional resources to their operation to further enhance the level 
of care and service provided.620 
 
611 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “Long-term care accommodation costs and subsidy”, (2018), online: 
<https://www.ontario.ca/page/get-help-paying-long-term-care>. These rates are effective July 1, 2019. 
612 Ontario Long-Term Care Association, supra note 598. 
613 Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2017- 2018 Published Plan and 2016-2017 Annual Report (Toronto: 
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2017). 
614 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Construction Funding Subsidy Policy for LongTerm Care Homes, 2015 
(Toronto: Ministry of Health an Long-Term Care, 2015) at 1. 
615 Ibid at 5. 
616 Ibid at 4 and 7. Each eligible home must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Ministry that the construction cost 
of $120,000 per Bed has been expended by the Eligible Operator in order to receive the maximum applicable 
Construction Funding Subsidy Per Diem. The Policy specifies eligible and ineligible costs. 
617 Ibid at 9. Homes are eligible upon entering into a Development Agreement with the Ministry. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Ibid at 12. 
620 Interviewee # 16, (2018); Interviewee # 17, (2018). 
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4.3.4 Summary  
It is almost trite to note that the LTC sector in Ontario is under-funded and over-
regulated, as frequently portrayed in newspaper headlines. The complexity of the regulatory, 
oversight and funding arrangements applicable to the sector should be apparent. Some of the 
nuances about the sector and the residents presented above are important because as Nedelsky 
(and other feminist scholars) has argued, law affects people differently under different 
circumstances. The context influences how procedural and substantive rights and entitlements 
are experienced by residents. The next section will explain why numerous regulatory and non-
regulatory changes, including the implementation of a new legal framework, occurred between 
2004 and 2018. 
4.4 Impetus for a new regulatory framework for LTC in Ontario 
The LTCHA and its regulation became effective in July 2010. A change in government in 
October 2003 (from Conservative to Liberal) created a window of opportunity for reform. To 
initiate legal reforms in the sector, the newly elected Liberal government (centre-to-left) 
conducted a review of the sector, releasing a report in Spring 2004,621 followed by a discussion 
paper in November 2004.622 While preparing a new statute (Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007), 
which was tabled in 2006, the government continued to implement non-legislative measures, 
such as additional funding to improve delivery of care.623 The new Act and its regulation – with 
certain provisions unproclaimed and then repealed in 2017 – became effective on July 1, 2010. 
Once a new legal framework was in place, funding responsibilities were transferred to the newly 
created LHINs. In 2016, the mandate of LHINs was expanded to take on more responsibilities, 
including the management of processes of admission to LTC homes (see Bill 41, Patients First 
 
621 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Commitment to Care: A Plan for Long- Term Care in Ontario by 
Monique Smith, Parliamentary Assistant, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (Toronto: Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care, 2004). 
622 Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, Future Directions for Legislation Governing Long-Term Care Homes 
(Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2004). 
623 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Mcguinty Government Launches Comprehensive Strategy to Protect 
Seniors in Long-Term Care (May 11 News Release) (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2004); 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, McGuinty Government Gives Long- Term Care Residents and Their 
Families Greater Say in Decisions” (August 26 News release) (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 
2004). 
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Act, 2016).624 In 2017, the LTCHA was amended by Bill 160, Strengthening Quality and 
Accountability for Patients Act, 2017.625 The latest amendments are intended to strengthen 
Ontario's quality and safety inspection program for LTC homes with new enforcement tools, 
including financial penalties and new provincial offences for non-compliance.626 Further 
regulation amendments are expected in order to fully implement the legislative amendments, 
which are to be proclaimed at a later date.627    
4.4.1 Policy problems in search of (legal) solutions  
Before I discuss the regulatory changes (by way of law), it is instructive to understand the 
public policy problems that the LTCHA was intended to address in this period. This discussion 
will help to contextualize the regulatory changes and situate these changes within a spectrum of 
tools that the provincial government used to try to “fix” the sector. 
First, the notion of quality of care has been driving policy debates about health care, 
including LTC, for some time.628  Quality of care is a highly controversial subject and as we will 
see later in this dissertation, there are opposing views about what quality means. The legal 
changes related to regulating quality of care in the LTC sector should be understood within this 
broader discourse of quality of care in the health care system. According to the OECD, three 
aspects are generally accepted as critical to quality of care: effectiveness and safety, patient-
centredness and responsiveness, and care coordination.629 In OECD and EU countries, three 
main approaches have been adopted to drive LTC quality improvement: regulatory standards, 
standards to normalise care practice, and market incentives for providers and users.630 As we will 
see in subsequent chapters, these approaches have also been adopted into Ontario’s regulatory 
 
624 Bill 41: An Act to amend various Acts in the interests of patient-centred care [Bill 41: An Act to amend various 
Acts in the interests of patient-centred care]. 
625 An Act to amend, repeal and enact various Acts in the interest of strengthening quality and accountability for 
patients, SO 2017, c.25 [Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients Act, 2017]. The Bill has 10 schedules 
and covers other issues as well, such as public health. 
626 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “News release: Ontario Passes Legislation to Strengthen Transparency 
in Health Care”, (12 December 2017), online: news.ontario.ca <https://news.ontario.ca/mohltc/en/2017/12/ontario-
passes-legislation-to-strengthen-transparency-in-health-care.html>. 
627 As of September 27, 2019, provisions about confining and restraining residents have not been proclaimed yet. 
628Generally see  Österle & Rothgang, supra note 477. 
629 Yuki Murakami & Francesca Colombo, “Why the Quality of Long-Term Care Matters” in A Good Life in Old 
Age? - Monitoring and Improving Quality in Long-term Care (Paris: OECD / EU, 2013) 37 at 37. 
630 Yuki Murakami & Francesca Colombo, “Regulation to Improve Quality in Long-Term Care” in A Good Life in 
Old Age? - Monitoring and Improving Quality in Long-term Care (Paris: OECD / EU, 2013) 143 at 144. 
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framework.    
Secondly, one of the key policy problems that dominated public debates in this period 
was the financial sustainability of the LTC system given Ontario’s aging population. The 
problem was three-fold: First, the percentage of Ontarians over 65 would increase 
significantly631 and therefore, the government was pressured to add more capacity to the sector 
(in terms of number of beds) by building new homes or re-developing existing ones.632 Second, 
the prevalence of dementia and other cognitive impairments would increase with the aging of the 
population and existing resources — in LTC and in community settings — were inadequate to 
address the complex needs of those with challenging behaviours.633 And third, the health care 
system was not designed to meet the needs of older Ontarians, and the result was that other parts 
of the health care system (e.g., hospitals) were under immense pressure.634 
Thirdly, deficiencies in care attracted intense media and public scrutiny635 and prompted 
the provincial government to adopt non-regulatory measures to correct them. The deficiencies 
were routinely attributed to lack of front-line staff time and resources for the delivery of proper 
basic care — from infectious disease control to planning of social activities — as well as more 
complex clinical or medical care.636 There were also more demands for recognition of individual 
preferences, cultural/religious sensitivity, and choices in delivery of care.637 Further, it appeared 
 
631 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 562; Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 
Healthcare Governance Models in Canada A Provincial Perspective (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of 
Canada, 2013). 
632 Legislative Assembly. Standing Committee on Public Accounts, supra note 599 at 11. 
633 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 621; Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario, Ezz-El-Dine 
El-Roubi and Pedro Lopez Inquest Jury Recommendations (Toronto: Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario, 2005); 
David Walker, Caring for Our Aging Population and Addressing Alternate Level of Care (ALC) (Toronto: Ministry 
of Health and Long-Term Care, 2011); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 562. 
634 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Alternative Levels Of Care Strategy Will See Patients Discharged From 
Hospitals Sooner (News release February 10) (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2005); Walker, 
supra note 633; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 562. 
635 Daly, supra note 514. 
636 Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, What We Heard: Long-Term Care Quality Consultation 2008 -A 
Common Vision of Quality in Ontario Long-Term Care Homes (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 
2008); Auditor General of Ontario, 2011 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario (Toronto: 
Auditor General of Ontario, 2011) at 347–354; Auditor General of Ontario, 2009 Annual Report of the Office of the 
Auditor General of Ontario (Toronto: Auditor General of Ontario, 2009) at 159–185; Office of the Chief ch for 
Ontario, supra note 633. 
637 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 636 at 4–6; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra 
note 562 at 11; Poland Lai, “Regulation of ‘Care’ in Long-term Care Homes in Ontario, Canada” in Aging / 
Disability Nexus (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2020).  
125 
that the government did not have a good understanding of the needs of LTC residents (and how 
much it would cost to improve care that would meet their needs) because of poor tracking and 
monitoring of activities in homes.638  In response, the government made financial investments — 
both permanent and one-off — for specific, quantifiable initiatives (in other words, 
“announceables”) that could be linked to “front-line” care, such as increasing the number of 
registered nurses,639 and purchasing specific equipment (e.g., specialized mattresses).640 It is also 
notable that the government did not incorporate minimum staffing standards in the form of 
minimum hours of care per resident, mix of staff, or staffing and resident ratios into the law.641  
Finally, the old regulatory framework (three similar statutes and a program manual) was 
perceived to be inadequate to protect vulnerable residents, and at the same time, too burdensome 
for homes. Further, it failed to drive public accountability.642 Equally important, the old 
inspection system was not properly resourced in terms of staffing, information technology, and 
expertise in monitoring compliance.643 As a result, the government indicated that “developing 
clear enforceable standards with tougher inspection and enforcement,”644 was one of the 
objectives of a new legal framework. Before the new standards were in place, the government 
also used administrative measures to improve how the sector was regulated, including enhanced 
risk management,645 better disclosure of performance of the sector (e.g., posting of inspection 
results and orders on government website), and establishment of a toll-free number for the 
reporting of problems in homes.646    
 
638 Auditor General of Ontario, supra note 557; Legislative Assembly. Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 
supra note 599. 
639 Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, supra note 622. 
640 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Mcguinty Government Investing in Better Patient Care (News Release 
February 9) (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2005). 
641 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 621. 
642 Ibid; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 622; Ontario Ombudsman, Findings Re Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care’s Monitoring of Long-Term Care Homes (Toronto: Ontario Ombudsman, 2010). 
643 Ontario Ombudsman, supra note 642. 
644 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 621; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 
622. 
645 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, supra note 600. 
646 Auditor General of Ontario, supra note 557; Ontario Ombudsman, supra note 642. 
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4.4.2 Broader Changes in the Health Care System in Ontario   
The new legal framework should be considered in conjunction with broader changes in 
the Ontario health care system. First, “bending the cost curve”647 became a priority for the 
government and was consistent with Canada’s pattern of health expenditures.648  Historically, the 
MOHLTC’s budget grew at an average annual rate of six per cent. The LTCHA was drafted and 
became effective during a period when the health budget was increasing at a relatively higher 
rate than the post-2008 period. In recent years, the ministry reduced its budget growth from 
almost six per cent in 2009–10 to two per cent in 2016–17.649 Second, the government promised 
to “create a system that delivers care in a better, smarter way — one that improves quality for 
patients as it delivers increased value for taxpayers”650 and improving home and community care 
was part of that commitment. The emphasis was on “ensuring patients are receiving care in the 
most appropriate setting, wherever possible at home instead of in hospital or long-term care”.651 
Several initiatives were connected to this objective, such as the Aging at Home initiative652 and 
the Seniors Strategy.653 Finally, the government also intensified its efforts to offer more choices, 
more information, and more support so that users (patients) could make informed decisions about 
their health. For example: “[a]s a government, we’re increasingly putting our efforts into 
promoting healthy habits and behaviours, supporting lifestyle changes and better management of 
chronic conditions. But to succeed, we need everyone to play an active role in their health care 
by participating in healthy living and wellness”.654 
 
647 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Results-based Plan Briefing 
Book 2014-2015 (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2014); Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care 2015-16 Published Plans and 2014-2015 Annual Reports (Toronto: 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2015); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care 2016-17 Published Plans and 2015-2016 Annual Reports (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care, 2016). 
648 OECD, OECD Health Policy Overview: Health Policies in Canada (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016). 
649 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 647. 
650 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Ontario’s Action Plan for Health Care (Toronto: Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, 2012) at 6. 
651 Ibid at 11. 
652 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Results-based Plan Briefing Book 2008-2009 (Toronto: Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care, 2008) at 27–28. 
653 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 562. 
654 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 650 at 7. 
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4.4.3 Summary  
The development of the LTCHA can be viewed as the culmination of government 
responses to a number of problems and challenges emerging in the sector: quality of care agenda, 
the needs of an aging population, deficiencies in care and an inadequate enforcement framework. 
The LTCHA should be considered alongside broader changes in the health care system: bending 
the cost curve, timely access to the most appropriate care in the most appropriate place and more 
choices for users. However, the LTCHA is not the “full and complete answer” to problems in the 
sector. The subsequent implementation of the LTCHA did not negate the sense of urgency that 
further changes to the LTC sector are required. I now turn to the feminist political economy 
literature to further my understanding of the problems and more importantly, promising 
practices655 in LTC.   
4.5 Themes in LTC research in the feminist political economy 
literature    
I rely on secondary literature to draw out critical themes and insights about the LTC 
home sector.  Clearly, there is a rich and growing body of literature on LTC homes, including 
important contributions in the feminist political economy literature.  The last section of this 
chapter will briefly explain the basic premises and assumptions of political economy and then 
feminist political economy. Recall that care matters to the state.656  Continuing on with the 
debates about care outlined in Chapter 2, the following themes in LTC research will be 
elaborated: the gendered nature of care work, the concept of care as a relationship, conditions of 
work as conditions of care and vice versa, and regulation including rigidity of the workplace.  A 
number of policy prescriptions in the form of promising practices have now emerged in the 
feminist political economy literature as a result of an international project which seeks to identify 
promising practices for conceptualizing and organizing LTC.657 
 
655 Baines & Armstrong, supra note 514; Pat Armstrong, “Balancing the Tension in Long-Term Residential Care” 
(2018) 43:1 Ageing Int 74 at 76–77. 
656 Herring, supra note 112 at 93. 
657 The Re-imagining Long-term Residential Care project is led by Dr. Pat Armstrong at York University, and 
includes academics from five Canadian provinces, three American states, the U.K., Sweden, Germany and Norway. 
The project includes scholars trained in sociology, medicine, social work, history, media studies, philosophy, 
architecture, health policy and more. http://reltc.apps01.yorku.ca  
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4.5.1 Basic Premises and Assumptions 
According to Armstrong et al, the term “political economy” originates from the central 
assumption that the political and the economic are integrally related. This unity of the political 
and the economic is understood in the more abstract sense of a fundamental link between power 
and economic control.658  As a method of analysis, political economy takes in multiple forms and 
remains a work-in-progress.659  The shared assumptions of various strands of political economy 
are as follows.  First and foremost, states, markets, ideas, discourses, and civil society are 
analyzed as interrelated parts of the same whole, rather than as separate variables.660  They are 
shaped by how people provide for their needs, by the means of producing and reproducing, as 
well as by collective and individual efforts to resist.661  Contradictions are also critical to 
understanding both historical developments and daily life. Contradictions are about opposing 
forces and internal tensions, some are possible to eliminate and others are integral to social 
relations. And it is not only economics, but also ideas, discourses, and practices developed over 
time that matter.662 
Feminist political economy is also concerned with the material practices of power and the 
distribution of social resources. Gender and class are interrelated systems of power that work 
through and are continuously (re)constituted by social relations of production and reproduction.  
Feminist political economy also examines the differential political and economic effects that 
flow from social and political relationships and structures.663 This field has now expanded to 
explore the multiple intersections of gender, race, and class (as well as other social locations 
including immigration status, geography, sexuality, and age) and the complex power 
relationships enacted through them.664  Three key concerns are addressed by feminist political 
economy: the sexual division of labour, the role of the state, and the construction of and 
 
658 Pat Armstrong, Hugh Armstrong & Krista Scott-Dixon, Critical To Care: The Invisible Women in Health 
Services (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 63. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Ibid at 7. 
662 Ibid at 7. 
663 Beth Jackson, “Chapter 1: Theory and Methods for Thinking Women” in Pat Armstrong, Barbara Clow & Karen 
Grant, eds, Thinking Women and Health Care Reform in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press and Women's 
Press, 2012) 15 at 18-19. 
664 Ibid at 20-21.  See also Armstrong, Armstrong & Scott-Dixon, supra note 178 at 65-66. 
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relationships between the public and private spheres.665  Of particular interest to this dissertation 
are feminist political economy’s insights into the public / private divide.  Generally speaking, the 
public sphere is associated with politics, government, markets, and workplaces whereas the 
private sphere is associated with the so-called domestic elements of social life (e.g., family, 
sexuality, child/elder care). Accordingly, feminist political economy examines the construction 
of these spheres and how they reinforce and recreate one another.666  
4.5.2 Gendered nature of LTC 
There is a consensus among feminist political economists about the gendered nature of 
LTC.  According to Morgan Seely, until recently, LTC was not always well-identified as a 
women’s issue. Historically, biomedically-oriented approaches to health and aging have ignored 
issues of gender, sex, and diversity.667 In the section entitled “a profile of LTC residents”, I 
explained that the majority of residents are older women with serious illnesses and impairments 
but there is also a group of younger disabled adults. It should be noted that in North America, the 
resident population has also become more racially and culturally mixed.668 LTC is gendered also 
because care work is done by women, and in Ontario and elsewhere, many of them are racialized 
or immigrant women.669 It is important to unpack assumptions about women’s “natural” 
propensity to do care work. Care work, as Donna Baines and Diane van den Broek state, is often 
seen as an extension of what women do ‘naturally’ in the home and community, making it 
difficult to improve pay or conditions.670 Most importantly, as Seely explains, issues central to 
discussions of residential LTC, such as access to beds, contracting out services, adoption of for-
profit managerial practices, and heavier workload of paid staff, have differing impacts on women 
and are experienced differently by particular groups of men and women.671 In a nutshell, as 
Tamara Daly and colleagues state: “LTC is thus a highly gendered home space and workplace 
 
665 Leah Vosko, “The Pasts (and Futures) of Feminist Political Economy in Canada: Reviving the Debate” (2002) 
68(Summer) Studies in Political Economy 5 cited in Jackson, supra note 663. 
666 Jackson, supra note 663 at 19-20. 
667 Morgan Seely, “Women, Aging, and Residential Long-Term Care” in Pat Armstrong et al, eds, Thinking Women 
and Health Care Reform in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press and Women’s Press, 2012) 107 at 113. 
668 Armstrong & Daly, supra note 163 at 15. 
669 Banerjee & Armstrong, supra note 514 at 10. 
670 Donna Baines & Diane van den Broek, “Coercive Care: Control and Coercion in the Restructured Care 
Workplace” (2017) 47:1 British Journal of Social Work 125 at 129. 
671 Seely, supra note 667. 
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regulated by overarching gendered norms and expectations of women that are shared across 
places but with obligations to provide familial care that are place specific.”672 As explained 
above, scholars generally explore the intersections of sexism with other social locations. For this 
reason, their empirical studies of LTC (many of which are based on rapid ethnography) are 
particularly useful in revealing how different contexts matter to those who work in LTC.  
The following findings emerge from the empirical studies conducted in Ontario and 
elsewhere and inform my own analysis. Firstly, LTC has been almost exclusively strongly 
influenced by biomedicalization i.e., aging tends to be viewed as a series of medical problems 
requiring medical solutions.673  In a biomedical model, frontline care workers are positioned at 
the bottom of a gendered and racialized hierarchy that put ‘scientific’ practices and physicians at 
the top and other professionals, such as managers, nurses, technicians and others in descending 
order.674 Gender is central to expectations managers, workers and service users have of female 
workers.675 Baines reported that workers and managers alike normalized unpaid overtime as an 
expectation of their job and they attributed it to their ‘professionalism and commitment’ to the 
residents. It also overlapped with altruism and the naturalized and gendered notion that women 
have an endless willingness to sacrifice on behalf of others, regardless of cost to self.676  
Secondly, assumptions about race and gender matter in the organization of care in homes. 
For example, often immigrant women are considered to be better caregivers due to what are 
perceived as cultural values of respect for old age.677 In Ontario’s LTC system, inequities of 
gender, race, class, and immigration status are built into the care arrangements, shaping 
exploitation of workers.678 In many urban facilities, newer immigrant workers, many of whom 
have nursing qualifications from their countries of origin, work in the most demanding, lower-
 
672 Tamara Daly et al, “Prescriptive or Interpretive Regulation at the Frontlines of Care Work in the ‘Three Worlds’ 
of Canada, Germany and Norway” (2016) 77:0 Labour 37 at 40. 
673 Donna Baines, “Neoliberalism and the convergence of nonprofit care work in Canada” (2015) 19:3 Competition 
& Change 194 at 196. 
674 Ibid at 196–197. 
675 Ibid at 198. 
676 Ibid at 202. 
677 Palle Storm, Susan Braedley & Sally Chivers, “Gender Regimes in Ontario Nursing Homes: Organization, Daily 
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paid RPN jobs, while white, Canadian-born workers dominate management positions.679 Even 
more concerning is their encounter with racisms or at the very least, cultural insensitivity, along 
with harassment and violence.680 Tensions around gender, culture, race and class are complex in 
LTC as resident choices have to be balanced with equity considerations.681  
Thirdly, and related to the previous finding, the very high illness and injury rates in 
health care among workers are often understood in terms of the attributes of the individual 
worker or the person requiring care. This includes gender, which is often viewed as an individual 
characteristic.682 For Armstrong et al, illness and injury rates should not be understood as the 
inevitable result of care work; rather they can be understood as indicators of structural 
violence.683 In an article based on four qualitative research studies of different kinds of care 
workers in Canada and Australia, workplace violence is gendered with the majority female 
victims being blamed or self-blaming for the violence, in conjunction with muted or unhelpful 
institutional responses and requirements to interact again with the abuser soon after the abuse.684    
The examination of gender and other social locations in care is always tied to critical 
analysis of larger market and political forces. Scholars have examined issues such as inadequate 
resources allocation,685 neoliberalism and the New Public Management (NPM),686 neoliberal 
globalization687 and austerity.688 By way of example, Baines asserts that NPM has gendered 
impacts and outcomes as agencies that implement the cutbacks that accompany government 
contracts, end up relying on the unpaid work of the self-sacrificing, largely female workforce to 
sustain service levels and care.689 The point is not that care workers are passive and powerless. 
Rather, resistance to uncaring management, government and larger society among care workers 
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is uneven due to factors such as educational background and space for resistance in the 
workplace and in the social values embedded in each subsector.690 
Feminist political economy is not only concerned with examining the living and working 
conditions of women. The presence of male workers in LTC homes may present dilemmas in 
terms of respecting choices and preferences of residents and families. Simply put, researchers 
heard from staff and residents about resistance to male care providers, which may be further 
complicated by racism, given that most of the male staff are from racialized communities.691 An 
emerging area of research is the experience of racialized men in LTC. According to Palle Storm 
et al, there is limited knowledge about men’s experiences in care work, and the dilemmas and 
opportunities they face in relation to their gender.692 Their claim is that organizational conditions 
such as degree of discretion exercised by workers shape how masculine gender positions are 
produced, understood, and accepted or rejected by other workers.693 In a study that draws on 
observations from two Ontario nursing homes and on interviews with direct care workers and 
managers, the men who work in nursing homes tend to be from working class, racialized, 
immigrant, and other subordinated groups. They have to find a balance between acceptable 
expressions of masculinity and required expressions of feminine caring.694 The authors conclude 
that male care workers were reported to be accepted more readily and viewed more positively by 
their women co-workers and residents if the workers are provided with a higher degree of 
discretion to decide how to complete care work.695 I will return to the discussion about working 
conditions later in this section.  
4.5.3 Care as a relationship 
A central concept in the literature is that care is conceptualized as a relationship involving 
residents, their families and workers.696 This stands in contrast to the dominant trend in LTC, 
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which is “to treat care as a commodity, workers as objects of control, and quality as something 
that flows naturally from market competition.”697 In other words, there are similarities between 
the critique of LTC in the feminist political economy literature and the work of Herring on caring 
and the law as explained in Chapter 2.   
Albert Banerjee and Pat Armstrong expand on the idea of care as a relationship using 
Annemarie Mol’s logic of care in The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient Choice. 
Mol rejects the logic of choice, where pre-given individuals are added together to form 
collectives.698 According to Mol, the logic of choice assumes that we are autonomous 
individuals. In contrast, the logic of care is attuned to people who are first and foremost related. 
While some of these relations cannot be changed, others can.699 Banerjee and Armstrong 
advance four inter-related ideas that represent a useful summary of what relational care means. 
First, relationships are central to the determination of good care for any particular person.700 
Secondly, relationships are understood as a means of delivering good care and doing so safely 
for both residents and workers.701 Thirdly, relational care involves the use of individual skills and 
capacities by workers, for example communication, that can be supported by organizational 
processes, such as allowing sufficient autonomy for workers to apply their skills. In other words, 
care is much more than the completion of tasks such as toileting and dressing.702 Thirdly, the 
relationality of care includes a nexus of relationships among residents, their family members, 
other residents, inspectors, other care workers, volunteers, and administrators and these 
relationships sometimes entail competing values. It follows that care requires empowering 
strategies that permit needs to be communicated and be heard on the one hand, and the flexibility 
to balance tensions as much as possible on the other.703 
Research on the involvement of families of residents is an interesting way to explore 
relational care. For Armstrong and Daly, the key point is that families should have more choices 
 
697 Banerjee & Armstrong, supra note 514 at 9. 
698 Annemarie Mol, The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient Choice (London: Routledge, 2008) at 59. 
699 Ibid at 62. 
700 Banerjee & Armstrong, supra note 514 at 11. 
701 Ibid at 11–12. 
702 Ibid at 12. 
703 Ibid. 
134 
about how, when and in what ways they participate in care.704 To understand this point, it is 
important to understand how families may be involved in different aspects of care now. Rachel 
Barken and Ruth Lowndes explain that family members and friends provide significant support 
for older relatives in LTC.  Many of these unpaid carers are women and they provide and 
manage body care, offer emotional support, promote social engagement, advocate for residents, 
oversee the care that staff provide, and contribute resources and ideas.705 An important nuance is 
that as Armstrong points out, sometimes families of residents often have little choice about doing 
the work (such as laundry and bathing) due to low staffing levels and the lack of continuity in 
staff.706 Barken and Lowndes use data gathered from rapid ethnography and key informant 
interviews to identify promising care practices associated with three phases of the LTC 
trajectory: (1) moving in of a resident, (2) throughout the time a resident was living in a LTC 
home, and (3) during the final stages of life and after the passing of a resident.707 They conclude 
that working conditions needed to support the well-being of family and friend carers as well as 
residents and staff include: a greater appreciation of relational care work, time for effective 
communication, teamwork, and finally, appropriate, inclusive physical spaces that make it 
possible for individuals to spend meaningful time together.708 Barken and Lowndes’ conclusions 
are similar to those reached by Armstrong, who proposes promising practices such as the 
establishment of Family Councils that can provide meaningful input into decision- making 
regarding the operation of homes.709  
Importantly, scholars attend to contributions made by non-regulated staff, including those 
staff members who provide so called “ancillary services” such as cleaning and housekeeping, to 
relational care. Obviously scholars are interested in forms of work organization that foster 
respectful care relationships between staff and residents, and inspire quality care.710 For example, 
Banerjee et al study the relational dimensions of nursing home medicine.711 In a study about 
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cleaning staff conducted by Müller et al, it is argued that the contributions of cleaning work are 
related to infection control, the maintenance of a home-like appearance and providing relational 
care.712 The researchers found that the important factors that allow cleaning staff to contribute to 
health and relational care are as follows: a flexible division of labour, team work, training, 
equipment, staffing and to some extent, autonomy.713 These factors are reiterated in the research 
that examines conditions of care. 
4.5.4 Conditions of work are the conditions of care and vice-versa 
It follows that appropriate conditions of work are central to care as a relationship.714 
Accordingly, scholars are particularly interested in exploring how structural issues determine 
working conditions, such as health care providers’ exposure to violence,715 professional 
autonomy and teamwork in the workplace,716 geographic mobility,717 and social injustices 
including but not limited to racism and sexism.718 Again, these issues are examined within a 
broader context with respect to structural issues in the sector, in particular privatization. A 
consistent claim in the literature is that the structural aspects of care that set the conditions for 
care are funding, ownership, and staffing levels.719 
It is argued that ownership matters for working and living conditions in LTC. Scholars 
build on earlier systematic reviews of studies investigating quality of care in for-profit versus 
not-for-profit nursing homes720 and draw attention to new challenges, such as austerity measures. 
For-profit, and especially corporate, nursing homes are associated with inferior care when 
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compared with their non-profit counterparts.721 According to Armstrong et al in a study about 
long-term residential care (both LTC homes and retirement homes), privatization—particularly 
in the form of for-profit care delivery—undermines four aspects of security in old age.722 Indeed, 
Armstrong et al express strong reservations with respect to market and health care reform: “Faith 
in markets and the position that health care in particular should be viewed as a commodity have 
long been driving the push for privatization as the principal route to ‘reform’.”723 This push was 
reinforced by fear of population aging and, mounting public debts and deficits, especially since 
the 2008 financial crisis.724  
In Canada, security in access to care is declining along with expansion of for-profit 
services.725 For those in need of care in old age, there is no guarantee the needed services will be 
available, other than those available in the niche market of affluent older adults with limited care 
needs. As well, eviction is mainly up to the owner in private-pay facilities, as are transfers to 
hospital.726 Security in locational access can be undermined by the business going bankrupt, 
closing or moving to a different location for financial reasons, or by evicting residents or leaving 
them at emergency rooms.727 Security of employment for those providing care is vital to quality 
of care. Indicators of good working conditions are low staff turnover and low staff injury and 
illness rates. They are more likely to be issues in for-profit chain facilities, where cutting 
expenses is a focus of efficiency.728 Most importantly, security in quality of care is also 
undermined in the process of privatization. Although governments have responded to scandals 
and complaints with investigations, new legislation and standards, they fail to legislate staffing 
minimums and mixes, to require appropriate training, to enforce legislation through appropriate 
inspections and to regulate the sectors that are not directly subsidized.729 That said, Margaret 
McGregor and Pat Armstrong are also careful to point out that while summary statistics of 
facilities indicate more verified complaints, more hospitalizations and lower staffing levels in 
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for-profit homes compared to non-profit or government ones, individual homes may deviate 
from this overall pattern.730 
Some factors internal to a home are important for creating good working conditions. Here 
are a few examples of promising practices that have been identified by scholars such as 
Armstrong and Daly that have not yet been addressed elsewhere in this chapter. A well-trained 
and well-supported staff are seen as necessary prerequisites for quality care.731 As well, 
providing enough staff to allow variation from rigid routines and time to take individual 
differences into account is critical for supporting choices.732  Further, staff continuity, together 
with shared decision-making among staff is conducive to responding to resident choices 
appropriately.733 Last but not least, where and when they exist, taboo topics and ageist, sexist, 
racist, homophobic or ableist attitudes should be acknowledged and addressed. Supporting staff 
in making decisions that allow them to navigate these complex issues in a communal setting also 
supports residents’ choices.734 
4.5.5 Regulation including rigidity of workplace 
The last and related to the previous theme is the regulation – not just formal law but also 
internal rules and technology required for monitoring of activities in homes – of LTC homes. 
Earlier work on explaining the proliferation of regulation in Ontario and elsewhere and its 
consequences serves as a useful starting point to illuminate the current regulatory regime in 
Ontario. Their viewpoints on regulation flow directly from their positions on privatization, 
ownership, and other structural issues in the sector. To be certain, scholars do not necessarily 
advocate for de-regulation (in the sense of emphasizing both private property and freedom of 
contract735) but they do have strong criticisms of regulation that aims at facilities and/or care 
providers.736 Scholars have explored different aspects of front-line care, such as design 
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standards,737 skill utilization,738 and organization and division of care work739 in order to 
illustrate why, how and under what conditions regulation might actually be detrimental to care.   
In an earlier publication, Albert Banerjee is critical of the current state of regulation of 
LTC homes in Canada (focusing on Ontario), and traces its origin to the place of for-profit 
corporations in the provision of welfare services.  Banerjee rejects reliance on the regulation and 
documentation of care work as a means of ensuring quality, because regulations tend to change 
the organization of caring work, constituting it as the completion of predetermined, standardized 
and documented tasks.740  Regulation of LTC in Ontario has become ideological, in the sense of 
a seemingly natural and accepted way of thinking about and responding to problems around 
quality of care — one that leaves resources, structures and political issues unaddressed.741  These 
political issues concern for-profit ownership, resources and the role of the state.742  The result is 
that the regulation of care work can detract from quality, paradoxically resulting in calls for 
further regulation.743 Banerjee’s conclusions are similar to those reached by Pat Armstrong, 
Susan Bradley and Rosemary Warskett and others.744 
More recent scholarly work builds on the findings about the linkage between regulation 
and structural issues and helpfully captures the tensions in balancing competing objectives in and 
through regulation as well as the nuances in various approaches to regulations. Recent studies 
include less-studied topics such as dining745 and music activities746 in order to interrogate the 
implications of regulation on care work. The notion of resistance continues to be a common way 
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to articulate responses from workers and homes when facing regulatory rigidities.747 It should 
also be noted that more comparative studies are now available to highlight the diversity of 
promising and not-so-promising practices across the globe. In advancing eight practices that 
promote care as a relationship, Baines and Armstrong summarize a general argument in the 
literature well: there is a “need for adequate funding and for rules that set goalposts and 
guidelines but do not micromanage through standardization and the removal of staff initiative 
and discretion.”748 
Some scholars adopt a comparative focus in their analysis in order to illustrate 
alternatives to highly prescriptive regulation and rigid organization of care work.749  Scholars 
attempt to demonstrate the link between extent of privatization in the sector and the need for 
more regulation, auditing and reporting. Generally speaking, jurisdictions with higher rates of 
privatization (mostly the liberal welfare regimes such as those in the U.S) have more 
standardized, complex and deterrence-based regulatory approaches.750 In a study of frontline care 
work in Canada, Germany and Norway, Daly et al investigate how regulatory frameworks affect 
workers’ responses.751  They advance two concepts at opposite ends of the interpretation 
continuum: prescriptive regulation and interpretive regulation.752 Prescriptive regulation is 
defined as “a tendency to identify which staff should do what work and when and how they 
should do it” while interpretive regulation “reflects a tendency to broadly define care but not 
which staff should do it, nor when and how they should do it.”753 One key finding is that the 
prescriptive regulations (Ontario sites) did not promote a high standard of relational care, nor did 
they promote good working conditions. Rather, prescriptive regulations promoted reactive work 
organization.754 On the other hand, the flow of the day was calmer in the German and Norwegian 
sites (representing examples of interpretative regulation) where there was less paperwork and 
more time to provide health and social care.755 They caution that de-professionalizing the LTC 
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sector may increase the need for prescriptive regulation, which in turn, hinders the provision of 
good quality, flexible care.756 
Recall that a long-standing theme in the literature is that working conditions are care 
conditions. Regulation is considered to be part of “conditions of work and care”.757 It is argued 
that one way that regulation could potentially be beneficial is a mandated minimum number of 
staffing hours per resident. However, such a mandated standard has not yet been adopted in 
Canadian provinces.758 Drawing on practices from around the world, three main observations can 
be made about how regulation should and should not look like in LTC in order to promote 
quality of life for residents and safe working conditions. First, there is a growing tension between 
basic trust and detailed regulations.759 The increasingly detailed regulations at the level of the 
home have not been shown to result in significantly better quality and often result in more time 
for documentation, resulting in less time for care.760 Again, it is argued that ownership has an 
impact on the type of regulation and its enforcement.761 As for-profit ownership becomes more 
prevalent, profit-making rather than care may become a driving interest and accordingly, more 
regulation is required. The result is less trust in staff, and greater need for reporting, inspection 
and regulation.762 Second, Armstrong and Baines propose that “standards (principles) that are 
effectively enforced and funded”763 is one of the promising practices. Standards are distinguished 
from standardisation and regulation. In particular, standards establish principles and allow 
individual care providers to make decisions in an equitable and evidence-informed manner.764 In 
contrast, “standardisation, which tends to underlay regulation, means one right way exists.”765 
The claim is that in the context of principles, there is more room for individualised care for 
residents (and therefore meeting individual needs and preferences) and worker discretion and 
autonomy.766 Third, regulatory systems should strike a balance between risk and safety, 
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accountability and autonomy, and finally, medical and social care. In particular, too great 
emphasis on safety and accountability frequently results in standardization reflected in rigid 
schedules, limited activities and few options for either residents or staff.767  
4.5.6 Summary  
My research is informed by and builds on the themes in the feminist political economy 
literature in three main ways. First, since working conditions are caring conditions, I will expand 
on this theme by providing updates on recent (albeit limited) efforts to address violence 
experienced by health care workers in Ontario. This will be linked to the work of Herring and 
Nedelsky in order to explain why an exclusive focus on the rights of residents to a safe and 
secure home is not effective in the protection of residents. The problem is, as I will show in 
Chapters 6 and 9, the safety of workers has not been adequately addressed as integral to the 
safety of residents. My contribution will be centred around the legal protections currently 
available to workers (e.g. whistleblower protections) under the LTCHA and can be used to 
compare with similar protections in other jurisdictions in order to extend the debate about 
working conditions.  
Secondly, feminist political economy scholars are correct to point out that LTC is a 
gendered space and have also attended to other social locations such as race, citizenship and 
immigration status in order to expose inequity and inequality. However, disability has not 
received as much attention as other social locations, but there are exceptions.768 In a recent 
article about balancing tensions that are central to reimagining LTC, Armstrong refers to a 
tension between ability and disability when she discusses autonomy of residents: “How can we 
balance the need to allow people to live to the full extent of their capacities and maintain or even 
improve those capacities while recognizing that they have significant incapacities?”769 My 
research also recognizes this tension and engages disability in a more substantive way, for 
example, by integrating the criticisms of care outlined in Chapter 2. Care ethics scholarship has 
been influential in the debates in the feminist political economy literature.770 And feminist 
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political economists have already written extensively on the concepts of choice and autonomy,771 
which are of great significance to disability scholars and activists. A more balanced view of care 
is possible if the views of disability scholars are also incorporated in the analysis.  
Thirdly, I will expand on the theme of tensions embedded in the more and more detailed 
regulations, reporting requirements and enforcement techniques. The existing studies have 
already thoroughly examined how front-line care (including practices that matter to care such as 
security and scheduling) is regulated and the impact of this type of regulation on quality of care 
while structural issues such as minimum standard of care remain outside of the reach of formal 
law to a large extent. But other topics of the LTC regulatory framework remain under-examined, 
such as legally mandated participation mechanisms for residents and families and consumer 
protection measures. As well, for some of the extensively written topics, such as regulation of 
safety of residents, the analysis would benefit from adding the constitutional and quasi-
constitutional context, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In doing so, I will 
be able to provide a more comprehensive review of how different aspects of care (not just front-
line or hands-on care) is regulated in Ontario. This Ontario case serves as exploratory study of 
other topics in the regulation of LTC and generates potential research questions for case studies 
in other provinces and territories.            
4.6 Conclusion 
LTC is a type of social policy and likewise is not immune from the increasing legal 
complexity of the modern welfare state. The preceding pages show a LTC sector that has been 
responding to a number of changes in the LTC sector and the broader health care system in 
Ontario between 2004 and 2018. A key change obviously is the implementation of the LTCHA, 
which should be seen as a milestone in the relatively short history of formally regulating LTC (as 
we understand it today). At the centre of the recent regulatory changes is the diverse group of 
residents living in very different homes across Ontario: older, more frail and more likely to be 
women. The fact that the residents are now older and more frail than their predecessors has 
significant implications for the funding and regulation of the sector. But it will be a mistake to 
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ignore those around the residents - formal and informal caregivers, family and friends – if we 
accept Herring’s idea that caring is about relationships and individual acts of care can only be 
understood in the context of the relationship between parties involved in care. Many themes in 
the feminist political economy literature exemplify this point.  
The challenge is to decipher how the law respond to the needs of the residents and those 
around them. In the next four chapters, I turn to a more detailed exploration of the regulatory 
changes that affect the LTC sector in Ontario between 2004 and 2018. The scholarly debates 
explored above and previously in Chapter 2 are instrumental in the identification of the themes 
of the regulatory changes to be discussed in the next four chapters.  I propose that to understand 
the implications of regulatory changes for residents and those around them, four themes of 
changes can be identified: rights and entitlements to quality “care”, respect for safety and 
security of the person, inclusion and participation in decision-making and tensions in the state / 
citizen (consumer) relationship.    
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5 Rights and Entitlement to Quality “Care” 
5.1 Introduction 
Recall the conceptualization of care that I offered in chapter 2: First, care is grounded in 
caring relationships and is fundamentally important for human survival; that care embodies 
intermingled needs and interests of all involved in caring relationships but must also recognize 
the actual and potentials for harm in caring. Second, caring relationships are constructed by law 
in many different ways and the promotion of caring relationships is simultaneously limited by 
current legal tools such as “rights”. Third, caring relationships are shaped by the administrative 
processes and legal structures of public benefit schemes and regulatory regimes, many of which 
are indicative of the role of the state in supporting or neglecting care regardless of the setting in 
which care occurs. 
This chapter queries how care in LTC has changed in Ontario as a result of the 
implementation of the LTCHA and other statutory changes from a “law on the books” 
perspective. This chapter seeks to reveal the ways in which the government attempted to use 
social regulation to control quality of care as a policy objective between 2004 and 2018. Quality 
of care is a controversial matter in the feminist political economy literature.772 By way of 
example, scholars question how quality is being measured as well as policy rhetoric such as 
“person-centred care”. These criticisms will be referenced below.  
This chapter is divided into three sections: the first section will explore what care means 
in the context of LTC; the second section will examine how care is delivered; and third section 
will examine how disability is accommodated in care delivery. The description below 
demonstrates that at the core of the changes to improve care is the notion that residents’ medical 
and clinical needs must be met by highly prescriptive requirements (i.e., what must be done and 
how). These requirements are tied to the more proactive dissemination of norms in the form of 
residents’ rights, and to the idea that these rights should be enforceable. Quality of care, if 
understood more narrowly in relation to residents’ physical and clinical needs, is also supported 
 
772 For example see Baines, supra note 673 at 198. 
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by ad hoc accommodation of certain types of disabilities. The discussion about care here will set 
the context for other regulatory changes in subsequent chapters.  
In this chapter, I argue that the caring relationship between residents and their formal care 
providers has not changed substantively with the implementation of the LTCHA and other 
statutory amendments. It is true that some progress has been made in terms of accessibility and 
accommodation of disabilities more generally. In the context of LTC, the caring relationship 
continues to be defined on the one hand by rights and entitlements for individual residents and on 
the other, standardized program requirements and health sector initiatives such as “person-
centred care”. My reading of the changes is that they were few in substance and more in legal 
form, however, to some extent, they respond to the disability scholars’ criticisms of care.  These 
changes can be interpreted as a way to communicate the idea that disabled people have the right 
to support and that they should have some control and choice over how their care is provided – 
an objective that disability scholars have reiterated.773 The problem is that care – very much 
defined and described in relation to tasks or activities in the provisions described here but there 
are some exceptions– continues to be based on a medical model of disability and focuses on the 
needs associated with the physical survival of residents, rather than the promotion of caring 
relationships.         
5.2 What is care in LTC?  
In essence, care is expressed legally in the language of individual rights and entitlements to 
services.774 At the core of care requirements in the LTCHA is the Residents’ Bill of Rights,775  
supported by the Home Principle776 and the Preamble.777 It is evident that the expansion of 
resident rights is limited and arguably sets the context of other rights and entitlements related to 
receipt of care. Care must be individualized and therefore resident choices and preferences must 
be respected.778 Care is intended to address medical and clinical needs as well as dietary, social 
 
773 Morris, supra note 197. 
774 Lai, supra note 637. 
775 Long-Term Care Homes Act, supra note 425, s 3. 
776 Ibid, s 1. 
777 “A preamble to a new Act is part of that Act and may be used to help explain its purpose.” Legislation Act, 2006, 
SO 2006, c 21, Sched F, s 69.  
778 Lai, supra note 637. 
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care and housing (shelter) needs. The remaining section is a close study of the rights and 
entitlements that constitute care.    
5.2.1 Care as individual rights and entitlements   
Recall that the rights discourse is a matter of contention in the disability scholarship.779 
Being left without necessary care, as Kröger explains, is an expression of a limited social 
citizenship and a serious breach of a person’s human right to a life with dignity.780 It follows that 
the question is whether the formal expansion of rights will give demands for adequate and 
appropriate care a more solid basis. Here I will consider how the language of individual rights 
and entitlements for services is engaged in the LTCHA, compared to the previous Nursing 
Homes Act.    
5.2.1.1 Changes to the Residents’ Bill of Rights  
The rights ehshrined in the Bill of Rights relate to the care, treatment, living circumstances, 
and participation of residents in homes and can be enforced like a contract.781  As we will see 
below, the requirements about care should be interpreted with the Residents’ Bill of Rights782 
and it is useful to begin with the sources of rights in the Bill. These rights are not new in the 
sense that they existed in other legal instruments not specific to LTC. In fact, many rights in the 
Bill build on the fundamental rights, protections and freedoms that residents enjoy as citizens 
and the Bill articulates them in the LTC context. For example, “Every resident has the right to 
pursue social, cultural, religious, spiritual and other interests, to develop his or her potential and 
to be given reasonable assistance by the licensee to pursue these interests and to develop his or 
her potential.”783 This right reflects the expectations articulated in the International Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
Human Rights Code of Ontario, Personal Health Information Protection Act and the 
Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005. Other rights may be characterized as 
 
779 For a summary see Kröger, supra note 156 at 412–414. 
780 Ibid at 414. 
781 Long-Term Care Homes Act, supra note 425, s 3(3). 
782 “The LTCHA, the Regulation, and any agreements between the Home and the Crown or between the Home and 
the resident must be interpreted in a way that advances the respect of the resident’s rights.” Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care, A Guide to the Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007 and Regulation 79/10 (Toronto: Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care, 2010) at 2–1. 
783 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 3(1)23. 
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“service rights”784 i.e., rights that residents enjoy when they receive care. An example is “Every 
resident who is dying or who is very ill has the right to have family and friends present 24 hours 
per day.”785 A good starting point for understanding how these rights evolved is to compare the 
content of the Residents’ Bill of rights under the Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA.  
The Nursing Homes Act contained a Residents’ Bill of Rights that included 19 rights 
(clauses) which were substantially the same as the LTCHA.  They ranged from very tangible 
entitlement (such as the right to live in a safe and clean environment786) to more intangible (but 
no less important) rights (such as the right to form friendships and enjoy relationships787).  Some 
rights were procedural (such as the right to be informed of any law, rule or policy affecting the 
operation of the home788), while others were substantial in nature (such as the right to be 
properly sheltered, fed, clothed, groomed and cared for789).  The Nursing Homes Act also 
enshrined the ability of residents to enforce their rights as if a contract had been entered into 
between the resident and the home.790  In the Program Manual, the Bill of Rights was 
incorporated into one of the “Resident Safeguards” standards: “There shall be mechanisms in 
place to promote and support residents’ rights, autonomy and decision-making.”791   
In the LTCHA, the Residents’ Bill of Rights contains 27 rights (clauses).  However, this 
should not be interpreted as an additional eight rights for residents:  “The Residents’ Bill of 
Rights expands on and strengthens the rights which existed in the legislation that governed 
Homes before the LTCHA.”792 In general, the majority of these additional rights are wording 
clarifications and expansions of the scope of existing rights or guidance in the Program Manual.  
It is commendable that some of the rights do address relations in the home (such as a resident’s 
 
784 Kerri Joffe, Enforcing the Rights of People with Disabilities in Ontario’s Developmental Services System 
(Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2010) at 4. Joffe uses the term “service rights” to denote those rights that 
relate to the day-to-day lives of people with intellectual disabilities and the specific developmental services and 
supports they receive. They are distinguished from the fundamental rights, freedoms and protections provided for in 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, federal, provincial and territorial human rights codes, and other 
legislation. 
785Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 3(1)15. 
786 Nursing Homes Act, RSO 1990, c N.7, s 2(2)18 [Nursing Homes Act]. 
787 Ibid, s 2(2)13. 
788 Ibid, s 2(2)16. 
789 Ibid, s 2(2)2. 
790 Ibid, s 2(5). 
791 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0902-01, page 1.  
792 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–1. 
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right to have any friend or family member or other person attend any meeting with the home or 
staff of the home) and in theory, should help residents to maintain and establish relations. One 
could argue that the Bill recognizes that relationships, not just medical care or other care 
activities, are an important part of a resident’s life in LTC. Rights which are new or amended are 
summarized in the table below:793 
Table 13: Comparison of the Resident's Bill of Rights under the Nursing Homes Act and the 
LTCHA 
 
Changes  Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA  
Right to participate in plan 
of care  
Opportunity to participate 
fully in the development and 
revision of the resident’s plan 
of care794 
Right to participate fully in 
the development, 
implementation, review and 
revision of his or her plan of 
care795 
Right to receive care and 
assistance towards 
independence  
Consistent with individual’s 
requirements796  
Based on a restorative care 
philosophy797  
Right to meet privately in a 
room that assures privacy  
With spouse798  With spouse or anybody799  
Right to have family 
members present 
When death is imminent800  When dying or very ill801  
Personal health information  Kept confidential in Kept confidential  
 
793 See also Jane Meadus, ACE Newsletter Special Insert “A Brand New World: Ontario’s New Long-Term Care 
Homes Act” (Toronto: Advocacy Centre for the Elderly, 2010). 
794 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 20.1(d). 
795 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 3(1)11. 
796 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 2(2)7. 
797 Long-Term Care Homes Act, supra note 425, s 3(1)12. 
798 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 2(2)14. 
799 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 3(1)21. 
800 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 2(2)10. 
801 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 3(1)15. 
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Changes  Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA  
accordance with law802  Have access to their records 
in accordance with law803  
Right to have any friend or 
family member or other 
person to attend any 
meeting with the home or 
staff of the home  
None  Yes804  
Right of individuals to have 
their lifestyles and choices 
respected  
None  Yes805  
Use of restraints  Right to be fully informed 
about the procedure and the 
consequences of receiving or 
refusing them.806 
Rights not to be restrained 
(except as allowed by law)807 
5.2.1.2 Right to respect for individual preferences and choices in care 
A related idea is that care must involve choices and respect for individual preferences, 
including cultural and religious preferences. The LTCHA has not changed substantively but a 
few changes are notable.  As noted in the chart above, a new right in the Bill of Rights is the 
right of individuals to have their lifestyles and choices respected.808 In particular, the LTCHA 
formalizes some of the requirements about respecting choices and preferences previously 
expressed only in the Program Manual.  Although the Nursing Homes Act and its regulation did 
not have explanation about individual preference (other than in the plan of care), the Program 
 
802 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 2(2)(6)iv. 
803 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 3(1)11. 
804 Ibid, s 3(1)27. 
805 Ibid, s 3(1)29. 
806 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 2(2)8. 
807 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 3(1)13. 
808 Ibid, s 3(1)19. 
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Manual provided considerable guidance on how to respect individual preferences, most of the 
guidance was located in the part about resident care and services standards and criteria. For 
example: “Each resident is provided with choices about his/her daily routine (e.g., bath or 
shower, time of activity, food preferences, amount of food, clothing, and involvement in 
programs).809 For many programs, it was emphasized that resident preferences must be 
respected. “Each resident shall have opportunities and assistance to participate in programs 
which are appropriate to his/her cognitive status, interests and preferences, both within the LTC 
home and in the community.”810 The LTCHA clarifies that the resident can choose the methods 
of bathing, and alternative meal and beverage choices.811 The preferences of a resident must be 
respected in a number of ways such as dressing and bedtime and rest routine.812 But since certain 
details about programs have been dropped, there are simply fewer requirements about respecting 
preferences under the LTCHA.  
It should be noted that the notions of choice (and the related concept of autonomy) as 
well as rights are also embedded in soft law as important values that should guide the behaviours 
of providers. Most often choice is implied in guidance about autonomy in treatment decision-
making, for example, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO), which 
regulates the practice of medicine in Ontario, states that physicians embody the values of 
compassion, service, altruism and trustworthiness and uphold the reputation of the profession by 
respecting patient autonomy with respect to health-care goals, and treatment decisions.813  The 
College of Nurses of Ontario (CNO) identifies that client well-being and client choice as primary 
values814 and reiterates these values in different guidelines. Similarly, Accreditation Canada 
states that one of four values that are fundamental to a resident- and family-centred care is 
dignity and respect: “Listening to and honouring resident and family perspectives and choices. 
Resident and family knowledge, values, beliefs, and cultural backgrounds are incorporated into 
 
809 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0902-02, page 3. 
810 Ibid at Tab 0903-01, page 16. 
811 General, O Reg 79/10, ss 33, 71 [O Reg 79/10]. 
812 Ibid, ss 40, 41. 
813 College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, Policy Number: #3-15: Consent to Treatment (Toronto: College 
of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2015). 
814 CNO has identified the following values as being most important in providing nursing care in Ontario: client 
well-being; client choice; privacy and confidentiality; respect for life; maintaining commitments; truthfulness; and  
fairness. College of Nurses of Ontario, Practice Standard: Ethics (Pub. No. 41034) (Toronto: College of Nurses of 
Ontario, 2009) at 4. 
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the planning and delivery of care.”815 Also, Accreditation Canada reiterates the LTCHA’s 
expectations about offering choices to residents in their daily routine such as dinning and 
respecting their choices in care.816   The notions of choice and rights may be discussed as 
guidance for professionals to balance competing demands. The CNO explains the meaning of 
and limits on client choice: “Client choice means self-determination and includes the right to the 
information necessary to make choices and to consent to or refuse care. Clients know the context 
in which they live and their own beliefs and values. As a result, when they have the necessary 
information, they can decide what is best for themselves.”  Further, the CNO stresses that there 
are limits to client choices, with emphasis on the boundaries of law and professional obligations 
to prevent harm to client and others.817  
Another point about care is that it should be individualized. At the core of individualized 
care is the idea that care must be based on assessed needs of individual residents, in relation to 
their illnesses, capabilities and functionalities. The entitlement to individualized care is not a new 
concept but simply formalized in law.  While the Nursing Homes Act and its regulation did not 
mention individualized care other than stipulating that a resident’s individuality must be 
recognized,818 the Program Manual contained specific guidance on individualized care in the 
areas of continence care,819 skin care,820 recreation and leisure service,821 therapy services,822 
medical care,823 and nutritional care.824 Some of the guidance was elevated from Program 
Manual to regulation under the LTCHA such as guidance pertaining to: personal care,825  
 
815Accreditation Canada, Standards: Long-Term Care Services (Ver. 11) (Ottawa: Accreditation Canada, 2016) at 1. 
816 Ibid at 63. 
817 “There are limits to client choice. For instance, clients do not have the right to choose to endanger the safety of 
others. Client choice may be restricted by policies that promote health . . . Client choice is also influenced by the 
resources available in a particular situation. There may be situations in which clients request nurses to perform an 
act that is illegal or may cause serious harm. In these situations, nurses need to inform clients, in a nonjudgmental 
manner, about the potential risks and harm associated with the practice, or that the practice is illegal in Canada or 
Ontario. By exploring the implications of the request and providing education and support to clients, nurses have a 
better chance of preventing a practice that has a risk of harm.” College of Nurses of Ontario, supra note 814 at 6. 
818 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 2(2)1. 
819 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0903-01, page 4, 5 and 12. 
820 Ibid at Tab 0903-01, page 19. 
821 Ibid at Tab 1003-01, page 1. 
822 Ibid at Tab 1006-01, page 1. 
823 Ibid at Tab 1002-01, page 1. 
824 Ibid at Tab 1014-01, page 5. 
825 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 32. See also Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–22 to 
2–23. 
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continence care products,826 bedtime and rest routines,827 menu planning828 and on-site 
physiotherapy.829 It should be noted that even if the new regulatory framework does not mention 
individualized care as much as the Program Manual, that does not necessary mean care in those 
areas such as skin care is not supposed to be individualized anymore. Professional guidelines 
also refer to individualized care830 or individualized care plan. 
It is also important to highlight what has not been changed either substantively or in legal 
form. In addition to the more abstract and subjective rights, there are also entitlements in the 
form of specific discreet services or activities. In some care categories, a few concrete and 
quantifiable care standards could be identified, such as a minimum of three meals and snacks 
between meals,831 a minimum of two baths or showers per week832 and an annual physical 
examination.833 These quantifiable standards continue in the new regime, sometimes with slight 
modifications.  
5.2.2 Meeting Bodily Needs   
In the feminist political economy literature, one topic is how care needs are being met (or 
not) including body work834 and the tensions that may be involved, such as autonomy of workers 
in meeting the needs of residents vs management and community control.835 One way for the 
government to influence body work, medical care and other tasks involved in care is to create 
more formal care categories or programs in order to name and define what a home has to deliver 
and by extension, what the government is willing to pay for.    
The Nursing Homes Act and its regulation attempted to capture key aspects of care by 
addressing the delivery of nursing and medical services, activities of daily living, and to a lesser 
extent, social care. The premise appeared to be that quality of care could be achieved by 
 
826 Ibid, s 51(2)(b). See also  Ibid at 2–31. 
827 Ibid, s 41. 
828 Ibid, s 71(5). 
829 Ibid, s 59(a). 
830 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Promoting Safety: Alternative Approaches to the Use of Restraints 
(Toronto: Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2012) at 22. “The philosophy of individualized care is 
foundational to the therapeutic nurse patient relationship.” 
831  RRO 1990, Reg 832: General, ss 75(1)(a), 75(1)(e) [Reg 832].  
832 Ibid, ss 56(9), 56(9.1). 
833 Ibid, s 51.(4)(b). 
834 Daly & Szebehely, supra note 739. 
835 Baines & Armstrong, supra note 514 at 12–13; Armstrong, supra note 655 at 83–86. 
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specifying broad categories of care (some are in the form of programs) to which residents were 
entitled, such as nursing care,836 laundry,837 recreation and social programs,838  and nutrition 
care839 in law.  The detailed descriptions of these and other categories were mostly contained in 
the Program Manual, rather than the Nursing Homes Act and regulation.    
The LTCHA and its regulation respond to the perceived deficiencies in quality of care 
(see Chapter 4) in a number of ways. The LTCHA definition of care is as follows: ““care” 
includes treatment and interventions”.840 To begin with, care is further differentiated and more 
categories of care have been introduced. For example, the category of “personal support 
services” is now separate from “nursing care” and is defined.841 Residents are also entitled to 
more types of care. For example, “foot care and nail care”,842  “End-of-life care / palliative care”, 
843 “hydration program”,844 “pain management”845  and “organized program for religious and 
spiritual practices”846 are some of the new prescribed categories of care that homes must deliver. 
But these new categories were simply elevated from the Program Manual to regulation or statute 
with further guidance to provide greater legal certainty to residents. For example, the Program 
Manual included requirements about cutting nails and O Reg 79/10 reflects such a requirement 
and the LTCHA Guideline further explains that residents cannot be charged for basic foot and 
nail care, including the cutting of toenails and fingernails.847 It should be noted that many of the 
details about how care should be provided are in soft law. For example, the RNAO has 
guidelines that can be used to implement care described in the LTCHA such as assessment and 
management of pain, end of life care, continence and pressure ulcer.848 Similarly, the Canadian 
Patient Safety Institute (CPSI) has guidelines about fall prevention and medication 
 
836 Reg 832, supra note 831, ss 1, 56(8). 
837 Ibid, s 22. 
838 Ibid, s 72. 
839 Ibid, ss 74 -77. 
840 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 2(1). 
841 Ibid, s 8(2). 
842 O Reg 79/10, ss 35(1)-(2). 
843 Ibid, s 42. 
844 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 11(b); O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 68(1). 
845 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 52. 
846 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 14. 
847 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–24. 
848 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, “Clinical Best Practice Guidelines | Long-Term Care Best Practices 
Toolkit, 2nd edition”, online: <http://ltctoolkit.rnao.ca/clinical-topics>. 
154 
management.849 It is possible that law simply gives deference to the regulated professionals to 
follow their respective guidelines.  
  However, it should be noted that some requirements have been eliminated under the 
new regime (regulatory contraction). Certain details about the following programs have been 
dropped: 
 social and recreation program (e.g. purposes of the program);850 
 accommodation (e.g. homes have to provide dry cleaning)851 
 nutrition and hydration (e.g. number of servings of vegetables).852 
Another point about meeting medical and clinical needs is that residents are being 
measured, monitored and reported on a regular basis. This is not simply a regulatory change but 
is also the government’s use of other non-regulatory tools in an attempt to influence quality of 
care. There are statutory requirements to measure, monitor, and report on residents by way of 
care plans and various documentation requirements, for example, in relation to responsive 
behavior (to be discussed in Chapter 6). But there has to be the necessary infrastructure to enable 
the implementation of these statutory requirements. The implementation of Resident Assessment 
Instrument - Minimum Data Set (RAI-MDS)853 is a good example how regulatory and non-
regulatory tools are intertwined to influence delivery of care.  The RAI-MDS is now the 
“standardized assessment tool for admission, quarterly assessment, significant change in health 
status and annual assessments for each resident.”854 Specifically, this tool captures information 
about a resident’s functioning, mental and physical health, social support and service use.855  All 
LTC homes in Ontario have submitted data to the Canadian Institute for Health Information 
(CIHI) on a quarterly basis since 2009.856At the time of implementation, MOHLTC characterized 
 
849 Canadian Patient Safety Institute, Medication Reconciliation in Long-Term Care Getting Started Kit (version 3) 
(Ottawa: Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2015); Canadian Patient Safety Institute, Reducing Falls and Injuries 
from Falls – Getting Started Kit (Ottawa: Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2015). 
850 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at 1003–02, page 1. 
851 Ibid at Tab 1013-01, page 8. 
852 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 76(1)2. 
853 For a critical view, see Daly, supra note 514 at 48.  
854 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, RAI-MDS 2.0 LTC Homes – Practice Requirements (Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, 2007). 
855 Health Quality Ontario, “Measuring Long-Term Care Homes”, (2017), online: <http://www.hqontario.ca/System-
Performance/Measuring-System-Performance/Measuring-Long-Term-Care-Homes>. 
856 Ibid. 
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the assessment tool as follows: “It’s a really significant assessment tool that not only helps with 
benchmarks, but just helps them manage people’s care better so that they don’t deteriorate while 
waiting for care. They’re actually assessed quickly and they can get occupational therapy, 
physiotherapy, what-ever the individual requires, at the home and right from the hospital as 
well.”857  Further, the quality indicators derived from the RAI-MDS “have the advantage of 
having been captured right at the bedside by the care teams and then aggregated up through the 
system.”858 As we will see in subsequent chapters, the use of quality indicators is highly 
controversial and reveals assumptions about our understanding of risks in LTC. 
The last point about meeting medical and clinical needs is that there is an increasing 
emphasis on care should be “inter-disciplinary” and “multi-disciplinary”.  While the previous 
regime also required inter-disciplinary review of care plans and care conferences859 and inter-
disciplinary approach to specific types of care (e.g. skin care), the new regime formalizes these 
approaches in law. All the required programs must be interdisciplinary,860 weight assessment has 
to be interdisciplinary861 and restorative care also has to be interdisciplinary.862 This 
formalization may simply reflect a longer term shift towards an inter-disciplinary approach to 
care (as an ideal or objective) in professional standards.863  Some of the guidelines reviewed also 
refer to “inter-disciplinary” teams.864  This apparent emphasis on inter-disciplinary care stands in 
contrast to the rigid division of labour depicted in the feminist political economy literature.  
5.2.3 Housing (or Shelter) Needs 
Although LTC is a basket of medical, personal assistance, dietary and social services, it is 
also intended to address the housing (or shelter) needs of residents.  In particular, regulation is 
intended to address the challenges of congregate (or communal) living while respecting 
individual preferences and providing choices. Both old and new frameworks emphasize facilities 
 
857 Ontario, Legislative Assembly (Standing Committee on Public Accounts), Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 
39th Parl, 2nd session, (12 May 2010) at 109. 
858 Ibid. 
859 Reg 832, ss 127(1)-(2). 
860 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 78(1). 
861 Ibid, s 69. 
862 Ibid, s 56. Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 9(1). 
863 One of the objects of a health profession regulatory college is “To promote inter-professional collaboration with 
other health profession colleges.” Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, supra note 61, s 3(1)9.  
864 Canadian Patient Safety Institute, supra note 849 at 27, 40 and 61. Accreditation Canada, supra note 815 at 25. 
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are primary the homes of residents and some considerations must be made to balance the safety 
and security rights of different people living / working in the home. The Program Manual states: 
“Risks to each resident's health and safety shall be identified and addressed in ways that consider 
his/her choice, freedom of movement, dignity and respect, in keeping with other residents' 
rights.”865 Similarly, the rights to decorate his / her room and to keep a rest routine are also 
subject to respecting other residents’ rights.866  
The legislative intent of balancing of competing interests in terms of individual vs. 
collective is more obvious in the new act. In the LTCHA’s preamble:  
The people of Ontario and their Government: 
 . . . Strongly support collaboration and mutual respect amongst residents, their families 
and friends, long-term care home providers, service providers, caregivers, volunteers, the 
community and governments to ensure that the care and services provided meet the needs 
of the resident and the safety needs of all residents.  
During clause-by-clause consideration of Bill 140, the Parliamentary Assistant  explained the 
rationale behind this clause when responding to requests to amend the Bill of Rights to reflect 
collective rights: “… that mutual respect in the preamble allows for the homes to have something 
to turn to, should they need to address a concern around a collective right versus bill of rights 
situation in a home . . . We address the issue by addressing not only the residents but their family 
and friends, which I think goes some way to addressing the concern that has been raised about 
individual versus collective rights.”867 One way this debate unfolds is around safety and security 
of residents as well as those who work and volunteer in the home. The underlying tensions will 
be explored in subsequent chapters.  
5.2.4 Summary 
The table below summarizes the changes: 
 
 
 
865 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1011-01, page 7.   
866 Ibid at Tab 0902-01 page 3, Table 0903-01 14 and 19. 
867 Ontario, Legislative Assembly (Standing Committee on Social Policy), Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 
38th Parl, 2nd session,  (30 January 30 2007). 
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Table 14: Key changes about care under the Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Rights and entitlements   Bill of Rights 
Guidance on how to respect 
individual preferences 
provided in the Program 
Manual  
Bill of Rights - Wording 
clarifications and expansions 
of the scope of existing rights 
or guidance in the Program 
Manual 
Respect for individual 
preferences and choices in 
care more formalized  
 
Meeting bodily needs Much guidance in the 
Program Manual 
Care is further differentiated 
and new categories of care 
elevated from the Program 
Manual to regulation or 
statute 
New IT system to monitor, 
track and measure residents 
Emphasis on care should be 
“inter-disciplinary” and 
“multi-disciplinary” 
formalized 
Housing Needs Emphasis on balancing rights 
in a communal setting in the 
Program Manual  
New - Home to be safe, 
secure environment principle  
Legislative intent of 
balancing of competing 
interests is more obvious 
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In this section, I have explored the role of law in defining and constructing care. It is 
evident that regulatory expansion has occurred in the sense that more activities seem to be 
brought under the reach of formal law but substantively may not be very different. One could 
argue that under the LTCHA, the care relationship is defined mainly by what the care provider 
(the home and its employees) must provide to the care recipients (residents). Care recipients are 
armed with rights and entitlements to ensure that they receive what they need for physical 
survival and that they are legally able to assert their choices and preferences for certain types of 
activities. I will now turn to the question of the delivery of care.  
5.3 How is care delivered? 
In Chapter 4, I explain that one of the themes in the feminist political economy literature 
is the regulation of care including rigidity of workplace. In this section, I will explain how the 
delivery of care is subject to various instruments of control. Obviously funding level is critical to 
the delivery of care and works together with regulatory instruments, but I will put aside the issue 
of funding here.  This section will being by describing how delivery of care is standardized and 
highly prescriptive so that each home will have the same programs. Then I will then explore how 
the government attempts to control homes’ discretion over staffing. This section will conclude by 
explaining the concept of “patient-centred” care, which is not necessarily new but has become 
more prominent in this period.  
5.3.1 Standardized and Highly prescriptive  
Under both the previous Nursing Homes Act and the current LTCHA, there are programs 
of various degrees of legal formality offered in homes. See Table 15 for a comparison. On first 
glance, it may appear that under the LTCHA, residents are now entitled to more programs. 
However, these programs are not new in the sense that they were not offered under the previous 
regime. Rather, some of them were elevated from Program Manual to statute or regulation and 
given a set of standardized processes and structures. One could argue that the programs are 
supposed to look and feel the same (at least consistent) across all homes under the LTCHA so 
that residents are assured of receiving similar support and services regardless of where they live 
in the province.   
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Table 15: Comparison of programs under the Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Programs  Nursing Services, Staff 
Education, Recreation and 
Leisure Service, Social Work 
Service, Spiritual and 
Religious Program, Therapy 
Services, Volunteer Services, 
Dental Services, Foot Care 
Services, Facility 
Organization and 
Administration, Medical 
Services, Environmental 
Services, Dietary Services, 
Diagnostic Services and 
Pharmacy Services.868 
Four inter-disciplinary 
programs: falls prevention 
and management, skin and 
wound care, continence care 
and bowel management, and 
pain management.869   
The organized programs are 
as follows: nursing and 
personal support services, 
restorative care, recreational 
and social activities, dietary 
services and hydration, 
medical services, information 
and referral assistance, 
religious and spiritual 
practices, accommodation 
services and volunteer 
programs.870    
Requirements  Within each program, there 
were standards, criteria and 
guidelines in the Program 
Manual.871 
The LTCHA mandates the 
establishment of and prescribe 
detailed requirements for all 
programs in each home.872 
Standardization Certain components were All programs must comply 
 
868 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545. See Tab 10 “Standards: Programs and Services”. 
869 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–20. 
870 Ibid. 
871 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545. See Tab 9901-01 for the definitions for criteria, 
guidelines and standards.   
872 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 8–18. 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
very common across the 
programs, such as written 
program description, 
evaluation, and policies and 
procedures. 
with certain process or 
procedural type of 
requirements regardless of the 
substance of the program: 
 There must be a 
written program 
description. 
 All equipment and 
aids used by staff must 
be appropriate for the 
resident. 
 The program must be 
evaluated and updated 
at least annually in 
accordance with 
evidence-based 
practices and, if there 
are none, in 
accordance with 
prevailing practices.  
 A written record of 
each evaluation must 
be maintained. 
 All actions taken with 
respect to every 
resident under a 
program must be 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
documented.873 
A few observations can be made about the differences in programs offered under the 
Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA. First, with respect to how care was supposed to be 
delivered, the level of detail varied significantly in both old and new regimes. Second, the 
LTCHA and its regulations continue to be highly prescriptive mainly because some of the 
Program Manual requirements were incorporated.  For example, the following programs have 
been formalized into law: volunteer program, recreation and social program, religious and 
spiritual practices program.874 Further, the requirements have become more complex in the sense 
that they anticipate different situations in which care may be provided. By way of example, more 
rules are required in order to permit exceptions to the availability of 24/7 RN requirement.875 
Some requirements are incorporated to reflect a more risk-based approach, which in turn 
necessitates more rules. For example, while monitoring residents’ weight has always been a 
requirement, the LTCHA provides more elaborate guidance on weight monitoring and 
assessment based on the changes in weight and duration.876  However, some requirements have 
been removed also such as certain details about the volunteer program877 (although the existence 
of the program is now mandated by law).      
5.3.2 Homes’ discretion over staffing  
Feminist political economists have made claims about the importance of structural 
aspects of care that set the conditions for care including funding, ownership, and staffing 
levels.878 LTC is a labour-intensive sector, and it is instructive to understand how the government 
uses various instruments to control homes’ discretion over staffing (full-time vs part-time, mix of 
staff, how many staff and when).  The changes in staffing requirements under the LTCHA are 
more about legal forms than substance.  The basic approach has not changed: there are 
 
873 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–20 to 2–21. 
874 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 16, 10, 14. 
875 Morriston Park Nursing Home v Ontario (Health and Long-term Care), 2014 CanLII 62311 (ON HSARB) 
[Morrison Park]. 
876 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 68–69. 
877 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545. The Program Manual provided a list of services that 
volunteers may provide and detailed responsibilities of the volunteer coordinator. 
878 Banerjee & Armstrong, supra note 514 at 7. 
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prescriptive requirements about how many minimum hours certain positions or occupations 
(administrator,879 director of nursing and personal care,880 nutrition manager,881 food service 
workers882) have to work depending on the size of facility (in terms of bed) supplemented by 
requirements that certain positions (medical director and designated leads for certain programs) 
are mandatory but no specific quantity (in terms of staffing hours) is indicated. Further, there is 
no prescribed minimum number of hours of care to be provided by the nursing staff (other than 
the stipulation that a home must have at least one RN 24/7 with some narrow exceptions883), 
therapists, and personal support workers (to be discussed further below). There are very few 
completely new requirements (as in the sense of never been implemented). They are about 
homes having processes in place and articulating the government’s policy intent. They build on 
and go beyond the Program Manual requirements: continuity of care principle, written staffing 
plan and the government’s authority to prescribe staffing and care standards by regulation. 
Otherwise, the LTCHA and its regulation do not provide any guidance on staffing related matters 
(other than outlining the rights and obligations of staff when the home is under the control by an 
interim manager – to be discussed in Chapter 8).   
5.3.2.1 Staffing level 
The LTCHA builds on the previous regime’s expectation about the use of agency or 
casual staff.  In a 2006 memo about the 24/7 RN requirements, the Ministry explained that 
limited and temporary utilization of contracted/agency Registered Nurses could be considered as 
an acceptable short-term plan until such time that permanent Registered Nurse staff is secured.884 
In the LTCHA, there is a new continuity of care provision intended to limit on the use of 
temporary, casual or agency staff:  “In order to provide a stable and consistent workforce and to 
improve continuity of care to residents, every licensee of a long-term care home shall ensure that 
 
879 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 212(1)–(3). 
880 Ibid, s 213(1)–(3). 
881 Ibid, s 75. 
882 Ibid, s 77. 
883 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 8(3). Morriston Park, supra note 875. 
884 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545. See the memo from Vahe Kehyayan, Director 
Compliance Inspections and Enforcement of the LTC Homes Programs to Long-Term Care Home Administrators 
(January 9, 2006) in Tab 1001-01. Two conditions must be met: 1) a formal agreement with an agency that 
facilitates the same RN assigned and 2) mandatory comprehensive orientation program for temporary agency staff. 
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the use of temporary, casual or agency staff is limited in accordance with the regulations”.885 
There is no regulation in place to provide further guidance on what homes have to do in order to 
limit causal or agency staff. 
It appears that the government relies on procedural solutions to manage the tension 
between the objective of safety of residents and the need to allow homes to manage the majority 
of their direct care staff. A written staffing plan is required for the nursing and personal support 
services program and must: 
 Provide for a staffing mix consistent with residents’ assessed care and safety 
needs;  
 Set out the organization and scheduling of staff shifts;  
 Promote continuity of care by minimizing the number of different staff members 
to each resident;  
 Include a back-up plan that addresses situations when staff cannot come to work, 
including 24/7 RN coverage; and 
 Be evaluated and updated annually. A written record of each evaluation must be 
maintained.886 
Although each home must have an organized program of personal support services,887 
there is no minimum staffing level for personal support workers, either in the form of resident-to-
staff ratio or number of care hours per resident per day. 
The last point about delivery of care is that the LTCHA provides for staffing and care 
standards to be prescribed by regulation.888The legislative intent was to have a provision “broad 
enough to allow for consultation on what should be included in a staffing and care standard and 
would allow the government to bring that in under regulation.”889  It should be emphasized that 
these are not minimum standards that each resident is entitled to.890 To date, there are no new 
staffing and care standards prescribed by regulation to date.  
 
885 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 78(1).  
886 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–22 to 2–23. 
887 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 8(b). 
888 Ibid, s 17. 
889 Supra note 867. 
890 Ibid. 
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5.3.2.2 Skills and qualifications of caregivers 
As explained above, the LTCHA regulates care directly by specifying the what, how and 
when of care delivery but the LTCHA also regulates those who provide care indirectly in the 
following ways. First, there is a new general statutory requirement that a home must ensure that 
all the staff of the home have the proper skills and qualifications and possess the qualifications 
provided for in the regulations.891  As well, each program must have a designated lead. Second, 
while staff qualifications requirements have always existed in different instruments, the LTCHA 
imposes more qualification requirements on caregivers (from regulated health professionals to 
cooks), such as higher formal education level attained892 and membership in regulatory or 
professional bodies. By way of example, the qualifications for the position of administrator are 
higher now and the expectations are clearer.  Rather than education in management or education 
in health services, the LTCHA specifically requires that either a diploma or degree. The LTCHA 
also specifies the skills required: communication, leadership, and supervisory/managerial 
experience.893 Similarly, the qualifications for the position of director of nursing and personal 
care are now enshrined in legislation.894 The designed lead for housekeeping, laundry, 
maintenance services must have a post-secondary degree or diploma, knowledge of evidence-
based practices and, if there are none, prevailing practices relating to housekeeping, laundry and 
maintenance, as applicable; and a minimum of two years’ experience in a managerial or 
supervisory capacity.895 But the Program Manual did not have these formal education 
requirements.896  
However, it should also be pointed that some of the more detailed responsibilities of 
select professionals have been dropped in the sense that they were in the Program Manual but 
they are not included in any legal instrument anymore. In a way, the LTCHA is less prescriptive 
 
891 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 73. 
892 Some of the changes are probably unrelated to the LTC sector. The necessary changes to professional regulation 
happened in other statutes and the LTCHA simply reflects those changes. For example, the baccalaureate 
requirement for RN became effective January 1, 2005. See http://cou.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/COU-
Position-Paper-on-Collaborative-Nursing-Programs-in-Ontario.pdf  
893 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 70. O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 212. 
894 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 71. See also Reg 832, supra note 831, s 213. 
895 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 92(2). 
896 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1013-02, page 1. 
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than the previous regime in terms of containing fewer requirements about what certain 
professions should be doing and how while directing or providing care. These include:   
 Detailed description of the responsibilities of the Director of Nursing and 
qualifications897  
 Detailed description of the responsibilities of RN managing each unit, functions of 
nursing services, criteria for evaluation898 
 Responsibilities of attending physicians and medical directors899   
 Role of the co-ordinator of the religious and spiritual practices program and 
qualifications.900  
This apparent reduction in regulation does not negate the fact that care activities are still subject 
to many complex standards that front-line care providers including unregulated professionals are 
responsible for. The increasing importance of monitoring quality backed by formal legal 
sanctions will be addressed in subsequent chapters. The table below is a simplified illustration of 
these changes: 
Table 16: Changes to staffing requirements under the LTCHA 
More substantive     Form (some effect) 
 Written staffing plan  
 Formal educational and skill 
requirements that are above the 
Nursing Homes Act     
 Medical director has to consult with 
the director of nursing and other 
health professionals 
 Limit on temporary, casual or agency 
staff 
 Move certain positions from 
regulation to statute 
 Written agreement between home and 
medical director (from program 
manual to regulation)  
 Orientation for volunteers 
 
897 Ibid at Tab 1001-02, page 1 to 3. 
898 Ibid at Tab 100102, page 3 to 5. 
899 Ibid at Tab 1012-01 and 1012-02. 
900 Ibid at Tab 1005-02, page 1 to 2. 
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 Government’s authority to prescribe 
staffing and care standards  
 
 24/7 RN (from regulation to statute)  
 Training and orientation of staff (from 
regulation to statute) 
Less substantive     Form (No real legal effect)901  
One could interpret the changes with respect to staffing as a way to avoid harm that may result 
from incompetent care: it is believed that legally-mandated professional qualifications, 
orientation and training will produce quality care. Other than that, regulation is more about 
making sure the home has a plan in place to control its staffing and scheduling at its discretion. 
But to understand the interaction between residents and their formal caregivers, the work now 
turns to the notion of patient-centred care which will help to explain what care means in the LTC 
sector.    
5.3.3 Patient-centred care 
As noted in Chapter 4, according to the OECD, one of the three aspects generally 
accepted as critical to quality of care is patient-centredness.902 In the feminist political economy 
literature, it is argued that patient-centred and person-centred care focuses almost exclusively on 
medical care while failing to recognize the larger social and economic context in which care is 
delivered and received.903 As well, there is the tension of whether to prioritize the collective and 
community, or the individual, person-centred needs of residents.904 
The increasing prominence of the notion of “patient-centred” care905 (which has a few 
variants such as “person-centred”, “client-centred”, “resident-centred” and “resident-focused” 
care) marks a significant change as part of the quality of care agenda during this period. To 
understand the notion of resident-centred care within a broader systemic change in quality of 
 
901 For example, a requirement in regulation has the same legal effect as if it is in statute.  Moving a requirement 
from regulation to statute will not make it more enforceable. 
902 Murakami & Colombo, supra note 629 at 159. 
903 Baines & Armstrong, supra note 514 at 3–4. 
904 Gudmund Ågotnes & Christine Øye, “Chapter 10 Person-Centred or Community-Centred Care? Why Doing It 
Wrong Is Sometimes Right” in Pat Armstrong & Ruth Lowndes, eds, Negotiating Tensions in Long-Term 
Residential Care: Ideas Worth Sharing (Montreal: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2018) 97. 
905 For example see Cathy Fooks et al, “The Patient Experience in Ontario 2020: What Is Possible?” (2015) 14:4 
HealthcarePapers 8. 
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care, one must refer to the Excellent Care of All Act, 2010: “The people of Ontario and their 
Government: . . . Recognize that a high quality health care system is one that is accessible, 
appropriate, effective, efficient, equitable, integrated, patient centred, population health focused, 
and safe”.906 Further, patient-centredness is one of the current indicators that health care 
organizations have to report on in their quality improvement plans.907 The Health Quality 
Ontario has since developed many frameworks and guidelines on quality improvement, which 
will be addressed in Chapter 8.  
As explained in Chapter 4, Bill 41, the Patients First Act was introduced in October 
2016, and received Royal Assent in December 2016. The long title of the bill is An Act to amend 
various Acts in the interests of patient-centred care.908 Despite the title, Bill 41 does not further 
elaborate what patient-centred care means. However, since the Bill purports to streamline the 
health care system and empower the remaining organizations such as the LHINs to undertake 
additional functions, it is probably fair to say that the perception is that more bureaucracy means 
“system-centred” care rather than “patient-centred” care. Accordingly, the notion of “patient-
centred care” is used to convey the idea that there is a pressing need to reform the health care 
system because delivery of care is cumbersome, inefficient and too bureaucratic.       
While the Nursing Home Act, its regulation and the Program Manual did not reference 
any variants related to “patient-centred care”, the LTCHA refers to resident-centred care in the 
Preamble: “The people of Ontario and their Government: Believe in resident-centred care”909 but 
provides no guidance on what that means. Similarly, the LTCHA Guideline explains: “The 
LTCHA is designed to help ensure that residents of long-term care homes receive safe, 
consistent, high-quality, resident-centred care.”910   
Other new legal or quasi-legal instruments also refer to person-centred care as a way to 
disseminate norms about what the government expects from the health care system. The 
Ministry-LHIN Accountability Agreement includes the following in the introduction: “The 
MOHLTC has defined the next phase of health care system transformation through Patients 
 
906 Excellent Care for All Act 2010, SO 2010, c14, Preamble. 
907 Annual Quality Improvement Plan, O Reg 187/15, ss 2(1)-(2). 
908 Patients First Act, supra note 624. 
909 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425. 
910 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 1. 
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First: Action Plan for Health Care” which “is focused on creating a health care system that is 
person-centred, . .”911 Throughout the agreement, “person-centred” care is referenced in the 
provision regarding principles,912  accountability,913 and performance improvement.914 Likewise, 
the background section of the LHIN-home service accountability agreement states it “supports a 
collaborative relationship between the LHIN and the HSP [health service provider]… to create a 
health care system that is person-centered, accountable, transparent, and evidence-based.”915 
More recently, the Ministry also imparts the importance of Ministry and LHINs “work[ing] 
together to put patients at the centre of a high performing health care system.”916 However, the 
notion of “person-centred” care is never defined or elaborated in these agreements. For this 
reason, I think it is safe to assume that the term is used to describe an objective of the health care 
system rather than to guide care delivery at the individual level (i.e., at the point of care).  
It is likely that different health professional associations have always had their own 
definitions of “patient-centred” care as a means to define the provider to client / patient 
relationship.917 A common theme in soft law is “patient-centred”, “client-centred” or “resident-
centred” care in the discharge of professional obligations and expectations. The definitions vary 
but it is fair to say that they overlap with or integrate concepts I addressed elsewhere in the 
dissertation, such as “choice” and “autonomy”.   They all illustrate what a caring relationship 
should look like i.e., it should not be solely about the care activities or transactions but should 
entail fostering the autonomy of users, patients and residents. The College of Dietitians of 
Ontario explains: “The client collaborates and is a partner in the decision-making process ... This 
means that the client's own experiences and knowledge are central, and carry authority within the 
client-professional partnership. This assumption forms the basis of a client-centred approach 
wherein mutual respect, trust, and shared objectives are fundamental.”918  RNAO’s definition is 
 
911 Ministry-LHIN Accountability Agreement (2015-16-2017-18).  
912 Ibid, s 2. 
913 Ibid, s 5. 
914 Ibid, s 7. 
915  Long-Term Care Service Accountability Agreements (L-SAA)(2016-2019). 
916 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Mandate Letter from the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care to 
Toronto Central LHIN (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2017). 
917 Other delivery organizations also work on their definitions of patient-centred care. For example, see Danielle 
Bender & Paul Holyoke, “Bringing Person- and Family-Centred Care Alive in Home, Community and Long-Term 
Care Organizations” (2016) 19:1 Healthcare Quarterly, online: <http://www.longwoods.com/content/24605>. 
918 College of Dietitians of Ontario, The Jurisprudence Handbook for Dietitians in Ontario (Toronto: College of 
Dietitians of Ontario, 2015) at 3–4. 
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as follows: “An approach in which clients are viewed as whole; it is not merely about delivering 
services where the client is located. Client-centred care involves advocacy, empowerment, and 
respecting the client’s autonomy, voice, self-determination, and participation in decision-
making.”919  Accreditation Canada incorporates more concepts into patient-centred care: 
“Providing resident- and family-centred care means working collaboratively with residents and 
their families to provide care that is respectful, compassionate, culturally safe, and competent, 
while being responsive to their needs, values, cultural backgrounds and beliefs, and preferences.” 
Further, four values are identified as fundamental to patient-centred care: 1) dignity and respect 
2) information sharing 3) partnership and participation and 4) collaboration.920 None of the 
values that Accreditation Canada identifies are new in soft law or hard law but the concept of 
resident- or person- or client-centred care connects them together.  
Viewed from this lens, other regulatory changes also support the notion of resident-
centred care. One such change is related to care plans and care planning, including assessing and 
reassessing residents and planning, delivering and evaluating their care, beginning when 
residents are first admitted to the home.921  Participation of residents in the development, review 
and implementation of their plan of care is now a right,922 supplemented by other requirements to 
have others involved.923 However, this may not be a significant change since under the Nursing 
Homes Act residents had the opportunity to participate in the plan of care development and 
review.924 The Program Manual also reflected the policy intent to direct homes to get to know 
residents and include them: “Assessment is the systematic collection and review of resident-
specific information gathered from all available sources. . . Whenever possible, the primary 
source of any information is the resident. In discussion with the resident, staff comes to better 
understand the resident's values, needs, wishes, strengths, social and personal resources, culture, 
interests, health status, extent of independent functioning, type and amount of supports 
 
919 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Preventing and Addressing Abuse and Neglect of Older Adults: 
Person-Centred, Collaborative, System-Wide Approaches (Toronto: Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 
2014) at 87. 
920 Accreditation Canada, supra note 815 at 1. 
921Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–12.  
922 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 3(1)11. 
923 Ibid, s 3(1)26. 
924 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 20.10(d). 
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required.”925 The LTCHA requirements about what must be included in the care plan (called care 
domains) and how to do assessment and re-assessment926 build on the Program Manual 
requirements927 and are formalized in law. In sum, one manifestation of “resident-centred” care 
may be that residents are being assessed, documented and monitored more closely. However, the 
emphasis on engaging residents, their substitute decision-makers and family members in 
operational planning is a consistent theme in the operation of homes, and not just in care.  
5.3.4 Summary  
The table below summarizes the changes: 
Table 17: Comparison of delivery of care under the Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTHCA 
Standardized program 
requirements (such as 
written program 
description, evaluation and 
documentation of actions 
taken with respect to every 
resident) 
Common processes and 
procedures across all 
programs 
Standardized program 
structure, processes and 
procedures in law 
Home’s discretion over 
staffing 
Expectation about utilization 
of contracted/agency 
Registered Nurses in the 
Program Manual 
Detailed descriptions of 
certain positions 
New - continuity of care 
principle, written staffing 
plan and the government’s 
authority to prescribe staffing 
and care standards by 
regulation. 
New – more formal 
qualification requirements 
 
925 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0903-01, page 1. 
926 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 6. See also O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 26. 
927 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0903-01. 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTHCA 
Concept of Patient-centred 
care  
None In the LTCHA and other 
legal instruments 
In this section, I have described how care is delivered by attending to the standardized 
and prescriptive programs and homes’ discretion over staffing under the LTCHA.  The 
increasing prominence of the concept of “patient-centred care” is also explained. The care 
relationship is further defined by standardized program structures and process, which set the 
context in which care providers interact with residents, substitute decision-makers, families and 
friends. The pro is that residents have greater certainty about what programs or services they are 
entitled to and how those programs should be managed. The downside is that the changes say 
very little about the substance of those programs and are unlikely to improve significantly the 
care received by residents.   
So far I have described the care relationship as unidirectional as law focuses on what the 
providers have to do and how. But there are other requirements that connect providers and 
residents in different ways. As I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, the notion of working 
collaboratively with residents and families is exemplified in other requirements around the 
operation of the home.  This includes formal mechanisms mandated by law to provide feedback 
to the home and receive information so that residents and their families have more influence (but 
not necessarily control) over how decisions are made. I will return to this issue in Chapter 8. 
5.4 How do the changes mandate accommodation of disability in 
care delivery? 
Recall that for disability studies scholar such as Tom Shakespeare “disability” and 
“disablism” are conceptualized as relational in nature.928 In this section, I will explain how the 
LTCHA has addressed the accommodation of residents’ care needs associated with their 
disabilities within the homes. The focus here is on individual residents with respect to care, 
rather than on all aspects of living in LTC homes. These requirements should be considered 
within the context of legal framework of disability rights in Ontario, mainly the Accessibility for 
 
928 Shakespeare, supra note 4. 
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Ontarians with Disabilities Act (AODA) and the Human Rights Code.  I will also briefly note the 
significance of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. While the equality 
rights guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are relevant to this 
research, these will be discussed in Chapter 7 when I address how residents exercise control over 
their lives.  
5.4.1 Personal assistance, social environment and program design  
The Nursing Homes Act and its regulation contained few requirements about 
accommodating impairments or disabilities.  The overall principle of accommodation can be 
inferred from the Bill of Rights: “Every resident has the right to receive reactivation and 
assistance towards independence consistent with his or her requirements.”929 A resident’s plan of 
care must include, among other things, “the assistance to be given to the resident with activities 
of daily living, and the safety and security precautions to be taken with respect to the 
resident”.930  In the Program Manual, there were requirements about accommodating physical 
disabilities such as self-help aids (such as walkers and canes) being included in the charges for 
basic accommodation,931 cleaning and repair of sensory and communication aids, as well as large 
print for certain documents.932 Also, one of the standards was “[a]rrangements shall be made to 
facilitate spiritual and religious care for the hearing and visually impaired, where resources are 
available.”933   As well, the Program Manual provided additional guidance for dealing with 
residents with cognitive impairments and/or “disruptive behavior” (which could “result in risk to 
themselves or others”), such as requirements for in-service education program for staff and 
orientation for new volunteers.934  There were also ad hoc requirements, for example, one of the 
resident care standards was: “Each resident shall have opportunities and assistance to participate 
in programs which are appropriate to his/her cognitive status, interests and preferences, both 
within the LTC home and in the community.”935   
The LTCHA has not changed significantly from the Nursing Homes Act in terms of what 
 
929Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 2(2)7. 
930 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 126(c)ii-iii. 
931Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0608-01, page 2.  
932 Ibid at Tab 0902-01, page 2. 
933Ibid at Tab 1005-01, page 1. 
934Ibid at Tab 1002-01, page 3, Tab 1007-02, 4 and Tab 1102-01, 30. 
935Ibid at Tab 0903-01, page 16. 
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homes have to do to accommodate residents. “Independence” continues to be a goal for 
residents, however, there is a recognition in the LTCHA that residents (or their health conditions) 
cannot always be changed (or “cured”) and therefore the law performs the function of mandating 
that the environment – physical and social – to be altered or adapted in order to deliver care.  
One could argue that this resembles the idea that the environment can be disabling and the focus 
should be on accommodation of differences.  Homes must take steps to respond to and 
accommodate limitations experienced by residents at the individual level and at the program 
design level, such as mandating provision of services for residents with cognitive impairments, 
and residents who are unable to leave their rooms. The goal is to allow all residents to access the 
same categories of care or services despite their impairments / disabilities in order to be as 
independent as possible.   Some of the LTCHA requirements were elevated from the Program 
Manual to regulation and therefore are not necessarily new. The table below summarizes how 
resident impairments are accounted for under the Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA. 
Table 18: Accommodation of impairments under the Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Personal care  Homes must provide assistance 
(e.g. dining)936 and cannot charge 
for mobility devices937 
Homes must provide assistance (e.g. 
dining and oral care), support or tools 
(such as assistive devices)938  
Social 
environment  
in-service education program for 
staff and orientation for new 
volunteers to deal with cognitive 
impairments and/or “disruptive 
behavior”939 
Home must develop and implement 
strategies to meet the needs of 
residents with compromised 
communication and verbalization 
skills, with cognitive impairment and 
those who cannot communicate in the 
languages used in the home940 
 
936 Ibid at Tab 0903-01, page 16–18. 
937 Ibid at Tab 0608-01, page 2. 
938 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 34, 73. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–43 to 2–51. 
939 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1002-01, page 3, Tab 1007-02, 4. 
940 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 43. 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Include references to communication 
challenges in pain management, 
volunteer training and information 
posting941   
Include responsive behavior 
provisions(to be discussed in chapter 
6) 
Program 
design  
Opportunities and assistance to 
participate in programs which are 
appropriate to his/her cognitive 
status, interests and preferences942 
Facilitate spiritual and religious 
care for the hearing and visually 
impaired943 
 
 
 
 
 
For social and recreation activities, 
homes must include services for 
residents with cognitive impairments, 
and residents who are unable to leave 
their rooms944  
Every resident must be assisted and 
supported to participate in activities 
that may be of interest if he or she is 
not able to do so independently945  
Arrangements should be made to 
facilitate the participation in the 
religious and spiritual programs of 
residents who have hearing or visual 
impairments, based on availability 
within the community946   
 
941 Ibid, ss 52(1), 223(2), 225(2). 
942 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0903-01, page 16. 
943 Ibid at Tab 1005-01, page 1. 
944 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 10(2). 
945 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 65(1)(f); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–41. 
946 Ibid, s 85(3). 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
It should be noted that impairment is 
not specifically referenced in other 
programs or categories of care. 
 
The professional guidelines reviewed show some more awareness of the needs of 
disabled residents (or patients) within a care context when compared to statutes. Very few 
guidelines mention “disability” or “impairment” directly with the exception of dementia and 
other cognitive impairments, especially in relation to consent to treatment (to be discussed in 
Chapter 7).  One exception is the RNAO guideline on oral health that focuses on vulnerable adult 
populations, which include “those with special needs may include older adults, those who are 
medically compromised, intellectually challenged, physically challenged, and/or have severe and 
persistent mental illness. Many may be frail or dependent upon caregivers to help with their 
activities of daily living. These adults may live in the community or may be in institutions.”947 In 
particular, there is more recognition of how impairment and disability (and other social locations 
such as age) should be taken into consideration when delivering care (compared to statutes). In 
the best practices guideline about pain management, it is acknowledged that some people may be 
unable to talk about or report pain, such as older adults with cognitive impairment and people 
with intellectual disability. Accordingly, there is guidance on how to perform a comprehensive 
pain assessment on such persons.948 While these guidelines appear to reflect a medical model of 
disability (as they are intended to disseminate clinical best practices), a few of them also attend 
to issues other than the individual impairments or illnesses. In particular, these guidelines 
acknowledge the interaction of individual impairment and the environment similar to 
Shakespeare’s interactional approach to disability.   For example, in the RNAO best practices 
guideline “Prevention of Falls and Fall Injuries in the Older Adult”, while many interventions 
focus on individual illness or impairment (such as medications management), one of the 
 
947 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Oral Health: Nursing Assessment and Intervention (Toronto: 
Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2008) at 13. 
948 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Assessment and Management of Pain (Third Edition) (Toronto: 
Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2013) at 25–26. 
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recommendations is that “[n]urses include environmental modifications as a component of fall 
prevention strategies.”949 Similarly, the RNAO best practices guideline about continence also 
acknowledges that the problem of incontinence does not just locate at the individual by making 
recommendations about removal of physical and social barriers (or extrinsic factors)950 to enable 
residents to exercise more autonomy over their own bodily needs. 
The discussion above shows that there is more recognition of how certain types of 
disability should be integrated in care delivery, especially in the professional guidelines. The 
professional guidelines fill a regulatory gap as the LTCHA says little about how a provider 
should accommodate disability.  However, it is difficult to argue with the observation that 
despite the increasing acuity of residents, the only area that has changed significantly between 
the current and previous regulatory regimes is accommodation of cognitive behaviors. Since this 
issue is understood as closely (although not exclusively) related to resident safety and caregiver 
and security, I will address the issue of responsive behavior in chapter 6.  
5.4.2 Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005 (AODA) 
From a disability law perspective, a key development during this period is the passing 
and coming into effect of the AODA. The AODA was passed unanimously by the legislature in 
May 2005 and received Royal Assent and took effect on June 13, 2005.951  The AODA is part of 
the legal framework protecting disability rights that includes two other Ontario laws: the Human 
Rights Code and the Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2001.952 The implementation of the AODA 
is a change for the LTC sector because the Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2001, the precursor to 
the AODA, was not (and is not) applicable to the LTC sector.953 The AODA authorizes the 
 
949 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Prevention of Falls and Fall Injuries in the Older Adult (Registered 
Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2005). 
950 Registered Nurses' Association of Ontario, Promoting Continence Using Prompted Voiding (Toronto: Registered 
Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2011) at 20. The recommendations are: “Identify attitudinal and environmental 
barriers to successful toileting. Barriers include: Proximity and availability of the nearest bathroom; Accessibility of 
commode; Satisfactory lighting; Use of restraints; Staff expectation that incontinence is an inevitable consequence 
of aging; and Staff belief that few interventions exist to promote continence.” 
951 Mayo Moran, Second Legislative Review of the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005 (Toronto: 
Ministry of Economic Development, Employment and Infrastructure, 2014) at 8.  
952 Ibid at 51 to 52. 
953 The Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2001, SO 2001, c 32 (to be repealed at a later date) is a much narrower Act. 
It only covers the public sector including the Ontario government and its agencies, hospitals, public transportation 
organization and educational institutions. 
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Government to establish accessibility standards by regulation. These standards set out 
requirements for the identification, removal and prevention of barriers that keep persons with 
disabilities from participating fully in all aspects of society. The standards also contain time 
periods for implementing the required measures.954  It should be noted that if the AODA 
standards conflict with other accessibility standards, the highest level of accessibility must 
prevail.955 Currently, accessibility standards are in place in the following areas: Information and 
Communications Standards,956 Employment,957 Transportation,958 Design of Public Spaces959 
and Customer Services.960  It should also be noted that more standards are under development. A 
Standards Development Committee will develop a new accessible Health Care Standard.961 The 
standards most relevant to this project are communication and customer service standards.  
 The Customer Service standard requires goods or services providers to: establish 
policies, practices and procedures for accessible customer service; train staff and 
volunteers; allow service animals and support persons; and create a feedback 
process.962 
 The Information and Communications standard requires the provision of accessible 
formats and communication supports on request and also covers such areas as 
emergency and public safety information; websites; feedback processes; educational, 
training and library materials and resources; and training of educators.963 
The AODA has been used in legal arguments raised in a variety of formal legal 
processes: small claims court, Superior Court, Law Society discipline hearings, and Workplace 
Safety and Insurance Appeal Tribunal, just to name a few.  In the sample cases (see Chapter 3 on 
 
954 Moran, supra note 951 at 9. 
955 “If a provision of this Act, of an accessibility standard or of any other regulation conflicts with a provision of any 
other Act or regulation, the provision that provides the highest level of accessibility for persons with disabilities with 
respect to goods, services, facilities, employment, accommodation, buildings, structures or premises shall prevail.” 
Accessibility for Ontarians With Disabilities Act, 2005, SO 2005, c 11, s 38.   
956 Integrated Accessibility Standards, O Reg 191/11, s 9-19. 
957 Ibid, s 20-32. 
958 Ibid, s 33-80. 
959 Ibid, s 80.1-80.44. 
960 Ibid, s 80.45-80.51. 
961 Ontario Government, “Accessibility: legislative reviews, committees and councils”, (2 June 2015), online: 
Ontario.ca <https://www.ontario.ca/page/accessibility-legislative-reviews-committees-and-councils>. 
962 Moran, supra note 951 at 12. 
963 Ibid. 
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the search method), the issues involved WheelTran964 (an accessible transportation option 
offered by the Toronto Transit Commission), “handicapped” parking,965 professional 
misconduct,966 termination of sales contract967 and limitation period.968  Although these cases are 
not related to LTC, they are still useful in terms of understanding the broader context of 
accommodation of disability because they illustrate how the AODA is being interpreted by the 
courts. In all of the cases I reviewed, the court (or tribunal) correctly identifies the broad policy 
objective and legislative intent of the AODA.  In two cases (WheelTrans and municipal parking 
by-law), the courts used the AODA to illustrate the context and background of the legal issues 
before them and explained that the spirit of the AODA would be supported by the respective 
judicial decisions.  These cases would probably arrive at the same conclusion even if the AODA 
was not mentioned. In a case about accessible parking by-law, Kastner J. explains:  
[128]         The by-law’s context is fully set out in the preamble, and it is to 
recognize the spirit and intent of the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 
2005. 
[129]         If one were to interpret this by-law as the Appellant submits, the result 
would be to dishonour that spirit and intent, and unfairly set the strides disabled people 
have made in achieving accessibility back decades, resulting in an absurd result.969 
Similarly, in a zoning by-law case, the Ontario Municipal Board allows an appeal about 
variance to the maximum driveway width of a private residence:  
[14]        The Board is of the view that the Appellant undertook this work in utter 
good faith and for the purpose of facilitating access to his dwelling by persons in 
wheelchairs. 
[15]        In keeping with the purpose of the Accessibility for Ontarians with 
Disabilities Act, 2005, the City has incorporated s. 9.4.3, regarding Accessibility, into its 
official plan.  The policy in that section explicitly says that the owners of existing 
buildings will be encouraged to retrofit them to be universally accessible.970 
In a case about sales tax exemption for equipments designed for the use of persons with 
disabilities, the court was alive to the history of disabled people in Ontario and attended to the 
 
964 Toronto Transit Commission v Ontario (Finance), 2008 CanLII 67910 (ON SC). 
965 City of Mississauga v 1747114 Ontario Inc, 2013 ONCJ 623. 
966 Law Society of Upper Canada v Battaglio, 2014 ONLSTH 222. 
967 Friman v Toledo Estates Ltd, 2013 CanLII 41976 (ON SCSM). 
968 SOT-68407-16 (Re), 2016 CanLII 88178 (ON LTB). 
969 City of Mississauga v. 1747114 Ontario Inc., supra note 965 at paras 128-129. 
970 Ahmed v Mississauga (City), 2017 ON LPAT 19981 at paras 14-15. 
179 
barriers faced by people with disabilities and how the elimination of those barriers can benefit 
them as well as society as a whole. Strathy J. states: 
. . . there has been significantly greater appreciation by our society of the barriers 
affecting people with disabilities and the extent to which the elimination of those barriers 
can enrich the lives of people with disabilities and society as a whole. This appreciation, 
and a resolve to eliminate barriers, are reflected in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, the Ontario 
Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 and Accessibility for Ontarians with 
Disabilities Act, 2005, S.O. 2005, c. 11. It is expressed in section 1 of the latter statute, 
which has as its purpose to “improve opportunities for persons with disabilities and to 
provide for their involvement in the identification, removal and prevention of barriers to 
their full participation in the life of the province.” It seems to me that these goals are not 
advanced by the interpretation put forward by the Minister.971 
However, besides the “expressive role”972 of the AODA as evidenced in these decisions, 
the AODA is not necessarily useful for the purpose of helping individuals to assert their rights 
when they encounter barriers in their daily lives.  First of all, the AODA does not have primacy 
over other legislation. Unlike the Human Rights Code, the AODA does not enable individuals to 
demand a particular organization remove a barrier or correct an accessibility issue. As the Moran 
report notes: “As some observers noted, while the Code is about individual cases, the AODA is 
about proactive change and can’t be everything for everybody.”973 Secondly, enforcement of the 
minimum standards rests with the government974 and it is not clear if compliance activities are 
adequate in the eyes of disability stakeholders. It could be described as a self-reporting regime: 
“The Tribunal accepts the premise that to ensure compliance with this important legislative 
initiative, self-reporting is a key component.”975 More recently, the government explained that it 
has adopted a “Progressive Approach” to compliance: “Awareness, Improvement and 
Enforcement.”976 
A more fundamental problem is whether the existing accessibility standards are suitable 
for the LTC sector, and the broader health sector. The Moran report suggests that the clearest 
 
971 Toronto Transit Commission v. Ontario (Finance), supra note 964, at para 69.  
972 Windholz, supra note 50 at 9. 
973 Moran, supra note 951 at 52. 
974 O Reg 191/11, supra note 956, ss 82-86.1. 
975 8677 v Director under the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities, 2014 2014 CanLII 46359 (ON LAT). 
976 Accessibility Directorate, “The Path to 2025: Ontario’s Accessibility Action Plan”, (1 June 2015), online: 
<https://www.ontario.ca/page/path-2025-ontarios-accessibility-action-plan>. 
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areas to consider for new standards development are health care and education. Specifically, 
during consultations, the hospital sector proposed developing a hospital or health-specific 
standard that would encompass the requirements of the existing AODA standards and adapt them 
to a health-care setting. Hospitals are serving patients with temporary or permanent disabilities at 
all times, which sets them apart from other organizations. Accessibility in a retail environment, 
for example, may not reflect the needs of health care patients. A health-specific standard would 
also reflect the complex statutory and regulatory environment in which health care functions, 
including the Excellent Care for All Act, 2010 that has areas of overlap with the AODA.977 The 
question whether any new standard can reflect the needs of LTC residents remain to be seen.       
5.4.3 Human Rights Code (“The Code”) 
The Code was amended significantly in 2006: Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 
2006, SO 2006, c 30 (Bill 107). Since June 30, 2008, all claims of discrimination under the 
Human Rights Code are dealt with through applications filed directly with the Human Rights 
Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).978 A new section of the Code enables a court to order monetary 
compensation or restitution for loss arising out of injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect, 
where a finding is made that a right under Part I of the Act has been infringed. But a person is 
not allowed to commence an action based solely on an infringement of a right under Part I.979 An 
example of such monetary compensation can be found in Friman v Toledo Estates Ltd, 2013, a 
small claims court decision about provision of disabled parking space in a condominium 
building. The defendants were found liable for misrepresentation and infringement of the 
Code.980 “The Ontario small claims court is now authorized under the OHRC to determine 
whether a defendant has breached the OHRC if the plaintiff is litigating in the small claims court 
on a related non OHRC matter.”981  As well, in 2012, Toby’s Act (Bill 33), added “gender 
identity” and “gender expression” as prohibited grounds of discrimination under the Code. The 
grounds make it clear that trans people and other gender non-conforming individuals are entitled 
to legal protections in the same way that people are protected from discrimination and 
 
977 Moran, supra note 951 at 49. 
978 Tess Sheldon & Ivana Petricone, Addressing the Capacity of Parties before Ontario’s Administrative Tribunals: 
Promoting Autonomy and Preserving Fairness (Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2009) at 16 to 17. 
979 Human Rights Code, supra note 493, ss 46.1(1)-(2). 
980 Friman v Toledo Estates Ltd, supra note 967 at para 72. 
981 Ibid at para 70. 
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harassment based on race, age, disability and all other prohibited grounds.982 The Code was also 
amended as a result of various omnibus bills, including government-wide initiatives to remove 
mandatory retirement983 and update the definition of “spouse”.984  
The Code is relevant for my discussion about care because the Code can be used to deal 
with individual cases of discrimination since LTC is a service. It should be noted that individual 
regulatory colleges of health professionals also have guidelines on complying with the Code.985 
There are only three HRTO cases (but multiple decisions including interim decisions) that 
involve LTC residents.  This small number of cases cannot really tell us much about systemic 
issues with LTC.  Indeed, the low number of cases to date may be indicative of the difficulties of 
initiating a human rights compliant for LTC residents and for older disabled people in general.  
But each of these cases can shed some light on specific issues: capacity for initiating a legal 
proceeding;986 whether medical judgment falls within the purview of the Code;987 and the need to 
protect disabled people from their relations.988  These issues will be addressed in future chapters.  
5.4.4 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Finally, norms about human rights in international law can also be relevant in the lives of 
LTC residents. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is an 
international human rights treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 
which came into force on May 3, 2008.989  The CRPD does not recognize new rights per se, nor 
is it the only instrument to address issues with disabilities.990  Unlike many earlier international 
 
982Ontario Human Rights Commission, “Policy on preventing discrimination because of gender identity and gender 
expression”, online: <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-preventing-discrimination-because-gender-identity-and-
gender-expression/1-introduction>; Bill 33, Toby’s Act (Right to be Free from Discrimination and Harassment 
Because of Gender Identity or Gender Expression), 2012. 
983 Ending Mandatory Retirement Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005, SO 2005, c 29. 
984 Spousal Relationships Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005, SO 2005, c 5. 
985 The CPSO expects its members to comply with their duty to accommodate and to make accommodations in a 
manner that is respectful of the dignity, autonomy and privacy of the person. College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Ontario, Policy Statement #2-15: Professional Obligations and Human Rights (Toronto: College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Ontario, 2015). 
986 Romanchook v Garda Ontario, 2009 HRTO 1077. 
987 TenBruggencate v Elgin (County), 2010 HRTO 1467. 
988 Romanchook v. Garda Ontario, supra note 986; Gan v College of Physicians and Surgeons, 2015 HRTO 1045. 
989United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Questions and Answers” online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/QuestionsAnswers.aspx>  
990 Walker, Julian, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: An Overview 
(Publication No. 2013-09-E) (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2013) at 2. 
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treaties that simply stated what rights are recognized by the UN, the CRPD outlines key steps 
and actions for States Parties (states that have given their consent to be bound by the CRPD) to 
take in order to promote and protect the human rights of people with disabilities.991 CRPD 
requires states to report to the UN on their implementation progress and seeks to develop more 
dynamic participation with civil society and closer monitoring by independent mechanisms .992 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“Committee”) is a body of 18 
independent experts which monitors implementation of the CRPD.  The members of the 
Committee serve in their individual capacity, not as government representatives.  They are 
elected from a list of persons nominated by the States at the Conference of the State Parties.993   
Canada signed the CRPD on March 20, 2007 and ratified it on March 11, 2010.  Three 
issues are relevant to Canada’s implementation of the CRPD.  First, Canada has not yet signed 
the Optional Protocol, which establishes two additional mandates for the Committee: 1) the 
receipt and examination of individual complaints; 2) the undertaking of inquiries in the case of 
reliable evidence of grave and systematic violations of the Convention.994  The Committee 
cannot receive communication from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who 
claim to be victims of a violation of the rights recognized and protected by the CRPD if it 
concerns a State party to the Convention that is not a party to the Optional Protocol.995  On 
November 30, 2017, the Government of Canada tabled the Optional Protocol in the House of 
Commons as a step towards accession of the Optional Protocol.996 Second, Canada made two 
reservations when it ratified the CRPD.  Canada reserved the right to continue to use substitute 
decision-making arrangements in appropriate circumstances and subject to appropriate and 
effective standards.  It further reserved the right not to subject all such measures to regular 
review by an independent authority, “where such measures are already subject to review and 
 
991Ibid at 1. 
992 Ibid. 
993 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 989. See also Ibid at 10–11. 
994 Ibid.  
995 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Fact sheet on the procedure for submitting 
communications to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities under the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention (Geneva: United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2011) online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/CRPD.C.5.2.Rev.1_en.doc>  
996 Employment and Social Development Canada, The Government of Canada tables the Optional Protocol to the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (News Release November 30, 2017) 
(Government of Canada, 2017). 
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appeal.”  Another reservation pertains to the provision that sets out the obligation on States 
Parties to create a framework that includes one or more independent mechanisms to promote, 
protect and monitor the CRPD’s implementation.  Canada noted that this should be interpreted as 
accommodating the “situation of federal states where the implementation of the convention will 
occur at more than one level of government and through a variety of mechanisms, including 
existing ones.”  To date, the federal government has not designated a national mechanism.997 
Although Canadians cannot take their complaints directly to the Committee, the CRPD is 
still relevant because of its normative values.  Advocacy groups and scholars may still use the 
CRPD to contextualize the rights of long-term care home residents.  The following provisions 
are particularly relevant:    
 “States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an 
equal basis with others in all aspects of life.” (Article 12.2) 
 “States Parties recognize that persons with disabilities have the right to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of health without discrimination on the basis of disability. 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure access for persons with 
disabilities to health services that are gender-sensitive, including health-related 
rehabilitation.” (Article 25) 
 “States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to an adequate standard of 
living for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions, and shall take appropriate steps 
to safeguard and promote the realization of this right without discrimination on the basis 
of disability.” (Article 28.1)  
 “States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to take part on an equal 
basis with others in cultural life” (Article 30.1) 
5.4.5 Summary  
The table below summarizes the changes: 
 
997 Library of Parliament, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: An Overview 
(Publication No. 2013-09-E) by Julian Walker (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2013) at 12.  See also Council of 
Canadians with Disabilities “Monitoring of the CRPD” 
(http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/international/un/canada/monitoring-of-the-crpd)  
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Table 19: Accommodation of impairments under the previous and current regimes 
 Previous Current  
Personal assistance, 
program design and social 
environment 
Some guidance about 
accommodating impairments 
or disabilities in the Program 
Manual 
Some of the guidance 
formalized in law  
New language of responsive 
behaviour 
AODA N/A New  
Human Rights Code  Yes New - monetary 
compensation or restitution 
New – gender identity as a 
prohibited ground for 
discrimination 
Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 
No New  
In Chapter 2, I explain the definition of disabilism, which highlights “the existence of 
relationships (at individual and institutional scales) between those designated normal and those 
designated disabled in any social arena.”998 It follows that an important question is whether the 
responsibility to adjust rests with society or the disabled individual.999 It is reasonable to 
conclude that the changes described in this section acknowledge that there is an obligation on 
those who provide care to accommodate the impairments of residents individually and 
collectively, although this obligation appears to be ad hoc and limited. Residents can be 
described as “right-bearers” if we consider the claims for accommodation that they can make 
under the LTCHA and the Human Rights Code. This discussion should not be construed as a 
complete explanation of how disability is addressed in the relevant legislation, but rather a 
description of the broader legal context in which LTC is delivered in Ontario. So far I have only 
 
998 Thomas, supra note 104 at 45. 
999 Christine Milligan & Carol Thomas, “Dementia and the Social Model of Disability: Does Responsibility to 
Adjust Lie with Society Rather Than People with Dementia?” (2015) 21:3 Signpost 5. 
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explained the most visible (and mostly positive) ways in which regulation responds to the needs 
of residents with disabilities. This could be depicted as law’s promise for progressive changes in 
relation to disability. As we will see in subsequent chapters, disability is also reflected in 
regulation in less visible and more ambiguous manners. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Illustration 3: Care in LTC 
 
In this chapter, I have explored how care - a contested concept in disability scholarship - 
manifested itself in the regulation of LTC homes. Illustration 3 summarizes what care looks like 
in law. There are indications that “rights” and choices for residents are built into the legal 
framework and therefore individual residents have some control over how care is delivered – at 
least from a “law on the books” perspective. The caring relationship is defined by standardized 
program structures and process, which set the context in which care providers interact with 
residents, substitute decision-makers, families and friends. I have also explored how disability is 
being accommodated in the provision of personal assistance, the social environment and program 
design. The changes reflected in the LTCHA should be explained and interpreted in conjunction 
with the AODA, the Human Rights Code and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.  
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I have referred to the feminist political economy literature in order to tease out the key 
themes in care. A closer examination of the changes has revealed that while care is indeed highly 
prescriptive and standardized, it is not uniformly so across all areas. The complexity of 
regulating care can also be explained by the fact that other bodies, such as regulatory colleges 
and professional associations, have influence over the meaning of quality of care. However, 
despite the plethora of requirements pertaining to delivery of care in hard law and soft law, 
government intervention is notably absent in mandating minimum staffing level other than the 
24/7 RN requirement.  
In sum, the LTCHA responded to the criticisms of care to some extent. In particular, the 
criticisms about disabled people being treated as objects of care or passive recipients of care can 
be partially addressed by the legally enabled mechanisms described in this chapter. However, 
some disability scholars reject the concept of care because of potential harm inherent in care. The 
LTCHA also emphasizes resident safety and security as integral to care, issues that will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
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6 Respect for safety and security of the person  
6.1 Introduction   
The new legal framework for LTC emphasizes resident safety and security as integral to 
care.  One could argue that legal recognition of the potential for violence in LTC homes 
acknowledges the painful history of the institutionalization of disabled people in Ontario and 
elsewhere.  However, the notion of protecting safety and security simultaneously justifies 
institutional risk avoidance measures intended to protect residents from others present in homes 
and from each other. This is complicated by the fact that LTC is a communal setting and the 
safety of one person cannot easily be separated from the safety of others. Herring’s idea of 
“intermingled interests”1000 provides the theoretical basis for analyzing the impact of safety 
measures in the context of caring relationships. In addition to meeting needs, Herring notes that 
respect, responsibilities and relationality are also markers of care.1001 These markers are useful 
for analyzing whether the safety measures mandated by law promote care. These measures also 
raise knotty questions about the tensions between acknowledging the extent of various 
impairments experienced by some residents and resisting the inclination to treat residents as 
helpless and dependent. As Pat Armstrong and other feminist political economy scholars argue 
persuasively, negotiating tensions between risk and safety is common in LTC, and many 
regulatory requirements are designed to avoid risk but at the expense of choice and autonomy of 
residents and workers.1002 Hugh Armstrong explains the matter succinctly: “To rigorously protect 
against every possible risk is to transform a nursing home into some sort of ‘total institution,’ 
paradoxically generating the attendant risks of boredom, inactivity and social isolation, risks that 
are themselves unhealthy.”1003 
This chapter will proceed as follows. The first section provides a short review of sections 
7 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The second section will begin with 
unpacking the changes to responsibilities of the home and then outline the measures intended to 
 
1000 Herring, supra note 112 at 59–60. 
1001 Ibid at 14. 
1002 Armstrong, supra note 655. 
1003 Hugh Armstrong, “Chapter 1 Tensions Between Risk and Safety” in Pat Armstrong & Ruth Lowndes, eds, 
Negotiating Tensions in Long-Term Residential Care: Ideas Worth Sharing (Montreal: Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 2018) 33 at 33. 
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identify those who can be admitted and remain in the home from a safety and security 
perspective. The third section will examine how regulatory changes respond to the risk of harm 
or interference of the body that may occur in caring relationships. The fourth section will explain 
the regulatory changes that correspond to challenges associated with living in a communal 
setting. I argue that these measures should be considered as part of a complex regulatory 
response to the potential harms in caring relationships. The residents’ impairments are 
recognized as something that others in the home have to respond to and accommodate 
accordingly but at the same time the effects of the impairments are used to justify more intense 
monitoring, reporting and limitations on the liberty of residents. The main question is whether 
the interests of all in a caring relationship can be protected while still holding those institutions 
and persons accountable for harms that occurred in caring relationships.  Some of the issues 
around accountability for protecting LTC residents as vulnerable citizens will be revisited again 
in Chapter 8.      
6.2 Sections 7 and 9 of the Charter  
Before proceeding to analyzing the LTCHA requirements with respect to safety and 
security of the person, it is useful to lay out the relevant Charter provisions that deal with safety 
and security of the person, mainly sections 7 and 9.1004 While it is not the intention of this project 
to review the sections 7 and 9 jurisprudence in a comprehensive manner, it is useful to be 
mindful of the interests that are protected by these provisions. Many of the leading cases are in 
the areas of criminal law (such as policing and solitary confinement in prison) and immigration 
(such as being detained while awaiting immigration removal), therefore not all of them will be 
directly applicable to my case study. But the LTCHA requirements have to comply with the 
requirements of the Charter and my objective here is to provide a foundation that will help to 
account for the interests that the regulatory changes in LTC are supposed to protect.    
6.2.1 Section 7  
Section 7 reads: ‘‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
 
1004 Hall suggests that sections 10 and 12 may be applicable to care facilities or nursing homes. Margaret Hall, 
Developing an Anti-Ageist Approach Within Law (Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2009) at 20–21. 
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justice.”1005 While much of the jurisprudence of section 7 and, therefore, fundamental justice, has 
been in relation to criminal law, the Supreme Court has permitted its application to extend well 
beyond this area such that the demands of fundamental justice now apply to a range of civil and 
administrative contexts.1006 
The rights to life, liberty and security of the person require further elaboration. According 
to Carter v. Canada: “. . . the case law suggests that the right to life is engaged where the law or 
state action imposes death or an increased risk of death on a person, either directly or 
indirectly.”1007 Further, the Supreme Court opines on the scope of “liberty and security”. Liberty 
and security of the person are distinct interests but underlying both is a concern for the protection 
of individual autonomy and dignity.1008  Liberty protects the right to make fundamental personal 
choices free from state interference.  Security of the person encompasses a notion of personal 
autonomy involving control over one’s bodily integrity free from state interference. This interest 
is engaged by state interference with an individual’s physical or psychological integrity, 
including any state action that causes physical or serious psychological suffering.1009  It is 
important to remember that “[s]ection 7 does not promise that the state will never interfere with a 
person’s life, liberty or security of the person — laws do this all the time — but rather that the 
state will not do so in a way that violates the principles of fundamental justice.”1010 The courts 
have recognized a range of rights protected under s.7 within and outside of the criminal 
context.1011  
 
1005 Charter, supra note 121, s 7. 
1006 Mark Carter, “Fundamental Justice” (2017) 78 SCLR(2d) 259, para 16. 
1007 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at para 62, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter]. 
1008 Ibid at para 64. 
1009 Ibid, s 64; Hall, supra note 1004 at 16. 
1010 Ibid at para 71. 
1011 Examples include right to privacy (R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411), parental decision-making and other 
attributes of custody (New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46), 
one’s choice to purchase private health insurance for services covered by the public health care scheme (Chaoulli v 
Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791 (SCC).) and accessing health services in a safe 
injection site (Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134.). 
Shaun O’Brien, Nadia Lambek & Amanda Dale, “Accounting for Deprivation: The Intersection of Sections 7 and 15 
of the Charter in the Context of Marginalized Groups” (2016) 35 National Journal of Constitutional Law; 
Scarborough 153 at 178; Young, Margot, ed, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, and Legal Activism (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2007); Margot Young, “Social Justice and the Charter: Comparison and Choice” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 669. 
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In recent cases such as Bedford v Canada1012 and Carter v. Canada, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has articulated a structured two-part test for breach of s.7 rights.1013 The first part 
considers infringements to one of the rights to life, liberty, and security of the person by the 
government. Courts have been relatively strict in determining that what qualifies as an 
‘‘infringement” is an action or inaction (but almost exclusively an action) taken by the 
government that ‘‘deprives” the claimant of their rights to life, liberty or security of the 
person.1014  The second part then considers the violations of the principles of fundamental 
justice.1015 “Laws that impinge on life, liberty or security of the person must not be arbitrary, 
overbroad, or have consequences that are grossly disproportionate to their object.”1016 Hamish 
Stewart explains that each of these norms is distinct from the other two: “a law that is effective in 
achieving its purposes but goes too far (overbreadth) is not the same as a law that is ineffective 
(arbitrary) or effective  and suitably tailored but nonetheless excessively damaging to section 7 
interests (grossly disproportionate).”1017 Although it is difficult to justify a s.7 violation, in some 
situations the state may be able to show that the public good justifies depriving an individual of 
life, liberty or security of the person under s. 1 of the Charter.1018 
How the court considers an alleged infringement to one of the rights to life, liberty, and 
security of the person by the government has great significance for the construction of safety 
risks in LTC and for the measures designed to address those risks in law. As Margaret Hall 
states, the principles of fundamental justice, have both a procedural and a substantive aspect.1019 
According to Mark Carter, the principles of fundamental justice form the standards that 
legislation and government activity must meet in order for deprivations of life, liberty and 
security to be permissible.1020 I believe that it is not difficult for the government to argue that a 
protection related law that restricts a resident’s liberty has a “rational connection between the 
 
1012 Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101. 
1013 Kiran Kang & Sonia K Kang, “Interpreting Equality Rights under Sections 7 and 15 in New and Old Ways: An 
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1014 For example, see O’Brien, Lambek & Dale, supra note 1011 at 160. 
1015 Bailey Fox, “You Are Not Alone: Ontario and British Columbia Invalidate Solitary Confinement”, (6 February 
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1018 Carter, supra note 1007, at para 95. 
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object of the law and the limit it imposes on life, liberty or security of the person”.1021 However, 
it is more difficult to construct a law that does not violate the other two norms. Although the 
inquiry is not about whether Parliament has chosen the least restrictive means, the government 
still has to demonstrate “whether the chosen means infringe life, liberty or security of the person 
in a way that has no connection with the mischief contemplated by the legislature.” 1022 LTC 
residents are a very diverse group (see Chapter 4). Any law that restricts liberty has to be 
construed in such a way that it is only applicable to a particular class of people that requires 
protection and does not encompass those who do not require protection (as the claimants in 
Carter). Further, the government will also have to argue that the impact of the restriction on the 
individual’s life, liberty or security of the person is not grossly disproportionate to the object of 
the measure.1023 That means the government will have to prescribe very specific criteria about 
who requires protection, for how long, for what a home can or cannot do in order to ensure 
safety, and how there are no other alternatives. 
6.2.2 Section 9  
Section 9 guarantees the right to be free from arbitrary detention: “Everyone has the right 
not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.”1024 According to Newman, in a broad sense, the 
prohibition against arbitrary detention or imprisonment protects individual liberty against 
unjustified state interference. But in a narrower sense, the right guarantees that the state must not 
detain or imprison individuals on a discretionary basis but only based on law.1025 Claims under 
section 9 of the Charter that have made their way before the Supreme Court have generally taken 
one of two forms. First, the guarantee has been used to challenge the constitutionality of a wide 
array of legislation that authorizes detention or imprisonment. The second category of claims 
under section 9 of the Charter involves challenges directed at the decision to detain or imprison 
 
1021 Carter, supra note 1007 at para 83. 
1022 Ibid at para 85. 
1023 Ibid at para 89. 
1024 Charter, s 9. 
1025 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Constitutional Law: Charter of Rights, “IX. Legal Rights: Sections 8 to 
14”  at HCHR-73 "Purpose of s. 9 protection and general approach" (2014 Reissue). 
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in individual cases.1026 Issues of contention include: (1) what "detention" means; (2) what 
"arbitrary" means and; (3) whether "arbitrary" has or should be equated with "unlawful".1027  
In R v. Therens,1028 three types of detention were explained: (i) physical detention, where 
a person is actually subject to physical constraint; (ii) detention by lawful compulsion, where 
there are legal consequences for the failure to comply with a police officer's demand (as in 
Therens); and (iii) psychological detention, where although in fact the police have no authority to 
detain a person that person reasonably feels compelled to remain. In R v. Grant,1029 the test for a 
psychological detention was created: whether a reasonable person in the individual's 
circumstances would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of the liberty of 
choice, taking into account a number of factors.1030 The factors are as follows: (a) the 
circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they would reasonably be perceived by the 
individual; (b) the nature of the police conduct; and (c) the particular characteristics or 
circumstances of the individual where relevant including age, physical stature, minority status 
and level of sophistication.1031 
Arbitrariness is determined by whether there are appropriate express or implied standards 
that determine whether a power to detain or imprison is exercised. This general principle applies 
both to the analysis of a particular detention or imprisonment and to the testing of a law that 
authorizes a particular detention or imprisonment. The existence of detailed and demanding 
criteria applied prior to a detention or arrest will typically undermine any claim for 
arbitrariness.1032 Detention without adequate or prompt review is also arbitrary, such as a failure 
leading to an inability to apply standards to that detention.1033 It should be noted that the courts 
have decided on required legal standards for non-arbitrariness in specific detention contexts. For 
 
1026 James Stribopoulos, “The Forgotten Right: Section 9 of the Charter, Its Purpose and Meaning” (2008) 40 
SCLR(2d) 211 at paras 13–15. 
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example, detention in psychiatric facilities cannot be based on blanket categories but must be 
based on carefully defined criteria furthering such objects as the safety of the public and the 
safety of individuals.1034  
Although section 9 is considered most frequently in the criminal law context, it has been 
considered in the context of mental health.1035 According to Hall, Section 9 may be applicable 
where a person is “involuntarily committed” to a care facility or nursing home and where the 
criteria for “committal” is determined to be vague and overly broad.1036 Although the regulatory 
framework for LTC does not use the language of “committal” and there is no change in legal 
status1037 for those residents in locked units,  it is instructive to consider how the courts decide 
Charter challenges related to criteria for involuntary committal. In Thwaites v. Health Sciences 
Centre Psychiatric Facility, the Manitoba Court of Appeal was asked to rule whether the criteria 
for involuntary committal contained in the legislation offended sections 7, 9 and 15 of the 
Charter.1038 The case was decided on section 9 of the Charter and the challenge was successful. 
The comments of Philip J.A. indicate the importance that standards for committal should be non-
arbitrary: 
[34]                  In Lyons, La Forest J. said of the appellant's contention that Part XXI of 
the Criminal Code offends s. 9 of the Charter [at p. 227 D.L.R., p. 35 C.C.C.]: 
However, even giving the word "arbitrary" its broadest signification, it is readily 
apparent that not only is the incarceration statutorily authorized, but that the 
legislation narrowly defines a class of offenders with respect to whom it may 
properly be invoked, and prescribes quite specifically the conditions under which 
an offender may be designated as dangerous. 
Applying those considerations to the compulsory admission provisions of the Act, 
detention is statutorily authorized, but the legislation does not narrowly define those 
persons with respect to whom it may be properly invoked, and does not prescribe 
 
1034  Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Constitutional Law: Charter of Rights, “IX. Legal Rights: Sections 8 to 
14”, at HCHR-76 "Required legal standards for non-arbitrariness in specific detention contexts" (2014 Reissue). 
1035 Hall, supra note 1004 at 18. 
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specifically the conditions under which a person may be detained. The compulsory 
admission provisions of the Act fail the test and are clearly arbitrary. 
[35]                  Scollin J. spoke of the "ultimate dependence" of the legislation on 
"professional ability and integrity" as a factor to be taken into account in considering the 
arbitrariness of the detention. With respect, I do not see how professional ability and 
integrity can operate to save statutory provisions which are inconsistent with the Charter. I 
find support for that conclusion in the comments of Lamer J. in R. v. Smith, supra, at pp. 
481-2 D.L.R., p. 48 W.W.R.: 
In my view, the section cannot be salvaged by relying on the discretion of the 
prosecution not to apply the law in those cases where, in the opinion of the 
prosecution, its application would be a violation of the Charter. To do so would 
be to disregard totally s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which provides that any 
law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force or effect to the 
extent of the inconsistency and the courts are duty-bound to make that 
pronouncement, not to delegate the avoidance of a violation to the prosecution or 
to anyone else for that matter.1039 
(My emphasis.) 
In subsequent challenges of mental health legislation, the respective governments were 
able to demonstrate the statutory provisions in question addressed concerns raised in Thwaites 
regarding “arbitrariness”.1040  In a B.C. case, the Supreme Court of British Columbia considered 
the B.C. mental health legislation (which was similar to the updated Manitoba legislation after 
Thwaites) and concluded that:  
As to the standards for committal, I find that they strike a reasonable balance between the 
rights of the individual to be free from restraint by the state and society's obligation to 
help and protect the mentally ill. . . Unlike incarceration in the criminal justice system, 
involuntary committal is primarily directed to the benefit of the individual so that they 
will regain their health.”1041 
Arguably, for legislative provisions that authorize detention-like living circumstances to 
be Charter compliant, they have to narrowly define a class of residents with respect to whom the 
admission criteria may properly be invoked, and must prescribe quite specifically the conditions 
under which a resident may be admitted. Further, the legislation cannot simply delegate the 
 
1039 Thwaites v. Health Sciences Centre Psychiatric Facility, supra note 1038, at paras 34–35. 
1040 Hall, supra note 1004 at 20. 
1041 McCorkell v. Director of Riverview Hospital 1993 CanLII 1200 (BC SC), supra note 1038 at 47. 
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decision to a health care provider without any checks and balances. As well, the court is expected 
to attend to the question whether the admission to a detention-like environment is primarily for 
the benefit of the individual. 
6.2.3 Summary  
The Charter is relevant for the discussion of legislative provisions for risk reduction 
measures in homes because while well-intentioned, these measures may deprive the life, liberty 
and security of residents. From a legal drafting perspective, the key is whether such risk 
reduction provisions include all the necessary safeguards to withstand potential Charter 
challenges. It is not surprising that to avoid claims of arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross 
disproportionality, the government has a strong incentive to demonstrate through very 
prescriptive regulatory requirements (for example, through establishment of a clear threshold) 
that any deprivation is consistent with the principle of fundamental justice. But it would be 
utterly wrong to assume that a Charter-compliant regulatory regime also promotes all four 
markers of care.  
6.3 Who can be accommodated in a LTC home?  
To begin, I summarize changes in LTC regulation that contribute to a home’s approach to 
safety and security of residents and others. While safety is never defined explicitly in legal terms 
in the LTCHA, it is probably not controversial to assume that safety means absence of physical 
harms, given the measures explained below. Similarly, security is also not defined legally but 
one could argue that it implies keeping out external threat or risk of threat or alternatively, 
keeping a potential threat contained. After laying out the overarching principles about 
responsibilities of the home, the first issue is how to determine who can be safely accommodated 
in the home in a non-arbitrary way and under what conditions. The processes for admitting and 
discharging residents will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. Here the concern is how the 
objective of safety is factored into the processes of admitting and discharging. Such 
determination is dependent on the “intrinsic factors” (to use Shakespeare’s terminology) of 
residents as well as extrinsic factors, such as the physical design of the home. The tension is to 
promote safety of residents, employees and others in the home while potentially restricting the 
liberty of residents who because of their impairments, may pose threats to others.  In 2007, the 
former Parliamentary Assistant Monique Smith articulated this tension during clause-by-clause 
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consideration of the LTCHA: “We believe that by amending the fundamental principle to include 
the word "primarily," we are acknowledging that it is not just the home of the residents but other 
things, including a workplace. We acknowledge that those workers are entitled to protection 
under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.”1042 Negotiation of this tension is even more 
pressing now as residents are admitted to LTC older and with more profound impairments than 
before including cognitive impairments (see Chapter 4). 
6.3.1 Overarching principles – the home’s responsibilities 
The LTCHA reiterates the importance of resident safety and security, either as a 
qualifying condition for various rights, or as justification for additional measures under the new 
regime. This is not entirely new -  as is reflected in the current and previous Residents’ Bill of 
Rights: “Every resident has the right to live in a safe and clean environment” and “Every resident 
has the right to keep and display personal possessions, pictures and furnishings in his or her 
room subject to safety requirements and the rights of other residents.”1043 The fundamental 
principle to be applied in the interpretation of the LTCHA and the Regulation is that a home is 
primarily the home of its residents and is to be operated so that it is a place where its residents 
may live with dignity and in security, safety and comfort and have their physical, psychological, 
social, spiritual and cultural needs adequately met.1044 While the fundamental principle is not 
new, the reference to “security, safety and comfort” is new and represents the increasing 
prominence of resident safety and security as a common concern. Similarly, in the Preamble: “.  . 
. care and services provided meet the needs of the resident and the safety needs of all residents . . 
. quality accommodation that provides a safe, comfortable, home-like environment …”1045 Last 
but not least, the most obvious new requirement is that the home must ensure that it is a safe and 
secure environment for residents.1046  
These broad principles are more than rhetoric and are important for interpreting the 
obligations of homes, especially when something goes wrong. In the only two enforcement 
decisions that have been appealed to the Health Services Appeal and Review Board, these 
 
1042 Ontario, supra note 867. 
1043 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 3(1)5, 3(1)10. 
1044 Ibid, s 1. 
1045 Ibid, Preamble. 
1046 Ibid, s 5. 
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legislative provisions were cited as relevant to the matters. In Seniorscare Operations v Director, 
Performance Improvement and Compliance Branch, the Health Services Appeal and Review 
Board cited sections 1, 3 and 5 of the LTCHA1047 in order to emphasize the importance of the 
safety of residents.  “The Appeal Board finds that the overriding principle to be applied in the 
interpretation and application of the Act is the best interest of the residents. Although the 
commercial interests of the licensee must also be taken into account, those interests must take a 
secondary position to the interests of the residents.”1048 In Morriston Park Nursing Home v 
Ontario (Health and Long-term Care), the Health Services Appeal and Review Board writes: 
“Finally, the Appeal Board notes that resident safety is identified as a key concern in sections 1, 
3 and 5 of the Act. The provision of very few and narrow exceptions to the requirement for 24/7 
RN coverage requirement is consistent with the importance of safety for this vulnerable 
population.”1049 
These broad principles have ramifications for setting expectations about how the home 
should influence and shape the behavior of people within the home. The home’s general 
responsibility for a safe and secure environment is translated into more specific requirements. 
The fulfillment of these requirements can then be measured and documented.  
By way of example, the LTCHA attempts to control the risks stemming from interactions 
between staff and volunteers with residents. A new requirement is prior screening of staff and 
volunteers, and applicable exemptions from such screening.1050 Training and orientation have not 
changed substantively as requirements have been moved from regulation and Program Manual to 
the LTCHA and its regulation. Many new training requirements are related to new regulatory 
requirements such as minimization of the use of restraints and confining (to be discussed later in 
this chapter). Under the LTCHA, every home must ensure that a training and orientation program 
is developed and implemented.1051 Additional training requirements are prescribed for direct care 
 
1047 Seniorscare Operations v Director, Performance Improvement and Compliance Branch, 2014 CanLII 81247 
(ON HSARB), at paras 117–119. 
1048 Ibid at para 120. 
1049 Morriston Park, supra note 875 at para 63. 
1050 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 75. The screening measures must include police record 
checks, unless the person being screened is under 18 years of age. 
1051 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 216–217. Requirements such as designated lead, topics, record-keeping and 
evaluation are also provided for. 
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staff, such as abuse recognition and prevention, mental health issues, including caring for 
persons with dementia and behaviour management. 1052 But some requirements, such as 
availability of library resources, have been dropped too.1053 As well, the home must develop and 
implement an orientation program for volunteers.1054 The point is that having properly trained 
staff and volunteers (facilitated by legally mandated screening, orientation and training) is part of 
the response to the safety and security of residents and others in the home, considering the 
specific clinical characteristics of the current and future cohort of residents.  
6.3.2 Admission and discharge of residents 
The LTC admission process is designed to ensure that those who, for a variety of reasons, 
can no longer reside safely in the community can access LTC. A related consideration is under 
what condition(s) an applicant may be admitted and an applicant’s impairment(s) is clearly 
implicated. A new requirement is to explicitly address the procedural protections of those who 
would be confined (a term to be defined in the regulation)1055 once they are admitted. A 
placement co-ordinator employed by a LHIN1056 must consider whether an eligible LTC 
applicant may need to be confined in the home and must make a recommendation to the home 
after considering whether (1) there would be a significant risk that the applicant or anyone else 
would suffer serious bodily harm if the applicant were not confined; (2) confining the applicant 
would be reasonable in light of the applicant’s physical and mental condition and personal 
history; and (3) a physician or registered nurse in the extended class.1057 The placement co-
ordinator must  advise the applicant or the substitute decision-maker of the confinement 
recommendation prior to authorization of admission.1058 The home must approve the applicant’s 
admission to the home unless the home lacks, (a) the physical facilities necessary to meet the 
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applicant’s care requirements; or (b) the nursing expertise necessary to meet the applicant’s care 
requirements.1059 I will return to the issue of confinement later in the chapter.     
To ensure residents are not removed from the home (i.e. discharged) without legitimate 
reasons while ensuring a safe and secure environment, the law sets out the requirements for and 
restrictions on discharging residents from a home. The mandatory and permissible grounds for 
discharge remain the same, such as death and medical and psychiatric absences that exceed the 
thresholds allowed in the respective regulations.1060 In general, the LTCHA provides more 
procedural protections for residents in the form of greater clarity about what the home can and 
cannot do. For example, it is an offence to discharge or threaten to discharge a resident or to 
subject a resident to discriminatory treatment (including threatening any family member, 
substitute decision-maker or person of importance to a resident that such action will be taken) 
because of anything that is disclosed to the Director or an inspector, or for giving evidence in a 
legal proceeding, even if the resident or other person acted maliciously or in bad faith. 1061  
Another example is the more elaborate notice requirements prior to discharge when a home 
closes some or all of its beds.1062  
Under both regimes, a home may discharge a resident because the home can no longer 
provide a safe and secure environment. In the Nursing Homes Act, a home was permitted to 
discharge a resident if other arrangements were made to provide the accommodation, care and 
secure environment required by the resident.1063  However, by contrast, the LTCHA’s procedural 
requirements are more extensive, including: alternatives to discharge must have been considered 
and tried; alternative arrangements must have been made in collaboration with the appropriate 
placement co-ordinator and other health service organizations; the resident and the resident’s 
substitute decision-maker, if any, and any person either of them may direct must be kept 
informed and given an opportunity to participate in the discharge planning and that the resident’s 
wishes are taken into consideration; a written notice must be provided to the resident, the 
resident’s substitute decision-maker, if any, and any person either of them may direct, setting out 
 
1059 Ibid, s 44(7). More grounds of refusal could be prescribed in the regulation in the future. 
1060 Reg 832, supra note 831, ss 47–49; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 144–146. 
1061 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–77. 
1062 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 147, 306. 
1063 Reg 832, supra note 831, ss 48(2)(a), 49(2). 
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a detailed explanation of the  home’s discharge decision.1064 That said, under the LTCHA, there 
is no way for a resident or the substitute decision-maker to challenge or appeal the home’s 
decision other than complaining to the Ministry if the discharge decision is not made in 
accordance with legislative requirements.   
6.3.3   Physical design of a home 
A variety of rules apply to the physical design of a home. In addition to statutes, the 
Ministry has published various manuals pertaining to design of LTC homes over the years. The 
Long-Term Care Home Design Manual, 2015 (the Design Manual) contains the Ministry’s 
current design standards for LTC homes being developed or redeveloped in Ontario.1065  The 
Manual includes design objectives, design standards for LTC homes’ resident, staff and public 
spaces.1066  The focus here is how statutory requirements about physical design supplement the 
discussion about safety and security.1067  
The notion of “safety and security” has been integrated into the requirements for the 
physical design of homes. These requirements contribute to the configuration of space within the 
home and provide specifications related to doors, windows, furnishings, elevators, 
communication and response systems etc.1068 The majority of the requirements are similar to 
those in the Nursing Homes Act, its regulation and the Program Manual. Some have been 
updated to articulate more clearly the risks to residents, for example, the risks of bed rails are 
more clearly articulated.1069 However, from a law on the books perspective, the LTCHA is not 
uniformly more prescriptive than the Nursing Homes Act as some design requirements have also 
been removed or scaled back. Some requirements related to elevators and windows have been 
removed.1070 These requirements may be experienced as more prescriptive by non-profit and 
 
1064 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 148(2). 
1065 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Long-Term Care Home Design Manual 2015 (Toronto: Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care, 2015). 
1066 Ibid at 1. 
1067 An important theme in scholarly debates is the idea of a “home like” environment. See Braedley & Martel, 
supra note 678. 
1068 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 9–23; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2-7-2–11. 
1069 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s15. 
1070 Ibid, ss 10, 16. For example, section 23 of Reg 832 stated that an elevator must equipped with handrails on the 
interior walls etc. These types of specificities no longer appear in the LTCHA. 
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municipal homes who were under Charitable Institutions Act and Homes for the Aged and Rest 
Homes Act. 
 The last point about the physical design of the home is the creation of different types of 
space within a home that are linked to the biomedical characteristics or needs of residents such as 
dementia. A new concept, the “specialized unit”, is introduced in the LTCHA. It means “any unit 
designated by or in accordance with the regulations to provide or offer certain types of 
accommodation, care, services, programs and goods to residents.”1071  The Director is authorized 
to designate a specialized unit in a home on the recommendation of the LHIN, or alternatively, 
on his/her own initiative after considering the input of the LHIN and the home.1072 A specialized 
unit cannot not be designated without the agreement of the home.1073  The rules regarding 
admission to and transfer from specialized units are also provided for.1074 
6.3.4 Summary  
Table 20: Key changes related to who can be accommodated under the Nursing Homes Act 
and the LTCHA 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Overarching principles  A home is primarily the home 
of residents  
Home must ensure that it is a 
safe and secure environment 
for residents 
Screening for staff and 
volunteers 
Additional training and 
orientation requirements   
Admission and discharge of 
residents 
No reference of confining  
 
More procedural protections 
for those who would be 
 
1071 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 39(3).  
1072 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 198(2).  
1073 Ibid, s 199 
1074 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 39; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 200–205. 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
confined once they are 
admitted  
More procedural protections 
for those who are deemed not 
safe to remain in the home  
Physical design of the home Specifications related to 
doors, windows etc  
Updated requirements to 
express the risks to residents 
New concept of “specialized 
units” 
In sum, the regulatory changes are intended to reinforce the objective of resident safety 
and security - as evident in the overarching principles of the LTCHA. The first measure is 
controlling who is allowed to be admitted (under what conditions) and then remain in the home. 
Having appropriately trained staff and volunteers is another measure. Safety also depends on 
whether the physical design of the home can meet the needs of all residents and that a subset of 
residents who are deemed to threaten the safety of themselves and others.  The majority of 
changes are not significant as they are simply changes in legal form. The more significant 
changes are those related to confinement and discharge of residents. More clarity and certainty 
about these aspects acknowledge that homes (and those who work in them) have 
responsibilities1075 in relation to their residents. The empirical question is whether law can 
actually enable homes to fulfill their responsibilities to residents while still respecting 
fundamental justice. I will return to this question in Chapter 9. The next section will turn to the 
regulatory changes that are intended to strengthen prevention of harm to residents.  
6.4 Prevention of physical (bodily) harm to residents  
An important consideration in the design of the new regime is that risk-reduction 
measures authorized by law must be in accordance with the principle of fundamental justice. 
Since these measures also create situations similar to detention, s.9 of the Charter should apply 
 
1075 Herring, supra note 112 at 60–62. Recall responsibility is one of the four markers of care. 
203 
too. As noted in the previous section, the law clearly establishes who is in charge of safety and 
security: the home. The focus here is on measures concerning potential physical or bodily harm 
suffered by residents because of some kind of interference of the body but it is acknowledged 
that there is always a mental component when a person’s bodily integrity is engaged.  Note that 
security of the person is not limited to physical integrity: “. . . security of the person is violated 
by state action interfering with an individual’s mental integrity.”1076 Building on empirical 
observations from the feminist political economy literature about negotiating the tensions 
between safety and risks in LTC, I explore what a home must do to prevent harm inflicted on 
residents by caregivers and other residents. Here, harm is understood in a relational context. By 
that, I mean the interference or harm occurs between people who are in a care relationship and 
that trust is integral to this relationship. Herring argues that the nature of power in a caring 
relationship is not straight forward.1077 The measures addressed here have to do with the fact that 
residents and caregivers are interdependent; that is their well-being is mutually dependent on 
each other’s intentions and actions, as explained by Herring’s idea of “intermingled interests”. 
As well, a central aspect of a caring relationship is respect for each other.1078  Three sets of 
changes are addressed below: the minimization of restraining and confining policy, zero 
tolerance for abuse and neglect and responsive behaviour. The strengths and weaknesses of these 
changes can be analyzed from the perspective of promoting respect as a marker of care.  
6.4.1 Minimization of restraining and confining policy  
To be certain, the use of restraints in LTC is not necessarily unlawful. Rather, the law’s 
pre-occupation is to define when restraining is lawful and to establish the appropriate checks and 
balances. The Nursing Homes Act provided very limited guidance with respect to the use of 
restraints. In fact, there was no definition of “restraint” in the Act.  Pursuant to the Residents’ 
Bill of Rights, “[e]very resident who is being considered for restraints has the right to be fully 
informed about the procedures and the consequences of receiving or refusing them”.1079  The 
Regulation only provided requirements for the use of physical restraints, including permissible 
situations where such restraints could be used, authorization, duration, regular 
 
1076 R v Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668, at para 85. 
1077 Herring, supra note 112 at 24. 
1078 Ibid at 280. 
1079 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 2(2)8. 
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assessment/monitoring, minimal conditions (not to cause harm or the least amount of 
discomfort), and written policies and procedures on the use of restraints.1080 The Program 
Manual provided additional guidance by defining chemical restraint, environmental restraint, and 
physical restraint.1081 Policies and/or procedures for ethical issues should include use of 
chemical, physical and environmental restraints.1082 
The LTCHA offers more substantive and procedural protections to residents than the 
Nursing Homes Act, and the objective of minimization of confining and restraining of residents 
is clear.  These protections for residents are necessary if we consider the requirements of the 
Charter, in particular, the jurisprudence on sections 7 and 9 of the Charter. For care providers, 
these protections may also be desirable because they provide greater legal certainty about what is 
permissible and what is not. The new system, which has been updated pursuant to Bill 160 in 
2017, sets out the requirements relating to minimizing the restraining and confining of residents, 
and when and how physical devices and personal assistance service devices (PASDs) are to be 
used in a home. The LTCHA can be described as more stringent than the Nursing Homes Act 
because the threshold for the lawful restraining and confining residents is higher than it was the 
previous regime and the concept of confining is also new. The following features are 
highlighted: common law duty, written policy, checks and balances, confining of residents, 
PSADs and soft law.  
6.4.1.1 LTCHA Requirements   
Although a system is in place to address restraining and confining, the common law duty 
of a caregiver to restrain or confine a person continues to be applicable.1083 According to the 
Ministry’s guidance on restraining by physical device, the common law duty allows staff to act 
quickly when immediate action is required to prevent serious bodily harm to the resident or 
others in an emergency situation. Further, the use of the common law duty should not be a 
routine part of any plan of care.1084 The Ministry also points out that both the LTCHA and the 
 
1080 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 55. 
1081 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 9901-01, page 6–7. 
1082 Ibid at Tab 1001-02, page 6. 
1083 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 36. 
1084 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–87. The assumption is that there is no time to meet 
the requirements specified for restraining using physical device. 
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Regulation are silent about who may authorize the use of the physical device to restrain a 
resident under the common law duty.  Since certain types of staff may not be in the home at the 
time of the emergency, the home should consider the relationship between the urgent nature of 
restraining under common law and the presence of appropriate staff when developing the policy 
on restraining under the common law duty.1085    
First and foremost, every home must have a written policy to minimize the restraining 
and confining of residents, and to ensure that any restraining or confining is done in accordance 
with the law. The home must ensure that the policy is complied with.1086 The content of the 
policy is also prescribed.1087   The LTCHA also specifies what homes cannot do: no resident can 
be restrained or confined for the convenience of the home or staff or, as a disciplinary 
measure.1088  The home must undertake a monthly analysis of the restraining of residents. The 
home must evaluate the effectiveness of its policy annually and determine the changes and 
improvements required and ensure that any restraining that is necessary is done according to law. 
The home must prepare a written record of its monthly analysis, the evaluation and any changes 
or improvements.1089  
The mandatory safeguards clearly indicate how the welfare of caregivers and recipients 
are intricately related when restraining is used. The Ministry emphasizes that restraining using a 
physical device is a “last resort” option1090 and points out that other regulatory requirements 
support the minimizing of restraining, including developing strategies to address residents’ 
behaviours and developing a falls prevention and management program. Both of these 
requirements may reduce or eliminate the need for restraining with a physical device.1091 Some 
new conditions have to be met before restraints can be used, such as significant risk of serious 
bodily harm, lack of alternatives, and reasonable and least restrictive method of restraining.1092 
 
1085 Ibid; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 109(c). 
1086 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 29. 
1087 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 109. The policy must deal with specific topics including use of physical devices, 
duties and responsibilities of staff, restraining under common law, types of permitted physical devices, how consent 
about the use of physical devices and PSADs is to be obtained and documented, alternatives to the use of physical 
devices, and evaluation 
1088 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 30(1)1 and 2. 
1089 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 113; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–97. 
1090 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–89. 
1091 Ibid. 
1092 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 31(2). 
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Additional checks and balances have been introduced to ensure residents are monitored regularly 
and provided with care such as re-positioning when they are being restrained and afterwards.1093 
Additional requirements such as increased frequency of reassessment of the resident’s condition 
apply when a resident is being restrained under the common law duty.1094  The rationale is as 
follows: “A resident being restrained by a physical device under these circumstances may be 
highly agitated and may require ongoing and heightened monitoring and reassessment.”1095 After 
a physical device has been used, the reason for using it must be explained to the resident or, to 
the resident’s substitute decision-maker.1096 Regardless of the type of authority that the home 
relies on to restrain a resident, there are record-keeping obligations.1097  
The Ministry provides further guidance on obtaining consent. The home may not ask a 
resident or the resident’s substitute decision-maker for up-front “blanket authority” to restrain a 
resident using a physical device (or any other permissible type of restraining) should the need 
ever arise. However, if a resident has been assessed as requiring restraining with a physical 
device on a continuing basis and consent from the resident or the resident’s substitute decision-
maker has been obtained, the home is not required to obtain consent every time the physical 
device is applied. If a resident or the resident’s substitute decision-maker refuses to consent to 
the restraining, the home can only restrain the resident under the common law duty. The home 
may apply to the Consent and Capacity Board to review whether the substitute decision-maker 
made the treatment decision in accordance with the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.1098 
The requirements for confining a resident are very similar to those related to restraining 
using a physical device.  The key difference is the additional steps to be taken after a substitute 
decision-maker has provided consent to confining a resident: the resident is promptly given a 
written notice and a verbal explanation, and is asked whether he or she wishes to meet with the 
rights advisor.1099 The written notice must inform the resident of: reasons for the confining, 
 
1093 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 110. 
1094 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–92; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 110(3). 
1095 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–92. 
1096 Ibid; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 110(4). 
1097 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 110(7)-(8). 
1098 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–89. 
1099 At the time of writing, the LTCHA is silent on the qualifications of the rights advisor or any other details. It is 
expected that the regulation will provide the necessary implementation details when the statutory amendments are 
proclaimed.  
207 
rights to meet with the rights advisor and the contact information, right to apply to the Consent 
and Capacity Board, and the resident’s right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. If the 
resident wishes to meet with the rights advisor or expresses disagreement with the confining, a 
rights advisor is promptly notified.1100  The rights advisor must promptly meet with and explain 
the right to apply to the Consent and Capacity Board1101 At the resident’s request, the rights 
advisor must assist with making an application to the Consent and Capacity Board and in 
obtaining legal services.1102 The home must ensure that the resident is not confined until the 
written notice requirement has been satisfied, requirements related to rights advisor (if 
applicable) have been met or that the resident has refused to meet with the rights advisor.1103 The 
rights advisor must promptly notify the home that: 1) the meeting with the resident has occurred 
or the resident has refused to meet; 2) the rights advisor is aware that the resident or someone 
acting on the resident’s behalf intends to make an application to the Consent and Capacity 
Board.1104 Since the confinement provisions have not yet been proclaimed, more requirements 
may be prescribed in regulation in the future.       
 The LTCHA also sets out requirements for the use of PASDs. A PASD is a personal 
assistance services device that is used to assist a person with a routine activity of living. The 
requirements only apply when a PASD has the effect of limiting or inhibiting a resident’s 
freedom of movement and the resident is not able, either physically or cognitively, to release 
himself or herself from the PASD.1105 The conditions that must be met for the lawful use of 
PASDs are similar to those of restraining by physical device.1106 A list of prohibited devices (for 
example, vest or jacket restraints) is also prescribed in the Regulation.1107  The Ministry provides 
 
1100 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 30.1(4)1, 30.1(6); Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care, Compendium to Bill 160, Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients Act, 2017 (Toronto: Ministry 
of Health and Long-Term Care, 2017) at 14–15. 
1101 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 30.1(4)2. The resident could apply for a determination as 
to whether the substitute decision-maker complied with principles for giving or refusing consent as mandated in the 
Health Care Consent Act. See chapter 7. 
1102 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782, s 30.1(4)3. 
1103 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 30.1(4)6. 
1104 Ibid, s 30.1(5). 
1105 Ibid, ss 33(1) – (2). 
1106 Ibid, ss 33(3) – (5). 
1107 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 112. 
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further guidance on using specific physical devices (which is not a defined term in statute and 
regulation) and whether they constitute restraining.1108   
6.4.1.2 Soft law  
In soft law, the issue of restraining is usually addressed in conjunction with abuse, fall 
prevention and medication management. The issue of confining (as used in the LTCHA) is new 
so soft law does not address that. The guidelines referred to here do not all address restraining in 
LTC exclusively; rather, they emphasize the role and responsibilities of the care provider in 
various settings.  They are explained here because they bring out some of the relational aspects 
of prevention of harm in LTC more clearly.  
Similar to the direction in the LTCHA, in soft law, the use of restraint is described as a 
last resort.1109 Accreditation Canada refers to ‘the least restraint’ approach and the guidance is 
similar to the legal requirements.1110 The College of Nurses of Ontario endorses the least 
restraint approach, which means nurses need to assess and implement alternative measures 
before using any form of restraint. Further, when restraint is required, the least restrictive form of 
restraint to meet the client’s needs should be used.1111 But the College of Nurses of Ontario also 
provides additional instructions within the context of providing quality care to clients. By way of 
example, one of the activities is discussing with the client or substitute decision-maker the 
options and associated risks of using a restraint to enable the client to make an informed 
decision. It is pointed out that clients will, at times, prefer to accept safety risks rather than be 
restrained.1112 The Practice Guide also points out that a least restraint policy does not mean that 
nurses are required to accept abuse.1113  
The RNAO also has the most comprehensive guidance on the use of restraints but it is not 
specifically designed for LTC. The guideline covers strategies for assessment, prevention and 
use of alternative practices (including de-escalation and crisis management techniques) to 
prevent the use of restraints, and moves towards restraint-free care in diverse settings such as 
 
1108 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2-98–2–100. 
1109 College of Nurses of Ontario, Practice Standard: Restraints (Pub. No. 41043) (Toronto: College of Nurses of 
Ontario, 2017) at 3; Accreditation Canada, supra note 815 at 57. 
1110 Accreditation Canada, supra note 815 at 56–57. 
1111 College of Nurses of Ontario, supra note 1109 at 4. 
1112 Ibid at 5. 
1113 Ibid at 4. 
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acute, long-term and home health-care.1114 Many of the steps involved (such as individualized 
plan of care)1115 are the same as the requirements in the LTCHA. There are more specific 
recommendations about the prevention of restraint use and the identification of risk factors. For 
example, nurses must assess on admission the potential for the presence of predisposing and 
precipitating factors that put the client at risk for the use of restraints.1116 The guideline also 
establishes linkage of restraint use to escalating responsive behaviour and fall management.1117 
But the RNAO also notes that successful implementation of nursing best practices guidelines 
requires adequate planning, resources, organizational and administrative support, as well as 
appropriate facilitation.1118  
6.4.2 Zero tolerance of abuse and neglect of residents 
Unlike restraining and confining, abuse and neglect of residents are not lawful. The issue 
is to define what they mean in the LTC setting and who is responsible for taking actions to 
prevent abuse and neglect and then directing the home to address their consequences. Another 
layer of complexity is the Criminal Code and the responsibilities of respective police forces. The 
Nursing Homes Act and its regulation contained very few references to abuse and neglect, and 
contained no definitions of “abuse” or “neglect.”  However, the Nursing Homes Act stated that 
every resident had the right to be free from mental and physical abuse.1119  The Nursing Homes 
Act also outlined a reporting duty related to unlawful conduct, improper or incompetent 
treatment or care, or neglect.1120  Finally, it stated that no person could be dismissed, disciplined 
or penalized because a report had been made to the Ministry unless the person acted maliciously 
or without reasonable grounds.1121 The Program Manual contained guidance on what constituted 
resident abuse and neglect, prevention, and actions to be taken by homes1122 and these were later 
elevated to formal law.  Not surprisingly, the LTCHA requirements are denser and more 
 
1114 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, supra note 830 at 17. 
1115 Ibid at 5. 
1116 Ibid at 23. 
1117 Ibid at 19, 24–26 and 38. 
1118 Ibid at 50. 
1119 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 2(2)1. 
1120 Ibid, s 25(1). 
1121 Ibid, s 25(2). 
1122 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0902-01, page 2 and Tab 0902-01, 1 and 4. 
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technical. As we will see below, many of these requirements can be described as a procedural fix 
to a very complex and contentious problem. 
6.4.2.1 LTCHA requirements 
The key provisions in the LTCHA pertaining to abuse and neglect are as follows.  The 
most significant change is a formal duty imposed on the home to protect residents from abuse by 
anyone and to ensure that residents are not neglected by the home or staff.  This duty does not 
apply when the resident is away from the home. It is an offence when a home has failed to 
protect residents from abuse by anyone and neglect by staff.1123 The interpretation of this duty 
also requires more precise meanings of abuse and neglect. The LTCHA and its regulation 
include definitions for “abuse”, “emotional abuse”, “physical abuse”, “financial abuse”, “sexual 
abuse”, “verbal abuse” and “neglect”.1124  These definitions expand on earlier examples of 
physical abuse, emotional abuse and financial abuse included in the Program Manual, and some 
definitions are also new.  For example, “sexual abuse” is now a separate category and previously, 
“physical abuse” included sexual assault or molestation. The regulation also further clarifies 
what is not sexual abuse, for example, sexual abuse is not touching, behaviour or remarks of a 
clinical nature.1125 However, despite the wide range of behaviours captured in the definitions, the 
Ministry is also careful to point out that resident-on-resident incidents may be outside the scope 
of the definitions. Altercations and harmful interactions among residents that are not covered 
under these definitions but could escalate into abusive situations are addressed separately (and 
this will be discussed later in this chapter). Addressing these situations early should be a key part 
of preventing abuse in the home.1126 
Further, every home must have a written policy to promote zero tolerance of abuse and 
neglect of residents, and must ensure that the policy complies with the LTCHA.1127  This 
requirement builds on the Program Manual requirement that every home should have policies on 
abuse.1128The LTCHA also specifies the content of such policy (for example, setting out the 
 
1123 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 19; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 
1100 at 13. There is no duty to ensure residents are not neglected by volunteers.  
1124 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 2(1); O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 2(1). 
1125 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 2(3). 
1126 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–62. 
1127 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 20(1). 
1128 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0902-01, page 2. 
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consequences for those who abuse or neglect residents).1129  However, the LTCHA does not 
provide very much direct guidance on what the home must do to assist residents affected by 
abuse and neglect other than noting that procedures and interventions to assist and support 
residents who have been abused or neglected may include counselling.1130 The effectiveness of 
the home’s policy must be evaluated at least annually to identify changes and improvements, 
which must be implemented promptly. A written record of the annual evaluation must be 
prepared.1131 
Another key component in the regulatory regime is addressing what homes must do after 
incidents of abuse and neglect: investigations, actions, reporting and notification. A home must 
ensure that every incident is immediately investigated and that appropriate action is taken.1132  
The results of every investigation and every action taken must be reported to the Ministry within 
10 days of the home becoming aware of the incident.1133 However, the Ministry also clarifies that 
not all resident-to-resident interactions that seem abusive require reporting to the Director. 
Homes and their staff members should ensure that when they consider reporting resident-to-
resident interactions that the interactions fall within the definitions of abuse.1134 The LTCHA 
also strengthens the reporting requirement by providing enhanced protection for those who make 
reports by making it an offence to suppress reports.1135  As well, there are penalties for certain 
persons (for example, homes, staff and health care providers) who fail to make a report.1136 The 
home must ensure that the appropriate police force is immediately notified of any alleged, 
suspected or witnessed incident of abuse or neglect of a resident that the home suspects may 
constitute a criminal offence.1137 Last but not least, if a resident wants a person notified about an 
incident of abuse or neglect, the home must notify that person (unless there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person is responsible for the incident). The home must notify a 
resident’s substitute decision-maker – even if that person does not wish to be notified (unless 
 
1129 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 20(2); O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 99. 
1130 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–64. 
1131 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 99; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–64. 
1132 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 23(1)(a) and (b). 
1133 Ibid, s 23(2); O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 104 (1) – (3); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 
782 at 2–71. The content of the report is also mandated 
1134 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–70. 
1135 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 24(6). 
1136 Ibid, s 24(5). 
1137 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 98. 
212 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is responsible for the incident). This 
requirement applies even if the resident does not wish to have the substitute decision-maker 
notified.1138    
6.4.2.2 Soft law  
The issue of abuse and neglect of patients / residents is also addressed in the guidelines 
prepared by various regulatory colleges and professional associations but the depth of the 
discussion of the subject varies. The variation across disciplines is indicative of the range of 
potential responses to relational wrongs, depending on one’s understanding of the importance of 
responsibilities as a maker of care.1139 The responses are targeted to individuals and institutions.  
At one end of the spectrum, health care providers are reminded of their legal obligations 
to report different types of abuse, including sexual abuse, and the manner and timing of such 
reporting under various statutes, such as the Regulated Health Professionals Act, 1991 and the 
LTCHA.1140 Accreditation Canada’s LTC service standards include discussion of reporting of 
resident abuse and these standards frame abuse as one of the issues related to the physical 
security of residents.1141 But the guideline also acknowledges that abuse may occur between 
residents, between residents and family, or between residents and staff.1142 Other topics include 
education and training on recognizing, preventing, and assessing risk of abuse,1143 workplace 
violence,1144 information and education for residents and families about recognizing and 
reporting abuse,1145 and the organization’s abuse prevention strategy.1146  
At the other end of the spectrum is the Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario’s 
Preventing and Addressing Abuse and Neglect of Older Adults: Person-Centred, Collaborative, 
 
1138 Ibid, s 97; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–65. A resident is not required to specify 
a person to be notified. 
1139 Herring, supra note 112 at 60–62. 
1140 College of Dietitians of Ontario, supra note 918 at 70; College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, Policy 
Statement # 6-12: Mandatory and Permissive Reporting (Toronto: College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 
2012) at 4–5; College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, Policy Statement #4-08 - Maintaining Appropriate 
Boundaries and Preventing Sexual Abuse (Toronto: College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2017). 
1141 Accreditation Canada, supra note 815 at 12. 
1142 Ibid at 21. 
1143 Ibid at 20. 
1144 Ibid at 29–30. 
1145 Ibid at 40. 
1146 Ibid at 41. 
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System-Wide Approaches. For the purpose of this research, it should be noted that the guideline 
acknowledges that institutions have the responsibility to provide safe, quality care for all 
residents. Furthermore, older adults living in institutions are in a relationship of trust with the 
organization, and a trusting relationship is a key element in most definitions of abuse and 
neglect.1147 In addition to practice recommendations for registered nurses, the Guideline also 
includes education and policy/organization/system recommendations. By way of example, the 
guideline includes a discussion of factors and conditions that contribute to abuse and neglect in 
institutions to contextualize adoption of a combination of approaches to prevent abuse and 
neglect of older adults.1148 In addition, the guideline recommends that nurses, other health-care 
providers, stakeholders that have advocacy mandates, and other groups can help prevent and 
address abuse and neglect of older adults through advocacy efforts.1149   
6.4.3 Responding to responsive behavior and altercations 
So far I have explained harm that is most likely to be inflicted by people other than the 
residents, even though others in the caring relationships can be harmed also. Harm to residents 
and others can also occur when residents engage in certain types of interactions – intentionally or 
unintentionally – when they encounter caregivers and residents. Some residents engage in 
behaviour that may normally be considered socially unacceptable (e.g., aggression) or in actual 
or potential violence, possibly attributed to an impairment, health condition, or care received by 
the resident (or lack thereof).  Such behaviours are known as responsive behaviours (to be 
defined below). Law’s responses to these behaviours have evolved over time and have been 
augmented by other non-regulatory initiatives, such as Behavioural Supports Ontario (to be 
discussed in Chapter 9).1150 Law’s function here is to change the language used to describe those 
living with significant cognitive impairments and to more formally recognize the responsibility 
to respond to their needs. The proliferation of guidelines on dealing with dementia is also 
indicative of how behavioural issues are now perceived and understood. Overall, the new 
requirements move away from blaming the residents’ impairments but at the same time, the 
 
1147 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, supra note 919 at 6. 
1148 Ibid at 52–56. 
1149 Ibid at 62. 
1150 Behavioural Supports Ontario, “Background”, online: Behavioural Supports Ontario Soutien en cas de troubles 
du comportement en Ontario Provincial Website / Site-Web Provincial 
<http://www.behaviouralsupportsontario.ca/29/Background/>. 
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impairments are used to justify more intense monitoring and documentation. There is also the 
question whether enough resources (human and otherwise) are made available to meet the needs 
of those who exhibit responsive behaviour as required by hard and soft law and others in the 
caring relationships.  
There was not much guidance on how to deal with residents’ behavioural issues under the 
previous regime. The Nursing Homes Act and its regulation did not have any reference to 
cognitive impairment or behaviour issues. Pursuant to the Program Manual, resident medical 
care was to include behaviour management of aggressive, agitated residents.1151 The home was 
required to provide annual education to staff on, among other things, understanding residents 
with cognitive impairment and responding to disruptive behavior.1152 Similarly, orientation was 
to include understanding disruptive behaviour.1153 As part of the Ministry’s review of the home, 
focused audits of residents were to include residents who demonstrated disruptive behaviour1154 
and there was a checklist for disruptive behavior focused audit.  The standards and criteria to be 
reviewed in the focused audit were related to the care received by the residents and some were 
modified to reflect a disruptive behavior emphasis. For example, one of the standards required 
that policies and procedures be in place for all aspects of behavior management.1155           
6.4.3.1 LTCHA requirements 
The LTCHA represents a different way of formally acknowledging the needs of residents 
who exhibit behavioural issues and the needs of people around them including other residents 
and caregivers. These are now described as “responsive behaviours,”  which means behaviours 
that often indicate: “(a) an unmet need in a person, whether cognitive, physical, emotional, 
social, environmental or other, or (b) a response to circumstances within the social or physical 
environment that may be frustrating, frightening or confusing to a person”.1156 MOHLTC 
explains: “In the past, these behaviours have often been termed ‘disruptive,’ ‘challenging,’ or 
‘aggressive.’ This terminology negatively labels residents”.1157  The significance of the change in 
 
1151 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1012-02, page 4. 
1152 Ibid at Tab 1002-01, page 3. 
1153 Ibid at Tab 1002-02, page 2 and Tab 1007-02, page 4. 
1154 Ibid at Tab 1101-01, page 6. 
1155 Ibid at Tab 1102-02, page 31. 
1156 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 1. 
1157 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–34. 
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language is that “[b]y calling these behaviours “responsive”, focus is placed on understanding 
the meaning behind the behaviour and what the resident may be trying to communicate. This 
focus requires a holistic approach to assessment that takes into consideration physical, cognitive, 
emotional, social, environmental and other conditions that might be triggering the behaviour.”1158 
New requirements for addressing these behaviours are targeted for individual residents 
and for the home as a whole. For each resident who demonstrates responsive behaviours, the 
home must identify the behaviour triggers, must develop and implement strategies to respond to 
these behaviours, and must take action to respond to the resident’s needs.1159  The home must 
also develop the following: written approaches to care, such as screening protocols and 
identification of behavioural triggers; written strategies, including techniques and interventions, 
to prevent, minimize or respond to the responsive behaviours; resident monitoring and internal 
reporting protocols; and protocols for referrals to specialized resources.1160 These tasks must be 
integrated into the care that is provided to all residents, based on the assessed needs of residents 
with responsive behaviours, and must be co-ordinated and implemented on an interdisciplinary 
basis.1161 They must also be evidence-based, must be evaluated and updated at least annually, 
and a written record of each evaluation must be kept.1162  
But not all behaviour issues can be attributed to a resident’s reaction to an unmet need. 
Steps must be taken to minimize the risk of altercations and potentially harmful interactions 
between and among residents i.e., identifying factors that could potentially trigger such 
altercations, and identifying and implementing interventions.1163 The Ministry reiterates that 
some interactions are not included in the definition of abuse. For example, the actions of a 
resident who does not understand or appreciate their consequences are not included in the 
definitions of emotional abuse and verbal abuse. But staff must be proactive in identifying 
triggers and must deal with potentially harmful interactions before they escalate into a harmful 
situation.1164 Further, homes must develop and implement procedures and interventions to assist 
 
1158 Ibid at 2–35. 
1159 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 53(4); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–34. 
1160 Ibid, s 53(1); Ibid at 2–33. 
1161 Ibid, s 53(2); Ibid at 2–34. 
1162  Ibid, s 53(3); Ibid at 2–34. 
1163  Ibid, s 54; Ibid at 2–36. 
1164  Ibid, s 54; Ibid at 2–36. 
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residents and staff who are at risk of harm or who are harmed as a result of a resident’s 
behaviour. All direct care staff must be advised of each resident whose behaviours require 
heightened monitoring.1165 The home must address all behaviours, including those that may not 
be responsive. To help identify residents whose behaviours should be monitored, the home can 
use information provided by family members and substitute decision-makers as well as 
admission assessments and any psychogeriatric or other assessments.1166 
6.4.3.2 Soft law  
The legal requirements say very little about what homes actually have to do other than 
having processes and procedures in place, and that gap is partially filled by soft law. A 
potentially promising feature in soft law is that it acknowledges the interactional nature of 
disability: that not only the physical environment but also the social environment can have a 
profound effect on the quality of life of those who experience behaviour issues. The resident 
cannot be “fixed”; it is those around the resident with behaviour issues who must change. The 
guidelines surveyed also devote considerable attention to the needs of those who experience 
behavioural issues, usually in conjunction with other related topics such as abuse, medication 
management and use of restraints. Responsive behaviour might also be addressed from the 
home’s perspective through programming. Accreditation Canada’s LTC Service Standards 
require that education and training on preventing and managing residents' responsive behaviours 
are provided to the team and include examples of training programs and evidence-informed use 
of pharmaceuticals.1167  
Responsive behavior might be addressed from the care provider’s perspective in the 
context of providing guidance on a variety of related topics. The Registered Nurses’ Association 
of Ontario’s guidance on behavioural issues appears in in the following guidelines: Promoting 
Safety: Alternative Approaches to the Use of Restraints, Preventing and Addressing Abuse and 
Neglect of Older Adults: Person-Centred, Collaborative, System-Wide Approaches, and 
Delirium, Dementia, and Depression in Older Adults: Assessment and Care. It is stated that 
responsive behavior is a predisposing risk factor for restraint use, and in partnership with the 
 
1165  Ibid , s 55; Ibid at 2–36. 
1166 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–37. 
1167 Accreditation Canada, supra note 815 at 21. 
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inter-professional team nurses should implement de-escalation and crisis management techniques 
and mobilize the appropriate resources to promote safety and mitigate risk of harm for all in the 
presence of escalating responsive behaviours.1168 Having effective strategies for 
challenging/responsive behaviours is also incorporated into discussions about prevention of 
abuse and neglect.1169 Risk factors for abuse and neglect include the presence of responsive 
behaviour.1170 Institutions should adopt a combination of approaches to prevent abuse and 
neglect of older adults, for example supporting the needs of individuals with cognitive 
impairment, including those with responsive behaviours.1171 Responsive behaviour is addressed 
within the context of employing communication strategies and techniques when caring for 
people with dementia.1172 
Finally, responsive behaviour could be a standalone topic addressed from multiple 
perspectives. Health Quality Ontario’s Behavioural Symptoms of Dementia Quality Standard 
incorporates 14 quality statements; each statement also explains how its successful delivery 
impacts people living with dementia, their caregivers, health care professionals, and health care 
services at large.1173 To begin with, this Standard is  
underpinned by the principle that people living with dementia have the right to receive 
services that are respectful of their rights and dignity and that promote self-determination. 
People living with dementia and symptoms of agitation or aggression are provided 
service that is respectful of their gender, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, 
housing, age, background (including self-identified cultural, ethnic, and religious 
backgrounds), and disability.1174  
The majority of the statements are not new in that they reflect existing regulatory 
requirements under the LTCHA and other legislation.1175  However, they articulate more 
 
1168 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, supra note 830 at 28 and 38. 
1169 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, supra note 919 at 8. 
1170 Ibid at 27. 
1171 Ibid at 10. 
1172 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Delirium, Dementia, and Depression in Older Adults: Assessment 
and Care Second Edition (Toronto: Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2016) at 63. 
1173 Health Quality Ontario, Behavioural Symptoms of Dementia Care for Patients in Hospitals and Residents in 
Long-Term Care Homes (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2016) at 4. This quality standard focuses on care for 
those who are in an emergency department, admitted to a hospital, or in a long-term care home. It also provides 
guidance on the care given when a person is transitioned between these settings; for example, when someone is 
discharged from a hospital to a long-term care home. 
1174 Ibid at 5. 
1175 Ibid at 7.  The topics include comprehensive assessment, individualized care plan, mechanical restraint, 
informed consent and provider training and education 
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concretely how to meet the expectations of the LTCHA.  More importantly, they accept the 
interactional nature of disability and explain more clearly how others may be affected if this 
interactional nature is not taken into account. For example, as discussed above, the home must 
identify the behaviour triggers, develop and implement strategies to respond to the responsive 
behaviours, and take actions to respond to the resident’s needs. Concrete guidance toward 
meeting this requirement can be seen in Quality Statement 13: An appropriate environment that 
is calm with minimal potentially disturbing stimuli helps prevent retriggering of behavioural 
symptoms related to the physical environment (e.g., overcrowding, lack of privacy, loud noise 
levels). This also benefits other service users who might experience violence or harm when 
witnessing the behavioural symptoms of the person with dementia.1176 Some are new in the sense 
that they go beyond the scope of the LTCHA, for example, recommending training and 
education for caregivers (defined as paid or unpaid people who help a family member, friend, or 
another person in need of assistance or support with daily living).1177  
6.4.4 Summary  
Table 21: Key changes about prevention of harm under the Nursing Homes Act and the 
LTCHA 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Minimization of restraining 
and confining of residents 
Resident’s right to be fully 
informed of the procedures 
and the consequences of 
receiving or refusing 
restraints  
Requirements for the use of 
physical restraints  
 
More substantive and 
procedural protections  
Explicit reference to the 
common duty to restrain and 
confine  
New concept of “confining” 
and related protections   
 
1176 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1173. 
1177 Ibid at 33–34. 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Prevention of abuse and 
neglect of residents 
Resident right to be free from 
mental and physical abuse  
Guidance on what constitutes 
resident abuse and neglect  
Prevention and actions to be 
taken by home 
Duty of home to protect 
residents from abuse and 
neglect 
Policy of zero tolerance of 
abuse and neglect  
Strengthened reporting 
requirements 
Responsive behaviour and 
altercations 
Yes –reference to what the 
home must do for residents 
with cognitive impairments 
and disruptive behaviour   
New language – responsive 
behaviour  
New requirements to deal 
with altercations and other 
harmful interactions 
 
This section is premised on the assumption that the safety of residents must be 
understood with respect to the relationships in the home. The changes are intended to protect the 
safety of residents and others in the home by avoiding certain types of risk or reducing its 
impact, although not necessarily consistently or to the same extent. Very few references are 
made to the safety of workers. The risk of physical harm that may occur in a caring relationship 
in LTC is addressed in three key categories of the requirements of the LTCHA: minimization of 
restraining and confining of residents, zero tolerance of abuse and neglect of residents and 
management of responsive behaviour and altercations. Together, they represent a trend in 
understanding and responding to risks in LTC homes: the impairments and health status of 
residents make them susceptible to intentional and unintentional harm inflicted by others in the 
home. At the same time, certain types of impairments, such as dementia, also justify restrictions 
on liberty, more intense monitoring and targeted measures to prevent harm to residents and 
others in the home.  These techniques make regulation of LTC homes appear to be more 
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“rational, analytical, and orderly,”1178 however caring relationships are messy in LTC. Law also 
serves the function of ensuring that any infringement of life, liberty and security by the 
government is in accordance with the principle of fundamental justice. Arbitrariness is of 
particular concern and the requirements in the LTCHA may take away some discretion that 
caregivers once had over certain types of interactions. The question is whether the degree of 
discretion that caregivers still have is adequate to give them the flexibility to respond to the 
needs of individual residents. 
6.5 Acknowledging the challenges of communal and congregate 
living  
In this last section, I will explore three sets of changes that illustrate how the law 
responds to other harms that may occur in LTC as a communal or congregate living setting. This 
is an interesting setting through which to understand relationality as a marker of care. This 
section highlights the fact that it is more meaningful to talk about the safety of all individuals 
present in a home. While resident health and safety are also the primary policy objectives 
addressed by the changes discussed below, a less obvious objective is to protect the safety of 
caregivers, albeit marginally. Keeping in mind the interdependences of residents and their 
caregivers and among residents continues to be important in the interpretation of these changes. 
Autonomy is also engaged in the discussion below. The regulatory changes concern fall 
prevention, medication management, infectious diseases control and dining.  The feminist 
political economy literature has commented on the medicalized nature of care within homes and 
the discussion below will also illustrate such concerns. 
6.5.1 Medication management 
The Regulation under the LTCHA establishes requirements relating to the home’s 
medication management system.1179According to the Ministry, the purpose of the system is to 
ensure medication requirements of residents are met in a safe and timely manner and to ensure 
the best health outcomes for residents. The Regulation also includes requirements for addressing 
 
1178 Windholz argues that the rise of risk-based regulation is part of broader efforts to make regulations more 
rational, analytical, and orderly. Windholz, supra note 50. 
1179 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 114–117; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–101 to 
2–102. 
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medication incidents, adverse drug reactions, and the use of any drug or drug combinations, 
including psychotropic drugs, which could potentially put residents at risk.1180 The majority of 
the LTCHA requirements build on the previous regime, where the bulk of the requirements were 
in the Program Manual and the Nursing Homes Act and its regulation provided less guidance. 
Under the LTCHA, the components of the medication management system are similar to those in 
the Program Manual, such as inter-disciplinary review and written policies and procedures.1181 
The following new requirements will be addressed here: use of chemical restraints, 
administration of drugs and medication incidents. 
Restraining a resident by the administration of a drug is prohibited under the LTCHA 
with only one exception: under the common law duty of a caregiver to restrain a person when 
immediate action is necessary to prevent serious bodily harm to the person or to others. In this 
situation, the administration of the drug must be ordered by a physician or a Registered 
Nurse.1182 The regulatory requirements focus on what the home must do after restraining. The 
home must document each incident.1183 It is also made clear that physical abuse includes 
administering or withholding a drug for an inappropriate purpose.1184 And the administration of a 
drug as a treatment set out in a plan of care is not considered as restraining a resident.1185 In 
contrast, the Nursing Homes Act and its regulation did not address restraining by administration 
of a drug and the Program Manual included only a definition of chemical restraint.1186   
The requirements related to administration of drugs involve the following changes: self-
administration of drugs, destruction of controlled substances and use of natural health products. 
The requirements are undoubtedly complex and can be partly explained by the fact that LTC is a 
 
1180 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–101. 
1181 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1016-01. 
1182 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 36(3); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 
782 at 2–112; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 137. 
1183 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 137(2). The documentation must include all of the following: the circumstances 
precipitating the administration of the drug; who made the order, what drug was administered, the dosage given, 
how the drug was administered, the time or times when the drug was administered and who administered the drug; 
the resident’s response to the drug;  assessments, reassessments and monitoring of the resident; and discussions with 
the resident or, the resident’s substitute decision-maker (following administration of the drug) to explain the reasons 
for using the drug. 
1184 Ibid, s 2(1). 
1185 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 30(4); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 
782 at 2–113. 
1186 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 9901-01, page 7. 
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communal setting. In this particular communal setting, the challenge is to allow general patient 
safety principles to apply while respecting autonomy. There is now more clarity about self-
administration of drugs whereas the Program Manual simply noted that self-administration must 
be permitted when specifically ordered by the physician in consultation with the care team.1187 
Under the new regime, a resident may self-administer a drug if approved by the prescriber in 
consultation with the resident. There must be written policies to ensure that the resident who self-
administers understands: the use and need for the drug; monitoring and documentation of the use 
of the drug; and safekeeping.1188 The processes and procedures about destruction of drugs 
including documentation, especially with respect to controlled substances have been 
expanded.1189 Another new requirement addresses the use of natural health products. The home 
must ensure that when a resident wishes to use a drug that is a natural health product and that has 
not been prescribed, there are written policies and procedures.1190 The Ministry further clarifies 
that the level of staff involvement in administering natural health products that have not been 
prescribed for a resident is at the discretion of the home. The home’s policies and procedures 
should not be overly restrictive or prevent a resident from using the products given the 
fundamental principle and the Residents’ Bill of Rights of the LTCHA.1191 
Last but not least, more extensive requirements about medication incidents and adverse 
drug reactions are now in place. The previous regime simply required a system for immediate 
reporting of each medication error and adverse drug reaction, with specific follow-up actions to 
be taken.1192  The new requirements in the LTCHA are as follows. The definitions of medication 
incident and adverse drug reactions are provided for. The scope of reporting is broader. A 
medication incident involving a resident or adverse drug reaction must be reported to the resident 
or the resident’s substitute decision-maker. All medication incidents (whether involving a 
 
 
 
1188 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 131(6). 
1189 Ibid, s 136; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at page 2-111. For example, any controlled 
substance that is to be destroyed and disposed must be stored in a double-locked area separate from any controlled 
substance that is available for administration to residents. 
1190 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 132. 
1191 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–108. 
1192 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1016-01, page 9. 
223 
resident or not) and adverse drug reactions must be documented, reviewed and analyzed. 
Corrective action must be taken and a written record must be kept. The home is required to 
review all medication incidents and adverse drug reactions quarterly. Any changes and 
improvements identified in the review must be implemented and a written record must be 
kept.1193 
The soft law on medication management is extensive. The emphasis is on patient safety 
and appropriateness of medication, including the use of anti-psychotics. Medication is addressed 
in almost all topic-specific guidelines1194 as well as in sector-specific guidelines.1195 These 
guidelines overlap with each other and with the LTCHA but they also add to the hard law, for 
example, resident engagement (including families) in medication reconciliation, risks of using 
psychotropic medications and alternatives to such medications, and appropriateness of long-term 
medications.1196   
6.5.2 Fall prevention and management  
The risk of falls is one of the safety issues addressed in the LTCHA and even more 
guidance is included in soft law. While falls can happen in other care settings, the potential 
implications of a fall extend beyond the person who fell such as liability for the home. Another 
way of thinking about this is how to support residents and/ or their substitute decision-makers to 
make decisions about balancing the safety risks and the values of the residents.  
One of the required programs under the LTCHA (see Chapter 5) is falls prevention and 
management. While “falls” were mentioned sporadically in the Program Manual,1197 this new 
required program must, at minimum, provide strategies to reduce or mitigate falls. These 
strategies must include monitoring residents, reviewing residents’ drug regimes, implementing 
restorative care approaches, and using equipment, supplies, devices and assistive aids, which 
 
1193 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 135; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–110. 
1194 For example see Registered Nurses Association of Ontario, Prevention of Falls and Fall Injuries in the Older 
Adult (Toronto: Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2005) at 8; Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1173 at 
13–24. 
1195 For example see Accreditation Canada, supra note 815 at 41–46, 59; Long Term Care Medical Directors 
Association of Canada, Long Term Care: Six Things Physicians and Patients Should Question (Toronto: Choose 
Wisely Canada, 2017). 
1196 Canadian Patient Safety Institute, supra note 849 at 31; Long Term Care Medical Directors Association of 
Canada, supra note 1195; Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1173 at 16–24. 
1197 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1012-02. 
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must be readily available at the Home. After a fall, the resident must be assessed and, when the 
resident’s condition or circumstances requires it, a post-fall assessment must be conducted.1198  
Soft law overlaps with the LTCHA. For example, Accreditation Canada’s LTC Service 
Standards require a documented and coordinated approach to falls prevention.1199 But there are 
some differences too. In contrast to the LTCHA and its regulation, the guidance in various 
guidelines is more contextualized in the sense of referring to other values (e.g. a resident’s 
autonomy) and attends to other social-economic and environmental aspects of falls and fall 
prevention. For example, according to the Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, the client’s 
perspective, risk-taking, autonomy, and self-determination are supported, respected, and 
considered in the plan of interventions. Further, clients, their significant other(s) and the care 
team engage in assessment and interventions through a collaborative process.1200 It is also 
acknowledged that interventions also must occur at the organization level. For example, 
organizations should review the communication processes between interdisciplinary team 
members especially between regulated and non-regulated staff.1201  
6.5.3 Infection control 
Every home must ensure that there is an infection prevention and control program for the 
home.1202  This simply formalizes and expands on the Program Manual’s requirements for an 
organized program of infection control.1203 The only significant changes are the immunization 
and screening measures provisions.1204 The soft law surveyed complements the LTCHA by 
giving more guidance on what individual providers should do. By way of example, the College 
of Nurses of Ontario’s Practice Standard: Infection Prevention and Control requires that nurses 
reduce the risk to self and others by appropriately handling, cleaning and disposing of materials 
and equipment.1205 As well, nurses should use appropriate and timely communication strategies 
 
1198 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 49; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–29. 
1199 Accreditation Canada, supra note 815 at 46–47. 
1200 Registered Nurses Association of Ontario, supra note 1194 at 8. 
1201 Canadian Patient Safety Institute, supra note 849 at 40. 
1202 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 86. 
1203 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1011-01, page 9–10. 
1204 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 229(10)–(12). The provisions specify: 1) which types of immunization must be 
offered to residents and screening residents for tuberculosis; 2) staff immunization program and screening for staff 
for tuberculosis and other infectious diseases; and 3) up-to-date immunizations for pets. 
1205 College of Nurses of Ontario, Practice Standard: Infection Prevention and Control (Pub. No. 41002) (Toronto: 
College of Nurses of Ontario, 2009) at 5. 
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with clients and their significant others, the health care team and the community when discussing 
infection prevention and control issues.1206 These examples illustrate the inter-dependency of 
caregivers and residents, and among residents and family members when dealing with infectious 
diseases. As Chapter 9 will show, the importance of balancing the needs and rights of various 
people living / working in a home is evident.      
6.5.4 Dining and nutrition 
In the previous chapter, I briefly discussed nutrition care as part of quality care. A closely 
related matter is the regulation of residents’ dining experiences. This area has always been highly 
prescriptive, in part due to safety reasons because residents must eat in a congregate setting 
under both regimes. The Program Manual included requirements about meal services, such as 
supervision of residents, meal times, location, and assistance to be provided to residents.1207 
These requirements are elevated to regulation1208 with small modifications. The only difference 
is that some of the context and guidance have not been incorporated into the new regime. For 
example, the Program Manual referred to the goals of meal service, such as providing meal 
service as a pleasurable dining experience, focusing on eating as a social experience, providing 
special meals to increase pleasure and creating happy memories and pleasant meal time 
ambience.1209  
6.5.5 Summary  
Table 22: Key changes to communal living under the Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Medication management  Yes  Added restraining by 
administration of drugs,  
consumption of natural health 
products  
 
1206 Ibid. 
1207 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1014-01, page 3–4. 
1208 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 73; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–46. 
1209 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1014-02, page 2. 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Modified requirements about 
self-administration of drugs, 
destruction of controlled 
substance and medication 
incidents and adverse drug 
reactions 
Fall prevention Yes  Formalized as a program and 
added strategies  
Infection control  Yes  Formalized in law and added 
immunization and screening 
measures provisions  
Dining  Yes Formalized in law but omitted 
some of the context  
 
All the topics discussed in this section share a common theme: they are perceived to be 
necessary for prevention of harm because LTC is a communal or congregate setting.  The point 
is that the safety is translated into detailed legal rules for activities that may be deemed 
potentially more risky in a communal setting. With more rules come the challenge of respecting 
the autonomy of residents when they take medications, attempt to reduce the risk of fall (or not), 
make decisions about immunization or dining.         
6.6 Conclusion   
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Illustration 4: Means to Protect Safety and Security of Residents  
 
 
 
This chapter illustrated the changes to the process of admitting and discharging residents, 
physical design of the home, the minimization of restraining and confining of residents, the 
policy of zero tolerance of abuse and neglect, the management of responsive behaviour and 
altercations and other care practices. The changes are mostly requirements elevated from the 
Program Manual but some are expansions too. They have important ramifications for protecting 
the autonomy of residents and for defining the caring relationship.  
Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter is also informed by the debates about 
criticisms of care, including the contributions from Herring1210 as well as contributions of the 
feminist political economy literature.1211 It is hard to argue with the observation that the safety 
and security of residents is prioritized by measures that are intended to minimize certain types of 
risks. Not interfering in abusive or harmful situations can leave residents without protection and 
therefore the Charter-protected right to life may be engaged. Our understanding of risk of harm 
is central to law’s response to residents’ impairments. The law is built around the image of a 
 
1210 Herring, supra note 112. 
1211 Armstrong, supra note 655; Armstrong, supra note 1003; Braedley & Martel, supra note 678. 
228 
frail, dependent and non-autonomous resident, in contrast to the autonomous individual as 
explained by Herring. The current regulatory tools available to protect the typical resident 
include enhanced monitoring, documentation and minimization of risks to physical safety. It is 
evident that some discretion is taken away from caregivers in the process of providing care. 
These tools are designed to keep the resident free from harm inflicted by workers, volunteers and 
other residents but could also interfere with the autonomy of residents. The sum of these 
observations reinforces the importance of analyzing safety and security measures from the 
perspective of promoting caring relationships.   
The promotion of caring relationships entails careful consideration of potential for harm 
in care but user involvement is also important. The next chapter will turn to another important 
theme in the disability scholarship: inclusion and participation. This theme is also informed by 
the insights advanced by New Governance scholars and the counter-arguments of their critics. In 
Chapter 8, I will return to the issue of harms in a caring relationship by examining what the state 
has to do to protect its vulnerable citizens, including enforcement and compliance.  
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7 Inclusion and Participation  
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to flesh out what inclusion and participation mean in LTC 
homes. My starting point is that from a disability perspective, autonomy is still an important 
concept in studying care, regardless of where it is offered.1212 The purpose here is to explore how 
participation mechanisms, especially those mandated by law, support or frustrate autonomy in 
the LTC context. In Chapter 2, I explained the significance of the idea of inclusion to the 
Canadian Disability Movement. I have also argued that there is a case for close examination of 
the techniques used to promote inclusion and participation in LTC as well as the purposes of and 
meanings attributed to such techniques. In Chapters 5 and 6, I examined how the law constructs 
care and what has changed in the regulation of LTC between 2004 and 2018. I have described 
the caring relationship as unidirectional as the law focuses on giving directions about what care 
providers have to do for the residents and how. If implicit in the scholarly criticisms of care is 
lack of meaningful user involvement, then reforming care in LTC will require a different 
understanding of how residents should participate in their own care, individually, as well as 
collectively, as a group, in homes.  
Inclusion and participation of LTC residents are enabled by a variety of rights, duties and 
safeguards enshrined in the Charter, the Ontario Human Rights Code, common law as well as in 
statutes. The following dimensions of inclusion and participation are explored in this chapter: the 
equality guarantee under the Charter, autonomy in decision-making at the individual level, and 
collective rights of residents to participate in the operation of home. This chapter will proceed as 
follows: the first section will summarize some of the recent s.15 cases; the second section will 
explain the changes to the Health Care Consent Act and Substitute Decisions Act in relation to 
residents’ autonomy in making and executing decisions at the point of care; the last section will 
explore how residents and their families and friends – as a group – participate in their homes 
under the LTCHA.  
 
1212 Boyle, supra note 154; Kröger, supra note 156. 
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From exploring these three dimensions of inclusion and participation, it becomes clear 
that there is no shortage of tools available to residents and to those in caring relationships with 
them. However, it is also the case that not all of these tools are equally useful. I question the 
utility of arguments based on the equality guarantee of the Charter and the Human Rights Code 
in order to generate changes to ameliorate some of the shortcomings in the LTC system that are 
directly related to the personal characteristics of residents. A greater emphasis on procedural 
fairness and due process in involuntary committal, capacity and consent matters may better 
support individual autonomy but says little about supporting caring relationships. If properly 
understood and implemented, the new or strengthened participation mechanisms at the individual 
and collective levels are significant for residents as they encourage residents to decide for 
themselves and collaborate with each other. These mechanisms also attend to the reality that 
families and friends continue to constitute part of the web of relationships of residents. It is my 
view that these mechanisms have the potential to reconcile dependence and autonomy in caring 
relationships in LTC. If LTC residents, even if they are dependent on others for meeting their 
needs, are not to be treated as objects of care or passive recipients of care, it follows that there 
must be mechanisms to empower and enable all parties in a caring relationship to seek out the 
wishes and needs of each other. Participation mechanisms are concrete ways of promoting 
autonomy at the individual and collective levels in LTC.     
7.2 Section 15 of the Charter  
The Charter provisions regarding liberty and security of the person (section 7), arbitrary 
detention (section 9) and equality (section 15) are especially relevant for LTC residents. In 
chapter 6, I discussed section 7 and section 9 jurisprudence in relation to bodily integrity as part 
of safety and security of the person. Section 7 is also relevant to consent and capacity law in this 
chapter. According to D’Arcy Hiltz, Anita Szigeti and Ruby Dhand, “statutory provisions setting 
out the requisite elements of informed consent constitute expressions of the constitutional right 
against unwanted or unwarranted interference with personal autonomy and dignity by way of 
unauthorized medical treatment, which are protected by s. 7.”1213 Here I will briefly outline the 
section 15 jurisprudence in this period. I adopt Robert Leckey and Régine Tremblay’s idea that a 
 
1213 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Mental Health, “II. Consent and Capacity 1. Overview of Consent and 
Capacity” at HMN-7 "Consent to treatment and refusal" (2019 Reissue). 
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judgment, law, or other measure should not be taken as an end; rather, legal reforms in equality’s 
name invite fresh lines of inquiry.1214 I focus on several aspects of the key judicial decisions that 
are relevant to my case study –not because they involve LTC residents. I am incorporating a 
short discussion about equality here because ultimately, freedom from discrimination often finds 
expression in government benefit schemes that may include or exclude a group of beneficiaries 
from enjoying a benefit or protection conferred by law based on one or more personal 
characteristics.  
In terms of equality jurisprudence, there has not been much progress1215 – if judged solely 
by the outcomes of the cases – in terms of using the Charter to advance social justice. Jennifer 
Koshan and Jonnette Watson Hamilton express a view not uncommon among scholars and 
activists: “although the Court continually describes its goal as one of substantive equality, it has 
yet to develop an approach that truly embraces that notion.”1216 In the landmark 2007 decision R 
v. Kapp,1217 the Supreme Court did indeed rework and provided important clarifications to the 
analytical framework for applying the equality guarantee provided for in s. 15(1) of the 
Charter.1218   For example, Kapp marked the end of the Law approach and a return to 
Andrews.1219 The Supreme Court was aware of criticisms about the resurfacing of formalism in 
the form of an artificial comparator analysis which focused on treating likes alike in some of the 
Court’s post-Andrews jurisprudence.1220 However, besides acknowledging the criticisms about 
formalism, the Supreme Court said nothing about comparator groups.  This left unsettled the 
issues surrounding comparator groups that had been raised in the academic literature the Court 
 
1214 Robert Leckey & Régine Tremblay, “Introduction: After Equality” (2015) 27:1 Can J Women & L i at i. 
1215 Jena McGill & Daphane Gilbert, “Of Promise and Peril: The Court and Equality Rights” (2017) 78 SCLR(2d) 
235; Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality after Withler” 
(2011) 16 Rev Const Stud 31; Hester Lessard, “‘Dollars Versus [Equality] Rights’: Money and the Limits on 
Distributive Justice” (2012) 58:1 SCLR (2d) 299; David Wiseman, “The Past and Future of Constitutional Law and 
Social Justice: Majestic or Substantive Equality?” (2015) 71:1 SCLR (2d) 563; Jennifer Koshan, “Redressing the 
Harms of Government (In)Action: A Section 7 Versus Section 15 Charter Showdown” (2013) 22:1 Constitutional 
Forum 31; John David Lee, C Tess Sheldon & Roberto Lattanzio, “Law and Ordered C.H.A.O.S.: Social Science 
Methodology, and the Charter Claims of Persons with Disabilities” (2013) 32:1 NJCL 61 at 101–104; Ena Chadha 
& C Tess Sheldon, “Promoting Equality: Economic and Social Rights for Persons with Disabilities Under Section 
15” (2004) 16:1 NJCL 27 at 71–72. 
1216 Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “The Continual Reinvention of Section 15 of the Charter Forum 
Topic Articles” (2013) 64 UNBLJ 19 at 21. 
1217 R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp]. 
1218 McGill & Gilbert, supra note 1215 at 246. 
1219 Ibid. 
1220 Kapp, supra note 1217, at para 22.  
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cited, and the impact of cases such as Auton where the Supreme Court’s choice of comparators 
precluded the establishment of the equality claims.1221  In the discussion of the 2011 Withler 
decision, this issue of comparator groups would be addressed again to reiterate the analysis is 
contextual and not formal.  
Despite the Supreme Court’s apparent willingness to move away from formalism in R v. 
Kapp,1222 subsequent decisions were subject to considerable scholarly criticisms.1223 The lack of 
progress in s.15 jurisprudence may prompt equality-seeking groups to bring claims under s.7.1224 
The problem with such an approach is that it would appear that some types of harm (e.g. those 
related to physical safety and security) are more worthy of Charter protection than others (e.g. 
those flowing from membership in disadvantaged groups).1225 The Supreme Court’s apparent 
unwillingness to engage s.15 arguments such as those advanced by LEAF will inform our 
analysis in chapter 9.    
7.2.1 Age, gender and entitlement to public benefits  
In Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), the appellants, representative plaintiffs in two 
class actions, were widows whose federal supplementary death benefits were reduced because of 
the age of their husbands at the time of death.1226  Federal civil servants and members of the 
Canadian Forces, and their families are provided with a suite of benefits both during employment 
and after retirement, including a package of survivor benefits for the surviving spouse and for 
dependents of a plan member after his or her death.1227  The two-part test for assessing a s. 15(1) 
claim as described in Kapp is as follows: “(1) Does the law create a distinction based on an 
enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating 
prejudice or stereotyping?”1228  With respect to the first stage of the analysis, the Supreme Court 
stated that “provided that the claimant establishes a distinction based on one or more enumerated 
or analogous grounds, the claim should proceed to the second step of the analysis.  This provides 
 
1221 Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, “Courting Confusion? Three Recent Alberta Cases on Equality 
Rights Post-Kapp” (2010) 47 Alta. L. Rev. 927 at para.6 (QL).  
1222 Kapp, supra note 1217. 
1223For example, see  Koshan & Hamilton, supra note 1216. 
1224 Koshan, supra note 1215 at 41. 
1225 Ibid at 41. 
1226 Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 at para 1, [2011] 1 SCR 396 [Withler]. 
1227 Ibid at para 4. 
1228 Ibid at para 30. 
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the flexibility required to accommodate claims based on intersecting grounds of 
discrimination.”1229 The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the Reduction Provisions at issue 
in this case were age-related; and they constituted an obvious distinction on an enumerated 
ground.1230 At the second stage of the analysis, factors such as those developed in Law — pre-
existing disadvantage, correspondence with actual characteristics, impact on other groups and the 
nature of the interest affected — may be helpful but need not be expressly canvassed in every 
case in order to fully and properly determine whether a particular distinction is 
discriminatory.1231  The heart of the issue is “whether, having regard to the relevant context, the 
impugned law perpetuates disadvantage or prejudice, or stereotypes the claimant group.”1232 
However, because the age-based rules are, overall, effective in meeting the actual needs of the 
claimants and in achieving important goals such as ensuring that retiree benefits are meaningful, 
they do not violate s. 15(1).1233    
For the purpose of my case study, the most relevant aspect of Withler is the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the comparator analysis. The acknowledgement of the problems associated 
with comparator group figures prominently in the decision: “. . . A formal equality analysis based 
on mirror comparator groups can be detrimental to the analysis.  Care must be taken to avoid 
converting the inquiry into substantive equality into a formalistic and arbitrary search for the 
“proper” comparator group.”1234 Further, “the analysis involves looking at the circumstances of 
members of the group and the negative impact of the law on them.  The analysis is contextual, 
not formalistic, grounded in the actual situation of the group and the potential of the impugned 
law to worsen their situation.”1235  The inquiry should take “full account of social, political, 
economic and historical factors concerning the group.”1236 Despite these seemingly encouraging 
paragraphs, the judgment actually did not address an obvious fact about the claimants: they were 
 
1229 Ibid at para 63. 
1230 Ibid at para 69. 
1231 Ibid at para 66. 
1232 Ibid at para 70. 
1233 Ibid at para 74. 
1234 Ibid at para 2. 
1235 Ibid at para 37. 
1236 Ibid at para 39. 
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predominantly older widows. Other than criticizing the B.C. Court of Appeal’s dissent opinion, 
the Supreme Court did not conduct any contextual analysis regarding the claimants.1237     
The Supreme Court’s continued focus on prejudice and stereotyping rather than on a 
broader range of harms of discrimination, such as marginalization, oppression and deprivation of 
significant benefits is problematic.1238 The law is often neutral on its face and rarely singles out 
women or men for differential treatment.1239 The troubling aspect here is the fact that the 
inequalities the claimants face flow from laws that fail to take their needs and circumstances into 
account.1240 As I will show later in this dissertation, the problems with many legal protections 
pertaining to those in caring relationships is that the law rarely considers their specific needs and 
circumstances, which result from an “intermeshing”1241 of gender, disability, age, immigration 
status and other grounds, as factors that contribute to the realization of these protections. 
7.2.2 Marital status and claim for patrimonial and support rights 
In Quebec (Attorney General) v A, the applicant (A) challenged the constitutionality of 
several provisions of the Civil Code of Québec in order to obtain the same legal regime for de 
facto spouses that existed for married spouses.1242  More specifically, the Supreme Court was 
asked to decide whether the exclusion of de facto spouses from patrimonial and support rights 
granted to married and civil union spouses violated the right to equality guaranteed by s. 15 of 
the Charter.1243 The majority of the Supreme Court ultimately did not find A’s arguments to be 
persuasive.1244  
 
1237 Ibid at para 80; Koshan & Hamilton, supra note 1215 at 57–58. 
1238 Koshan, supra note 1215 at 32–33. 
1239 Kimberly Potter, “The Role of Choice in Claims under Section 15 of the Charter: The Impact of Recent 
Developments in Section 7 Jurisprudence” (2016) 35:2 NJCL 181 at 184. 
1240 Koshan, supra note 1215 at 33. 
1241 Thomas, supra note 96. 
1242 Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5 at para 6, [2013] 1 SCR 61. A and B separated after living together 
for a total of seven years. In 2002, A filed a motion in the Quebec Superior Court seeking custody of the children, 
support, a lump sum, use of the family residence, a provision for costs and an interim order. A also challenged the 
constitutionality of several provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec. When the matter finally reached the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the only unresolved aspect of the matter was the constitutionality of the impugned provisions. 
Other issues (such as child support and custody) were resolved in the lower courts.  
1243 Ibid at para 1. 
1244 This is a complicated decision. While the majority agreed that the impugned provision violated s.15(1), Abella J 
was the only justice who argued that the impugned provisions could not be saved by s.1. The Chief Justice stated 
that the impugned provisions could be saved by s.1. Deschamps, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. concluded that only 
the exclusion of de facto spouses from support is not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.   
235 
The issue from this case that is of particular relevance to this research is the notion of 
choice.1245 It was stated by the then Chief Justice that the Quebec law falls within a range of 
reasonable alternatives for maximizing choice and autonomy in the matter of family assets and 
support.1246 When she applied the s.15 framework to A’s claim, McLachlin C.J (as she then was) 
explained:  “In its effect, the Quebec scheme denies separated de facto partners important 
protections that it accords to separated married and civil union partners, despite the fact that they 
may not have meaningfully exercised a choice of regime.  It is reasonable to infer from this, 
subject to a full analysis of the relevant contextual factors, that the law that denies them these 
protections treats them as less deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”1247 However, at 
the s.1 analysis stage, she concluded that the objective of the law, which is to promote choice and 
autonomy for all Quebec spouses with respect to property division and support”, is sufficiently 
important to justify an infringement of the right to equality.1248 When applying the minimum 
impairment test, she agreed that availability of judicial recourse for de facto spouses would 
obviously be less impairing of their equality right than the Quebec regime. However, she noted 
that there would be a trade-off in diminished choice and autonomy.  In the Quebec scheme, 
partners choose whether to opt into the mandatory regime and have the discretion to manage 
their independence if they do not opt in. If judges were allowed to make orders that would limit 
those choices, individuals who thought they were free to structure their affairs would find 
themselves bound by judicially imposed obligations.1249  
In contrast, Abella J (dissenting in result) took the position at the section 1 analysis stage 
that “[t]he harm of excluding all de facto spouses from the protection of the spousal support and 
family property regimes is clearly profound.”1250In her view, the analysis should recognize 
protection “of those spouses for whom the choices to marry are illusory and who are left 
economically vulnerable at the dissolution of their relationship.”1251 Further, “the salutary impact 
of the exclusion . . . is the preservation of de facto spouses’ freedom to choose not to be in a 
 
1245 More generally on the topic of choice in judicial decisions see Young, supra note 1011; Potter, supra note 1239; 
Koshan, supra note 1215.  
1246 Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, supra note 1242, at para 447. 
1247 Ibid at para 426. 
1248 Ibid at paras 435 and 437. 
1249 Ibid at para 445. 
1250 Ibid at para 377. 
1251 Ibid at para 376. 
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formal union. . .  this freedom would be equally protected under a presumptive scheme.  Those 
for whom a de facto union is truly a chosen means to preserve economic independence can still 
achieve this result by opting out.”1252 
The prioritization of an idealized version of choice over equality1253 – a constitutional 
guarantee – is puzzling and troubling. In contrast to s.7 cases such as PHS Community Services 
Society,1254 Bedford1255 and Adams,1256 where the respective governments’ arguments about 
choice were not successful, the Supreme Court found the Quebec government’s reliance on the 
notion of choice in the justification of impairing equality to be persuasive.1257  I am not calling 
for an end to the preservation of choice and autonomy, rather, that “the context in which those 
choices are exercised”1258 must be scrutinized carefully. In particular, it is argued by Potter, that 
equality is a pre-condition for the exercise of choice.1259 My position is that meaningful exercise 
of choice is denied to those who are excluded from the protection of substantive equality. 
Without advancing substantive equality concurrent with initiatives to promote choices in care, it 
is unlikely that autonomy in decision-making can be fostered for those who experience the 
effects of “intermeshing” (to use the terminology of Carol Thomas) of gender, disability and 
other grounds. As Chapter 9 will show, some residents and their families are not able to exercise 
choices with respect to accommodation, despite the rhetoric of choice in the LTC sector.   
7.2.3 Disability and autonomy in assisted dying   
The last case is the 2015 Supreme Court of Canada decision Carter v. Canada (Attorney 
General),1260 which was about Criminal Code provisions that prohibited the provision of 
assistance in dying in Canada. This meant that a person could not legally seek the option of a 
 
1252 Ibid at para 379. 
1253 Potter, supra note 1239 at 188. 
1254 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society 2011 SCC 44, supra note 1011. 
1255 Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, supra note 1012. 
1256 Victoria (City) v Adams, 2009 BCCA 563. 
1257 Koshan, supra note 1215 at 38. 
1258 Potter, supra note 1239 at 181. 
1259 Ibid. 
1260 Carter, supra note 1007. The appellants are Lee Carter, Hollis Johnson, William Shoichet, British Columbia 
Civil Liberties Association and Gloria Taylor. Gloria Taylor was diagnosed with a fatal neurodegenerative disease, 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (or ALS). Lee Carter and Hollis Johnson, who had assisted Ms. Carter’s mother in 
achieving her goal of dying with dignity by taking her to Switzerland to use the services of an assisted-suicide clinic. 
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physician-assisted death.1261 The Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions infringed s. 7 
of the Charter and are of no force or effect to the extent that they prohibited physician-assisted 
death for a competent adult who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life and (2) has a 
grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that 
causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her 
condition. The declaration of invalidity was suspended for 12 months.1262  
This decision is important in terms of understanding how the Court interprets autonomy 
in the context of health care decision-making. It should be stressed that the Supreme Court was 
careful to point out the diverse views about autonomy in relation to the assisted dying debate 
since Rodriguez.1263 The Supreme Court maintained that liberty and security rights deal with 
concerns about autonomy and quality of life.1264 Liberty protects the right to make fundamental 
personal choices free from state interference while security of the person involves control over 
one’s bodily and psychological integrity free from state interference.1265  The law has long 
protected patient autonomy in medical decision-making.1266 This is how the Supreme Court 
explained autonomy in medical decision-making: 
. . . An individual’s response to a grievous and irremediable medical condition is a 
matter critical to their dignity and autonomy. The law allows people in this 
situation to request palliative sedation, refuse artificial nutrition and hydration, or 
request the removal of life-sustaining medical equipment, but denies them the 
right to request a physician’s assistance in dying. This interferes with their ability 
to make decisions concerning their bodily integrity and medical care and thus 
trenches on liberty.1267  
This case is also significant for our purpose because the Supreme Court declined to opine 
on the s.15 part of the claim.1268 David Lepofsky argues that disability equality should have been 
the judicial focus of this case.1269 The Carter claimants contended that because of their 
 
1261 Ibid at para 5. 
1262 Ibid at paras 127–128. 
1263 Ibid at paras 6, 10 and 59. 
1264 Ibid at paras 62 and 64. 
1265 Ibid at para 64. 
1266 Ibid at para 67. 
1267 Ibid at para 66. 
1268 Ibid at para 93. 
1269 David Lepofsky, “Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), The Constitutional Attack on Canada’s Ban on Assisted 
Dying: Missing an Obvious Chance to Rule on the Charter’s Disability Equality Guarantee” (2016) 76 SCLR(2d) 89 
at 91. 
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disabilities they would not be able to end their own lives and needed help to carry out that 
wish.1270 Lepofsky asserts that prior to Carter, the Supreme Court had failed to explore disability 
equality violations in R. v. Swain and Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General).1271 
Lepofsky’s critique of Carter also relates to his (and other disability scholars’1272) 
disappointment concerning the realization of disability rights in general: “The Supreme Court of 
Canada has made some great pronouncements about the Charter’s disability equality guarantee. 
Yet governments too readily disregard them. Consequently, the lives of Canadians with 
disabilities are full of accessibility barriers, many of which are a government responsibility. All 
violate the Charter / human rights statutes.”1273  
Carter may indicate the Supreme Court’s willingness to engage in Charter analysis of 
state interferences with an individual’s ability to make decisions concerning their bodily integrity 
and medical care. The problem for LTC residents is that some of the interferences such as the use 
of physical and chemical restraints and confinement (see Chapter 6), are more likely to be 
disability-related. The government’s justification is grounded in the need to protect vulnerable 
persons and those around them. It is not clear if the Supreme Court will be willing to accept 
arguments that are based on the relationship between liberty and equality.1274 For LTC residents, 
the “totality of their lived reality”1275 may need to be brought forward by claims that engage both 
s.7 and s.15. 
7.2.4 Summary  
To recap, the rights of residents that are created by various statutes must be considered in 
relation to the equality guarantee of the Charter as all laws must comply with the Charter. For 
many legal scholars, the post-Kapp legal landscape is not promising for equality-seeking groups. 
Although the cases discussed above do not involve LTC residents, they can illuminate a few 
important concepts related to the discussion below, including autonomy and choices. 
Governments have found courtroom success in defending their own characterizations of the 
 
1270 Ibid. 
1271 Ibid at 95–97. 
1272 Mary Ann McColl et al, “People with Disabilities and the Charter: Disability Rights at the Supreme Court of 
Canada Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2016) 5:1 Canadian Journal of Disability Studies 183. 
1273 Lepofsky, supra note 1269 at 109. 
1274 For example, see Sheldon, Spector & Perez, supra note 14. 
1275 Ibid at 232. 
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purposes of statutory schemes in s.15 cases, for example, by using a decontextualized notion of 
choice. These cases and their legal commentaries show that legal expression of substantive 
equality may not provide better prospects for challenging systemic discrimination in the s. 15 
context and is unlikely to generate systemic changes in the LTC sector.  
7.3 Autonomy in receiving care (decision and execution) 
This section is intended to build on the discussion about care in Chapter 5 by explaining 
how individual residents exercise control over decisions about their own admission to or being 
confined in LTC, medical treatments, personal care and property matters. To understand why 
some residents may not be able to decide or influence their own care, it is important to address 
how law recognizes autonomy in making health care decisions. As Joan Gilmour explains, the 
law’s strong support for an individual’s right to autonomy is not extended to everyone. In 
particular, people with disabilities, seniors and minors are most at risk of being deprived of the 
power and authority to make their own decisions about health care.1276 Recall that autonomy is a 
concept that has attracted criticisms from Nedelsky and Herring (see Chapter 2). At the core of 
their work is the concept of the “relational self”. In consent and capacity law, the relational 
context in situations where a person lacks or may lack capacity (a term to be defined below) is 
frequently at the forefront of legal and factual analysis. The concept of the relational self allows 
me to focus on consent and capacity law issues that are most pertinent to the lives of LTC 
applicants and residents.  The insights of Nedelsky and Herring will also help us understand how 
relationships may affect a person’s ability or inability to exercise autonomy in practice (see 
Chapter 9).    
This section will begin by unpacking some of the policy and legal considerations around 
autonomy in decision-making,1277 followed by an overview of changes to consent and capacity 
law in Ontario.  The law has not changed significantly – the elements of informed consent 
remain the same but there are some procedural changes that may be relevant to LTC residents 
 
1276 Joan Gilmour, “Legal Capacity and Decision Making” in Joanna N Erdman, Vanessa Gruben & Erin Nelson, 
eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, fifth ed (Toronto, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada, 2017) 351 at 352. 
1277 I should note that for reasons of space, I exclude other relevant legal devices such as parens patriae for in-depth 
discussion. Parens Patriae  refers to the state's responsibility to protect persons who are deemed incapable of 
protecting their own interests by reason of their particular personal characteristics. Margaret Hall, “The 
Vulnerability Jurisdiction: Equity, Parens Patriae, and the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (2016) 2 Can J Comp 
& Contemp L 185; Sheldon, Spector & Perez, supra note 14 at 203. 
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and potential applicants to LTC, including substitute decision-makers.  The professional 
guidelines will also be referenced as they guide the conduct of health care providers at the point 
of care. This section will end with a discussion about human rights cases involving LTC 
residents, which will add some nuances to the discussion about autonomy in decision-making 
when disability is engaged. 
7.3.1 Achieving a balance between autonomy and protection  
My starting point is to unpack the concept of “capacity” because as the Law Commission 
of Ontario argues, it is foundational to the law related to decision-making.1278 The concept of 
capacity is associated with autonomy because capacity is “intimately tied to the ability to make 
independent decisions and take responsibility for their consequences.”1279 For Clíona de Bhailís, 
the right to legal capacity “encompasses both the ability to be the holder of rights (including 
legal standing) and the ability to be an actor in law (legal agency) … this can be categorized as 
the right to make decisions which have legal consequences and to have those decisions respected 
by the law.”1280 The threshold test that must be met to establish capacity varies depending on the 
context.1281  
Law governing involuntary committal and capacity and consent matters attempts to 
balance individual rights against the interest of the state. Citizens have certain rights to liberty, 
autonomy and self-determination and the state also has the right as well as obligations to protect 
the safety of the community and to protect incapable individuals from self-harm, exploitation by 
others or unnecessary suffering.1282 Ontario’s attempt to achieve an appropriate balance between 
these competing interests and rights is evident in the four inter-related statutes that govern 
involuntary committal, capacity and consent matters: the Mental Health Act, Health Care 
Consent Act, 1996, Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, and the Personal Health Information 
 
1278 Law Commission of Ontario, Discussion Paper: Legal Capacity, Decision Making and Guardianship (Toronto: 
Law Commission of Ontario, 2014) at 4. 
1279 Ibid. 
1280 Clíona de Bhailís, “Theoretical framework for the VOICES Project” in Eilionóir Flynn et al, eds, Global 
Perspectives on Legal Capacity Reform: Our Voices, Our Stories (Abingdon, Oxon ; Routledge, 2019) 1 at 1. 
1281 Gilmour, supra note 1276 at 353. 
1282 D’Arcy Hiltz & Anita Szigeti, A Guide to Consent and Capacity Law in Ontario, 2017 edition. ed (Markham: 
LexisNexis, 2017) at xiii. See also Jane Meadus & Mary Jane Dykeman, Health Care Consent and Advance Care 
Planning in Ontario: Legal Capacity, Decision‐Making and Guardianship (Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 
2014) at 32. 
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Protection Act, 2004.1283 All four statutes engage individual liberty and autonomy; the intent is to 
enhance autonomy and self-determination as much as possible while using the principle of 
minimal restrictions on liberties. Since the principle of fundamental justice must be adhered to, 
all four statutes are replete with procedural safeguards, checks and balances.1284 It should be 
emphasized that even when a person is no longer capable, the intent of the law is to maximize 
personal autonomy for the incapable person by allowing for prior expressed wishes, values and 
beliefs to guide substitute decision-making.1285 These statutes are of general application, so the 
discussion below is not limited to LTC applicants or residents but as I will show in Chapter 9, 
capacity issues are much debated in the LTC sector. 
The general principle in consent and capacity law is that capable people have the right to 
take risks, whereas incapable people have the right to informed decision-making by others based 
on their prior capable wishes or best interests. Capable individuals enjoy decision-making 
autonomy in the broad areas of “property”, “treatment/placement”, “detention”, and “personal 
health information” regardless of the wisdom of the choices.1286 More importantly, we are all 
presumed to be capable in these areas.1287 However, the state owes us a duty to protect our 
interests and those of the community if and when we become sufficiently incapacitated that we, 
or others, are at serious risk of harm. The law is about setting out the circumstances wherein 
others can take over making important decisions on behalf of incapable persons and detailing the 
protections afforded to incapable persons.1288 Guardianship, as a legal option, should only be 
used as a last resort; indeed, the Substitute Decisions Act specifically prohibits court appointment 
 
1283 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at xiii to xiv. For a more comprehensive background on Ontario’s history 
regarding guardianship and related issues, see Israel Doron, From Guardianship to Long -Term Legal Care: Law 
and Caring for the Elderly (D.Jur., York University (Canada), 2000) [unpublished]. 
1284 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at xiv. 
1285 Hall, supra note 1004 at 16. See also Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Mental Health, “II. Consent and 
Capacity, 4. Substitute Consent, (4) Hierarchy of Substitute Decision-Makers (a) General” at HMN-41 "Overview" 
(2019 Reissue). 
1286 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at 1. See also CD Freedman, “Misfeasance, Nonfeasance, and the Self-
Interested Attorney” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 457, para 26. 
1287 Health Care Consent Act, supra note 490, s 4; Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 30, s 2. 
1288 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at 1. For a history on the old concept that a public obligation of some kind is 
owed to persons whose processes of thought and mind are seen to create or exacerbate vulnerability see Margaret 
Isabel Hall, “Dementia, Decision-Making, and the Modern (Adult) Guardianship Paradigm: Bentley v. Maplewood 
Seniors Care Society” (2015) 1 Can J Comp & Contemp L 293. 
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of a guardian if less restrictive alternatives exist.1289 Procedural safeguards enshrined in other 
legislation, such as the Statutory Powers Procedures Act which applies to Ontario tribunals 
including the Consent and Capacity Board,1290 are also relevant to the protection of incapable 
persons.     
7.3.1.1 Health Care Consent Act: decisions about LTC admission, confinement to 
a care facility, medical treatments and personal care    
The Health Care Consent Act, 1996 largely codifies the common law. It also codifies 
principles of assessing capacity. Further, it establishes a framework for substitute decision-
making, including a hierarchy of substitute decision-makers and rules applicable for consenting 
to or refusing treatment, personal assistance services, admission to or confinement in LTC.1291 
The Consent and Capacity Board, which adjudicates a variety of matters under a number of 
statutes, is also established by the Health Care Consent Act.1292 A quick clarification about the 
structure of the Health Care Consent Act is in order. The Health Care Consent Act is divided 
into six parts dealing with, among other subjects, legal tests for capacity to make health care 
decisions, treatment, admission to care facilities and personal assistance services. Each type of 
decision has its own part, which covers common topics such as decisions on behalf of incapable 
persons and application to the Consent and Capacity Board. It should be noted that the LTC 
admission provisions mirror the treatment provisions, with some differences.1293 Similarly, the 
personal assistance services provisions mirror the treatment provisions, with differences in the 
decision-making by substitute decision-maker.1294 
The role of the concept of best interests in substitute-decision making is important for my 
research. The concept of best interests highlights how the law regulates the complex interplay of 
relational selves and need for protection.  The hierarchy of substitute decision-makers1295 
indicates that most of the time, substitute decision-makers have continuing relationships with the 
incapable person (such as spouses, parents, children and siblings). Other types of relationships 
 
1289 Capacity Assessment Office, Guidelines for Conducting Assessments of Capacity (Toronto: Ministry of the 
Attorney General, 2005) at I.3. 
1290 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at 593–597; Statutory Powers Procedure Act, RSO 1990, c. S.22, s 3(1). 
1291 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at 165. 
1292 Health Care Consent Act, supra note 490 at Part V. See also Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at 198. 
1293 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at 192. 
1294 Ibid at 197–198. 
1295 Health Care Consent Act, supra note 490, s 20. 
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between the incapable person and public institutions are created by law, such as the appointment 
of the Public Guardian and Trustee as guardian. A person who gives or refuses consent on an 
incapable person’s behalf for his or her admission to a care facility must be in accordance with 
prior capable wishes.1296 If there are no prior expressed capable wishes expressed, then the 
person must act in the incapable person’s best interests.1297  In deciding what the incapable 
person’s best interests are, the following must be considered: 
 the values and beliefs that the person knows the incapable person held when capable and 
believes he or she would still act on if capable; 
 any prior capable wishes expressed by the incapable person with respect to admission to a 
care facility that are not required to be followed;  
 Whether admission to the care facility is likely to improve the quality of the incapable 
person’s life, prevent the quality of the incapable person’s life from deteriorating, or 
reduce the extent to which, or the rate at which, the quality of the incapable person’s life 
is likely to deteriorate; 
 whether the quality of the incapable person’s life is likely to improve, remain the same or 
deteriorate without admission to the care facility; 
 whether the benefit the incapable person is expected to obtain from admission to the care 
facility outweighs the risk of negative consequences to him or her; and 
 Whether a course of action that is less restrictive than admission to the care facility is 
available and is appropriate in the circumstances.1298    
One could interpret from the above discussion that the law assumes a family member or 
friend appointed through a substitute-decision making process is best placed to: 1) know the 
individual's "prior intentional states" (i.e., reference to “values and beliefs” in s. 42(2)(a) of the 
Health Care Consent Act) and to effect the decision that the incapable person would have made 
if able to do so;1299 2) determine other factors that contribute to the determination of the best 
interests of the incapable person, such as the quality of life of the incapable person.  
 
1296 Ibid, s 42(1)1. 
1297 Ibid, s 42(1)2. 
1298 Ibid, s 42(2). 
1299 Margaret Hall argues that pursuant to modern guardianship paradigm, the assumption is that persons generally 
make decisions like those they have made in the past, the substitute is able to maintain the identity of the incapable 
individual by perpetuating this kind of consistent decision-making. Hall, supra note 1288 at 296–301. 
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7.3.1.2 Substitute Decisions Act, 1992: decisions about property and personal 
care   
The Substitute Decisions Act governs what may happen when someone is not mentally 
capable of making certain decisions about their own property or personal care (health care, 
accommodation, safety, nutrition, hygiene and clothing).1300 Similar to the law regarding consent 
to health care, “[g]uardianship laws continue to grapple with the competing values and interests 
of individual autonomy and self-determination vs. the best interests of the individual.”1301 The 
Substitute Decisions Act applies to both court appointed personal and property guardianship and 
to powers of attorney for personal care and otherwise.1302 The procedures to be followed depend 
on the type of decision the person is unable to make i.e., property or personal matters.1303 The 
Public Guardian and Trustee may also be appointed by the court as the guardian of an incapable 
person, if there is no one else willing, suitable, and available to take on the responsibility.1304 
For the purpose of this chapter, incapacity for personal care is particularly relevant. If the 
court makes an order for full guardianship of the incapable person, the guardian may have a wide 
range of powers, including powers to: 
 determine his or her living arrangements and provide for his or her shelter and safety;1305   
 on behalf of the person, make any decision to which the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 
applies;1306 and 
 make decisions about the person’s health care, nutrition and hygiene.1307 
There is overlap and similarity between the Health Care Consent Act and Substitute 
Decisions Act. The Substitute Decisions Act mandates the guardian to make decisions to which 
the Health Care Consent Act applies in accordance with that Act.1308 For decisions to which the 
 
1300 Ministry of the Attorney General, A Guide to the Substitute Decisions Act (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 2000) at 2. 
1301 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Mental Health, “II. Consent and Capacity 1. Overview of Consent and 
Capacity” at HMN-108 "Overview" (2019 Reissue). 
1302 Hall, supra note 1004 at 22. For a history of power of attorney, see C.D. Freedman, supra note 1286. 
1303 Ministry of the Attorney General, supra note 1300 at 2. 
1304 Ibid at 6. See also C.D. Freedman, supra note 1286 at para 26. 
1305 Substitute Decisions Act, supra note 1287, s 59(2)(a). 
1306 Ibid, s 59(2)(e). 
1307 Ibid, s 59(2)(e.1). 
1308 Ibid, s 66(2.1). 
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Health Care Consent Act does not apply, if the guardian does not know of a wish or instruction 
applicable to the circumstances that the incapable person expressed while capable, or if it is 
impossible to make the decision in accordance with the wish or instruction, the guardian must 
make the decision in the incapable person’s best interests.1309 In deciding what the incapable 
person’s best interests are, the guardian must consider factors such as the values and beliefs that 
the guardian knows the person held when capable and believes the person would still act on if 
capable.1310 
7.3.1.3 Amendments to the Health Care Consent Act and Substitute Decisions 
Act between 2004 and 2018 
To briefly recap the legislative developments in this period, I did not note any 
fundamental changes to consent and capacity law outside of the Mental Health Act.1311 Similarly, 
I found no significant developments in common law either, except for the few cases noted here. 
With respect to the Health Care Consent Act, the key provisions about consent and 
capacity with respect to treatment have not changed: these include elements of informed 
consent,1312 presumption of capacity,1313 principles for giving or refusing consent on behalf of an 
incapable person,1314 application of review of finding of incapacity.1315 The changes that did 
occur were the result of other legislative initiatives: Personal Health Information Protection Act, 
2004,1316 Regulated Health Professions Statute Law Amendment Act, 2009 (Bill 179),1317 Good 
Government Bill 2009 (Bill 212)1318, the Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, and more recently, 
Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients Act, 2017 (Bill 160).1319 In what follows, I 
will first address the more substantive changes specific to LTC residents and then other types of 
changes.  
 
1309 Ibid, s 66(3). 
1310 Ibid, s 66(4)(a). 
1311 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at 289–291. 
1312 Health Care Consent Act, supra note 490, s 11. 
1313 Ibid, s 4(2). 
1314 Ibid, s 21. 
1315 Ibid, s 32. 
1316 Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, SO 2004, c 3, Sched A. 
1317 Regulated Health Professions Statute Law Amendment Act, 2009, SO 2009, c 26. 
1318 The author was involved in Bill 212. 
1319 Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients Act, 2017, supra note 625. Schedule 5 of Bill 160 
includes amendments to the Health Care Consent Act. This Schedule comes into force on a day to be named by 
proclamation of the Lieutenant Governor (see s.70 of Bill 160). I am assuming the amendments will be proclaimed.  
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Similar to the Health Care Consent Act, the Substitute Decisions Act1320 was amended by 
a number of omnibus bills. In addition, the capacity assessment regulation1321 and the Guidelines 
for Conducting Assessments of Capacity1322 have been updated also. None of these changes were 
major changes for residents or their substitute decision-makers.  They were more procedural in 
nature and did not fundamentally change the existing ways of dealing with incapacity and its 
legal consequences. 
7.3.1.4 Highlights of the statutory amendments and case law  
The developments in law are intended to ensure due process and procedural fairness and 
can be grouped into the following themes. First, the jurisdiction of the Consent and Capacity 
Board was clarified. Second, more checks and balances were introduced into the capacity 
evaluation process. Third, how substitute decision makers give or refuse consent was clarified. 
Fourth, minor procedural changes were made to the consent process.  
Jurisdiction of the Consent and Capacity Board  
The first set of changes concerned the jurisdiction of the Consent and Capacity Board. 
The Health Care Consent Act was amended to clarify that the Consent and Capacity Board 
cannot adjudicate on constitutional issues.1323 In Ontario (Attorney General) v. Patient, the 
Attorney General applied for judicial review of a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board in 
which the Board held that it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the constitutional validity of 
its enabling legislation.1324 The Superior Court concluded that the majority of the Consent and 
Capacity Board erred in law in holding that the Board had implied jurisdiction to deal with 
questions of law arising from the impugned provisions of the Mental Health Act and was 
therefore presumed to have jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of those 
provisions.1325 The Superior Court stated that the legislature in this case had ensured that patients 
have an expedited opportunity to have their Charter rights addressed by a court.1326 In 2006, the 
 
1320 Substitute Decisions Act, supra note 1287. 
1321 Capacity Assessment, O Reg 460/05. 
1322 Capacity Assessment Office, supra note 1289. 
1323 Health Care Consent Act, 1996, supra note 490, s 70.1(1). 
1324 Ontario (Attorney General) v Patient, 2005 CanLII 3982 (ON SCDC) at para 1, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 697. 
1325 Ibid at para 7. 
1326 Ibid at para 53. 
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Health Care Consent Act was amended to clarify that the jurisdiction of the Consent and 
Capacity Board does not include the consideration of constitutional questions.1327  
The Supreme Court of Canada decision Cuthbertson v. Rasouli1328 is the most recent 
decision about Ontario’s statutory scheme (i.e., Health Care Consent Act) to deal with a dispute 
between next of kin and physicians over consent regarding life support and other forms of 
medical treatment for incapable patients.1329 Writing for the majority, McLachlin C.J. stated: “. . 
. The simple fact is that appropriate medical care at the end of life, including palliative care, is 
closely tied to the withdrawal of life support.”1330Provision of palliative care requires consent: 
““Treatment” is “anything that is done” for one of the enumerated purposes (therapeutic, 
preventive, palliative, diagnostic and cosmetic) or “other health-related purpose”.  Under the 
HCCA, only acts undertaken for a health-related purpose constitute treatment, and therefore 
require consent.”1331 The Supreme Court confirmed that withdrawal of life support constitutes 
treatment requiring consent under the Health Care Consent Act.1332 However, the Supreme Court 
was careful to point out that this case does not mean consent is required under the Health Care 
Consent Act for withdrawals of other medical services or in other medical contexts.1333 
Further, McLachlin C.J noted: “[i]n summary, the HCCA contemplates disputes between 
physicians and substitute decision-makers over the care of incapable patients, and provides for 
their resolution by the Board, an independent, quasi-judicial body with specialized jurisdiction 
over matters of consent to medical treatment.”1334   The Supreme Court explained the role of the 
Consent and Capacity Board as follows: “Bringing its expertise to the issue, the Board’s 
decisions may be expected to bring consistency and certainty to the application of the statute, 
thereby providing essential guidance to both substitute decision-makers and health care providers 
 
1327 This was amended as part of the Good Government Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 19. See the explanatory note of the 
Bill.  
1328 Cuthbertson v Rasouli, 2013 SCC 53, [2013] 3 SCR 341. Mr. Rasouli was unconscious and on life support. The 
physicians responsible for Rasouli’s care believed that he was in a persistent vegetative state. In their opinion, 
continuing life support would not provide any medical benefit to Rasouli and may cause harm. They sought to 
remove his life support and to provide palliative care until his expected death. Ms. Salasel, Rasouli’s wife and 
substitute decision-maker, refused to provide her consent. 
1329 Ibid at para 2. 
1330 Ibid at para 67. 
1331 Ibid at para 37. 
1332 Ibid at para 76. See also Meadus & Dykeman, supra note 1282 at 49-50. 
1333 Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, supra note 1328 at para 70. 
1334 Ibid at para 28. 
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in this difficult area of the law.”1335 According to Hiltz and Szigeti, this case has had a profound 
impact on litigation of end of life cases, encouraging greater use of the Consent and Capacity 
Board as the forum where substitute decision-making processes may be reviewed..1336  
Capacity evaluation process   
In both the Health Care Consent Act and the Substitute Decisions Act, there are 
provisions about evaluating or assessing capacity. Another significant change with respect to 
health care consent concerns assessment of capacity by an evaluator, which may lead to 
substitute decision-making. An evaluator1337 must now provide information about consequences 
of findings of incapacity regarding admission to LTC, personal assistance and confining to a care 
facility to a person found incapable in accordance with guidelines established by the governing 
body of the evaluator’s profession.1338  Previously the requirement to provide information about 
the consequences of findings of incapacity was only applicable to a finding of incapacity 
regarding treatment decision.1339 All the regulatory colleges surveyed address the issue of finding 
of incapacity, but their respective guidelines are slightly different. The College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Ontario and College of Dietitians of Ontario direct their respective members to 
inform the client of the right to appeal the finding of incapacity to the Consent and Capacity 
Board for review if the client disagrees with the finding of incapacity.1340 The College of Nurses 
of Ontario stipulates that nurses are professionally accountable for helping clients understand the 
information relevant to making decisions to the extent permitted by the client’s capacity. If there 
is an indication that the client is uncomfortable with the finding of incapacity, or objects to the 
choice of substitute decision-maker, then the nurse informs the client of his/her options to apply 
to the Consent and Capacity Board for a review of the finding of incapacity, and/ or for the 
appointment of a representative of the client’s choice.1341  
 
1335 Ibid at para 103. 
1336 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at xi. 
1337 Health Care Consent Act, supra note 490, s 2. See also EVALUATORS, O Reg 104/96. Evaluation of capacity 
may be made “evaluators” entitled to make such determination, such as physicians, social workers, nurses and 
psychologists.  
1338 Health Care Consent Act, supra note 490, ss 47.1, 54.11, 62.1. 
1339 Ibid, s 17. This provision has been in place 1996. 
1340 College of Dietitians of Ontario, supra note 918 at 82. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, supra 
note 813 at 7. 
1341 College of Nurses of Ontario, Practice Guideline: Consent (Pub. No. 41020) (Toronto: College of Nurses of 
Ontario, 2017) at 3 and 9. 
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Assessments of legal capacity are undertaken under the Substitute Decisions Act in 
situations where, in order to protect an individual from personal or financial harm, it may be 
appropriate to change his / her legal status or to restrict his/her legal rights.1342 Under the 
Substitute Decisions Act, only a qualified assessor can conduct assessments of capacity for 
purposes such as creating a statutory guardianship.1343 According to the Ministry of the Attorney 
General, the Substitute Decisions Act “creates the opportunity for a standard assessment protocol, 
which reduces bias and introduces consistency in the way that mental capacity assessments are 
conducted.”1344 The regulation governing assessors under the Substitute Decisions Act was also 
updated in 2005; Ontario Regulation 460/05 replaced Ontario Regulation 293/96. The rules 
concerning assessors have been modified to make assessments more professional by introducing 
a new continuing education requirement1345 and requiring a minimum annual number of 
assessments.1346 As well, the content of the qualifying course has been modified: instead of 
giving instructions about procedures for the conduct of capacity assessments, there will be 
instructions on best practices in completing forms and reports, and on standards for the 
performance of capacity assessments.1347 Other minor changes include clarification about 
liability insurance1348 and about which classes of nurses can perform capacity assessments.1349  
The key tenets and methodologies of capacity assessments are provided in the 2005 
Guidelines for Conducting Assessments of Capacity, which replaced the 1995 Manual for 
Capacity Assessments – Section R.1350 The highlights are as follows. The Guidelines emphasize 
procedural protections: for example, assessors have to explain the purpose of the assessment and 
the need for reviewing documentation.1351 An assessor has to make a determination of whether 
 
1342 Capacity Assessment Office, supra note 1289 at I.1. 
1343 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282. 
1344 Capacity Assessment Office, supra note 1289 at I.1. 
1345 O Reg 460/05, supra note 1321, s 5(1). 
1346 Ibid, s 6. 
1347 Ibid, ss 4(a)2 and 3. 
1348 Ibid, s 2(1)(e). The new regulation clarifies that the $1million liability insurance requirement is satisfied if the 
assessor belongs to an association that is specified in the by-laws of the regulated health profession of which the 
assessor is a member, and  provides protection against professional liability, in respect of assessments of capacity, in 
an amount not less than $1M.  
1349 Ibid, s 2(2)5. The new regulation just allows Registered Nurses and Registered Nurses (Extended Class) to 
perform assessments.  The old regulation allowed Registered Practical Nurses to conduct assessments (see Ontario 
Regulation 293/96, s 1(1.1)5. 
1350 Capacity Assessment Office, supra note 1289 at iii. 
1351 Ibid at III.1. 
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the person’s decisions or actions are reasoned, not whether the decisions or actions are 
reasonable.1352 The Guidelines provide an explanation as to how capacity (as a socio-legal 
concept) has evolved over time.1353 A medical condition or disability does not mean 
incapacity.1354 Part VII of the Guidelines addresses special populations: the elderly, Focal 
Neurological Disorders, The Psychiatrically Disabled and People with Intellectual Disabilities. 
This part addresses disability, including intellectual disability, from various perspectives and 
includes special considerations and implications for each special population.  Some examples of 
the considerations are as follows. Past experience of institutionalization will affect how a person 
may react to the assessor.1355 Family members do not necessarily want rights or autonomy for the 
disabled person.1356 The assessor must be alert to bias and prejudice against disabled people.1357 
It should be noted that the Guidelines also address the intersection of aging and disability.  In 
particular, it is suggested that various deficits do not mean incapacity.1358 
The more recent Consent and Capacity Board decisions and the handful of appellate level 
cases can shed light on the importance of procedural fairness for individuals who may be 
incapable. Since the 1997 decision Re Koch,1359 which was the first consideration of consent and 
capacity issues with respect to admission to LTC, the Consent and Capacity Board and the courts 
have pondered what types of procedural safeguards are necessary and the consequences if the 
process is somehow tainted.  The overarching theme is that some protections and due process 
rights must be afforded to individuals when the implications of determinations of capacity have 
such fundamental impact on the liberty of the person.1360 In the cases reviewed, procedural 
fairness played a critical role in the Board’s or the court’s decision about an evaluator’s finding 
of incapacity. For example, in MN (Re):  
 
1352 Ibid at II.4. 
1353 Ibid at II.1. 
1354 Ibid at Part VII. 
1355 Ibid at VII.10. 
1356 Ibid. 
1357 Ibid at VII.9. 
1358 Ibid at VII.2 to VII.5. 
1359 Koch (Re), 1997 CanLII 12138 (ON SC), [1997] 33 OR (3d) 485; [1997] OJ No 1487 (QL). The appellant 
suffered from multiple sclerosis and was separated from her husband. The husband made a complaint about his 
wife's capacity. The appellant appealed from the Consent and Capacity Board's findings that she was incapable of 
managing her affairs and incapable of consenting to placement in a care facility. The appeal was allowed. 
1360 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at 196. 
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However, the Health Care Consent Act is replete with provisions designed to 
protect the legal rights of the individual and provides for due process where those 
rights are to be protected. Procedural fairness, like natural justice, is impliedly, 
however, required by the statute, since the end result for the individual is a denial 
of his or her fundamental rights to make one’s own choices in life. That right of 
the individual places an onus on the capacity assessor or evaluator to establish 
that the process of evaluation or assessment was procedurally fair.1361  
In these decisions, the Board or the court was critical of certain aspects of the processes that led 
to the hearing (in other words, capacity assessment), including detailed notes or documentation 
of the process i.e., completeness of the evidence,1362 whether the evaluator informed the patient 
of the consequences of a finding of incapacity,1363 and how the evaluator reached his/her 
conclusion in particular whether the evaluator started with the presumption of capacity.1364 The 
Board was also critical of an evaluator who misunderstood the legal test for capacity.1365 By the 
same token, the Board or court also took note when an evaluation was done properly.1366 The 
rules can be summarized as follows. The individual must be informed of the fact that a capacity 
assessment for the purpose of LTC admission is going to be undertaken, the purpose of the 
assessment and the significance of a finding of incapacity.  The individual must be informed as 
soon as a decision to assess capacity is made as well as on an on-going basis.1367   
Giving consent by capable person or substitute decision-maker  
In 2017, the Health Care Consent Act was amended mainly to provide for rules with 
respect to confining in a care facility, including rules for who may give consent to confining on 
behalf of an incapable person, and respecting reviews by the Consent and Capacity Board.1368 
These amendments are consequential amendments to the provisions in the LTCHA about 
restraining and confining residents, which I addressed in Chapter 6. More specifically, because 
 
1361 MN (Re), 2010 CanLII 70783 (ON CCB) at 11. 
1362 FK (Re), 2013 CanLII 73956 (ON CCB). see also Ibid. 
1363 AB (Re), 2004 CanLII 34873 (ON CCB). 
1364 FK (Re), supra note 1362; RTC (Re), 2007 CanLII 20001 (ON CCB).  
1365 C (Re), 2005 CanLII 57860 (ON CCB). 
1366 AM (Re), supra note 570. 
1367 Hiltz & Szigeti, supra note 1282 at 196. See also Saunders v Bridgepoint Hospital, 2005 CanLII 47735 (ON 
SC). 
1368 Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients Act, 2017, supra note 625. See explanatory note of 
Schedule 5 of the Bill.  
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the concept of “confining in a care facility” has to be incorporated,1369 the Health Care Consent 
Act had to be amended throughout so that the application of the Act is extended beyond 
treatment, admission to LTC, and personal assistance services to include “confining in a care 
facility”. The most significant change is the addition of a new part (Part III.1 Confining in a Care 
Facility).  The steps of consenting to confinement are basically the same as other types of 
decisions, but a few requirements are important to note. It is made clear that the common law 
duty of a caregiver to confine a person when immediate action is necessary to prevent serious 
bodily harm to the person or to others continues to apply, and therefore the home does not 
necessarily have to wait 48 hours or until any appeal is disposed of.1370 The majority of the 
changes involve striking out “admission to a care facility”, and substituting “admission to or 
confining in a care facility” so they are not necessarily substantive. For example, one of the 
purposes of the Health Care Consent Act has been updated to state: “to permit intervention by 
the Public Guardian and Trustee only as a last resort in decisions on behalf of incapable persons 
concerning treatment, admission to or confining in a care facility or personal assistance services” 
[my emphasis].1371 As well, the 2007 amendments were never proclaimed so the provisions 
unrelated to the secure unit provisions have to be reintroduced. For example, one of the new (but 
never proclaimed) requirements in the 2007 amendments was that the person responsible for 
authorizing admission must take reasonable steps to ensure that the incapable person’s admission 
is only authorized when the substitute decision-maker has given consent in accordance with the 
Act. Previously the Health Care Consent Act stated consent may be given or refused on the 
incapable person’s behalf by his or her substitute decision-maker in accordance with the Act.1372  
Procedural changes  
The Health Care Consent Act was amended to introduce procedural changes. The 
Consent and Capacity Board now has four business days to release its reasons for a decision after 
 
1369 Confinement is not a completely new concept in the Health Care Consent Act. See s.7: “This Act does not affect 
the common law duty of a caregiver to restrain or confine a person when immediate action is necessary to prevent 
serious bodily harm to the person or to others.” Also, s.59(3) states that “the person shall not give consent on the 
recipient’s behalf to the use of confinement, monitoring devices or means of restraint, unless the practice is essential 
to prevent serious bodily harm to the recipient or to others, or allows the recipient greater freedom or enjoyment.”    
1370 Health Care Consent Act, supra note 490, s 54.10(6). 
1371 Ibid, s 1(f). 
1372 Ibid, s 40(1). It is amended by s.59 of Bill 160. 
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receipt of a request1373 instead of two days.1374 Further, there were changes related to arranging 
counsel for incapable persons. While the Consent and Capacity Board has always been able to 
arrange for legal representation for a person who is or may be incapable regarding treatment, 
admission to a care facility or a personal assistance service, the Consent and Capacity Board can 
now arrange legal representation for a person who is or may be incapable with respect to 
managing property.1375 The Consent and Capacity Board may direct Legal Aid Ontario - instead 
of the Public Guardian and Trustee Office or the Children’s Lawyer - to arrange for legal 
representation to be provided for the incapable person.1376   The Health Care Consent Act was 
further amended to include specific authority for an incapable person’s attorney or guardian of 
property to assess, review and challenge a solicitor’s bill under the Solicitors Act.1377 
The key changes to Substitute Decisions Act are as follows. There is a new requirement 
that the resigning statutory guardian of property or attorney under a continuing power of attorney 
or a power of attorney for personal care must provide an accessible copy of their notice of 
resignation to any entitled recipient who requests it in an accessible format. The accessible copy 
must also be provided if the guardian or attorney has reason to believe that the recipient needs an 
accessible copy. The guardian or attorney is also required to explain their resignation on request 
or if there is reason to believe that an explanation is necessary.1378 Further, previously, there were 
a number of requirements related to the Public Guardian and Trustee. The Substitute Decisions 
Act now places responsibility for enforcement on the applicant in the proceeding in which the 
assessment order is made, rather than on the Public Guardian and Trustee.1379 The Public 
Guardian and Trustee must reasonably believe a record relating to a person who is alleged to be 
incapable to be relevant to an investigation arising from the allegation in order to be entitled to 
have access to the record.1380 A duty is created for the Public Guardian and Trustee to provide 
notice of the access to the person alleged to be incapable, unless notice is not appropriate in the 
 
1373 Ibid, s 75(4). 
1374 This was amended by the Good Government Bill 2009, SO 2009, c 33. 
1375 Health Care Consent Act, 1996, supra note 490, s 81(1). 
1376 Ibid, s 81(1)(a).  
1377 Ibid, s 81(2.1). 
1378 Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, supra note 1287, ss 11(3), 4, 20(2)-(3). See the explanatory note of Bill 173. 
Jobs for Today and Tomorrow Act (Budget Measures), 2016, SO 2016, c 5. 
1379 Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, supra note 1287, s 81. 
1380 Ibid, s 83(1). 
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circumstances.1381  The court must not appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee as a guardian 
unless the application is accompanied by the Public Guardian and Trustee’s written consent to 
the appointment. 1382  Also, provisions about requiring the disclosure of certain categories of 
personal information about an incapable person to his or her guardian were added.1383    
In sum, this brief overview of the changes to the consent and capacity law above set the 
stage for understanding decision-making autonomy that residents may enjoy. They very much 
correspond to Herring’s comments: “. . . medical law is built around highly individualised 
concepts of what are people, what are bodies and what our rights are.”1384 The legal safeguards 
are created to enhance the protection of persons who appear to be of limited or marginal 
capacity. Sometimes problems may arise in determining the responsibilities and rights of those in 
caring relationships. As Nedelsky explains, relationships are not necessarily benign, and it is 
important to understand what kinds of relationships foster—and which undermine— autonomy 
and other core values.1385 This discussion on capacity also helps us understand how caring 
relationships may be factored into the lives of incapable LTC applicants and residents when 
decisions about property, treatment and LTC admission, including confinement, must be made. 
In Chapter 9, the exercise of these rights will be examined.     
7.3.2 Asserting Rights at the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario    
Sometimes decisions about treatment, LTC admission and property also engage other 
legislation. In Chapter 5, I discussed the recent changes to the Ontario Human Rights Code. Here 
I will describe three human right cases1386 involving LTC residents to illustrate some nuances 
around autonomous decision-making. I take no position with respect to the adjudicative facts in 
these cases. 
 
1381 Ibid, s 83(9). 
1382 Ibid, s 24(2.1). See Bill 190. Good Government Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 19. 
1383 Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, supra note 1287, ss 31.1, 59.1. See explanatory note of Bill 190. Good 
Government Act, 2006, supra note 1382. 
1384 Herring, supra note 112 at 186. 
1385 Nedelsky, supra note 248 at 39. 
1386 These three cases involve multiple decisions including interim decisions from the Human Rights Tribunal of 
Ontario. 
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7.3.2.1 Lack of capacity to conduct litigation and accessing tribunals  
Since capacity is domain-specific, it is possible to be competent in one domain but not 
others. The challenge for those who lack litigation capacity is the appointment of a litigation 
guardian if they want to assert their rights in more formal forums. This may be further 
complicated by the fact that they may have given power of attorney to others who do not act in 
their best interests to manage their affairs. In Romanchook v. Garda Ontario, the Human Rights 
Tribunal of Ontario was asked to decide “whether and when the Tribunal should use its powers 
to control its process to require the appointment of a litigation guardian for a party who may not 
be competent to make decisions about the litigation, and to disqualify a licensed member of the 
Law Society of Upper Canada from continuing to act as a party’s representative.”1387 It was 
alleged that the claimant, Mr. Romanchook, had not obtained placement at the LTC home of his 
choice because of a priority given to married couples.1388 Mr. Romanchook was represented by a 
paralegal, R.J. Potomski, at this proceeding. In an earlier court proceeding, the court declared 
that Mr. Romanchook was incapable of managing property and that the Public Guardian and 
Trustee was appointed guardian of property for Mr. Romanchook. Further, the court terminated 
the Power of Attorney of Robert Joseph Potomski and Norma Johns over the property of Mr. 
Romanchook.1389 The Consent and Capacity Board determined that Mr. Romanchook was 
capable of making treatment decisions regarding mental stimulation and socialization.1390 The 
Chair conducted a preliminary investigation into Mr. Romanchook’s capacity to make decisions 
about the litigation and found strong reasons to believe that he did not have capacity to conduct 
the litigation without a litigation guardian.1391 
One of the issues that was litigated at the proceeding was legal capacity. Citing a 1997 
decision Calvert (Litigation Guardian of) v. Calvert, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario 
stated that instructing counsel requires a relatively high level of competency.1392 “The capacity to 
instruct counsel involves the ability to understand financial and legal issues. This puts it 
 
1387 Romanchook v. Garda Ontario, supra note 986 at para 1. There were six applications filed by the paralegal and 
the Tribunal ordered them to be heard together. See also Tess Sheldon & Ivana Petricone, supra note 978 at 48–49. 
1388 Romanchook v. Garda Ontario, supra note 986 at para 3. 
1389 Ibid at para 21. 
1390 Ibid at para 13. 
1391 Ibid at paras 50–51. 
1392 Ibid at para 36. 
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significantly higher on the competency hierarchy.”1393  The conduct of court litigation on behalf 
of incapable parties is governed by comprehensive schemes contained in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Rules of the Small Claims Court. Both Rules define a person under a 
disability to include a person or party who is “mentally incapable within the meaning of section 6 
or 45 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 in respect of an issue in the proceeding, whether the 
person or party has a guardian or not.” Both sets of Rules require that, with limited exceptions, a 
proceeding must be commenced, continued or defended on behalf of a person under a disability 
by a litigation guardian. The courts have powers to appoint, remove, and substitute litigation 
guardians in certain circumstances, and, in particular, to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee 
or Children’s Lawyer as litigation guardian. Courts must approve settlements and give leave 
(permission) for discontinuances. For proceedings under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
litigation guardian must be represented by a lawyer.1394 Also, courts of inherent jurisdiction (in 
Ontario the Superior Court of Justice) have parens patriae jurisdiction to make orders to protect 
children and others under legal disabilities.1395  
The gap, as pointed out by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, is that the Tribunal has 
no parens patriae jurisdiction and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, which addresses 
tribunals’ procedural powers, contains no provisions regarding proceedings on behalf of children 
or individuals who are not legally capable of conducting litigation on their own behalf: “In our 
contemporary justice system, in which many important decisions that affect the lives of 
individuals are often made by administrative tribunals and not courts, this is a significant, and in 
my view, unfortunate, gap.”1396  The results are as follows:1) the Tribunal’s proceedings were 
suspended unless and until a litigation guardian is appointed or there is new evidence that Mr. 
Romanchook was competent to make decisions about the litigation; 2) R.J. Potomski was 
disqualified from acting as representative for Mr. Romanchook or as his litigation guardian.; 3) If 
no party communicates with the Tribunal in one year, the Applications may be dismissed as 
withdrawn.1397 
 
1393 Ibid at para 59. 
1394 Ibid at para 37. 
1395 Ibid at para 38. 
1396 Ibid at para 39. 
1397 Ibid at para 68. 
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7.3.2.2 Executional autonomy and disability  
Sometimes a LTC resident may require assistance to execute his / her decision because of 
a disability. As Boyle argues, the decisional autonomy of older disabled people may be ignored 
or overridden because they lack the ability to execute their decisions.1398 But the question is to 
what extent others must assist the disabled person to execute his / her decision. In 
TenBruggencate v. Elgin (County), the application was filed by the son (Roeland) of a LTC 
resident (Albert TenBruggencate) against the home (institutional respondent) and the medical 
director (personal respondent).1399 The applicant told nursing staff at home that a specialist in 
Chinese medicine and acupuncture was recommending that the applicant’s father take some 
homeopathic drops including Pimpinella (an over-the-counter medication) to help alleviate his 
cough. The applicant’s father could not self-administer this medication because of his physical 
disabilities. However, nursing staff were not permitted to administer any medication without a 
physician’s order.1400 The home’s medical director maintained that Chinese medicine was 
outside the scope of his practice and that he did not have sufficient knowledge about Pimpinella 
to order this treatment for the applicant’s father.1401 The applicant submitted that the LTC home 
was his father’s home and that he should be able to take over-the-counter medications if he so 
wishes, as he would be able to if he was living in a private home.1402 It was alleged that the 
respondents have a duty to assist him. The refusal of the respondents to do so would constitute 
discrimination based on disability.1403 The respondents principally argue that administering a 
herbal remedy is not a service the respondents provide to anyone.1404 
The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissed the application as there was no prima 
facie case of discrimination. Further, the Vice-Chair stated that even if the applicant’s allegations 
were accepted to be true, he did not find that the refusal to administer Pimpinella to the 
applicant’s father constitutes discrimination based on disability.1405 Specifically, the Vice-Chair 
 
1398 Boyle, supra note 154 at 303. 
1399 TenBruggencate v. Elgin (County), supra note 987 at para 2. The respondents were the County of Elgin as it 
operated the LTC home and the medical director of the home. 
1400 Ibid at paras 3, 6. 
1401 Ibid at para 4. 
1402 Ibid at para 16. 
1403 Ibid at para 6. 
1404 Ibid at para 7. 
1405 Ibid at para 11. 
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found the physical disabilities of the applicant’s father were not a factor in the medical director’s 
decision.1406 With respect to the institutional respondent, the policy requiring a doctor’s order for 
residents to self-administer over-the-counter medications can be said to restrict the “rights” of 
residents to take over-the-counter medications. However, under this policy everyone is expected 
to have a doctor’s order in order to self-administer medications. With a doctor’s order, the 
respondents would assist the applicant’s father in administering the Pimpinella.1407 Further, this 
was not a case of adverse impact discrimination.1408 In sum: “ . . . that the service that the 
respondents provide in this regard is medical treatment when ordered by a doctor. I do not see a 
positive obligation on the respondents’ part to provide a service beyond this established policy 
and practice by being required to assist the applicant’s father in self-administering a medication 
he wishes to take. . . ”1409 
7.3.2.3 Challenges of family members as advocate for disabled resident  
The last group of decisions also concerns a LTC resident who may lack capacity in 
making certain decisions.  The most troubling aspect of these decisions is that the disabled 
resident in question may have experienced discrimination in accessing services, but her relative 
(daughter) was not able to make a case (or cases) without counsel. The daughter clearly lacked 
understanding of disability as a ground of discrimination and of the Tribunal’s process. This 
resulted in the disabled resident being involved (unwillingly) in a series of Tribunal decisions 
that unavoidably exposed her private information, such as health records.  
By way of background, the applicant (Ms. Gan) was a LTC resident and was non-verbal, 
non-mobile and completely dependent on others for all activities of daily living.1410 She was 
being fed through a gastrostomy feeding (“G feeding”) tube.1411 Ms. Gan and her daughter (Ms. 
He) have had a history of difficulties with the LTC care home.1412 It appears that the cases can be 
traced to an incident involving the daughter (Ms. He) being removed from the home because Ms. 
 
1406 Ibid at para 27. 
1407 Ibid at para 29. 
1408 Ibid at para 31. 
1409 Ibid at para 34. 
1410 Public Guardian and Trustee v Gan et al, 2014 ONSC 2145 at para 3. 
1411 Gan v Sergeant Gowan, 2013 HRTO 2080 (CanLII) at para 10. 
1412 Ibid. 
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He removed the feeding tube with Ms. Gan’s consent but without the home’s permission.1413 Ms. 
He complained to a number of bodies, including the College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Ontario and Toronto Police, about this incident. Then Ms. Gan and Ms. He made a variety of 
allegations of discrimination with respect to goods, services and facilities against several 
respondents, including the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, Toronto Police, and 
the LTC home.1414 It should be noted that in a separate proceeding, the Superior Court refused to 
allow Ms. He to be Ms. Gan’s guardian of the person and appointed the Public Guardian and 
Trustee as the guardian.1415 Due to space constraints, instead of summarizing all the cases, I will 
only highlight a few pertinent legal points.  
For the allegation against the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, the issue 
was whether the respondent infringed Ms. Gan’s right to equal treatment without discrimination 
by refusing to allow her to file a complaint about a doctor because of disability.1416 The vice-
chair found that: 
Ms. He misinterpreted Mr. Bellefontaine’s [the College’s investigator] words that he 
used to explain his inability to obtain the applicant’s consent for the release of medical 
information. I find that Mr. Bellefontaine reasonably understood that it was Ms. He who 
filed a complaint against the doctor on her mother’s behalf, that he reasonably understood 
that the applicant was unable to provide consent for the release of her medical 
information, and that he reasonably understood that Ms. He could provide consent 
because she was the applicant’s next-of-kin. The respondent obtained Ms. He’s consent 
and processed the complaint filed by her against the doctor treating the applicant. There 
was no evidence at the hearing to establish that Mr. Bellefontaine was aware that Ms. He 
wanted her mother recognized as the complainant.1417 
For the case against a Toronto Police Sergeant, it was claimed that the respondent 
discriminated against Ms. Gan by failing to take action in relation to a complaint letter she had 
signed.1418 In brief, the letter (signed by Ms. Gan) stated that Ms. He had disconnected her G 
feeding tube with her consent. Also, by asking her daughter to leave the home’s premises, the 
 
1413 Ibid at para 11. 
1414 Gan v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, supra note 988. As of August 17, 2018, there are at least 13 
decisions related to Ms. Gan and her daughter, Ms. He.  Ms. He filed parallel applications along Ms. Gan’s 
applications with similar allegations. Some applications were about discrimination on the basis of creed. All Human 
Rights applications were dismissed.  
1415 Ibid at para 4. See also Public Guardian and Trustee v. Gan et al., supra note 1410. 
1416 Gan v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, supra note 988 at para 8. 
1417 Ibid at para 43. 
1418 Gan v. Sergeant Gowan, supra note 1411 at para 1. 
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police were assisting the home to breach the LTCHA. The letter quoted a section of the Act that 
provides, among other things, that every resident has the right to receive visitors of their choice. 
The letter also stated that, due to their actions, the home and the police had discriminated against 
the Ms. Gan because of disability.1419 The Vice-Chair found that the allegation had no reasonable 
prospect of success:  
. . . The issue is whether there is any information from which the Tribunal could 
reasonably conclude that the applicant’s disability was a factor in the respondent’s 
decision not to deal with her complaint. In my view, there is not. I find that the applicant 
has provided no information from which the Tribunal could reasonably infer that her 
disability tainted the respondent’s judgment regarding the scope of the police’s power to 
intervene in this case.1420  
… 
there is no basis on which the Tribunal could reasonably find that the respondent’s 
actions constituted a reprisal under the Code. . . 1421 
In sum, these Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario cases raise questions about the 
underlying tensions inherent in on the one hand respecting the desires and preferences of LTC 
residents (or their representatives), and on the other recognizing the support, including enabling 
relationships, required by residents. First, when LTC residents require assistance to execute their 
decisions because of their disabilities, others may not be obligated to assist them, and such 
refusal is not necessarily discrimination. Second, the state has a duty to ensure that the legal 
system (in this case, the human rights tribunal) is accessible to hear any allegations of right 
violations, including from those whose capacity, including legal capacity, may be in question. At 
the same time, there must be safeguards (such as those provided by the Rules of Civil Procedures 
for court proceedings) to protect those who may be incapable from their relatives, representatives 
and people in their lives generally, so that they are not subject to unnecessary litigations that only 
benefit their relatives (for example, financial gains). The Health Care Consent Act prescribes the 
principles for giving or refusing consent by substitute decision-makers1422 and provides for 
application to the Consent and Capacity Board to determine compliance with such principles.1423 
Outside of the issues covered by the HCCA, the safeguards are hit and miss. Last but not least, 
 
1419 Ibid at para 11. 
1420 Ibid at para 19. 
1421 Ibid at para 20. 
1422 Health Care Consent Act, 1996, supra note 490, s 21. 
1423 Ibid, s 37. 
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while the claimants in these cases were disabled, they were not necessarily completely incapable 
with regard to all decisions. These claimants were not assisted by counsel at their respective 
hearings. One could ask how much support they received (if any) in making decisions about 
these applications.  
7.3.3 Summary  
In this section, I have considered how law is used to protect the autonomous individual in 
decision-making. Our law is predicated on the belief that capable individuals are free to make 
unwise choices. Substitute decision-making is available to protect us when we become incapable 
in specific domains. Legal safeguards are in place to ensure individuals are not unnecessarily 
denied opportunities to make decisions concerning healthcare, financial and personal matters. 
Human rights claims can be initiated to address discrimination as a form of barrier to 
autonomous decision-making. Being attentive to the relational context of persons who may lack 
capacity in one or more domain gives us insights as to why autonomy in decision-making is not 
always possible. More procedural safeguards have been introduced to respond to the need for 
protection of individual autonomy in situations where caring relationships may be detrimental to 
the exercise of autonomy without interventions from the state, for example, by rejecting an 
incapacity finding at the Consent and Capacity Board. The problem is that the law is silent on 
promoting caring relationships so that individuals can exercise their autonomy.       
7.4 How do residents (as a group) and their families and friends 
influence the activities within homes?  
Respecting the autonomy of LTC residents requires a variety of legal and non-legal 
responses. Thus far I have examined how individuals (not just LTC residents) may be able to 
enjoy autonomous decision-making in specific domains. But living in a communal setting comes 
with restrictions (as previous chapters have demonstrated) and compromises. In Chapter 5, I 
described how residents may exercise control at point of care, such as maintaining a resting 
routine or meal choices. With this in mind, I turn to the more specific mechanisms that are 
available to LTC residents – individually and collectively – in order to reflect the notion that the 
LTC home is primarily the home of residents. Formal and informal caregivers also have access 
to participation mechanisms that allow them to influence certain activities within homes such as 
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quality improvement initiatives. More importantly, I believe that participation mechanisms have 
the potential to reconcile dependence and autonomy in caring relationships in LTC.  
The participation mechanisms described here will be analyzed using insights from the 
New Governance literature. Recall that participation is an important principle in the New 
Governance literature, and scholars have debated about incorporating traditional legal 
approaches to promote accountability, while using New Governance approaches to stimulate 
innovation and collaboration.1424 There have always been formal (legally mandated) and 
informal mechanisms enabling residents and their families and friends to have some role to play 
in the homes. In recent years, “patient”, client or family engagement is the buzz word in the 
health care system, usually in the context of promoting quality care. Using examples of New 
Governance approaches, I have argued elsewhere that the changes brought by the LTCHA since 
2010 are about strengthening existing or creating additional processes and procedures for 
participants – homes, residents, families, advocacy groups, industry organizations and 
government - to problem-solve challenges in the sector.  One could view these approaches as 
recognition that while state involvement continues to be necessary in the governance of LTC, 
participants in the sector need to play a more active role in problem-solving – arguably in an 
attempt to broaden the scope of possible solutions and changes that could be implemented in the 
sector.1425 By acknowledging and promoting residents’ capacity for problem-solving, we can 
make space for residents – even those with profound disabilities - to express autonomy 
collectively. This section is a more comprehensive review of changes to the inclusion and 
participation mechanisms in LTC. I will add more nuances to my claim in Chapter 9. To do so, I 
will first discuss the Residents’ Councils and Family Councils, which are autonomous bodies in 
LTC homes empowered by law. Then I will explain other participation mechanisms – of various 
degrees of legal formality - that are intended to promote problem-solving at the home level. 
 
1424 Alexander, supra note 339. 
1425 Poland Lai, “How New Governance Shapes Changes in the Long-Term Care Sector in Ontario, Canada” (2015) 
20:1 The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal Article 4. 
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7.4.1 Residents’ Councils  
The establishment of Residents’ Council has become mandatory under the LTCHA.1426 
Under the Nursing Homes Act, a Residents’ Council was optional: if three residents, substitute 
decision-makers, or persons selected by residents made a request then the home was obligated to 
assist in terms of logistical support and was required to advise the Ministry.1427 The Program 
Manual stated that residents were to be given the opportunity and supports to establish and 
maintain an organized Residents' Council.1428 In absence of a Residents’ Council, the home was 
required, at least once a year, to convene a meeting of residents and substitute decision-makers to 
advise them of their right to establish a Residents’ Council and then notify the Ministry of the 
results of the meeting.1429  This annual general meeting also provided an opportunity for 
residents, families and representatives to express suggestions or concerns and for the facility to 
report on the status of services in the facility.1430  
The Residents’ Council’s membership has also changed. Under the Nursing Homes Act, 
the substitute decision-maker or someone designated by the substitute decision-maker could also 
be a member of the Residents’ Council.  As well, the Minister was authorized to appoint 
members to the Residents’ Council.1431  Under the LTCHA, only residents of the home can be 
members of the Residents’ Council.1432 
The scope of the powers of the Residents’ Council has not changed significantly. There 
are two new powers under the LTCHA: Residents’ Council may sponsor, plan and collaborate 
with community groups and volunteers activities for residents.1433There are broader powers to 
advise and make recommendations about operations to the home.1434 Homes also have an 
obligation to respond in writing to such concerns or recommendations within 10 days of receipt 
(instead of the 21 days required by the Nursing Homes Act).  The Residents’ Council may report 
 
1426 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 56(1). 
1427 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 29. Reg 832, supra note 831, ss 73(6)(a)-(c). 
1428 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0902-01, page 7. 
1429 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 29(3). 
1430 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0902-01, page 7. 
1431 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 29(5). 
1432 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 56(2). 
1433 Ibid, ss 57(1)4-5.  
1434 Ibid, ss 57(1)6-7.  
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to the Ministry’s Director of LTC program (rather than to the Minister under the Nursing Homes 
Act) about its concerns.1435  
7.4.2 Family Councils  
Family Councils have always existed as well, but they are now legally recognized in the 
LTCHA. The Nursing Homes Act did not contain any reference to Family Councils, but the 
Program Manual made references to Family Council and Family advisory organizations.1436 
Under the LTCHA, if there is no Family Council, a family member or person of importance to a 
resident may request the establishment of a Family Council.1437  The home must then assist and 
notify the Director within 30 days of the establishment of the council.1438 Subject to exceptions 
allowed in the LTCHA, a family member or person of importance (for example, a friend or a 
significant other) to a resident has the right to be a member of the Family Council. A person can 
no longer be a member of the Family Council after the death or transfer of the resident, unless 
the person is a person of importance to another resident in the Home.1439  If there is no Family 
Council, the Home must advise residents’ families and persons of importance on an ongoing 
basis of their right to establish a Family Council and must convene semi-annual meetings to 
advise these persons of this right.1440 The powers of the Family Council are similar to those 
possessed by the resident council. The Family Council may: 
 provide assistance, information and advice to residents and their families, including the 
rights and obligations of residents, families and homes under the LTCHA; 
 attempt to resolve disputes between the Home and residents; 
 sponsor, plan and collaborate with community groups and volunteers regarding activities 
for residents; 
 advise and make recommendations to the home; and 
 review inspection reports, the home’s written plan for achieving compliance, financial 
statements and operations of the home.1441 
 
1435 Ibid, s 57(2). 
1436 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0902-01, page 10, 11, 14. 
1437 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 59. 
1438 Ibid, s 59(1)-(5). 
1439 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 4–3. 
1440 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 59(7)(b). 
1441 Ibid, s 60(1). 
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7.4.3 Home’s relationships with the Councils  
The relationship between the home and the Councils can be described in a number of 
ways. There are formal responsibilities, obligations and rights assigned to each party under the 
LTCHA. In general, they build on the requirements in the Nursing Homes Act and the Program 
Manual. At the same time, some requirements have been eliminated too.  For example, the home 
is no longer required to consult its residents to determine optional services to be made available 
to residents1442 nor to consult residents and families on the development of facility-specific 
admission agreement.1443 
Firstly, the home is expected to provide staffing support to the councils. Specifically, an 
assistant must be made available to the Residents’ Council1444 and may be available to the 
Family Council (if requested).1445 The council assistants must take instructions from the 
respective councils, ensure confidentiality where requested and report to the respective 
councils.1446 Under the previous regime, there was no obligation on the home’s part to appoint 
any assistant to assist the councils; however, the Minister had the authority to appoint a 
Residents’ Council assistant who would then take instructions from and report to the Residents’ 
Council.1447 Secondly, the home was always expected to co-operate with the councils and the 
respective assistants (if any).1448 The LTCHA imposes a duty on the home to consult regularly 
with the councils, or at least every three months, rather than merely requiring the administrator to 
hear suggestions or complaints from the Residents’ Council and to act on them where 
practicable, as was the case under the Nursing Homes Act.1449 The home must meet with the 
Residents’ Council or the Family Council if invited to do so.1450Thirdly, while the home has 
always been expected to respect the autonomy of the councils, under the LTCHA this 
expectation is more formalized in law. Attendance of home staff at Resident Council meetings 
 
1442 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0608-02, page 1. 
1443 Ibid at Tab 0902-01, page 9-11. 
1444 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 58(1). 
1445 Ibid, s 61(1). 
1446 Ibid, ss 58(2), 62(2). 
1447 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, ss 31(1)-(2). 
1448 Ibid, s 32(1). Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 62. 
1449 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 67. 
1450 Ibid, s 63. 
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was by invitation only1451 and this requirement now applies to meetings of both councils under 
the LTCHA.1452 The Nursing Homes Act also prohibited anyone from refusing a Resident 
Council assistant entry to the home or otherwise hindering, obstructing or interfering with a 
Residents’ Council assistant in carrying out his/her duties.1453 The Program Manual also directed 
the home to refrain from any involvement in the Residents’ Council’s commercial activities (e.g. 
fund-raising, craft sales and bazaars).1454  This has been replaced by more general non-
interference provisions in the LTCHA. Specifically, the home must not interfere with the 
meetings or operation of the councils, must not prevent a member of either Council from 
entering the Home to attend a meeting or performing any functions as a member, and must not 
hinder, obstruct or interfere with the member carrying out those functions. The home must not 
prevent a Council assistant from entering the home to carry out his or her duties or otherwise 
hinder, obstruct or interfere with the assistant in carrying out those duties.1455  
7.4.4 Resident and Family Participation in the Ministry’s Annual 
Inspections of Homes 
It should be noted that the Ministry is also mandated to engage Residents’ and Family 
Councils. For example, the Councils are involved in the Ministry’s enforcement and compliance 
activities. Under the new legal requirements, all LTC homes are subject to the Resident Quality 
Inspection (RQI), an annual unannounced comprehensive inspection that assesses residents’ 
satisfaction and homes’ compliance with legislative requirements (see Chapter 8).1456 Residents’ 
and Family Councils have a formal right to participate in the RQIs, and the LTCHA requires that 
Ministry inspectors meet with the Family and Residents’ Councils if they are willing to 
participate.1457 In other words, residents and families are co-regulating LTC homes in the sense 
that they contribute their expertise and knowledge to monitor their homes.     
 
1451 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 73(7). 
1452 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 64. 
1453 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 32(2). 
1454 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0603, page 5–6. 
1455 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 65(a)-(d). see also Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care, supra note 782 at 4–7. This requirement applies to those involved in the management or operation of the 
Home as well 
1456 Standing Committee on Public Account, Long-Term Care Home Quality Inspection Program (Section 3.09 of 
the Auditor General’s 2015 Annual Report) (Toronto: Legislative Assembly.  Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts, 2017). 
1457 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 145; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Inspection 
Protocol - Resident Council Interview (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2013); Ministry of Health 
267 
The table below summarizes the various features of both councils and indicates whether 
any of the features are new (in the sense of having not been included in the Nursing Homes Act):  
Table 23: Summary of the provisions related to Residents' Council and Family Council 
 Residents’ Council Family Council 
Establishment  Mandatory (new)   Home must assist if requested 
by a family member or 
person of importance (new) 
Scope of Powers  Expanded modestly 
(amended) 
Similar to Residents’ Council 
(new)  
Membership  Residents only (amended)  A family member of a 
resident or person of 
importance (for example, a 
friend or a significant other) 
to a resident (new) 
Council Assistant  Home must provide (new) Home must provide if 
requested (new) 
Council Meetings  General obligation that home 
must not interfere with the 
Council and staff must attend 
if invited (amended) 
General obligation that home 
must not interfere with the 
Council and staff to attend 
must be invited (new) 
Ministry inspector meetings 
with councils 
Yes  Yes 
 
 
and Long-Term Care, Inspection Protocol - Family Council Interview (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care, 2013). The procedures and processes for the inspector’s interviews with the respective councils are prescribed 
in the inspection protocols. 
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7.4.5 Other mechanisms to promote participation and inclusion   
In addition to formalizing the roles of the Family and Residents’ Councils, the LTCHA 
expanded or formalized a number of mechanisms to promote participation and inclusion: 
distribution and posting of information, development of the home’s mission statement, quality 
improvement and satisfaction surveys, quality improvement plans, immunity provisions and 
whistleblower protection. These mechanisms are available not just to residents, but also to their 
families and friends. They reflect the approaches advanced by New Governance scholars, in 
particular, participation of non-state actors; flexibility and non-coerciveness (softness in law); 
collaboration and collaborative process; decentralization; fallibility, adaptability and dynamic 
learning; and enforced self-regulation.1458  At the same time, they still retain characteristics of 
law and legal processes, such as rights.    
7.4.5.1 Distribution and posting of information 
The home has always been required to post information to ensure residents and others are 
aware of the services provided in the home, the rights and obligations of different parties and the 
government’s activities and relationship with the home. The only change under the LTCHA is 
that more information items have to be posted in the home. Examples of such items are the 
home’s mission statement, its zero tolerance of abuse policy, the duty to make mandatory 
reports, the minimization of use of restraints policy, the Ministry’s toll-free numbers, inspection 
reports from the past two years (rather than the most recent report), orders made by the Ministry 
and decisions from the Health Services Appeal and Review Board.1459 This is in addition to 
information posted on-line by the Ministry, such as inspection reports.1460 
7.4.5.2 Development of Mission statement  
Having a mission statement is a new concept in the LTCHA; it was not mentioned in the 
Nursing Homes Act or its regulation, but is based on the Program Manual, which required a 
statement of mission and a resident-focused service philosophy to guide the operation of the 
home. Long-term goals and short-term objectives must be developed to support the home's 
 
1458 Lobel, supra note 319. 
1459 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 79; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 225.  
1460 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “Find long-term care homes in Ontario”, (2019), online: 
<http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/public/programs/ltc/home-finder.aspx>. 
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mission statement.1461 Under the LTCHA, there must be a mission statement that sets out the 
principles, purpose and philosophy of care of the Home. The principles, purpose and philosophy 
of care set out in the mission statement must be put into practice in the day-to-day operation of 
the Home. Further, the Home’s mission statement must be consistent with the fundamental 
principle set out in section 1 of the LTCHA, and with the Residents’ Bill of Rights.1462 There are 
also more directions regarding the process of developing and revising the mission statement. The 
Program Manual simply required the mission statement to be developed and approved by the 
board/owner/governing body and reviewed, at a minimum, every three years.1463 In contrast, the 
LTCHA stipulates that the mission statement must be developed and revised as necessary, in 
collaboration with the Residents’ Council and the Family Council, if any. Further, staff and 
volunteers must be invited to participate in the development and revision of the mission 
statement. At least once every five years after a mission statement is developed, the home must 
consult with the Residents’ Council and the Family Council, if any, as to whether revisions are 
required, and must invite the Home’s staff and volunteers to participate.1464 
7.4.5.3 Continuous Quality Improvement and Satisfaction surveys 
The practice of conducting satisfaction surveys is not new in the LTC sector. Under the 
previous regime, a quality management system had to be developed and implemented1465 and 
there were requirements for regular monitoring of the satisfaction of residents and families1466 
and references to satisfaction questionnaires.1467  In contrast, under the LTCHA, the emphasis on 
participation is more prominent. Each home must develop and implement a quality improvement 
and utilization review system concerning the quality of the accommodations, care, services, 
programs and goods.1468 In addition, each home must conduct a satisfaction survey of residents 
and their families at least once a year. In developing and carrying out the survey, and in acting on 
 
1461 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1011-01, page 1. 
1462 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–6; Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 
425, ss 4(1), 4(2).2-6, 4(1)-(2). 
1463 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1011-02, page 1.  
1464 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 4; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 
at 2–6.  
1465 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 20.11. 
1466 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 128. 
1467 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1011-02, page 5. 
1468 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 84. 
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its results, homes must seek the advice of both the Residents’ and the Family Councils. 
Documentation about the survey and any actions taken must be made available to residents, 
families, Residents’ Councils and Family Councils. Homes must make every reasonable effort to 
act on the survey results and to improve their homes.1469    
7.4.5.4 Quality Improvement Plans 
As noted elsewhere in this dissertation, Health Quality Ontario is the provincial advisor 
on the quality of health care.1470 The Excellent Care for All Act 2010 and other accountability 
agreements require all public hospitals, primary health care organizations (e.g. family health 
teams), and LTC homes to create a Quality Improvement Plan every year. Each organization 
develops a plan including specific targets and actions that reflect the province’s health care 
improvement priorities, as well as the quality issues that are locally relevant.1471 2015-16 was the 
first year that the LTC sector was required to make annual submissions.1472 For LTC homes, the 
priority indicators are: prescribing of antipsychotic medications, falls, pressure ulcers, restraints 
use and urinary incontinence, Emergency Department visits and resident experience.  Homes 
may choose one or more of these indicators to work on.1473 It is evident that these indicators also 
correspond to the programs mandated by the LTCHA (see Chapter 5). To put it differently, one 
could argue that these indicators are also used to measure how effective the regulatory provisions 
are. I will return to this subject in Chapter 9. 
Homes are increasing their efforts to engage the Residents’ and Family Councils in 
quality improvement and the development of their Quality Improvement Plans.1474 In a memo to 
the health sector, Health Quality Ontario explains its expectation about engagement as follows:  
It has been impressive to see the increased engagement and involvement of patients and 
those with lived experience in quality improvement in Ontario, and the active 
measurement of patient experience. . . indicators related to patient/resident relations 
processes have been added for the hospital, home care, and long-term care sectors, 
 
1469 Ibid, s 85. 
1470 Health Quality Ontario, Insights into Quality Improvement: Long-Term Care: Impressions and Observations – 
2016/17 Quality Improvement Plans (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2017) at 2.Impressions, page 2 
1471 “Quality Improvement Plan Guidance”, online: <http://www.hqontario.ca/Quality-Improvement/Quality-
Improvement-Plans/Quality-Improvement-Plan-Guidance>. 
1472 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1470 at 7. 
1473 Ibid at 8. 
1474 Ibid at 6. 
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reflecting the important role of good patient relations programs on quality of care and 
patient experience.1475  
In the Quality Improvement Plan Guidance Document, the justification for engagement is to 
ensure that the Quality Improvement Plan includes targets and Quality Improvement activities 
that are meaningful to patients, clients, and residents. Further, Quality improvement plans are 
designed to create a system that provides care with patients/clients/residents rather than for them. 
Health sector organizations are encouraged to engage their communities through established 
formats, such as patient, resident and Family Councils; town halls; or focus groups.1476 Similarly, 
in a guidance document for patients and families, Health Quality Ontario explains why they 
should get involved in quality improvement: “You are an expert in your health experiences, and 
bring valued insights to the table. By taking part in quality improvement, you are using your 
experience to help fix a problem. Your voice can improve the health system for future patients 
and caregivers.”1477 A variety of resources has also been made available to address the 
techniques of engagement.1478 By way of example, Health Quality Ontario proposes a list of 
orientation and follow-up questions that patients and caregivers can ask of staff at their 
organizations. Also, Health Quality Ontario suggests some key points for patients and caregivers 
to consider when they are invited to review a Quality Improvement Plan that has already been 
written.1479    
Each year, Health Quality Ontario publishes a report that analyzes LTC Quality 
Improvement Plans across the province.  It should also be noted that Health Quality Ontario 
posts all Quality Improvement Plans on its website, along with statistics about the sector, such as 
wait times for LTC beds.1480   
 
1475 Health Quality Ontario, Annual Memo re 2018/19 Annual Priorities for Quality Improvement Plans (Novemebr 
27, 2017) (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2017). 
1476 Health Quality Ontario, Quality Improvement Plan (QIP) Guidance Document for Ontario’s Health Care 
Organizations (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2017) at 17. 
1477 Health Quality Ontario, Engaging with Patients and Caregivers about Quality Improvement A Guide for Health 
Care Providers (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2016) at 38. 
1478 Health Quality Ontario, “Patient Engagement Tools and Resources - Health Quality Ontario (HQO)”, online: 
<http://www.hqontario.ca/Engaging-Patients/Patient-Engagement-Tools-and-Resources>. 
1479 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1477 at 43–44. 
1480 Health Quality Ontario, “Long-Term Care Home Performance in Ontario - Health Quality Ontario (HQO)”, 
online: <http://www.hqontario.ca/System-Performance/Long-Term-Care-Home-Performance>. 
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7.4.5.5 Immunity provisions 
The immunity from actions or other proceedings offered to Residents’ Council members 
and Resident Council assistants has been expanded to Family council members and Family 
Council assistants, but the conditions have been changed. Under the Nursing Homes Act, 
protection would be available unless the act was done maliciously or without reasonable 
grounds. Under the LTCHA, no action or other proceeding can be commenced against a member 
of a Residents’ Council or Family Council, or a Residents’ Council assistant or Family Council 
assistant for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in his or her capacity as a member 
or assistant.1481 
7.4.5.6 Whistleblower protection  
Previously, legal protection from reprisals was offered to anyone who made a disclosure 
to an inspector, so long as the disclosure was made in good faith.1482  As well, there was limited 
protection for persons reporting various information to the Director at MOHLTC, such as harm 
to residents as a result of improper or incompetent treatment.1483  Expanded whistle-blowing 
protections have been included in the LTCHA to protect anyone from retaliation as a result of 
disclosing information to an inspector, making a report to MOHLTC, or providing evidence in a 
legal proceeding.  The definition of retaliation includes, but is not limited to: dismissing, 
disciplining or suspending a staff member; imposing a penalty upon any person; and 
intimidating, coercing or harassing any person.  More importantly, a resident cannot be 
discharged from a LTC home, threatened with discharge, or in any way be subjected to 
discriminatory treatment.  Further, no family member, substitute decision-maker, or person of 
importance to a resident shall be threatened with retaliation against the resident.1484 
The table below summarizes the changes to various participation mechanism under the 
LTCHA: 
 
1481 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 66. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 
782 at 4–6. 
1482 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, ss 24.3(1)-(2). 
1483 Ibid, ss 25(1)-(2). 
1484 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 26(1)-(3); Meadus, supra note 793. 
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Table 24: Summary of other mechanisms to promote participation under the Nursing 
Homes Act and the LTCHA and other means 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA and other means 
Distribution and posting of 
information  
Yes  Expanded  
Development of Mission 
Statement 
Yes  Formalized in law and more 
prescriptive in terms of 
process 
Continuous Quality 
Improvement and 
Satisfaction surveys 
Yes  Formalized in law and more 
prescriptive in terms of 
process 
Quality Improvement Plans None  New but by way of soft law 
Immunity for Councils  Yes  Expanded  
Whistleblower protection Yes  Expanded  
 
7.4.6 Summary  
This section has explained how residents, families and friends may participate in the 
operation of the home. I analyzed participation mechanisms from the perspective of reconciling 
dependency and autonomy. The Residents’ Council became mandatory under the new LTCHA. 
With powers and functions authorized by the LTCHA, Family Councils assume a more 
formalized role in LTC homes. There are additional mechanisms that could promote problem-
solving at the home level.  Working together, these participation mechanisms allow residents and 
their families to access more information relevant to the operation of the home, to have the 
means to communicate their concerns and suggestions to the home on a regular basis and to have 
the protected spaces in which residents and their families can collaborate with one another. If 
properly understood and implemented, these mechanisms could play an important role in 
correcting some of the power imbalances inherent in caring relationships.  
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Many of the mechanisms explained above are related directly or indirectly to quality of 
care—in particular, the notion of continuous quality improvement, which is formalized in law as 
a mandatory requirement.1485 The notion of “quality improvement” has always been a part of the 
LTC system; what varies is how formalized it is, whether resident and family participation is 
mandated, and protection available to those who speak up. Because annual health expenditure 
increases are expected to be modest in the foreseeable future (see Chapter 4), a cynical 
interpretation of these new (or enhanced) approaches might be to suggest that the government is 
simply looking for ways to improve the experience of residents and their families and friends 
that do not require additional government funding. While this could very well be the motivation 
of the government, it does not negate the fact that various forms of participation are occurring as 
part of the problem-solving process. As well, these approaches could simply be New Public 
Management techniques dressed up as “user involvement” and “empowerment”. In Chapter 9, 
the findings from my key informant interviews will help us decipher some of the practical 
implications of these approaches.   
The above is not a comprehensive analysis of inclusion and participation under the 
LTCHA. There are other additional mechanisms that are not exclusive to residents and their 
families and friends. These are designed to allow a broader range of stakeholders influence 
policy on LTC in Ontario, such as mandatory consultation on proposed regulation,1486 public 
consultation regarding licensing,1487 and complaints procedures.1488 They will be addressed in 
Chapter 8. 
7.5 Conclusion   
 
 
 
 
 
1485 The Excellent Care for All Act states that one of the functions of HQO is “to support continuous quality 
improvement”. See Excellent Care for All Act 2010, supra note 906, s 12(1)(b). 
1486 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 184. 
1487 Ibid, s 106. O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 273. 
1488 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 21–24. 
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Illustration 5: The three dimensions of participation and inclusion 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have sought to flesh out how different dimensions of inclusion 
and participation (see Illustration 5) matter from the perspective of promoting autonomy in LTC. 
The first dimension concerns the equality guarantee under s.15 of the Charter. It is important to 
remember that the purpose of s. 15 is to ensure equality in the formulation and application of the 
law.1489 The recent Supreme Court decisions – Withler, Carter, and Quebec (Attorney General) v 
A – illustrate how exclusion from a legal benefit or protection may be based on one or more 
enumerated or analogous grounds. The second dimension concerns an individual’s autonomy in 
decision-making in matters such as health care, property and personal matters. I have examined 
how the law protects a capable individual’s right to be free from unwanted interference.  The 
statutory scheme was outlined to explore the legal considerations in substitute-decision making. I 
have focused on the Health Care Consent Act but also attended to the issues of guardianship and 
powers of attorney under the Substitute Decisions Act. The human rights cases have been 
included to give us a glimpse of the ways in which LTC residents may or may not be able to 
execute their decisions. The third dimension concerns participation in the everyday activities in 
LTC homes. The emphasis has been on the participation and inclusion mechanisms that are 
mandated by hard law and soft law. Unlike the other two dimensions, which are about 
individuals, the third dimension also entails a collective component. Together, these new or 
formalized mechanisms allow LTC residents and their families and friends to have some 
 
1489 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143. 
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influence over the activities in their respective homes and to try to problem-solve issues that 
arise in the home. The significance is that acknowledging the problem-solving capacity of 
residents can potentially reconcile the tensions between dependency and autonomy. This inquiry 
is very timely as residents are admitted older and with more profound disabilities. Respecting the 
autonomy of residents requires drawing on criticisms of the concept of autonomy (such as those 
articulated by Herring and Nedelsky). The question of how these mechanisms are implemented 
on the ground is one to which I will return in Chapter 9. The next chapter will shift the focus to 
the structural issues inherent the sector (such as the size of the sector) and how law is implicated 
in those issues, which will contextualize the changes to the regulation of LTC discussed in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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8 Tensions in the state / citizen (consumer?) relationship 
8.1 Introduction 
In the context of care, the role of the state is an important area of contention.1490 In 
chapter 2, I made the case that there are follow-up questions about the nature and rationale of the 
state’s relationship with disabled citizens that need to be addressed. In previous chapters, I 
demonstrated how law articulates expectations about what care is and how it is supposed to be 
delivered. I also explained how caring relationships look and the different ways in which 
residents and the home may be connected, for example by formal and informal participation 
mechanisms. The goal in this chapter is to unpack some of the regulatory changes not directly 
related to hands-on care. Nonetheless, they create conditions that make care possible (or not) 
because they concern some of the structural issues of the sector, such as adequate public funding, 
equitable access, affordability, the oversight role of the government and the appropriate role of 
the market in delivering care. As well, the secondary objectives of social regulation,1491 such as 
economic efficiency and value for money in our case, are more apparent in the changes discussed 
in this chapter. It is important to identify these secondary objectives because they make the state 
/ citizen relationship more complicated. The state attempts to regulate caring relationships 
indirectly by creating legal constraints in relationships of those involved in care - from officers 
and directors of the home to suppliers.  These constraints acknowledge that certain business 
relationships or transactions (e.g. non-arms’ length transactions) matter because residents’  
experiences are shaped by “patterns of economic relationships”1492 and business law.        
The first section will demonstrate the ways in which the government attempts to deploy 
and privilege regulation in order to control access to the LTC sector while searching for ways to 
make the system financially sustainable (from the government’s perspective). I focus on the 
following areas of law: eligibility, admission and placement, affordability, and licensing of LTC 
homes. The second section will show the extent to which the state (in conjunction with other 
bodies) can intervene in order to protect residents from different forms of harm in care such as 
 
1490 Banerjee, supra note 301 at 213; Armstrong, Armstrong & Daly, supra note 163 at 52. 
1491 Windholz & Hodge, supra note 86. 
1492 Nedelsky, supra note 248 at 31. 
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abuse and to a much more limited extent, safety of workers. It will include both the coercive and 
the more informal and flexible means of intervention. The last section will concentrate on 
protection of residents as consumers, including corporate governance requirements and market-
like mechanisms. What I hope to illustrate is that from examining these regulatory changes, a 
number of tensions can be identified, which in turn are critical to understanding the implications 
of these changes.   
I argue that the state supports caring relationships by establishing LTC as a way to 
reallocate dependencies and protect those in caring relationships. There is certainly a sufficiently 
wide range of activities – from licensing of homes to restrictions on fees - that the state 
undertakes in order to make LTC available to those needing care. It is probably not controversial 
to say that the state’s responses recognize the consequences of dependencies for residents, their 
families, providers and the home.  The state’s responses highlight the legal and economic 
complexity in the LTC system.            
8.2 Capacity of the LTC sector: Control over demand and supply of 
beds  
This section will illustrate how the law has changed by examining examples of new 
requirements related to the purpose, scope, and capacity of the LTC system. Timely access to 
LTC depends on the availability and affordability of beds. In Chapter 4, I explained how the 
sector is funded and the distribution of for-profit, non-profit and municipal homes in Ontario. 
The level of government funding obviously directly affects the capacity of the sector to respond 
to those needing care. For economic reasons, the government also uses social regulation (see 
Chapter 2) to control the growth of the sector in terms of quantity of care. For example, rules are 
in place to ration available beds and prioritize certain residents over others i.e., who are more 
“deserving” of state support. This prioritization logic inevitably raises  difficult questions about 
how the state decides on questions of access to LTC beds. The affordability of beds is dependent 
on both the amount of public funds available and on restrictions as to how much homes are 
permitted to charge residents for accommodation. Rules governing affordability raise questions 
about the determination of individuals’ responsibility towards providing for their own care 
needs. The supply of beds is also controlled by the licensing system in the shadow of market 
forces explained in the feminist political economy literature.      
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8.2.1 Who are more "deserving" of state support? 
Recall that disability scholars such as Hughes, Soldatic and Meekosha have analyzed the 
logic of dividing, sorting and classifying bodies into distinct classes of the “deserving” and 
“undeserving” in the neoliberal capitalist state.1493 In Ontario, LTC applicants and residents are 
deemed as “really disabled” and “deserving of state welfare” by the application process but at the 
same time, have witnessed tighter and tighter resources in the LTC sector. Scholars have 
criticized the fact that in Canada, the number of beds has not kept up with the number of people 
defined as needing care, even though eligibility has become more and more restricted to people 
with complex health issues combined with dementia and little possibility for receiving care in 
their own homes.1494 In Chapter 4, I presented some of the statistics about wait times for LTC 
admission in order to provide a glimpse of the consequences of government decisions about 
rationing care. Here, I will consider how the law reflects the state’s responsibilities to those who 
are in caring relationships, and in particular, government responses to those who are considered 
to be “deserving”1495 of state support.   
One way to limit access to LTC is to control the demand for beds and guide applicants 
towards home or community-based services by establishing eligibility requirements. As of 
January 2019, MOHLTC provides access to LTC beds through the 14 LHINs, which manage the 
LTC admission and placement processes and access to other home and community care.1496  The 
underlying assumption is that a LTC applicant’s publicly-funded community-based services and 
other caregiving, support or companionship arrangements available to the person are not 
sufficient, in any combination, to meet the person’s requirements.1497 A standardized and 
centralized admission process is necessary to ensure that “only the most appropriate candidates 
for long-term care are prioritized for admission”.1498 The key steps for placing a client in a LTC 
home are enumerated in the illustration below.1499  
 
1493 Hughes, supra note 18; Soldatic & Meekosha, supra note 116. 
1494 Armstrong & Daly, supra note 163 at 17. 
1495 Hughes, supra note 18; Soldatic & Meekosha, supra note 116. 
1496 Until recently, the CCACs were the designated placement co-ordinator. Local Health System Integration Act, 
2006, SO 2006, c 4, supra note 591, s 5(m.2). In April 2017, the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care made the 
necessary orders to transfer staff from CCACs to LHINs. 
1497 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 155(1)(d); Reg 832, supra note 831, s 130(3)1. 
1498 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 562 at 136. 
1499 Auditor General of Ontario, supra note 575 at 189–190 and 193. 
280 
Illustration 6: LTC admission process 
 
While these steps have not changed as a result of the implementation of the LTCHA, a 
number of changes have been made to manage the demand for LTC. It should be noted that the 
admission and placement process is also engaged when residents have to be relocated for other 
reasons, such as home closure due to re-development however, I will concentrate on new 
applicants in this section.  I contend that despite the rhetoric of “person-centred care” (see 
Chapter 5) and “assessed need”, the changes deem fewer people to be “deserving” of LTC and 
much later (therefore they are sicker when they enter LTC) and the changes are intended to deal 
with pressures on the health care system and to balance other priorities.   
The most significant change introduced by LTCHA is the stricter eligibility criteria for 
LTC home placement.1500 Accessing LTC appears to be based on needs: “The people of Ontario 
and their Government: . . . Recognize the principle of access to long-term care homes that is 
based on assessed need”.1501 However, defining and prioritizing those needs is fraught with 
tensions, as recent thinking in feminist political economy shows. For example, under the new 
eligibility criteria of the LTCHA, it is not enough that an applicant requires assistance each day 
with activities of daily living;1502 he/she must require such assistance at frequent intervals 
 
1500 Ibid at 189. See also GM v North Simcoe Muskoka Community Care Access Centre, CanLII 73121, 2013 ON 
HSARB. 
1501 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425 at Preamble. 
1502 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 130(2)2. 
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throughout the day.1503 In addition, the new regime no longer permits people access based solely 
on: 
 whether they would be financially, emotionally, or physically harmed if they stayed in 
their current residence; 
 whether they are at risk of suffering harm due to environmental conditions that cannot be 
resolved if the applicant remains in their residence; or 
 whether they may harm someone else if they remain in their own residence.1504  
Previously, under the Nursing Homes Act, there was explicit recognition of a community-based 
applicant whose condition was expected to deteriorate within three months, or whose care needs 
were jeopardizing the health and well-being of their caregiver (category 2).1505 This condition is 
no longer present in the description of any category in the LTCHA.  
Once they are deemed eligible and their applications accepted by their chosen homes, 
LTC applicants are put on the homes’ wait lists based on priority levels. There are rules to rank 
applicants within each category.1506 The categories have been modified and the table below 
compares the current and previous regimes for some of the categories:  
Table 25: Select priority categories under the Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA 
Type (in order of priority) Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Readmission  N/A New - Re-admission after 
a prolonged medical or 
psychiatric leave or a stay at a 
specialized unit1507  
Crisis (immediate admission 
is required as a result of a 
1A1508 11509 - similar to the 
previous regime with a 
 
1503 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 155(1)(c)(ii). 
1504 Reg 832, supra note 831, ss 130(2)4, 5 and 6. 
1505 Ibid, s 128.1. 
1506 Auditor General of Ontario, supra note 575 at 194–195; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 182. 
1507 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 177. 
1508 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 143. 
1509 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 171. 
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Type (in order of priority) Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
crisis arising from the 
applicant’s condition or 
circumstances) 
clarification about those 
applicants from hospitals 
Spousal reunification (when 
both partners want to reside 
in the same home) 
1A11510 - two spouses 
can apply at the same time or 
one spouse is a resident 
21511- similar to the 
previous regime, but one of the 
spouses must be a current 
resident 
New requirements - 
reunification priority access beds 
Cultural, religious, and 
ethnic (a home that is 
primarily engaged in 
serving the interests of 
persons of a particular 
religion, ethnic origin or 
linguistic origin) 
1B1512 3A and 3B1513 - similar to 
the previous regime, but this 
group is now divided into those 
who need admission more 
urgently for different reasons 
(3A) and those less urgently (3B) 
Other (applicants who do 
not fit into any other 
categories such as transfer 
from another home) 
2 and 31514 4A and 4B1515 
  
The prioritization of eligible applicants denotes a significant change. The management of 
waiting lists has been modified to deal with a number of pressures within the health care system. 
 
1510 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 143.1.  
1511 Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 172. 
1512 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 144. 
1513 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 173. 
1514 Reg 832, supra note 831, ss 145 and 148.3. 
1515 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 174. 
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The crisis category has been clarified to refer specifically to applicants in hospitals that are 
facing significant pressures on capacity if certain conditions are met, such as the placement co-
ordinators employed by the relevant LHIN verifying these pressures.1516 This change was likely 
made to formalize the practices at that time, as the CCAC Client Services Program Manual 
provided extensive guidance on when to expedite the admission of Alternative Level of Care 
patients to LTC homes if there is a systemic crisis.1517 In addition, to facilitate the flow of 
residents across the continuum of care, a new “re-admission” category was created to allow 
persons who were discharged from a home due to a medical or psychiatric leave longer than the 
permitted time to be readmitted, and except for special categories, such as veteran, individuals in 
the re-admission category are placed before those in all other categories.1518  
Another group of changes was intended to encourage applicants to be more 
knowledgeable about LTC and more flexible in the placement process. The LTCHA increased 
the number of LTC homes to which an individual may apply if they are not in crisis from three to 
five.1519 While CCACs have always provided information to potential applicants, as per the 
Nursing Homes Act1520 and the CCAC Client Service Manual,1521 the LTCHA formalized some 
of the information requirements previously in soft law, such as a resident’s responsibility to pay, 
how to apply for a rate reduction and documents required, and length of wait-lists and 
approximate time to admission.1522 Some of the rights associated with the assessment process 
(e.g., to be informed of the use of the assessment) are also formalized in law.1523 The LTCHA 
decreased the wait to reapply for admission from six months to 12 weeks in cases where the 
client refuses a bed at a LTC home to which they applied.1524 
The priority categories illustrate that the notion of “assessed needs” is intended to 
encompass other public policy considerations in the prioritization process, such as familial 
 
1516 Ibid, s 171(2); Meadus, supra note 793. 
1517 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, CCAC Client Services Policy Manual (Toronto: Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care, 2007) at Chapter 12, 10-14. 
1518 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 177; Meadus, supra note 793 at 14. 
1519 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 164. 
1520 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 154. 
1521 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 1517 at Chapter 11, page 1, 8 and 12. 
1522 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 154. 
1523 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 43(4) – (7). 
1524 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 167(4). 
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relationships and membership in a cultural or religious group, in addition to medical and nursing 
needs. The change concerning spousal or partner reunification is indicative of the difficulties of 
prioritizing needs among those who urgently require care. The Director of the MOHLTC’s LTC 
program may designate reunification priority access beds for persons who meet the requirements 
to be placed in category 1 (crisis) on the waiting list for admission and are seeking to be 
reunified in a home with their spouse/partner. Placement co-ordinators (i.e., LHINs) must keep 
separate waiting lists for these beds. Requirements to be placed on the waiting lists and priority 
for admission to these beds are set out. As among those waiting for the reunification priority 
access bed, applicants must be ranked for admission according to the date on which their spouses 
or partners were admitted to the long-term care home.1525 These beds have been created so that 
those who have a spouse or partner in a LTC home and who have also been designated as crisis 
can be reunited more quickly.1526 
The last group of changes concern how safety and security issues are addressed in the 
admission and placement processes. In Chapter 6, I explained the requirements around 
confinement of residents. While an assessment is always required, the new regime is more 
precise about what that assessment entails, and specifically refers to an applicant’s mental health, 
current behavior and behaviour during the year preceding the assessment.1527 The regulation 
under LTCHA also makes it explicit that a home can request additional information about an 
applicant from the LHIN within five days of receiving the application and then make a decision 
within three days of receiving that information.1528 Finally, the Director may deem that residents 
of a home urgently need to be relocated to another home to protect their health or safety.  Certain 
administration requirements (e.g. resident making an application to the second home) are 
exempted to facilitate the transfer of residents.1529    
So far I have only described access to LTC in terms of the supply of beds. It is evident 
that formal legal rules are increasingly used to serve two purposes: to restrict access to LTC to 
 
1525 Ibid, ss 206.1–206.2; Service Ontario, “Amendments to Ontario Regulation 79/10 under the Long-Term Care 
Homes Act, 2007”, online: <http://www.ontariocanada.com/registry/view.do?postingId=26226&language=en>. 
1526 Advocacy Centre for the Elderly, Newsletter (Spring/Summer 2018) Vol. 15, No. 1 (Toronto: Advocacy Centre 
for the Elderly, 2018) at 8. 
1527 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 43(4). 
1528 Reg 832, supra note 831, ss 162(4) and (5). 
1529 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 208. 
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those with the most profound impairments and to delay their admission for as long as possible. 
This affects the experiences of residents, workers and family members as the LTC population as 
a whole gradually becomes older and residents live with more profound impairments. In Chapter 
9, I will return to this topic. I will now turn to the other part of the access equation in LTC: 
affordability. 
8.2.2 Is LTC affordable? 
Similar to other Canadian provinces, Ontario’s LTC system is financially supported by a 
mix of public and private contributions (see Chapter 4). The usual argument, MacDonald writes, 
is that a LTC facility is a principal residence, and people are normally expected to pay for their 
primary room and board.1530 Here, there is an underlying tension: on the one hand, the 
government relies on private contributions in the form of resident charges and other fees that 
homes retain to help ensure the financial sustainability of the LTC system; on the other hand, the 
system has to remain affordable for all eligible Ontarians regardless of income. The result is a 
complex web of rules that dictate how much homes can charge residents and for what. The 
maximum rates for basic, as well as private accommodation are set by the government (from 
$1,891 to $2,702 per month). Those who cannot afford to pay the maximum rate for basic 
accommodation can apply for a rate reduction. The government provides subsidies for residents 
who are eligible for the rate reduction.1531 Legal rules about how to measure ability to pay and at 
what level to set the resident charges can reveal what the state considers to be “care”1532 and 
therefore should be paid for by the state.  
While the accommodation cost structure (resident charges) remains the same for most 
people under the LTCHA, there have been some changes that affect the affordability of LTC. 
First, one substantial change is the prohibition of any bed-holding fees following medical or 
psychiatric leave. Previously, a resident could hold a bed for up to 30 days in addition to the 
available 21-day medical or 45-day psychiatric leave under the Nursing Homes Act.1533 During 
 
1530 Martha MacDonald, “Regulating Individual Charges for Long-Term Residential Care in Canada” (2015) 95 
Studies in Political Economy 83 at 88. 
1531 Government of Ontario, “Find a long-term care home”, (7 November 2017), online: Ontario.ca 
<https://www.ontario.ca/page/find-long-term-care-home>; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 611. 
The rates are as of July 1, 2019.  
1532 MacDonald, supra note 1530 at 90. 
1533 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 47. 
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the bed-holding period, the resident would continue to pay accommodation charges and bed-
holding fee ($53 per day).1534 The LTCHA has prohibited such holding fees1535 and increased the 
duration of medical and psychiatric leave,1536 which means a resident can no longer extend a 
medical or psychiatric leave by paying extra. The second substantial change is the calculation of 
the accommodation charge. Effective from July 1, 2017, the annual adjustment to the 
accommodation charge is determined by applying the Consumer Price Index, and any increase is 
subject to a ceiling of 2.5%.1537 The third substantial change is modification of the rate reduction 
scheme for residents who may be supporting dependents in the community.1538 Under the 
previous regime, a resident could apply for a rate reduction if his or her spouse resided in the 
community.1539 The LTCHA allows for rate reduction if the resident has other dependents, such 
as children under 18 or under 25 and enrolled in full-time study at a secondary or postsecondary 
institution, in addition to a spouse residing in the community.1540 Finally, upon the request of a 
resident, the home is required to assist with completing applications for rate reductions, which 
was previously a requirement in the Program Manual.1541 If the maximum amount is calculated 
incorrectly as the result of a false or incomplete application, the home is liable for the 
difference.1542 
8.2.3 How many beds can be licensed, where and at what cost? 
By establishing a licensing and approval program, the Ministry currently regulates 
activities such as changes in bed capacity, buying/selling of homes, relocation of a LTC home 
for re-development, purchase or sale of shares in a LTC home, hiring a management company 
and closing of a home.1543 The licensing and approval program serves multiple objectives, such 
 
1534 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0803-01; Reg 832, supra note 831, ss 47(4) and 
117.  
1535 Meadus, supra note 793 at 18; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 245.5. 
1536 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 146. 
1537 Ibid, s 247.5. 
1538 Meadus, supra note 793 at 18. 
1539 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 116.1(1)2; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0607-07, 
page 1–2. 
1540  O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 251. 
1541 Ibid, s 253(3); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0607-07. page 2.  
1542 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 253(6). 
1543 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Act, Long-Term Care Homes Licensing Overview: Prepared for the 
Ministry-LHIN-LTC Operator Education Sessions March-April 2015 (Toronto: Ministry of Health an Long-Term 
Care, 2015) at 6. 
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as ensuring that homes are operated by suitable people. But also, since homes are not owned or 
directly operated by the provincial government, one way to control the size of the sector (and 
hence the public expenditures for it) is to manage the supply of beds via licensing. Under the 
current and previous regimes, it is prohibited to operate residential premises where nursing care 
is provided except in accordance with applicable legislation (certain entities such as hospitals are 
exempted).1544 Licences are issued by the Director of the MOHLTC based on what the Minister 
considers to be the public interest.1545 Criteria are also set for who is ineligible to be issued a 
licence.1546 All LTC homes must comply with any licensing conditions.1547  
However, despite the similarities between the old and new regimes, there are significant 
changes under the LTCHA. Changes to the licensing system are one of the key areas of change 
in the LTCHA1548 and represent an important milestone in the evolution of the sector. First, the 
licensing term was increased from one year1549 to a fixed term of maximum of 30 years.1550 The 
term is tied to structural compliance of the home, depending on its type of beds.1551 Similar to the 
previous regime, a licence can be revoked in cases of non-compliance and for other reasons.1552 
The much longer licensing term necessitates a number of new corresponding safeguards to 
ensure sufficient government control over homes, such as: 
 
1544 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 4; Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 95; O Reg 79/10, 
supra note 811, s 268. 
1545 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, ss 5(2)  – (6); Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 96–97. 
1546 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 5(7); Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 98; O Reg 
79/10, supra note 811, s 270. 
1547 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 3; Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 101. 
1548 Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, McGuinty Government Continues to Improve Quality of Life For 
Residents in Long-Term Care Homes (January 16, 2007 News Release) (Toronto: Ministry of Health an Long-Term 
Care, 2007). 
1549 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 5(8). See also Auditor General of Ontario, supra note 557 at 381. The 
Auditor General noted that homes did not have current licences.  
1550 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 102(1). When the LTCHA was introduced, the maximum 
term was 25 years. In 2014, the maximum term was extended to 30 years by Bill 14.  Building Opportunity and 
Securing Our Future Act (Budget Measures), 2014, SO 2014, c 7.  See also Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 
Enhanced Long-Term Care Home Renewal Strategy: Frequently Asked Questions (Toronto: Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care, 2015) at 6. 
1551 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 180.  A home with new beds (built since 1998 to current 
design standards) would have a 30-year term licence. A home with D-beds (do not meet the 1972 design standard) 
would get a 4-year licence.  Upon expiration, these beds will not receive a new licence unless they are upgraded to 
meet current design standards. See Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Act, supra note 1543 at 4. 
1552 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 157. 
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 More detailed guidance on the operation of the home once a revocation or suspension 
order is issued.1553 
 Removal of certain rights to appeal refusal to issue licence decisions.1554 
 More approval, disclosure, and reporting requirements on the home’s part pertaining to 
the de facto control of the home.1555  
 Longer notice period (changed from 16 weeks to five years before the intended closure 
date) and a closure plan and a closure agreement are required if a home wants to 
close.1556  
Second, the licensing approval process has become more complex, in the sense that 
requirements are denser and more technical. One significant change was to ensure that the 
government’s discretion to make policy and funding decisions about LTC homes remains as 
unfettered as possible. For example, although competitive procurement processes have always 
existed, the LTCHA states explicitly that a competitive process may be used, but is not 
required.1557 Furthermore, the scope of matters that the Director of MOHLTC may consider in 
relation to eligibility and ineligibility for licensing is broader than under the previous Act1558 and 
potentially more flexible for deeming an applicant ineligible. To retain the ability to manage the 
supply of beds in the short-term, the MOHLTC can issue temporary, emergency, or short-term 
licences and stipulate who may be admitted to beds offered under such licences.1559Procedural 
fairness also necessitates more transparency requirements. While the process has always 
involved public consultation and the Director was required to consider submissions received 
before making a decision,1560 the LTCHA is slightly more certain in terms of articulating the 
requirements for consultation, including: who can chair a public meeting, details of notice 
requirements, and clarification that the home’s failure to post notice does not invalidate the 
 
1553 Ibid, ss 157(4) – (7). 
1554 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 15; Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 116. 
1555 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 107–110. 
1556 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 308–311. The Director may agree to a shorter notice period or to a plan being 
submitted or an agreement entered into by a later date. 
1557 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 115. 
1558 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 5(7); Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 98; O Reg 
79/10, supra note 811, s 270. 
1559 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 111–113; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 277–279. 
1560 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 12. 
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notice.1561 Finally, more requirements have been introduced to improve transparency and 
certainty around fees and undertaking to issue licence.1562   
Third, the changes are intended to control the capacity of the LTC system in light of the 
changing non-profit/for-profit mix in the sector. The preference for non-profit delivery is 
proffered by the government as follows: “The people of Ontario and their Government: . . . Are 
committed to the promotion of the delivery of long-term care home services by not-for-profit 
organizations.”1563 The LTCHA prescribes more detailed requirements in terms of amendments 
to a licence (increase or decrease in number of beds, change of location of the home, and 
increase in preferred accommodation),1564 such as the consultation requirements and public 
interest considerations discussed above. Transfer of licence was not permitted under the previous 
Act,1565 whereas transfer of licence or beds is now permitted with limitations,1566 but a non-profit 
entity may not transfer a licence or beds to a for-profit entity except in limited circumstances (for 
example, if the non-profit entity is in default).1567 However, at the same time, the Minister is no 
longer required to announce, annually, in the Legislature the desired balance between non-profit 
and profit-oriented nursing homes.1568  
8.2.4 Summary  
The table below is a summary of the key changes related to regulating the capacity of the 
LTC sector: 
 
 
 
 
 
1561 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 106; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 273. 
1562 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 314; Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 100. 
1563 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425 at Preamble. 
1564 Ibid, s 114; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 280. 
1565 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 5(9). 
1566 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 105. 
1567 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 271. 
1568 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 5(6). 
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Table 26: Key changes related to the capacity of the LTC sector under the Nursing Homes 
Act and the LTCHA 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Admission and 
prioritization of LTC 
applicants 
 May be eligible based 
solely on potential harm 
to applicant or others  
 Stricter eligibility 
requirements  
 Prioritization categories 
change  
Co-payments and other fees   Rate reduction available if 
spouse resided in the 
community  
 Bed-holding fees 
permissible  
 Rate reduction available if 
spouse or dependents (e.g. 
children) reside in the 
community 
 No bed-holding fees 
Licensing requirements  Licences issued for one-
year term  
 More rights of appeal 
regarding licensing 
decisions 
 Licences issued for 
maximum fixed term of 
30 years, depending on 
the type of beds  
 More types of licences  
 More government 
discretion over the 
licensing processes 
As a public benefits scheme, the LTC program illustrates the relationship between state 
and citizens when the latter is dependent on the former to make available the necessities of life. 
The state’s role is to redistribute some of the dependencies associated (though not exclusively) 
with aging and disability so that care is also a collective responsibility. Thus far, I have explained 
how the government has attempted to control the supply and demand of LTC beds in order to 
meet and prioritize the needs of older Ontarians while managing the tensions between 
affordability of beds and fiscal pressures. My reading of the changes related to admission is 
similar to conclusions reached by other scholars i.e., that eligibility for LTC admission has 
become more restricted, however at least the rules are fair and transparent (on paper).  Some of 
the changes are positive because to a certain extent, they do recognize the circumstances of 
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residents for example, poverty in older age. The changes concerning resident charges and rate 
reductions can potentially make access more equitable. That said, the problem is that even if an 
applicant is eligible for and can afford LTC (or is eligible for rate reductions), access is still 
difficult due to restrictions to the number of homes and beds being licenced. The changes to the 
licensing system are necessary if seen from the perspective of maximizing the discretion of the 
government over the supply of beds. If properly funded (capital and operating costs), more 
stringent licensing requirements could contribute to a LTC system that is more predictable and is 
run by suitable operators.       
But LTC is also a regulatory regime – the government is also the regulator of LTC and 
citizens are part of the regulated. I will now turn to situations where the government uses  
coercive and non-coercive means to address current and anticipated problems in the sector.       
8.3 How far does the state have to go to protect vulnerable citizens?  
The responsibility of the state goes beyond creating and funding the capacity of the LTC 
system. Recent events in Ontario, notably the Public Inquiry into the Safety and Security of 
Residents in the Long-Term Care Homes System, clearly show that the public expects the state 
to protect those who are considered to be “vulnerable” by holding those in charge of providing 
care accountable for actual or perceived harm. The dark side of care has been examined by 
disability scholars. But how the state should intervene, for example by establishing a legal 
regime of protection for those who receive care,1569 is far from settled.  For some feminist 
political economy scholars, detailed regulations and documentation to demonstrate they are 
followed are often detrimental to care relationships and take time away from care.1570 I now turn 
to the coercive and non-coercive means by which the government controls or influences the 
behaviour of participants in the sector. I will also briefly address the role of other bodies that are 
involved in regulating the behavior of LTC participants.  
8.3.1  Compliance and enforcement: what are the coercive means? 
As discussed in Chapter 4, responses to the tragedies and scandals during the period 
leading up to the implementation of the LTCHA involved strengthening the Ministry’s ability to 
 
1569 Herring, supra note 112 at 260–318. 
1570 McGregor & Armstrong, supra note 719 at 84. 
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address poor care, such as setting up a toll-free number for complaints. But as I will explain later 
in this chapter, the Ministry also has other policy objectives in the sector, such as value for 
money, and the compliance and enforcement tools are used to pursue those other objectives also. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I described how law is used to prescribe what homes can and cannot do 
when they deliver care. The LTCHA enables the establishment of a new inspection program, 
which continues to evolve legally and administratively. Bill 160 is the latest attempt to create 
new enforcement tools, including financial penalties, and new provincial offences to ensure that 
LTC home operators are addressing concerns promptly.1571 However, there are other legal 
mechanisms through which the state can attempt to assert its oversight role, including mandatory 
reporting obligations, issuance of directives and performance and financial management. In the 
process of defining, negotiating and enforcing compliance, residents, families, and those who 
have contact with residents such as volunteers, are also involved in (and in some sense, 
conscripted into) detecting non-compliance with various regulatory requirements in homes.  The 
main difficulty is that while these means may be effective in recognizing disabling relationships 
and relational wrongs (e.g. abuse), they very much understand relationships as being 
unidirectional where residents are passive recipients of care while workers are providers of care. 
A related difficulty is that the regulatory changes say very little about the responsibilities of 
residents, other than those related to their role as consumers (see section 8.4).    
8.3.1.1 Long-Term Care Home Quality Inspection Program 
While the Ministry has always undertaken activities to monitor homes’ compliance with 
the applicable law, the Ministry’s approaches have changed significantly over the years. It 
should be noted that under the LTCHA, not all of the legal requirements are new in the sense that 
they have never been implemented.  Indeed, some legal requirements simply formalize existing 
Ministry policies or approaches.  By way of example, prior to the LTCHA, the Ministry adopted 
the practice of unannounced visits to homes and performed annual inspections.1572  The LTCHA 
includes provisions that mandate annual inspections of homes and that no prior notice should be 
given of such inspections.1573 Another example is the notion of risk, which was frequently 
 
1571 Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, Backgrounder “Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients 
Act, 2017” (September 27, 2017) (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2017). 
1572 Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, supra note 622 at 4. 
1573 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 143–144. 
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mentioned and referred to as something to be identified and managed in the Program Manual; 
under the LTCHA, a risk-based approach is now formalized.  
A good starting point for comparing the previous and current regimes is to consider the 
respective legal authority to undertake compliance-related activities. The Nursing Homes Act and 
its Regulation provided little specific guidance with respect to compliance and enforcement, but 
guidance for homes was included in the Program Manual.1574  In contrast, the LTCHA and its 
regulation contain more rules defining what the Ministry can or cannot do in order to enforce 
compliance. It should be noted that some of the details of the inspection program are expressed 
in the form of inspection guidelines (31 in total).1575 These protocols explain how government 
inspectors intend to determine the meaning of compliance, such as what types of documents they 
have to check, who they have to talk to, and which questions they have to ask.  
The first significant change is the Ministry’s purported approach to monitoring 
compliance and detecting non-compliance. The Program Manual repeatedly emphasized the 
collaborative nature of the relationship between the Ministry and the home and expressed a 
desire to work with homes to address concerns. For example, activities to be undertaken by 
ministry staff included “providing feedback and addressing concerns and issues using a 
collaborative approach” and “offering interpretation and consultation to facility staff”.1576 
Further, the review of resident care process was “completed in collaboration with the facility's 
management staff, to assist in identifying factors contributing to the presence of the indicator of 
risk or negative outcome, and to assist in development of a corrective action plan.”1577 The 
organization of the Ministry’s LTC division was indicative of the collaborative orientation: 1) 
the compliance management unit ensured homes provide care and services according to ministry 
requirements and 2) the enforcement unit investigated very serious complaints and incidents, 
implemented sanctions and conducted pre-licence reviews and other inspections.1578 The 
 
1574 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 11. 
1575 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Inspection Protocols Summary (31) (Toronto: Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care, 2013). The 31 protocols are divided into the following categories: 1) Home-Related Mandatory; 2) 
Inspector-Initiated; 3) Home-Related Triggered; and 4) Resident-Related Triggered. 
1576 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 1101-01, page 2. 
1577 Ibid at Tab 1101-01, page 7. 
1578 Ibid at Tab 0402, page 1–2. 
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compliance advisors of the compliance management unit clarified ministry expectations to 
homes, using a consultative and collaborative approach.1579  
In contrast, the new program under the LTCHA is based on more formal and 
standardized processes and procedures in order to induce homes to comply with legal rules. The 
LTCHA defines a more prescriptive compliance and enforcement system (Part IX of the 
LTCHA).  The Preamble of the LTCHA states:  
The people of Ontario and their Government: 
... 
Firmly believe in clear and consistent standards of care and services, supported by a 
strong compliance, inspection and enforcement system; 
Recognize the responsibility to take action where standards or requirements under this 
Act are not being met, or where the care, safety, security and rights of residents might be 
compromised.1580   
Some requirements are new, in the sense that they are strengthened requirements or 
represent more clearly articulated expectations of the regulator.  They are characterized by 
greater reliance on formal legal rules and the force of law. They are intended to create more 
certainty about expectations by taking some discretion away from the regulator, especially after 
non-compliance has been established. The LTCHA specifies a wider range of potential action(s) 
that an inspector must take if a home is non-compliant such as the types of orders that can be 
issued against the home (for example, order for a home to prepare, submit and implement a 
compliance plan), and cost recovery.1581  A compliance plan under the LTCHA is similar to the 
corrective action plan under the previous regime. Furthermore, the criteria to be considered in 
determining what actions to take or orders to make for non-compliance are: severity, scope and 
history of non-compliance.1582 But they essentially build on the guidance and examples regarding 
issuing notice of compliance and ordering suspension of admission described in the Program 
Manual.    
 
1579 Ibid at Tab 0402-02, page 1. It should be noted that the Nursing Homes Act did not have any reference to 
compliance advisors.  
1580 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425 at Preamble. 
1581 Ibid, ss 152–153. 
1582 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 299. 
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There are also new requirements that represent a more deterrent-based or adversarial 
stance of the Ministry as the regulator. To detect non-compliance, the scope of an inspector’s 
powers has been expanded to facilitate fact-gathering and potentially restrict the rights of persons 
being questioned.1583 More sanctions are made available to the Ministry as the regulator, notably, 
higher fines on conviction, administrative penalty, re-inspection fees and suspension of licence 
(by director or Minister).1584 The LTCHA also states specifically that failure to comply with an 
order is an offence and that due diligence and mistaken belief do not prevent orders or penalties 
i.e., absolute liability offence.1585  At the same time, the severity of the sanctions also 
necessitates more elaborate review and appeal processes and procedures, such as timelines for 
hearings and evidentiary rules.  More information about what the Ministry has done to enforce 
compliance also must be published.1586 See Appendix D for a more comprehensive explanation 
of the key aspects of the previous and current regimes. 
 The Program created under this new legal regime is called the Long-Term Care Home 
Quality Inspection Program. The aim of the Inspection Program is to protect residents’ quality of 
care and quality of life by safeguarding their rights, safety, and security, as well as by ensuring 
that homes comply with legislation and regulations.1587 There are four types of inspections: 
comprehensive inspections (also known as Resident Quality Inspection), complaint inspections, 
critical-incident inspections and follow-up inspections.1588 Even within this highly prescriptive 
regime, the Ministry still has to make decisions about the administration of the program, such as 
determining what “risk-based” means. For example, while all LTC homes are subject to an 
annual Resident Quality Inspection, a new risk-focused approach was introduced in August 
2016, with the intensity of the Resident Quality Inspection informed by the home’s compliance 
history and risk level. Approximately 80% of homes are considered to be substantially compliant 
 
1583 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 114, 147 and 151. 
1584 Ibid, ss 156.1, 158.1 and 182; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 299.1-299.2. 
1585 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 162.2; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 
1100 at 21.  
1586 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 173. 
1587 Standing Committee on Public Account, supra note 1456 at 2. 
1588 Auditor General of Ontario, 2015 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario (Section 3.09 
Long-term-care Home Quality Inspection Program) (Toronto: Auditor General of Ontario, 2015) at 364. The 
Program is administered by the Ministry’s Performance Improvement and Compliance Branch, which falls under its 
Health System Accountability and Performance Division. The Program consists of a head office with a centralized 
intake unit and five regional offices. 
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in their overall operations and provision of care. Each year, one-third of substantially compliant 
homes will receive an intensive risk-focused Resident Quality Inspection.1589 Homes that are 
substantially compliant and low risk may receive a risk-focused Resident Quality Inspection, 
which follows the same principles and algorithms but is shorter in duration and the inspection 
team is smaller.1590 The point is that despite the Ministry’s more adversarial stance, the regulator 
is still constrained by other considerations, such as availability of human and financial resources, 
and therefore may not necessary utilize the full extent of the law. I will return to this in Chapter 
9.     
The conduct and practices of inspectors are also governed by other soft law unrelated to 
LTC. For example, the Ontario government’s 2011 Regulator’s Code of Practice: Integrity in 
Pursuit of Compliance1591  is also applicable to ministry inspectors. The Code of Practice is 
intended to ensure that businesses and the public are treated fairly and with respect when they are 
being licensed, inspected, investigated, audited or otherwise regulated.1592 Most importantly, the 
Code of Practice promotes a compliance-focused approach, which “asks regulators to focus on 
the objectives of regulatory law and policy and then consider the most innovative, efficient and 
effective method of achieving compliance. This shift in focus can lead to proactive approaches to 
compliance based on prevention . . .  rather than solely focusing on the investigation of 
compliance failures... The aim is to have greater effect with less burden.”1593 This compliance–
focused approach is also combined with risk-based targeting: “Risk management is the process 
of identifying potential hazards and undesirable events, understanding the likelihood and 
consequences of the undesirable events, and taking steps to reduce their risk.”1594 As I will 
demonstrate in the next chapter, the assumptions and purported benefits of a risk-based approach 
to compliance need to be unpacked.   
 
1589 Standing Committee on Public Account, supra note 1456 at 7. 
1590 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Response from the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care to the 
Standing Committee on Public Account’s report on Long-Term Care Home Quality Inspection Program (Section 
3.09 of the 2015 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario) (September 25, 2017) (Toronto: 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2017) at 4. 
1591 Government of Ontario, Regulator’s Code of Practice: Integrity in Pursuit of Compliance (Toronto: 
Government of Ontario, 2011). The Code of Practice provides a set of Organizational Values, Elements of 
Professionalism, Service Principles and Best Practices to support compliance activities and to promote a consistent 
level of service. 
1592 Ibid at 7. 
1593 Ibid at 6. 
1594 Ibid. 
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8.3.1.2 Mandatory reporting and investigation of complaints  
Despite the seemingly broad powers of the Ministry to monitor and inspect homes, the 
detection of non-compliance also relies on self-reporting by homes and complaints made by 
residents and anybody. Again, the concept of co-regulation1595 is applicable here. Under both 
previous and current legal regimes, a system for making reports and complaints is established, 
together with whistle-blowing protections (see Chapter 6). Inspections and inquiries that must be 
made by inspectors in response to reports and complaints are also provided for. In the previous 
regime, many of the reporting requirements were contained in the Program Manual. These 
requirements are now formalized (with some modifications) in statute and regulation.   
The following changes should be highlighted. First, the types of events that must be 
reported by the home and information about those events are similar but the LTCHA 
encompasses more events and the corresponding reporting obligation is intended to be more 
proportional to the potential consequences of the event.1596 Second, under the LTCHA, the 
mandatory reporting requirements applicable to every person (other than residents), such as staff 
members, volunteers and family members, are more elaborate. For example, anyone other than a 
resident must report misuse or misappropriation of a resident’s money as well as misuse or 
misappropriation of funding provided to a home.1597 Third, a new provision is that incapable 
residents are exempt from the offence provision about making false statements to the 
Ministry.1598 Fourth, the LTCHA provides more clarity about when an inspector must visit the 
home immediately and actions that the Ministry will take if an inspection is not warranted.1599 
Finally, under the LTCHA, the Home must promptly notify a resident’s substitute decision-
maker or anyone designated by the resident or his or her substitute decision-maker of any serious 
injury to or illness of the resident. Notice must be provided in accordance with instructions 
provided by the persons who are to be notified.1600 
 
1595 Windholz, supra note 50. 
1596 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 96; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 107. 
1597 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 24(1)4–5. 
1598 Ibid, ss 24(2) – (3); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–74. 
1599 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 24–25. 
1600  O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 107(5); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–81. 
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The LTCHA is also more specific about the home’s mechanisms for receiving, 
investigating, and responding to complaints from residents and family members. While the home 
has always been required to have policies and procedures about complaints in place, to respond 
to a complaint within 10 days and to forward to the Ministry all written complaints with follow-
up actions,1601 the LTCHA provides a few more clarifications such as: complaints may be 
verbal,1602 information received by the Ministry may be shared with Residents’ Council and 
Family Council,1603 and the homes must conduct quarterly analysis of the complaints 
received.1604 It also sets out the actions the home should take to deal with complaints.1605         
8.3.1.3 Operational or Policy Directives Issued by the Minister  
The Ministry has always used guidelines such as the Program Manual, memos, letters etc 
to guide homes in providing care. Thus far, I have referred to guidelines of various degrees of 
legal formality, issued by the government, agencies, professional associations and regulatory 
bodies. The issue is two-fold: first, whether a guideline is issued with any specific legal 
authority; second, the enforceability of a guideline. In 2017, the LTCHA was amended to 
provide authority for the Minister to make operational and policy directives (which are not 
regulations) in respect of LTC homes1606 and to require every home to carry out a directive.1607 
The authority to issue directives is restricted to the sector and not to one particular home.1608 
Some of the public interest factors the Minister may consider when deciding to issue a directive 
include: the proper management and operation of homes in general; the availability of financial 
resources for the management and operation of the LTC home system and for the delivery of 
LTC home services; and the quality of care and treatment of residents generally.1609  The 
directives must be available to the public.1610  
 
1601 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 26; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0902-
01, page 9. 
1602 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 101(1). 
1603 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 25(5) and (6). 
1604 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 101(3). 
1605 Ibid, ss 103–105; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 782 at 2–74. 
1606 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 174.1 (1). See also Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care, supra note 1100 at 22. 
1607 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425 at s 174.1(3). 
1608 Ibid, s 174.1(4). 
1609 Ibid, s 174.1(2). 
1610 Ibid, s 174.1(6). At the time of writing, there is no directive posted on the MOHLTC website.  
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8.3.1.4 Other Oversight Mechanisms – Performance and Financial Management  
In addition to statutory obligations and any policy directives, the home’s operation is also 
constrained by contractual obligations. Previously the home negotiated a service agreement with 
the Ministry annually.1611 Currently, the LHIN-Home accountability agreement can also be used 
to influence the behavior of homes. It is a funding agreement and contains typical contractual 
terms such as describing how the funding is to be used and financial reporting requirements, such 
as completion of the In-Year Revenue/Occupancy Report.1612  Reporting is not new; the Nursing 
Homes Act and the Program Manual established requirements such as regular reports from 
homes,1613 however the frequency and content of reporting have changed under the LTCHA. 
Obviously, the LHIN-home agreement provides the means through which the LHIN can compel 
performance on the home’s part. For instance, the home is required to conduct quarterly and 
other assessments of residents using the RAI-MDS Tools, to ensure that the RAI-MDS Tools are 
used, to submit the RAI-MDS Data to the Canadian Institute for Health Information, and finally, 
to have systems in place to regularly monitor, evaluate and where necessary, correct the RAI-
MDS Data.1614 The agreement is also used to articulate the government’s and the LHIN’s 
expectations and priorities. For example, one of the schedules requires the home to support the 
LHIN’s Ministry/LHIN Accountability Agreement Performance Indicators related to Alternative 
Level of Care and Emergency Department performance. As well, the home is required to 
participate in the LHIN’s strategic priorities, such as supporting approaches to service planning 
and delivery that improve existing health disparities and actively seeking new opportunities to 
reduce health disparities.1615   
8.3.2 Quality improvements (delegated to agency): what are the non-
coercive means? 
So far I have described means of ensuring regulatory compliance that are more like the 
“command-and-control” ideal type but as New Governance scholars point out, more flexible 
approaches can co-exist. One area that has been excluded from this research is the regulation of 
 
1611 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0701-02, page 1–3. 
1612 Accountability agreement, supra note 593 at Article 4 and 5. 
1613 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, ss 112–113; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at 
Tab 0602-01, page 2. 
1614 Supra note 911 at Article 8.1(c). 
1615 Supra note 593 at Schedule D. 
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executive compensation as a means to enforce compliance. Part III of the Commitment to the 
Future of Medicare Act, 20041616 created a framework for establishing accountability agreements 
and the issuance of compliance directives. One way of dealing with non-compliance was holding 
back, reducing or varying the compensation package of executives of health resource providers. 
In 2016, Part III was repealed by Bill 41, Patients First Act. Between 2004 and 2016, there were 
many initiatives that addressed executive compensation, such as the Broader Public Sector 
Executive Compensation Act, 2014.1617 Some LTC homes would have been affected and some 
would not.1618 Here I focus on the following initiatives undertaken by Health Quality Ontario: 
Quality Improvement Plans, publication of quality indicators and quality standards.  
One new tool that is relatively more flexible (but is still connected to and overlaps with 
formal law and contractual requirements) is the annual Quality Improvement Plans, which must 
be submitted by health sector organizations, including LTC homes. The Quality Improvement 
Plan is a “public, documented set of quality commitments that a health care organization makes 
to its patients, clients, residents, staff, and community on an annual basis to improve quality 
through focused targets and actions.”1619 It consists of three components – the Progress Report, 
Narrative and Workplan.1620 In previous chapters, I discussed the more recent focus on quality 
care from the perspective of inclusion and participation including the Excellent Care for All Act, 
2010 and homes’ annual Quality Improvement Plans and satisfaction surveys. Here, I will 
address in more details how quality improvement plans1621 are related to promoting compliance 
with the LTCHA.   
The Quality Improvement Plan (QIP) is clearly linked to legislation and the 
accountability agreement. For example, according to Health Quality Ontario, the Health Quality 
Improvement Plan “provides a means to demonstrate that your organization is meeting the 
requirements of the legislation and/or accountability agreements.”1622 Further, “Where 
 
1616 Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004, SO 2004, c 5. 
1617 Broader Public Sector Executive Compensation Act, 2014, SO 2014, c 13, Sched. 1. 
1618 For example, the Broader Public Sector Executive Compensation Act, 2014 applies to public hospitals. Some 
hospitals also operate LTC homes. 
1619 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1476 at 5. 
1620 Ibid at 18. 
1621 It should be noted that the LHIN-home accountability agreement also requires a home to submit quality 
improvement plan to the Health Quality Ontario.  
1622 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1476 at 7. 
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organizations are currently not meeting SAA [sector accountability agreement] expectations, the 
QIP can serve as a tool to identify how improvements will be made.”1623 The quality indicators 
are also related to compliance with legislation. For 2018-19, the indicators are: avoidable 
Emergency Department visits for ambulatory care sensitive conditions, pressure ulcers, resident 
experience, restraints, falls, prescribing antipsychotic medication, and percent complaints 
acknowledged.1624 Other than the “avoidable ED visits” indicators, all other indicators can be 
traced back to specific obligations of the home defined in the LTCHA.  Health Quality Ontario 
publishes data on these indicators and an annual report on its observations and one could argue 
that this provides an additional means of ascertaining compliance at the sectoral level.  
Each year, Health Quality Ontario identifies as series of priority issues and corresponding 
indicators that are included in the Quality Improvement Plan. These quality priorities are selected 
through consultation with Health Quality Ontario’s Patient, Family, and Public Advisors 
Council, key stakeholders, sector associations, the Ministry, the local health integration networks 
(LHINs), and other organizations.1625 For example, one of the 2018-19 priorities is prevention of 
workplace violence. All health care organizations are asked to reflect on how workplace violence 
prevention is a strategic priority in their respective organizations.1626 In other words, homes are 
asked to publicly explain how they address workplace violence issues (which do not constitute 
an entirely new legal obligation since violence and harassment issues are already addressed in 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act1627). This is supposed to be part of the efforts to address 
violence across the health care system without necessarily adding more law. 
Last but not least, Health Quality Ontario also develops quality standards, which “address 
standards of care for clinically defined populations (for example, adults with schizophrenia), 
service areas (for example, preoperative-operative testing), and health system issues (for 
 
1623 Ibid at 14. 
1624 Health Quality Ontario, Looking Back and Looking Forward: A sneak peek for the 2018/19 long-term care 
quality improvement plans (QIPs) (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2017) at 35. 
1625 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1476 at 5. 
1626 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1475; Health Quality Ontario, Quality Improvement Plan Guidance: 
Workplace Violence Prevention (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2017) at 2.  All organizations that submit QIPs 
will be asked to answer the following question in their QIP Narratives: “Please describe how workplace violence 
prevention is a strategic priority for your organization. For example, is it included in your strategic plan or do you 
report on it to your board?” Hospitals are required to complete an indicator that will measure the number of 
workplace violence incidents reported by hospital workers within a 12-month period.  
1627 Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSO 1990, c O.1, ss 32.01-32.08. 
302 
example, care transitions).”1628 Each quality standard contains five to fifteen quality statements 
and each statement comprises a strong recommendation of high-quality practice for a specific 
aspect of care. In turn, each statement is accompanied by one or more process, structural, or 
outcome indicators to help health care professionals and organizations measure their 
achievement of the practice outlined in the statement. Quality standards also include a small set 
of outcome indicators.1629 Interestingly, the standards are useful not only for care providers and 
patients, but from Health Quality Ontario’s perspective, they are useful to government also: 
“Government can use quality standards to identify provincial priority areas, inform new data 
collection and reporting initiatives, and design performance indicators and funding 
incentives.”1630 An example of quality standards is the Behavioural Symptoms of Dementia,1631 
which was referenced in Chapter 6.   
8.3.3 Reliance on other bodies for ensuring regulatory compliance: who 
else are responsible? 
Thus far, this chapter focuses on what the government does in terms of enforcement and 
compliance with the LTCHA, as well as some of the more flexible means of influencing 
behaviours of health care providers used by Health Quality Ontario. Julia Black’s concept of de-
centring directs our attention to how some of the non-state actors influence the behaviour of 
health care providers and homes. While the existence of self-regulation in parallel with 
command-and-control regulation is not new to the health care sector, how a hybrid approach is 
slowly evolving is new. The discussion below also illustrates how the government and the 
regulated entities work together on some of the regulatory tasks. 
There are new ways that professional governance and formal command-and-control 
regulation work together in order to influence behaviours of health care providers.  First, 
enhanced information-sharing is enabled to ensure the regulatory colleges can take action against 
their members. In Chapter 6, I explained the reporting requirements related to abuse and neglect 
of residents. In 2017, the regulation under the LTCHA was amended to allow the Ministry to 
 
1628 Health Quality Ontario, Quality Standards: Process and Methods Guide (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 
2017) at 4. 
1629 Ibid. 
1630 Ibid. 
1631 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1173. 
303 
disclose personal information about an individual to a regulatory College for the purpose of the 
administration or enforcement of certain statutes.1632 Second, funding may be provided to 
professional organizations to develop guidelines that support legal compliance. For example, the 
Ministry provided funding to the Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario to implement the 
Long-Term Care Best Practices Program.1633 I have referred to some of the guidelines in 
previous chapters. 
Accreditation, as a form of self-regulation, is not new in the health sector. Indeed, homes 
have always received additional government funding to support their accreditation efforts.1634 
According to Accreditation Canada, to pursue accreditation, organizations conduct an extensive 
self-assessment to determine whether they are meeting the standards set by Accreditation Canada 
and where they need to make improvements. The standards encompass matters such as 
governance, risk management, infection prevention and control, and medication management. 
Every four years, trained surveyors (experienced health care professionals from accredited 
organizations), visit organizations to assess whether the standards are being met. Then 
Accreditation Canada assesses this information and provides the organization with a final report 
and an accreditation decision. 1635 With respect to the LTC sector, Accreditation Canada offers a 
two-year Accreditation Primer award as well as a four-year QuentumTM accreditation award.1636  
Accreditation is linked to different parts of the regulatory regime in the following ways. 
Health Quality Ontario explains that when determining priorities to include in the Quality 
Improvement Plan, accreditation standards and processes are an important resource that help 
organizations identify priority areas for improvement and encourage organizations to review 
these standards (as applicable) as per ongoing accreditation processes relevant for the sector.1637 
 
1632 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 304.1. They are the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act, the Regulated Health 
Professions Act, 1991 or an Act named in Schedule 1 to that Act; and  to the Ontario College of Social Workers and 
Social Service Workers for the purpose of the administration or enforcement of the Social Work and Social Service 
Work Act, 1998. 
1633 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, “Long-Term Care Best Practices Program”, online: 
<http://rnao.ca/bpg/initiatives/longterm-care-best-practices-initiative>. 
1634 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0603-03, page 2. 
1635 Accreditation Canada, Accreditation Basics (Ottawa: Accreditation Canada). 
1636 Accreditation Canada, Helping you deliver quality residential care for seniors (Ottawa: Accreditation Canada, 
2015). 
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Indeed, Accreditation Canada’s LTC services standards also emphasizes the fact that homes have 
to meet the requirements of the applicable legislation. Last but not least, the government also 
appears to give credibility to the accreditation process on the Ministry’s website on LTC homes 
by indicating a home’s accreditation status, along with information such as previous inspection 
reports and orders. According to the Ministry: “Accreditation is a voluntary process that LTC 
homes may use to assess their services and help them improve the quality, safety and efficiency 
of their performance for the benefit of their residents and the health system.”1638 
8.3.4 Summary  
The table below summarizes the key changes regarding protection of residents discussed 
in this section: 
Table 27: Key changes related to the state’s obligations to protect residents under the 
Nursing Homes Act and the LTCHA and other means 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA and other means 
Compliance 
and 
Enforcement  
Statement of Unmet Standards 
or Criteria  
Fines and imprisonment  
 
All non-compliance must be documented  
A wider range of sanctions 
Higher maximum fines and 
administration penalty 
Re-inspection fees 
Due diligence, honest and reasonable 
belief not a defence  
Non-coercive 
means (other 
agencies) 
N/A (but see Program Manual) Health Quality Ontario’s Quality 
Improvement Plans, publication of 
quality indicators and Quality Standards 
 
1638 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “Reports on Long-Term Care Homes: Search Selections for Long-
Term Care homes”, online: <http://publicreporting.ltchomes.net/en-ca/default.aspx>. 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA and other means 
Reliance on 
other bodies  
Reporting about abuse and 
neglect  
Funding for homes for their 
accreditation efforts 
Ministry is empowered to share personal 
information about an individual to a 
regulatory college  
Funding for the Registered Nurses’ of 
Ontario to develop a LTC best practices 
program 
Accreditation standards more integrated 
with formal law and other parts of the 
regulatory standards   
 
It is not surprising that in order to address real or perceived concerns about the quality of 
care provided in LTC homes, the formal compliance and enforcement system continues to 
evolve, with more regulatory and non-regulatory tools being made available to the Ministry. 
Concurrently, there are more informal and flexible means to influence the behavior of homes and 
health care providers. While these other means may not be mandatory in the sense that non-
compliance does not carry formal sanctions such as fines, they nonetheless become interwoven 
into the formal law and reinforce the importance of certain objectives of regulation.  
The question is whether multiple and overlapping layers of formal and informal rules 
coupled with enforcement tools can actually influence the behaviour of participants in order to 
promote caring relationships in homes. On the one hand, the more adversarial stance of the 
regulator can be justified theoretically with arguments made by Herring with respect to the 
danger of care becoming an exercise of power over a passive individual. One the other hand, 
feminist political economists also have proposed powerful critiques of regulation, especially of 
the detailed rules that are directed to individual carers and homes.1639 My reading of the changes 
is that the compliance and enforcement regime is becoming more deterrent focused overall but 
the previous regime is no panacea. The question is whether state interventions in caring 
 
1639 Daly, supra note 514; Baines & Daly, supra note 514; Daly et al, supra note 672. 
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relationships, for example, rights afforded to those in caring relationships and legal recognition 
of responsibilities and obligations of the state (in this case, exemplified in the compliance and 
enforcement program), can actually promote the four markers of care advanced by Herring. A 
related question is how the state chooses particular tools when a whole range of various degrees 
of legal formality are available.  In Chapter 9, I will also revisit the question about hybridity.    
8.4 What does the state do to protect residents as consumers?  
The state also plays the role of regulating the LTC market by imposing restrictions on 
transactions and exchanges between home and residents, among homes and within homes. In this 
final section, I will explore regulation of the home’s corporate and business activities i.e., 
activities that are not directly related to hands-on care, including corporate governance of homes, 
and implementation of market-like mechanisms to promote efficiency and value for money. One 
could argue that the relationship between a home and its residents is akin to that of landlord and 
tenant, as residents contribute to their accommodation costs (in the form of co-payment). There 
is a contractual relationship between resident and home, and it is important to recognize the 
consumer protection objective as a secondary value (to use Windholz and Hodge’s expression) 
here. Accordingly, the LTCHA also incorporates changes that are intended to protect residents as 
consumers or purchasers of goods and services from the home. Similarly, the home needs to 
engage in various transactions in order to deliver LTC services (such as raising of capital and 
related party transactions). Although these regulatory changes may not appear to be directly 
related to hands-on care, they contribute to the conditions of care. I call them conditions of care 
because they can foster or hinder relationships that are critical to the operations of the home. 
They represent another way the government attempts to create and maintain a LTC market since 
the government does not have a direct delivery role in the sector.   
If interpreted from a feminist political economy perspective, extensive rules on governance 
and transactions become necessary because of for-profit ownership and other privatization 
techniques (such as contracting out of food services). This may very well be the case but even if 
there is no for-profit home anymore, there will always be a need to supervise governance and 
transactions within a home for a number of reasons. First, the effect of collective responsibility 
for care means the state now has an interest in how the homes are run and by whom. It follows 
that the state has to give itself the necessary authority to intervene in the operation of the home 
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when necessary. Second, and more importantly, more rules are believed to be necessary in order 
to recognize that residents and their respective homes (even if they are municipal or non-profit) 
are not on an equal footing. How much liberty and agency the state should allow when residents 
enter into contracts with their respective homes depends on the nature of the relationship 
between the parties. Herring explains the image of a typical contractor in law: 
The typical contractor around which contract law is built is the man driven by rationality, 
who is intelligent, powerful, and able to stand up for himself. He is a man who likes to 
drive a hard bargain and get as much as he can from his contracting partner. His only real 
fear in terms of being taken advantage of in a contract is that another will use lies or threats 
against him.1640 
Further, he provides a different vision:  
… a contract law built around vulnerable contractor: one who knows very little about 
what they are purchasing, who lacks the expertise to read complex legal documents, who 
is driven by emotional pressures as much as rational thought, and who enters contract 
without the time, energy, or ability to understand all the issues involved. . . Where 
contracts must be understood as part of the ongoing relationship between the parties and 
where they gain their meaning and value from those relationships.1641  
There is a question whether the consumer protection measures in LTC are based on the image of 
the typical contractor advanced by Herring, or the vulnerable contractor. As I will show below, 
achieving a balance between protection and administrative burden on the home’s part will not be 
easy.  
8.4.1 Corporate governance of homes 
There are a variety of means that the government can use to set expectations about the 
home’s governance. Under the previous regime, although the Nursing Homes Act did not contain 
many requirements about governance, the Program Manual did include sections on governance, 
responsibilities and accountability.1642 The government’s expectation about governance is 
elevated to the LTCHA: “The people of Ontario and their Government: . . . Firmly believe in 
public accountability and transparency to demonstrate that long-term care homes are governed 
and operated in a way that reflects the interest of the public, and promotes effective and efficient 
 
1640 Herring, supra note 245 at 261. 
1641 Ibid at 262. 
1642 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0701-02. 
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delivery of high-quality services to all residents.”1643 Under the LTCHA, there are more 
requirements pertaining to duties of officers and directors and ownership and control of the 
home. It should also be noted that the LHIN-home accountability agreement also contains a 
section on home governance in the representation, warranties and covenants article.1644  
8.4.1.1 Duties of directors and officers 
The Nursing Homes Act and its regulation did not have any reference to the duties of the 
home’s board of directors and officers if the home is a corporation. However, the Program 
Manual contained references to activities that may be undertaken or approved by the governing 
body, board or owner of the home, for example, chair of the board’s sign-off on the annual report 
of the home and approval of the home’s mission statement.1645 In contrast, when it was first 
introduced, the LTCHA adopted the duties of directors and officers of a home that is a 
corporation from the Ontario Business Corporations Act1646 and the Not-for-Profit Corporations 
Act (not proclaimed yet).1647 More recently, Bill 160 has brought the duties to a higher standard: 
“when a licensee is a corporation, every director and every officer of the corporation shall ensure 
that the corporation complies with all requirements under this Act.”1648 Further, a provision is 
added to clarify that corporate prosecution is not necessary for individuals to be prosecuted: “A 
person may be prosecuted and convicted under this section even if the corporation has not been 
prosecuted or convicted.”1649 
8.4.1.2 Ownership and control  
The LTCHA focuses on who has de facto control in the home and attempts to mitigate 
the risk of poor governance by imposing restrictions on certain types of business transactions. 
 
1643 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425 at Preamble. 
1644 Supra note 593 at Article 10. 
1645 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0605-01, page 1 and Tab 1011-02, 1. 
1646 Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16, s 134. “Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising 
his or her powers and discharging his or her duties to the corporation shall, (a) act honestly and in good faith with a 
view to the best interests of the corporation; and  (b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent 
person would exercise in comparable circumstances.” 
1647 Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, SO 2010, c 15, s 43. “Every director and officer in exercising his or her 
powers and discharging his or her duties to the corporation shall, (a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the 
best interests of the corporation; and (b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances.” As of September 27, 2019, the Act has not been proclaimed yet. 
1648 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 69(1). 
1649 Ibid, s 69(4). See also Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 1100 at 17. 
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Consider the following matters: controlling interest,1650 exercising security interest,1651 and 
management contracts.1652 In addition to reporting any changes to the home’s directors and 
offices or in the persons who have a controlling interest in the home as required by Nursing 
Homes Act,1653 the LTCHA also requires that if the home is managed by a corporation through a 
management contract, the home has the same obligations to report with respect to that 
corporation.1654 Further, the Nursing Homes Act required that a person who has a security interest 
in a licence must not exercise that interest without the approval of the Director if exercise of the 
interest would change the ownership or controlling interest in the licence.1655 In contrast, under 
the LTCHA, no person may acquire control over, or interfere with, the operation of a home by 
exercising a security interest except through a management contract. If that happens, the LTCHA 
applies to the person exercising the security interest as if the person were acting as the licensee 
subject to any regulation. No exercise of a security interest results in a transfer of a licence. This 
provision applies, with necessary modifications, to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy as 
though they were exercising a security interest.1656 A home may not be managed under a 
management contract for more than one year (with possible extensions), unless the person 
exercising the security interest receives the same approval from the Director that would be 
required if the licence were being transferred to the person.1657 While Ministry approval is 
always required before a home may allow anyone else to manage the home,1658 the Ministry’s 
ability to control management contracts also has been expanded: Ministry approval may be 
 
1650 The definition is in Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 2(2). “Without limiting the meaning of 
controlling interest, a person shall be deemed to have a controlling interest in a licensee if the person, either alone or 
with one or more associates, directly or indirectly, 
(a) owns or controls, beneficially or otherwise, with respect to a licensee that is a corporation, 
(i) 10 per cent or more of the issued and outstanding equity shares, and 
(ii) voting rights sufficient, if exercised, to direct the management and policies of the licensee; or 
(b) has the direct or indirect right or ability, beneficially or otherwise, to direct the management and policies of a 
licensee that is not a corporation.” 
1651 Ibid, s 107(5). The definition is as follows: ““security interest” means an interest in or charge upon a licence or 
property of the licensee to secure a debt or the performance of some other obligation.” 
1652 The LTCHA does not contain a definition of “management contract”. 
1653 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, ss 9(1) – (2). 
1654 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 108. 
1655 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, ss 10(1) – (2). 
1656 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 107. See also Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 
Compendium to Bill 140, Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007 (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 
2006) at 27. 
1657 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 274(2). 
1658 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 11. 
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subject to restrictions imposed by the Minister and can be withdrawn by the Ministry, 
amendments to the management contract also have to be approved by the Ministry and 
requirements of the management contract are also specified (e.g. management of the home 
cannot be subcontracted or assigned).1659      
8.4.2 Market-like mechanisms to facilitate transactions  
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed how the government attempts to control the capacity of 
LTC while managing fiscal pressures. Optimizing the use of limited public financial resources 
also entails identifying strategies to modify relationships, practices and structures between 
providers and purchasers.1660 This last area concerns strengthened or new measures that were 
intended to facilitate the efficient functioning of the LTC market. Of course, the relationship 
between resident and home is not completely market-based in the neoclassical economics sense: 
those who need LTC cannot freely enter into contracts with homes under any conditions they 
negotiate. The allocation of beds is not completely determined by the price of a bed (in the form 
of resident fees), and residents have preferences other than quantity and price. However, there 
are indications that market-like mechanisms are introduced to correct market failure in order to 
facilitate private ordering in a highly regulated context.1661  
To allow residents, substitute decision-makers and/or their families to make rational 
decisions like consumers do, it is necessary for homes to disclose more information about their 
operations. While homes have always been required to post information publicly, such as 
residents’ bills of rights, accountability agreements, and financial statements,1662 under the 
LTCHA, more information must be posted, such as decisions of tribunals and divisional courts, 
mandatory reporting requirements, minimization of restraints policies, and zero tolerance of 
abuse policies.1663 There are also more ad hoc information requirements once a resident is 
 
1659 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 110; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 276; Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 1656 at 28. 
1660 Joanna Marczak & Gerald Wistow, “Commission Long Term Care Services” in Cristiano Gori, Jose-Luis 
Fernández & Raphael Wittenberg, eds, Long-Term Care Reforms in OECD Countries (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016) 
117. 
1661 For background on neoclassical economic assumptions see Gary Stanley Becker, The Economic Approach to 
Human Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). For an explanation of different types of market 
failures or imperfections, see Windholz, supra note 50 at 36–39. 
1662 Reg 832, supra note 831, s 121. 
1663 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 79; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 225. 
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admitted. For example, homes are required to provide monthly statements about their charges to 
residents instead of quarterly statements, as mandated in the previous act.1664 As well, Cabinet 
may make regulations requiring that certain documents meet certain requirements (called 
“regulated documents”). The home must ensure that these documents are not presented for 
signature to a resident or prospective resident, their substitute decision-maker or family member 
unless the documents comply with the requirements set out in the regulations and the compliance 
has been certified by a lawyer.1665 
Furthermore, to create a more equal relationship between homes and residents (outside of 
medical and nursing care), more legal protections are included in terms of any agreements or 
contracts between a resident and a home. No person shall be told or led to believe that 
prospective residents can be discharged from the home for: not signing a document; voiding an 
agreement; or giving, not giving, withdrawing, or revoking a consent or directive with respect to 
treatment or care.1666 As well, the content of an agreement relating to accommodation is now 
prescribed by regulation instead of the Program Manual.1667 Some of the requirements about trust 
accounts have also been updated to prevent financial abuse: homes are prohibited from holding 
more than $5,000 in trust from any one resident at one time and can no longer charge any 
transactional fees for using the trust account.1668 In addition to regulation of co-payments (see 
above), new requirements about fees include: any fee other than accommodation has to be 
reasonable, much more guidance about when residents do not have to pay for the maximum 
amount and the government has the ability to regulate non-accommodation costs,  restrictions on 
interest charges, and more clarity about non-allowable charges.1669 
Finally, while the LTCHA has shaped residents into consumers, it has also clarified the 
role of government as the ultimate purchaser of goods and services in addition to being the 
regulator of the sector. While the government has always possessed permissive monitoring 
 
1664 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 261; Nursing Homes Act, supra note 786, s 21(3). 
1665 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 80; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 227; Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, supra note 1656 at 20. 
1666 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 81–83. 
1667 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 227; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0902-01, 
page 9–11. 
1668 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 241; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0609-01, 
page 4. 
1669 O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 245, 246–254. 
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power such as auditing,1670 the establishment of LHINs necessitated another layer of monitoring. 
As per the more recent amendments to the Local Health System Integration Act, new procedures 
and requirements are provided for the negotiation of service accountability agreements between 
LHINs and service providers. The additional provisions concern situations where a LHIN and a 
service provider fail to reach an accountability agreement: mandatory meetings between LHIN 
and service provider, notice requirements, and ability of a LHIN to impose an agreement on a 
provider.1671 At the same time, the Ministry retains much financial oversight at both the system 
level and the home level to ensure value for money. For example, the LTCHA and regulation 
prohibit the home from entering into certain types of non-arms’ length transactions, mostly 
related to suppliers, or without the prior consent of the Director where required. The home must 
submit reports to the Director on every non-arm’s length transactions entered into by the licensee 
as provided for in the regulations.1672 As well, the accountability agreement assigns the role of 
receipt of reconciliation reports (a type of financial report) to MOHLTC.1673 As explained earlier 
in this chapter, provincial priorities such as quality of care are embedded and reinforced in 
agreements.1674 
8.4.3 Summary  
The table below summarizes the key changes to consumer protection measures: 
Table 28: Key changes related to consumer protection under the Nursing Homes Act and 
the LTCHA 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Corporate 
Governance   
No provision regarding duties 
of directors and officers 
Ministry’s ability to monitor and 
possibly control those who have a 
controlling interest, exercise of 
security interest and management 
contracts expanded   
 
1670 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 545 at Tab 0604-01. 
1671 Local Health System Integration Act, 2006, supra note 591, s 20. 
1672 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, s 93; O Reg 79/10, supra note 811, s 265. 
1673Supra note 593 at Article 3 and 5, and Schedule B. 
1674 Ibid at Article 8.0 and Schedule B. 
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 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Director and officers must ensure that 
the home complies with all 
requirements in the LTCHA 
Market-like 
mechanisms 
Information disclosure  
Requirements about 
accommodation agreements in 
the Program Manual 
More information disclosure  
More requirements about trust 
accounts and contracts between homes 
and residents (accommodation 
agreements) 
   In the LTCHA, there is a recognition that unrestrained commercial relationships are 
probably not conducive to quality care. This will be an increasingly important topic as more 
complex forms of investment and ownership may emerge in the health sector, such as Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). The downside of this recognition is that more elaborate legal 
interventions need to be in place in order to mitigate the effects of an imperfect market. While 
many regulatory requirements are related to how care is delivered, by whom and when, another 
function of the regulatory regime is to prescribe limitations and restrictions that contribute to 
care conditions. To conclude this chapter, I have considered protection of residents as 
consumers. This last section shifts to the corporate and business activities of the home and 
focuses on the corporate governance of homes and the market-like mechanisms that facilitate 
transactions and exchanges between LTC homes and their residents.  Together, the legal 
interventions discussed here represent the government’s increased efforts to promote economic 
values such as consumer protection, efficiency and value-for-money in the LTC market.  The 
tension here is that if residents (or their substitute decision makers) are treated as consumers who 
are expected to be responsible for their choices, it is necessary to recognize the fact that the 
relationship between home and residents is asymmetrical. The question is whether market-
oriented legal interventions can actually support or undermine relationships between a home and 
its residents. More protections such as information disclosure to residents and/or their substitute 
decision-makers will be more onerous on the home’s part.  
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8.5 Conclusion 
Illustration 7: What the state has to do to support care? 
 
This chapter has explored some of the structural issues inherent in the LTC sector in 
order to examine the relationship between state and citizens. At the core of this chapter is the 
question of how to reallocate dependencies from the private realm to the public domain and 
protect those in caring relationships. In the previous chapters, implicit in my findings is how 
caring relationships in homes are shaped by regulation, which is undertaken by the government 
as well as other bodies. In this chapter, I raised the question of what the state must do in order to 
protect its citizens, in this case LTC residents, beyond defining how care is supposed to be 
delivered at the home level. The first issue is the control of the supply and demand of beds, 
which has significant implications for those who are waiting for a bed and for their caregivers. 
The measures in place raise questions about who are considered more deserving of state support. 
The second issue pertains to about enforcement and compliance in LTC homes. I have explored 
both the formal and the more flexible ways by which the government (in conjunction with other 
bodies) attempts to influence the behaviour of homes and those who work in homes. The last 
issue is about shaping the corporate and business activities within the home, which contribute to 
care conditions. It concerns putting measures in place to protect residents as consumers, 
including corporate governance and market-like mechanisms to facilitate transactions and 
exchanges in the LTC market.  
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To conclude, one could identify a few tensions at the system level. First, there is a tension 
between meeting the needs of individuals and those of the health care system (and presumably 
other patients in the system).  The result is the necessity of stricter admission requirements and 
prioritization, which means LTC admission is also used to support other priorities in the health 
care system, such as Alternative Level of Care pressure. The prioritization categories show the 
tension in defining and negotiating “assessed need”. Second, while the legal framework imposes 
more onerous requirements on homes so the government can intervene, or at least influence the 
behaviour of participants in the sector if necessary (the new compliance system being the latest 
example), the government also attempts to distance itself from some of the quality improvement 
initiatives (delegated to Health Quality Ontario) and some of the financial decisions such as 
those related to the negotiation of accountability agreements with homes. Third, while the 
government continues to assert that it controls LTC policy decision-making at the provincial 
level, including the supply of beds and eligibility for licensing, it also realizes that it must make 
LTC an attractive investment as it relies on the sector not just to operate beds on an ongoing 
basis, but also to make the necessary transformational changes for the future. Fourth, since the 
government is not operating the homes, it must create consumer protection measures that 
recognize the unequal relationship between a home and its residents (who could be considered as 
vulnerable as a result of their social locations) while still allowing homes to be financially viable 
in the long-term.  These tensions will inform our analysis of the implications of the regulatory 
changes discussed so far, which will be presented in Chapter 9.  
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9 Discussion and Analysis 
9.1 Introduction 
The research question that this dissertation seeks to answer is: what are the potential 
implications of the changes made by the Government of Ontario between 2004 and 2018 to the 
legislation and governance of treatment, care and living circumstances within LTC homes for 
persons with disabilities?  In Ontario, the implementation of the LTCHA in 2010, along with 
changes to other statutes relevant to the LTC sector, represented another regulatory milestone in 
the history of LTC in Ontario. What emerges from a comparison of the current and previous 
legal regimes is a clearer picture of the nuances of LTC regulation evolution that have not been 
fully explored in previous studies. This research is motivated by a desire to identify the 
consequences of these nuances for residents, who are most likely to be older women with 
multiple impairments and illnesses. Following feminist political economists1675 and care 
researchers, this research also attends to caring relationships (as understood by Herring1676) in 
homes. The preoccupation here is gaining a better understanding of law and caring relationships. 
Recall the conceptualization of care offered in Chapter 2. In this research, care is understood in 
the following ways: First, care is grounded in caring relationships and is fundamentally 
important for human survival; that care embodies intermingled needs and interests of all 
involved in caring relationships but must also recognize the actual and potentials for harm in 
caring. Second, caring relationships are constructed by law in many different ways and the 
promotion of caring relationships is simultaneously limited by current legal tools such as 
“rights”. Third, caring relationships are shaped by the administrative processes and legal 
structures of public benefit schemes and regulatory regimes, many of which are indicative of the 
role of the state in supporting or neglecting care regardless of the setting in which care occurs.          
This chapter seeks to synthesize the data collected from the comparison as well as the themes 
from the key informant interviews. I hope to tell some of the stories of “how is” regulation 
experienced in everyday life by those to whom regulation is directed as regulated entities or 
beneficiaries1677 i.e., homes, residents, workers, families and friends.  
 
1675 Armstrong & Daly, supra note 163. 
1676 Herring, supra note 112. 
1677 Parker, supra note 68 at 9. 
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In this chapter, I begin with a summary of the findings from my review of changes to the 
regulation of LTC homes between 2004 and 2018. Then I present my examination of some of the 
implications of the regulatory changes, which are divided into the following themes: the 
implications of understanding care as rights and entitlements, searching for changes in 
governance, meaningful participation and finally, law’s response to caring. This chapter 
concludes with this study’s contributions to the following scholarly debates: dementia as a 
disability, protecting the interests of those in caring relationships, and conditions necessary for 
successful implementation of New Governance principles.   
9.2 Summary of the findings from previous chapters 
9.2.1 Changes in legal form  
The current regulatory regime is more prescriptive than the previous regime in the sense 
that more activities in the home are brought under the reach of formal law and are subject to 
standardization in terms of program structure. Equally important, the regulatory regime is also 
more complex in the sense that it is denser and more technical. As Herring explains, the ‘rule of 
law’ requires the law to be sufficiently certain so that citizens can know in advance what the law 
requires of them.1678 Many changes as introduced by the LTCHA (2010) were simply 
requirements elevated from the Program Manual to regulation or statute, with some 
modifications. Such changes in legal form provide greater legal certainty to homes, caregivers, 
residents, families and friends in terms of what care means and how care is delivered in a 
communal or congregate setting. This could be an indication of a greater reliance by the 
regulator (MOHLTC) on the force of law to influence the behaviour of homes and of those who 
work inside the homes. I contend that requirements that define care and specify care delivery 
mean that care is expressed legally in the language of rights and entitlements for services. It 
should be noted that “choices”, respect for individual preferences and accommodation of 
disability are built into the legal framework. It should also be noted that the regulatory regime 
covers a variety of topics and is not uniformly prescriptive. The comparison shows that indeed, 
some requirements were dropped when the LTCHA was introduced.  An area that is notably less 
 
1678 Jonathan Herring, “Older People and Deficiencies in the Formal Care System: Equality and Rights” in Sue 
Westwood, ed, Ageing, Diversity and Equality: Social Justice Perspectives (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : 
Routledge, 2019) 276 at 285. 
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prescriptive than other areas of regulation is the home’s staffing, which still allows considerable 
discretion over how many staff members are hired and scheduled.  
However, even with a highly prescriptive regulatory regime sustained by formal law, 
there are still regulatory gaps. The proliferation of soft law in the form of guidelines and 
standards issued by regulatory colleges, professional associations and accreditation bodies 
provide additional guidance to homes as well as regulated and unregulated health care providers 
on a variety of topics. These guidelines and standards reinforce the expectations articulated in 
formal law and at the same time, give more instructions as to how to meet those expectations, 
and therefore may lead to less interpretation being required at point of care.  
9.2.2 More Procedural Protections for those in Caring Relationships 
The majority of the new requirements concern processes and procedures that create and 
shape the caring relationships between residents and their formal and informal caregivers on the 
one hand, and among residents on the other. One category of changes is the provision of more 
procedural protections to residents when they receive care, encounter caregivers or deal with the 
home. These changes are built around the image of a resident who is vulnerable because of his / 
her age and impairment and therefore needs to be protected from the risks in the home. 
Paradoxically, another image of the resident also emerges: he / she may inflict serious harm on 
other residents and those around him/her because of his/her age-related impairments such as 
dementia. Changes to consent and capacity law, to admission and discharge of resident 
requirements, and to designation of specialized units fall into this category. Another category of 
changes is made to reflect the expectations in other statutes and the Constitution, including the 
AODA, the Human Rights Code of Ontario and the Charter.  These changes ensure that other 
fundamental legal values, such as freedom from discrimination and non-arbitrariness, are 
embedded into the rules that govern the caring relationship. These changes are usually expressed 
in the language of rights and entitlements. The modifications to the Residents’ Bill of Rights, to 
requirements about accommodation of certain types of disability and to additional information 
disclosure requirements fit into this category. The last category of changes allows more formal 
opportunities for residents, families and friends to be included in and to participate in the 
operation of the home. The legal recognition of Family Councils and Residents’ Councils is the 
most significant change. The participation envisioned in law is mainly in the form of problem-
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solving, from giving feedback via satisfaction surveys and Quality Improvement Plans, to being 
conscripted into helping the ministry to detect non-compliance and to monitor enforcement in the 
home.  
9.2.3 Few substantive changes for residents 
The introduction of the LTCHA brings only a few new requirements that can be 
described as truly substantive for residents. The first category of changes deals with safety and 
security of residents and others in the home and possibly imposes restrictions on the autonomy of 
residents. This category includes the duty to create a safe and secure home, the minimization of 
restraining and confining residents, zero tolerance of abuse and neglect, and the management of 
responsive behaviour and altercations. These changes provide greater consistency in terms of 
what the home can or cannot do in order to manage the risks to safety and security, usually 
understood in relation to physical or bodily harm to residents and others in the home. The most 
common techniques employed include reliance on homes having the necessary policies in place, 
increased monitoring and documentation, mandatory reporting and evaluation, and training. The 
second category of changes allows the Ministry to intervene and maintain credible deterrents 
against homes and their employees contravening applicable law as necessary. In addition to 
strengthened compliance and enforcement mechanisms including a wider range of possible 
sanctions for non-compliance, it is evident that the Ministry also relies on more flexible and 
informal means backed by law to influence the behavior of homes.  The final category of 
changes allows the government to further distance itself from the day-to-day home operations 
while maintaining discretion over policy issues and funding commitments. The changes to 
government control over supply and demand of beds, licensing of homes, regulation of co-
payments and fees and funding arrangements belong to this category.  The government also uses 
other tools such as contracts and directives to influence the operation of homes indirectly. These 
regulatory changes, along with the amount of funding provided to the sector, define the capacity 
of the sector to respond to the needs of residents and their informal caregivers.            
9.2.4 Can legal regulation transform care and caring relationships in LTC? 
To summarize, I contend that the majority of changes to regulation and governance to 
LTC between 2004 and 2018 created new or strengthened existing processes and procedures. 
The few substantive changes identified in my review can be described as fragmented efforts to 
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reduce risks to the safety, physical survival and security of individual residents. In the remainder 
of this chapter, I will argue that these changes to regulation and governance – if properly 
understood and implemented - are significant for persons with disabilities. They afford more 
procedural protections to residents in caring relationships and allow residents to make claims for 
inclusion and participation in making care decisions and to influence conditions within the home. 
It is apparent that the majority of the regulatory changes introduced between 2004 and 
2018 created additional sources of legal complexity.1679 In this LTC regulatory landscape, we 
now have multiple organizations (MOHLTC, Health Care Ontario, Local Health System 
Integration Networks, and regulatory colleges, just to name a few), each subject to different 
combination of statutes, contracts, soft law and processes. I agree that legal complexity has been 
increasing in the regulation of LTC and that this can be problematic for those who provide care, 
receive care and support caring relationships. The LTCHA probably has received more scrutiny 
than other statutes such as the Excellent Care for All Act. Many commentators and scholars have 
commented that the LTCHA is highly prescriptive,1680 perhaps substantially more so than the 
previous Nursing Homes Act, Charitable Institutions Act and Homes for the Aged and Rest 
Homes Act. However, it is probably not controversial to suggest that the previous regime was no 
panacea: having a regime composed of three similar statutes and their associated regulations and 
a 800 page-long Program Manual was also onerous for homes, health care providers, 
administrators and so on. In Chapter 2, I referred to Peter Schuck’s work on legal complexity. 
Schuck defines a legal system as complex “to the extent that its rules, processes, institutions, and 
supporting culture possess four features: density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy 
or uncertainty.”1681 Recall that legal complexity can only be located on a continuum: extreme 
simplicity on one end and extreme complexity on the other.1682 The LTCHA can be described as 
more complex on the continuum because of its density, technicality and differentiation. Many of 
the requirements are intended to reduce indeterminacy.   
 
1679 Schuck, supra note 497. 
1680 Armstrong & Daly, supra note 163. 
1681 Schuck, supra note 497 at 3. 
1682 Ibid at 6. 
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Legal complexity has consequences.1683 The benefits and costs of complexity are not 
evenly distributed.1684 In my opinion, the greatest danger of unrestrained increasing legal 
complexity in LTC are delegitimation costs, which occur when rules become so complex that 
their intelligibility and legitimacy decline.1685  It is not hard to imagine that care providers will 
find ways to avoid meaningful compliance when the rules become too complex.1686 For this 
reason, it is important to understand how homes, residents, workers, families and friends 
experience regulation. Are the benefits of a given level of complexity worth its costs?1687 If the 
purported benefits of the LTCHA cannot even materialize, then it would be even more difficult 
to justify the costs of the complexity of the LTCHA (or other related statutes).    
Here is how my argument proceeds. I will first establish that care conceived as rights and 
entitlements can change the conversation about the needs of residents. However, there is a clear 
gap between the promise of rights and their realization. This gap leads to questions about how 
policy, financial and operational decisions are made about LTC in Ontario. Next I will show how 
governance changes shape care and caring relationships re-orienting the process through which 
problems are to be solved in the sector. A significant part of problem-solving is meaningful 
participation. Participation mechanisms have the potential to reconcile dependence and 
autonomy in caring relationships in LTC. One of the strengths of Ontario’s system is that 
participation rights and mechanisms are well established and some are even enforceable. I make 
the case that the key concern is whether the appropriate supports can be provided to residents so 
that disabilities and impairments are not barriers to meaningful participation for those who are 
willing to participate.  I will return to the question of law’s response to care and caring 
relationships as a means to examining an ongoing struggle to define the state and citizen 
relationship. Access to LTC is increasingly restricted in order to limit the state’s financial 
responsibility. The rhetoric of choice is deployed by the government to justify the difficult 
situations of some residents. The choices made with respect to enforcement are illustrative of the 
responsibilities of the state towards those in caring relationships. The greatest weakness in 
 
1683 Ibid. 
1684 Ibid at 26. 
1685 Ibid at 20. 
1686 Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 515. 
1687 Schuck, supra note 497 at 8. 
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Ontario’s system is that the law creates an unwarranted appearance of legitimacy as far as the 
more ‘macro’ conditions of care are concerned.  
9.3 From ‘total institution’ to caring relationships: the significance of 
rights and entitlements in the regulation of care  
In this section, I bring the insights of the interviewees in order to illustrate some of the 
gaps left by the new legal framework. The debates about “care” in the disability literature 
(outlined in Chapter 2) as well as the tensions in LTC identified by feminist political economists 
such as Pat Armstrong (detailed in chapter 4) will be integrated into the analysis. In Chapter 5, I 
made the case for a close study of the ways in which the government attempted to use social 
regulation to control quality of care as a policy objective. Then in Chapter 6, I explained that the 
new legal framework emphasizes resident safety and security as integral to care.  The objective 
here is to identify gaps in the new legal framework regarding care by analyzing the implications 
of understanding care as rights and entitlements. Here I start by examining the priority given to 
the safety and security of disabled residents. This topic is chosen because the government has 
always maintained that resident safety is paramount and the LTCHA is the policy response to 
resident safety. Disability is clearly implicated in the debate about safety, in particular, the risks 
around responsive behaviour. Then, I turn to the limitations of a rights-based approach to care.  
9.3.1 Emphasis on safety and security of disabled residents 
The emphasis on safety and security of disabled residents, including measures to address 
responsive behaviours, seeks to discourage certain potentially harmful practices, such as the 
inappropriate use of restraints and anti-psychotic medications. In previous chapters, I have 
explained why residents may need to be restrained, confined in some way, or put in a locked 
unit. I have also explained the legal protections in place to ensure these measures are not done in 
an arbitrary manner. Legal rules, as well as soft law, may be effective at communicating the 
normative aspects of the prevention of harm in care. However, the effects of legal rules are more 
indeterminate, and the question of how to recognize and evaluate safety in LTC is more difficult 
to answer. This section will examine the tension between the safety of all in a home and the 
liberty of residents. I will then shift to the safety of caregivers, a subject that has received less 
attention than resident safety but is slowly gaining more recognition. The section will end with a 
discussion on responsive behaviour. 
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9.3.1.1 How do we know if residents are safe? 
It is not possible to talk about safety in LTC without making reference to the concept of 
risk. As discussed in Chapter 2, 'risk' has a range of different meanings, and risk and its 
management are becoming increasingly pervasive features of the contemporary world.1688 Risk, 
as Moran puts it, “has increasingly come to occupy a central place in analyses of the regulatory 
state.”1689 More importantly for the purpose of this research, regulators use risk control as the 
language to explain and justify regulatory decisions.1690 One view is that safety-related outcomes 
in LTC are generally those considered to be largely preventable through close monitoring of risk 
factors at critical points during care.1691  
Since the implementation of the LTCHA, the manifestation of risk control and its 
deficiencies takes a number of forms in public policy debates.  In Chapter 4, I mentioned 
deficiencies in care attracted intense media and public scrutiny. First, reporting on LTC 
performance, including resident safety, is based on seven indicators: wait times, antipsychotic 
medication use, falls, physical restraint use, pressure ulcers, pain and depression.1692 The 
indicators, which are published by Health Quality Ontario, are supposed to tell us how the LTC 
system and individual homes are performing in terms of risk reduction in these areas. Second, 
safety is defined in relation to the presence or prevalence of adverse incidents or events that are 
deemed to be harmful or tragic, such as abuse and neglect, homicides and suicides. An example 
is the annual review of homicides in LTC by the Geriatric and Long-Term Care Review 
Committee.1693 Third, safety is also described in relation to the government’s actions (or 
inactions) of monitoring, evaluating and responding to risks in homes, including those related to 
the safety of residents. Examples include the Long-Term Care Task Force on Resident Care and 
 
1688 David Garland, “The Rise of Risk” in Richard V Ericson & Aaron Doyle, eds, Risk and Morality (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003) 47 at 50. 
1689 Moran, supra note 37 at 407. 
1690 Windholz, supra note 50 at 39; Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: 
Theory, Strategy, and Practice, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 292–294. 
1691 Shawna M McDonald & Laura M Wagner and Andrea Gruneir, “Accreditation and Resident Safety in Ontario 
Long-Term Care Homes” (2015) 18:1 Healthcare Quarterly 54 at 55. Five areas of care considered to be amenable 
to such risk reduction in LTC are: (1) falls, (2) physical restraints, (3) urinary catheters, (4) pressure ulcers and (5) 
infections. 
1692 Health Quality Ontario, “Long-Term Care Sector Performance”, online: <http://www.hqontario.ca/System-
Performance/Long-Term-Care-Sector-Performance>. 
1693 Geriatric and Long term Care Review Committee, 2016 Annual Report of the Geriatric and Long term Care 
Review Committee (Toronto: Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario, 2017). 
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Safety1694 and the 2015 Auditor General Report on the Long-Term Quality Inspection 
Program.1695 Fourth, safety is also understood and articulated in terms of non-compliance with 
the LTCHA, such as summary statistics about critical incidents, number of non-compliances 
identified through annual comprehensive inspections and enforcement actions taken by the 
Ministry.1696 These statistics are supposed to tell us which homes are considered “high-risk” and 
which ones are not. These sources of information were referred to by many of the interviewees 
and the interviewees’ comments should be understood within this context. 
Before outlining the themes that emerged from the interviews, I will add that collectively, 
these sources of information can tell us something important about how safety is understood: 
residents are safe (or not safe) not just because the intrinsic factors of the residents (e.g. 
dementia) or the resources available in the home (for example, adequately trained staff to deal 
with residents exhibiting aggression), but also because of the government’s timely and 
appropriate intervention (for example, in the form of inspections) when there is information 
about identifiable risks (for example, complaints and critical incidents). The point of contention 
is how the government should intervene in the name of keeping residents safe. I will return to 
this point about the government’s obligation to intervene later in the chapter.  
9.3.1.2 Safety of all vs. Liberty of residents? 
In the feminist political economy literature, one issue that is identified as problematic is 
that the safety and security of residents is prioritized over other needs or preferences of 
residents.1697 If understood from a disability perspective, this is indicative of a “cared for” 
attitude of professionals. Here I will add one more nuance about this tension in the scholarly 
debate. As explained in Chapter 6, measures to keep residents safe may also restrict their liberty, 
which in turn contains an autonomy dimension. Implicit in the debate is how a resident’s 
disability is implicated in the justification for restrictions on liberty. A recurring theme in the 
interviews is the question of where residents can be safe. To prevent serious bodily harm, the 
 
1694 Long Term Care Task Force on Resident Care and Safety, supra note 562. 
1695 Auditor General of Ontario, supra note 1588. 
1696 Ibid; Ontario, Legislative Assembly (Standing Committee on Public Accounts), Official Report of Debates 
(Hansard), 41st Parl, 2nd session,  (26 October 2016); Legislative Assembly. Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts, supra note 599. 
1697 Baines & Armstrong, supra note 514; Armstrong & Daly, supra note 696. 
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government’s first attempt at legally restricting the liberty of certain residents with the necessary 
safeguards was through the secure unit provisions included in the original LTCHA (Bill 140).1698  
Those provisions were never proclaimed and have since been repealed by Bill 160 in 2017. That 
means the home did not really have any statute-based authority to detain residents who attempted 
to leave the home or to detain residents in the dementia unit (locked unit) within the home for 
prolonged periods.  
The issue of contention is not the existence of such locked units in the LTC system. One 
elder law lawyer reflected on the rationale for those unproclaimed provisions:  
We fought for those [secure unit] sections to get in because we wanted to protect 
the rights of people [who] object going in and to have a hearing.  We weren’t 
objecting to the fact there were locked units.  But [since] you’re being detained, 
you should have some rights to challenge that or ask for a review.  But that was 
fair.  That’s in the mental health system, how come it’s not in long-term care?1699   
When I asked about the period when there was a gap in the appropriate detention authority (other 
than common law) to put residents on the dementia unit (or floor), the health law lawyer shared 
her thoughts on the difficulties facing the home, families and the incapable residents:  
What is the threshold to invoke the common law such that someone can be 
detained without the authority of the Mental Health Act? Are staff almost always 
at the threshold of common law authority for that person? (clearly that cannot be 
the case) . . . By invoking  the common law very broadly, we are saying that this 
whole group of people belong in locked units, and in Ontario there is no real 
authority at this time to do this.. Right now, there is no authority, and there is no 
rights advice.  There’s no rights information.1700   
Further, it is not clear if consent to live in a locked unit is always properly addressed:  
 . . as far as I can tell, the home does not necessarily assess a resident for capacity 
to consent to live in a locked unit. Homes will say we just do it because the 
substitute decision-maker said it is okay - even though the substitute decision-
maker does not specifically have the authority. To be frank, the adult children of 
an incapable resident would probably not want anyone from the home to advise 
the incapable resident that she could not leave and that she could challenge it.1701  
 
1698 An Act respecting long-term care homes, 2006 [Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007], s 43. 
1699 Interviewee # 12, (2017). 
1700 Interviewee # 1, (2017). 
1701 Ibid. 
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But the health law lawyer also pointed out that the opposite can be true in some homes by 
offering the following example:  
a substitute decision-maker wants an incapable resident to roam free.  Well, 
there’s a construction site though between here and that corner store.  Do you 
appreciate that your father can fall down the hole?  No, he must be free ... Staff of 
the home ask me what should we do?  Should we let him?1702  
The point is that by not implementing the secure unit provisions in the LTCHA and the 
complementary provisions in the Health Care Consent Act, the implication is that the autonomy 
of some residents (specifically, those most likely to be living with advanced dementia) has been 
restricted without due process. That means some decisions about placing residents in locked 
units could have been made in an arbitrary manner, i.e., possibly inconsistent with sections 7 and 
9 of the Charter. This also presented an untenable situation to the home, as administrators and 
health care providers do not have much guidance on the application of the common law duty in 
particular situations. It is not possible to ascertain how many residents or homes have been 
affected by the absence of appropriate authority. Regardless of the actual number, my objection 
relates to too little attention has been paid to protection of the fundamental rights of residents 
when they are the most vulnerable.  
The latest unproclaimed provisions (2017) pertaining to the confinement of residents are 
unlikely to end the controversies around placing residents in a locked unit (or a confined area). A 
number of organizations commented on these provisions when Bill 160 was at the committee 
stage.1703  The Advocacy Centre for the Elderly provided a legal analysis of these provisions. 
Some of its objections are worth repeating here. First, the legislation should allow only for the 
confining of incapable residents; capable residents should only be able to be confined in 
accordance with the common law.1704 Second, the test for recommending confinement (where it 
is only to be recommended where there is a significant risk of serious bodily harm to self and 
others) conflicts with the principles in the Health Care Consent Act. As well, if the issue is 
 
1702 Ibid. 
1703 Legislative Library and Research Services, Bill 160, the Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients 
Act, 2017: Summary of Recommendations (Toronto: Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2017) at 21–22. 
1704 Advocacy Centre for the Elderly, Submission to the Standing Committee on General Government: Bill 160 
Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients Act (Toronto: Advocacy Centre for the Elderly, 2017) at 16–
17. 
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potential serious bodily harm to self and others, the care is beyond the scope of a LTC home.1705 
Third, there is no ongoing review process or rights advice for the residents who are being 
confined.1706   
My reading of the Advocacy Centre for the Elderly’s critique is that there is an 
underlying tension between the rights of individual residents and the ability of the home to 
protect the safety of all residents and those who work in the home. Recall that in the civil mental 
health system, involuntary committal is primarily directed to the benefit of the individuals so that 
they will regain their health.1707 In LTC, lawful confinement may be recommended if there is a 
significant risk that the resident or another person would suffer serious bodily harm. This begs 
the question of how much weight we should give to the rights of others when we interpret the 
rights of those who live with impairment effects and justify any potential restrictions of those 
rights. One way of understanding this tension is through the debate about “rights as trumps”, as 
articulated by Jennifer Nedelsky.1708 Recall that rights are understood as triggers for a dialogue 
of democratic accountability, which works best with a relational approach because it is an 
optimal way to describe conflicting interpretations of rights.1709 Then the question is whether we 
are willing to explore rights that could structure caring relations differently. But first, I will 
explain how safety is understood if the caregiver experience is taken into account.          
9.3.1.3 Are caregivers safe? 
In a caring relationship, Herring argues, the interests and identities of the two people 
become intermingled.  Thus, it becomes impossible to consider the welfare or rights of any one 
party in isolation.1710 It follows that discussion about resident safety cannot be complete without 
consideration of the safety of formal and informal caregivers.  The intertwined nature of 
caregiving was evident when the key informants discussed safety in LTC homes. One could 
 
1705 Ibid at 17–18. 
1706 Ibid at 21–22. 
1707 McCorkell v. Director of Riverview Hospital 1993 CanLII 1200 (BC SC), supra note 1038 at 47. “… A 
protective statute and a penal statute operate in dramatically dissimilar contexts. Strict and narrow criteria for the 
detention of persons in a criminal law context reflect our society's notions of fundamental justice for an accused 
person and protection of the public is a foremost consideration. But in the field of mental health, the same criteria 
would defeat the purpose of the legislation which is to help seriously mentally ill people in need of protection.” 
1708 Nedelsky, supra note 248 at 232. 
1709 Ibid at 234. 
1710 Herring, supra note 112 at 4. 
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argue that a clear gap in approaching safety in LTC homes is that resident safety and worker 
safety are addressed separately, often at different policy tables and then regulated by distinct 
statutes and regulators. As noted above, the Ministry of Labour led the workplace violence 
prevention activities but MOHLTC is responsible for resident safety and security issues. While 
the measures to protect resident safety are extensive (at least on paper, as described in Chapter 
6), the right to a safe workplace is more circumscribed. One interviewee explained the matter 
succinctly: “If I'm safe working there, it’s safe for you to be a resident there.”1711  There are 
indications that this separation may be slowly being dismantled.  
Just how unsafe LTC homes are from the perspective of caregivers is hard to pin down. 
In Chapter 4, the feminist political economy literature research findings about workplace 
violence were outlined. The discussion here adds to that by providing updates on recent 
initiatives in Ontario. The major labour unions (CUPE, Unifor, ONA, OPSEU and SEIU)1712 all 
have launched campaigns to increase awareness of violence experienced by workers in the health 
care sector. According to the Ministry of Labour, the health care sector represents 11.7 per cent 
of Ontario’s labour market and is the largest sector impacted by violence in the workplace. 
Violence claims make up 11 per cent of the lost-time injuries in hospitals.1713 
The union representatives I interviewed reiterated the long-standing problem of violence 
in the whole health care sector, in other words, not just LTC, although the problem has indeed 
received more government attention in recent years.1714 One interviewee provided context for her 
union’s workplace violence prevention campaign:  
… our members say loud and clear [that] they were, for lack of a better word, 
tired of being punching bags, that violence is not part of the job …  They were 
done with being beaten at work, they were done with being verbally assaulted by 
 
1711 Interviewee # 11, (2017). 
1712 Canadian Union of Public Employees, “Stop the violence against us”, (5 October 2017), online: 
<https://cupey.ca/stop-violence-against-us>; Unifor, The Unifor Healthcare Council Action Plan 2016 (Unifor, 
2016); Ontario Nurses' Association, “ONA – Workplace Violence | Recognize Violence. Report It.”, online: 
<http://violence.ona.org/>; SEIU, “‘Break the Silence’: Workplace Violence Survey (Anonymous)”, online: 
<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/breakthesilenceonworkplaceviolence?sm=RiOpAicD7V0uDpGMjEzqDYZZiJm
1d%2bdglkawhZtV4kE%3d>; OPSEU, End Workplace Violence By making safety a priority in mental health 
(OPSEU, 2016). 
1713 Ministry of Labour, News release: Keeping Health Care Professionals Safe on the Job Ontario Moving Forward 
with Recommendations to Prevent Workplace Violence (May 15, 2017) (Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 2017). 
1714 Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711; Interviewee # 15, (2017). 
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patients, their families, and that was what triggered us to have a much more 
aggressive anti-violence campaign.1715  
The interviewees expressed the view that violence should not be part of a caregiver’s 
experience and explained factors that contribute to the violence problem. Part of the problem in 
LTC is that violence becomes normalized: “There's something different about violence in long-
term care and it is about the fact that we’ve normalized it completely… by calling it a responsive 
behaviour.”1716 Another union interviewee also described their members getting assaulted 
verbally or physically as daily occurrences.1717 The union representatives were careful to 
acknowledge that incidents involving residents should not be normalized neither. Further, they 
pointed out that the workplace safety solutions proposed by unions also support resident 
safety.1718 
The issue of workplace violence has received more attention in recent years and some of 
the measures undertaken by the government are located outside of formal law. I examine these 
initiatives as government responses to the problems in the sector. Two initiatives are examined 
below: the Workplace Violence Prevention in Health Care Leadership Table and the workplace 
violence portion of the Quality Improvement Plans. 
In May 2017, the Workplace Violence Prevention in Health Care Leadership Table 
released a report that includes 23 recommendations to address the issue of workplace violence in 
the hospital sector. The Ministry of Labour and the MOHLTC established the Leadership Table 
to improve workplace safety culture with respect to violence, to reduce violent incidents, and to 
make health care settings safer for both staff and patients. Initially, the Leadership Table focused 
on preventing workplace violence against nurses in hospitals; later it expanded its activities to 
preventing workplace violence against all workers in the broader health care sector. The second 
phase of the work of the Leadership Table included all workers in hospitals and LTC homes.1719 
 
1715 Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711. 
1716 Ibid. 
1717 Interviewee # 15, supra note 1714. 
1718 Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711; Interviewee # 15, supra note 1714. 
1719 Ministry of Labour, supra note 1713; Ministry of Labour, Workplace Violence Prevention in Health Care 
Progress Report (Ontario: Ministry of Labour, 2017). It does not appear that  
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As part of Phase 2, a number of resources such as checklists were developed for use in the LTC 
sector.1720 
HQO has been using more flexible and non-coercive means to address workplace 
violence as a quality issue in the health care system. According to HQO, there is increasing 
recognition that worker safety must be included in the discussion about safety as one of the six 
dimensions of quality.1721 As noted in Chapter 8, in the 2017/18 QIPs, the subject of workplace 
violence prevention was included, with the following instructions: “Describe what steps your 
organization is taking to monitor, reduce, and prevent workplace violence.” The question was not 
mandatory, and organizations were not provided with specific instructions for answering it 
beyond the topic and question described above. Therefore, many organizations may not have 
described the full extent of their work to address workplace violence in their QIPs. Some 
organizations added specific indicators to track their performance on measures related to 
workplace violence prevention.1722 85 percent of LTC homes addressed workplace violence in 
their submitted QIPs.1723 HQO conducted a qualitative analysis of all of the content related to 
workplace violence prevention in the 2017/18 QIPs.1724 There was no separate analysis on sub-
sectors such as LTC homes, but the HQO analysis did include examples from individual LTC 
homes.1725  According to HQO, most organizations described prevention strategies, response 
strategies, and measurement and reporting strategies. Many organizations mentioned the 
importance of working in partnership with other sectors, as well as with police services. Further, 
many organizations described efforts that aligned with legislative requirements, and many 
described work that exceeded legislative requirements.1726  HQO encourages “organizations to 
consider how they can continue moving toward leading practices as they focus on addressing 
workplace violence prevention through a quality improvement lens.”1727  For 2018-19, all sectors 
(hospital, primary care, long-term care, and home care) will address this question: “Please 
 
1720 Public Services Health & Safety Association, “Workplace Violence Prevention Resources – Hospital, 
Community Care and Long Term Care”, online: <https://www.pshsa.ca/workplace-violence-leadership-table-4/>. 
1721 Health Quality Ontario, Workplace violence prevention in the 2017/18 Quality Improvement Plans (Toronto: 
Health Quality Ontario, 2017) at 4. See also Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1475. 
1722 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1721 at 5. 
1723 Ibid at 6. Workplace violence was addressed in the narrative section of QIPs. 
1724 Ibid at 7. 
1725 Ibid at 12, 14, 16 and 17. 
1726 Ibid at 22. 
1727 Ibid. 
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describe how workplace violence prevention is a strategic priority for your organization. For 
example, is it included in your strategic plan or do you report on it to your board?”1728 A 
mandatory indicator measuring workplace violence is included in the QIP for the hospital sector 
only.1729 
While it is a positive sign that safety is acknowledged as a dimension of quality that can 
and should include both patient and workplace safety, the impacts of these initiatives on safety in 
the LTC sector remain to be seen. First of all, the hospital sector is the first sector to complete a 
mandatory quality indicator that measures the number of workplace violence incidents reported 
by hospital workers within a 12-month period.1730 We will not have quantitative data about 
prevalence of violence (in terms of incidents) in the LTC sector in the near future. Second, while 
many resources are available to assist organizations in analyzing data and identifying 
opportunities for improvement,1731 there is no reference to factors that may contribute to violence 
in the workplace, such as inadequate staffing resources and unresolved workplace issues related 
to racism and sexism (reported in the feminist political economy literature). Third, as HQO 
stated, the QIP indicator measures the number of reported violent incidents – and workplace 
violence is known to be underreported.1732  While building a culture that supports reporting may 
help collection of baseline data, the reasons for under-reporting are complicated and will need to 
be addressed. 
The interviewees representing unionized workers provided important insights into why 
critical incidents may be under-reported, including incidents where caregivers are harmed and 
require medical attention. Their comments help explain why mandatory reporting obligations 
alone (or reliance on self-reported complaints) may not be very effective in promoting safety of 
residents and caregivers.  According to one union representative, even when the union has 
communicated to members about their rights (such as rights to refuse unsafe work and 
whistleblower protections), some frontline workers hesitate to report because they may have 
language barriers, or may be newcomers to Canada (especially in the GTA).  They are afraid to 
 
1728 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1626 at 2. 
1729 Ibid at 2 and 7. Each hospital is required to describe its change ideas and associated process measures in the 
QIP. 
1730 Ibid at 2. 
1731 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1626. 
1732 Ibid at 3. 
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speak out because their jobs are everything to them. They may come from a cultural background 
that does not encourage speaking out and they may simply focus on just doing the job when they 
are in the LTC facility.1733 Another union representative added:  
We do have nurses who struggle to question authority and some of it’s 
generational, too.  And it depends on how you were educated as a nurse, too . . . 
we have three distinct sets of nursing education out there. . . then you mix in our 
internationally educated nurses . . . we’re a very diverse, multicultural group, but 
with a very different skill set, cultural background.1734   
Two union representatives stated that their members are concerned about retaliation from their 
colleagues if they report any wrongdoing.1735 Another union representative explained that while 
the union really promotes reporting, recording and follow-up, members sometimes hesitate to 
report because they would be pressed to defend their actions:  
When they report to the employer an aggressive behaviour, or an incident with a 
resident, the first question to them often is what did you do to provoke this, or 
how did you approach, the first questions are based on their actions, not on the 
incident itself.1736  
The consequences of reporting can be far-reaching for regulated health professionals when they 
try to speak up to protect a resident and/or advocate for their colleagues:  
. . . the home terminates the nurse for cause. . . The union files a grievance but 
grievance process takes time. We could assist that nurse in doing a reprisal 
complaint under the Long-Term Care Home Act . . . the employer has to report 
that termination to College of Nurses. . .  So, that nurse has three, at least, separate 
processes going on . . .  If you know this is the risk, why would you do that unless 
it was something big and bad like sexual abuse, or big or bad like you had to 
transfer somebody to a hospital?  The normal stuff, the stuff that they’ve 
normalized, I don’t think gets reported hardly ever.1737      
To conclude, despite being touted by the government as the solution to many problems in 
the LTC sector, the LTCHA has its limitations as far as worker safety is concerned. On the one 
hand, the actual results (based on medical and clinical data) are mixed: while a few safety-related 
quality indicators have improved, incidents involving residents have persisted.1738 This may be 
indicative that existing hard law and soft law are having some influence over the behavior of 
 
1733 Interviewee # 9, (2017). 
1734 Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711. 
1735 Interviewee # 9, supra note 1733; Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711. 
1736 Interviewee # 15, supra note 1714. 
1737 Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711. 
1738 Geriatric and Long term Care Review Committee, supra note 1693. 
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caregivers as the strengthened regulatory requirements correspond to those indicators. On the 
other hand, the issue of safety, if understood as encompassing resident and caregiver safety, 
requires more work beyond the LTCHA. Next, I turn to how disability is used to structure the 
understanding and response to safety related issues.     
9.3.2 Responsive Behaviour – what’s in a name? 
As explained in previous chapters, the new legal requirements in the LTCHA reflect in 
some limited way the idea that the environment can be disabling and the focus should be on the 
accommodation of differences including those related to disabilities.1739  Changing the 
environment can mean others have to – though not always - adjust to the disabled person, not the 
other way round.  The importance of having assistive devices available in the home, of 
consideration of communication barriers in care and of assistance with Activities of Daily Living 
should be self-evident. The LTCHA represents a small step towards tackling the barriers 
stemming from the interaction between multiple impairments (including cognitive impairment) 
and an institutional environment that was not originally designed for the types of residents we 
have today. This is particularly important for those living with advanced dementia because the 
stimuli in the environment (e.g. noise) can be triggers for their responsive behaviour.  The danger 
is that disability is used as a justification for lawful interference with the body (person). At the 
root of the problem is that the health care system in Ontario is ill-equipped to respond to the 
cumulative effects of aging and age-related impairments.  
A positive step in the new legal framework is the change in the legal language to talk 
about the needs of those who live with certain types of impairment (although the LTCHA does 
not actually say dementia) and exhibit behaviour issues. However, the expression “responsive 
behaviour” also comes with its own set of difficulties. My interviewees were all aware of the 
practical challenges while firmly rejecting stigmatization of those who exhibit behavior issues.  
According to one union representative,  
when you give the growing violence in LTC a nice name like a responsive 
behaviour, it makes it more normalized and more acceptable than calling it what it 
is, which is violence perpetrated against somebody else, it just is.1740   
 
1739 Lai, supra note 637. 
1740 Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711. 
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She then added an important insight about how violence affects everyone in a caring 
relationship,  
not every dementia patient has responsive behaviours as aggressive, not every 
mental health patient will be aggressive, it is a subset of them.  My struggle with 
the word responsive behaviours is just that it minimizes the impact it has on 
everyone around them, and I don’t think we should stigmatize these residents … 
There has to be a way for people to know who are those residents . . . the term 
responsive behaviour also takes away from how other people get to protect 
themselves and at least be alerted to risk.”1741  
As one elder law lawyer explained:  
the responsive behaviour language is really trying to get away from that blaming 
of the resident ... I don’t think the term responsive behaviour diminishes the actual 
difficulties of dealing with that . . . it is to really bring attention to the fact that the 
staff have to watch out, that they have to manage the situation.  And staffing 
should be sufficient to meet those needs, to also protect the staff, because it’s 
extremely challenging to take care of some of these people.1742    
 My interviewees also had very different views about the actual impact of recent efforts 
to improve the LTC system’s responses to residents’ responsive behaviours.  Medication 
management, use of physical restraints and responsive behaviours are closely related issues and 
recognized as such in hard law and soft law. One industry association representative explained 
that “Homes have been involved in antipsychotic reduction, long-term care physicians have been 
involved, so there’s been a huge, huge push, so everybody is catching up on reducing 
antipsychotics.”1743 According to the representative from the Ontario Long-Term Care Clinicians 
(OLTCC),  
one item that’s been big in the news over the last few years has been antipsychotic 
use without an indication in long-term care and there’s been a successful effort to 
reduce the number of antipsychotics that are prescribed without an indication.  
There are four or five specific indications.  It’s not that all the prescriptions 
outside of those four or five indications are inappropriate, it’s just that it is a 
measure.1744   
One union representative cautioned that the picture may be more complex than it appears and 
expressed reservations about the sustainability of the recent efforts to reduce the use of 
antipsychotics: 
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. . . our nurses will tell you, because of the push by government to get rid of the 
antipsychotic drugs, what happens is it’s a horrible, vicious cycle.  The doctors 
will order antipsychotic drugs and get the behaviours controlled. Sadly, the 
resident will have not a lot of quality of life because of the horrible side effects of 
antipsychotic drugs, but the people around that resident are safe and the resident is 
safe from harming themselves. But then there's this push to take the antipsychotic 
drugs away, so then the doctors start weaning them off.  And at first, the residents 
are okay … then something will trigger them and they’ll be back on the drugs and 
we’ll do the cycle again. But in the meantime, they could hurt someone, or 
themselves again.1745     
Interviewees continue to be critical of or at least acknowledge the limitations of how our 
current health system responds to the complex needs of those experiencing severe cognitive and 
other impairments in LTC, despite the legal safeguards in place to protect residents and 
caregivers. One union representative explained how some LTC residents may be unwanted at 
different points of care:  
. . . what our homes are saying is they [cognitive impaired residents] do need 
acute care.  They need acute care to bring these conditions back under control, at 
which point, then they should come back to long-term care. But what happens is 
they go over here [hospital], a psychiatrist sees them, gives them an antipsychotic 
med, puts them right back in an ambulance because they know if they keep them, 
they’ll never get them out of the building again. Our nurses tell us it’s futile to 
send them to hospital because they're only going to be back in three hours and 
pissed off because they got taken somewhere.1746  
The elder law lawyer recounted examples of former LTC residents being “dumped” (or 
discharged) by their homes, and further explained that homes could still use various legal devices 
(such as Form 1 under the Mental Health Act and leave provisions in the LTCHA) and there are 
few remedies – legal and otherwise – for her and her clients: “There’s almost no remedy.  That’s 
the problem.” 1747But she was also careful to point out the importance of advocacy:  
This is the world of elder law. We try to find little hooks in something. . . Often 
when we were involved, because they [hospitals and LTC homes] knew we were 
lawyers, we also went to the mat for our clients, a lot of things worked out. But 
think of the people who don’t have the lawyers to find all those little nuanced 
arguments. They wouldn’t get anywhere. I think some places would concede to 
us, because they said, it’s only ACE [Advocacy Centre for the Elderly] and they 
only get a few clients . . . And they didn’t want us to go into courts . . . But they 
 
1745 Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711. 
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knew we were free.  We would argue it, potentially argue it.  They may have 
given up.1748       
The final point is that interviewees also discussed the limited potential of and problems 
with the LTCHA in relation to responsive behaviours. They are similar to the criticisms about 
regulation expressed in the feminist political economy literature. One industry association 
representative remarked:  
The provisions are … not really designed to meet the needs of residents. . . the 
provisions are fine . . . they are just basic provisions. Have a program, make sure 
you’ve got goals. They do the PDSA [Plan-Do-Study-Act] cycle on all of their 
programs. You must have a program, you must implement it, you must evaluate 
it, you must fix it and you must do this on an annual basis. That’s basic, there’s 
nothing extraordinary in that.1749  
One union representative commented on the prescriptive nature of the LTCHA in relation to the 
individual needs of residents:  
Some of the triggers in long-term care, we can't fix. . . If the trigger for me is it’s 
too noisy and I'm in one of these 32 bed ward units, and when I go to have lunch 
there's 31 other people plus staff sitting in that area, what does that look like?  . . .   
And some of this is really difficult because of how restrictive the Long-Term Care 
Homes Act is.1750  
She further elaborated how difficult it is to provide individual care:  
. . . Where do you take me and another staff so the home still meets that 
requirement of feeding me within the prescribed hours and I'm supervised?  . . . 
We hear this all the time that they [Ministry] wrote the Act as prescriptive as it is 
because people just weren't doing the right thing. But they’ve also now tied 
operators’ hands and caregivers’ hands so tightly, it’s almost impossible to make 
the exception for one person.1751    
9.3.3 Limitations of a rights-based approach to receiving care  
To wrap up the analysis of the significance of rights and entitlements in the regulation of 
care, I will present some of the limitations of and tensions around residents’ rights that emerged 
from the interviews. Disability scholars such as Tom Shakespeare and Marta Russell have raised 
objections to a focus on civil rights which implies a liberal solution to disability.1752 Relational 
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theorists such as Jennifer Nedelsky and Johnathan Herring also pose constructive questions about 
rights and an individualistic understanding of the person.1753 As explained in Chapter 5, the 
Residents’ Bill of Rights reflects the fundamental rights that residents possess as citizens as well 
as service rights while they remain in the home. Equally important, the home has a duty to 
ensure that it is a safe environment. In addition, the LTCHA also provides for a number of 
participatory rights to residents and families as a collective by way of Family Councils, 
Residents’ Councils and other mechanisms (which will be addressed later in this chapter). An 
obvious criticism of rights in LTC is that the LTCHA does not actually confer any resident rights 
to minimum care in the form of number of hours of direct care or staff-to-resident ratio standard, 
a frequently argued point in the feminist political economy literature.1754 I will address some of 
these structural issues in the last part of this chapter. I do not question the importance of the 
existing rights but want to highlight some of the difficulties of interpreting and applying these 
rights in homes and to explore how some participants in the sector respond to those difficulties. I 
will revisit the issue of asserting rights in legal forums later in this chapter in the section on 
access to justice.  
9.3.3.1 Implementation of rights 
One critique of rights in LTC homes generally (not just in Ontario) is that these rights are 
too abstract and peripheral, and obscure to the everyday struggles that many people in LTC 
homes have to undergo.1755 “Not all rights imputed to old people living in nursing homes can 
actually be exercised by them or, more importantly, are central to their day-to-day life. Some 
rights are simply too peripheral or require interests that nursing home residents seldom 
possess.”1756 Here I will attend to some of the “subtle concrete complexities”1757 associated with 
living in LTC homes and its linkage to exercise of rights.   
Despite the fact that the Bill of Rights has existed for a long time (with various 
amendments over the years), there are strong indications that its implementation is still a 
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problem on the ground. The elder law lawyer offered her insights with respect to how homes 
may interpret the rights in the Bill of Rights by referring to the experience of her previous 
clients.  She used the example of the right to have visitors and meet people in private to illustrate 
how a right may be interpreted independently of other rights and duties, rendering it devoid of 
connection to the actual circumstances of residents: 
A client whose husband was coming every Friday night to see his wife. He’d 
close the door. And then she’d scream. He was forcing himself on her. The home 
originally said she has a right to visitors. This woman was totally incapable and 
he was just using her as a sexual object. The home has a duty to protect her. But 
the home asserted that there was nothing in the Act that really said that.1758   
The elder law lawyer then pointed out to the home the provisions on abuse prevention:  
They [the home] don’t understand there’s a whole body of law about duty to 
protect.  And it’s there. But it’s not exactly in it. So, they interpreted this, she has 
a right to have visitors. Well, you also have the duty to protect. The provisions 
work together. No, they’re not trained. They’re not taught that stuff.1759   
The existing rights may be premised on oversimplification of potential harms in a home. 
The Bill of Rights and other provisions such as altercations between and among residents are 
intended to create boundaries around residents so that they can be protected from their caregivers 
or other residents who experience cognitive impairments. Less attention has been given to 
situations where incapable residents are intentionally harmed by other, more capable residents. 
The elder law lawyer remembered an elderly woman client who ended up in a LTC home.   
She was extremely passive due to her dementia. She had never had sex with 
anybody other than her spouse. Six men were having sex with her on a regular 
basis. She did not know what was going on. The home thought this was fine 
because she was not screaming. When the daughter found out a couple of months 
into her mother’s residency, she pulled her mother out of there immediately. The 
home wasn’t protecting the resident from sexual assault . . . These men were 
capable ... they [the home] really have a duty to protect people who can’t 
consent.1760   
At the same time, it is useful to consider the possibility that homes may have real 
difficulties in applying several rights in particular situations. One lawyer representing homes 
provided important insights into how homes interpret the rights of residents when their capacity 
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may be in question and there are competing rights. And then, Ministry inspectors may bring their 
own interpretations of the factual situations.  
I’ve come across situations where a resident may be forming an intimate 
relationship with another resident, one of whom has a mild to moderate cognitive 
impairment.  In these instances, homes struggle with assessing whether the 
resident who has some level of cognitive impairment has the capacity to make 
their own decisions about their sexuality. Homes are required by their governing 
legislation to protect residents from sexual abuse, but they are also obliged to 
fully respect and promote friendships and relationships between residents.  There 
have been contradictory findings amongst Ministry inspectors about what homes 
must be doing in such circumstances.  One inspector might find that the residents 
had a right to pursue the relationship, and a different inspector may say there was 
an obligation to protect the residents from abuse and the home should not have 
allowed that relationship to develop.  This is one example of the competing rights 
and obligations which homes may face.  In two instances, I’ve had Ministry 
inspection orders rescinded at the Director level because it’s a very grey area.1761     
When asked about whether there are any particular rights that people have more difficulty 
understanding and implementing, the Ontario Association of Residents’ Councils (OARC) 
representative felt that subjective rights can be tricky:  
We’re treating people with dignity and respect, for example.  What does that look 
like?  What does that feel like?  . . . An example is if a resident wishes to walk 
and they can walk, but if the staff members put their walker on the other side of 
the room, it can give the message to that resident that your independence and your 
ability to take personal risks is less important than our ability to protect you.  So, 
there’s a balancing of personal risk and personhood. It’s recognizing the person as 
a whole, that they have the ability to make decisions for themselves.1762  
The right to privacy is also tricky in a congregate setting:  
You have the right to privacy. If you’re living amongst residents who are living 
with cognitive changes, you most likely will have people coming into your room, 
touching your things. That kind of thing is something that new residents are often 
horrified by.1763  
But she pointed out a more fundamental challenge in terms of recognizing the rights of residents, 
especially those who experience more profound cognitive changes:  
It’s difficult for staff members sometimes to view that person as a whole person, 
because they’re meeting them in a state where dementia has led them down that 
journey where they have expressive behaviours, etcetera. To see that person as a 
whole human being — and again, that’s around dignity and respect and valuing 
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the person as a whole — is very tricky when you’re working with people who 
have dementia and can’t speak for themselves.1764       
A lawyer representing homes provided more examples of practical difficulties with 
reconciliation of various rights in the Residents’ Bill of Rights. The difficulty is not always about 
the home or caregivers refusing to acknowledge a particular right. One of the examples concerns 
the right to make lifestyle choices, which must be reconciled with the resident’s right to share a 
room with a roommate in accordance with their mutual wishes:  
I had a situation in which two residents – one male and the other who was born of 
the male sex but identified as female – shared a room.  The resident who 
identified as female began openly dressing as a woman and wished to be 
addressed as a woman.  Their male co-resident had great difficulty understanding 
and respecting these choices – he felt he could not explain the situation to his 
visitors (including grandchildren) and requested a different roommate.  As a long-
term care home, it is difficult to respect one resident’s gender identity and 
expression, and reconcile that with the right of another resident to share a room 
with another resident according to their mutual wishes.   Who, if anyone, do you 
relocate in these circumstances? Respecting beliefs and lifestyle choices, and 
accommodating transgender residents, can be a challenge in long-term care 
homes.1765       
Finally, it is not easy for residents and families to demand remedies for violation of rights 
ex-poste. As explained in Chapter 5, the LTCHA allows residents to enforce the Residents’ Bill 
of Rights as if a contract has been entered into between the resident and the home. The elder law 
lawyer explained the rationale of such a private right of action. This idea of enforcing residents’ 
rights like a contract came from American legislation. She was very practical about the utility of 
such a right:  
It’s important to have that in the Act, because you never know where there’s 
going to be a case where you’d want that. You don’t want to be totally dependent 
on the inspection system. You want the private right of action, because something 
could happen. And I predict it might happen someday in the future, because now 
the tighter and tighter and tighter the resources you have, the more likelihood 
you’ve got some people looking at litigation.1766  
The prospect of actually using litigation can be summarized as follows:  
Whether anybody has used that?  I can tell you if we hadn’t sued people on it, it’s 
unlikely you’re seeing any actions on that. And even if people do start an action, 
it will be settled very quickly, because the homes would be foolish to let 
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somebody go through with the private right of action. It’s cheaper just to settle it.  
It’s typical civil litigation.1767   
The elder law lawyer’s view is similar to Herring’s view about legal interventions. Herring 
suggests that although there are reasons to be wary of legal interventions, it would be wrong to 
dismiss their role entirely.1768 The availability of credible threat is an important tool in the 
toolbox:  
I want it to be retained in there, but we never thought it would even be that useful.  
It’s a good threat.  As an advocate for those clients, we wanted to know that we 
had that ability if we had to pursue something.1769       
9.3.3.2 Practical and concrete ways to respect rights  
LTC participants, for example residents and advocates, are also taking their own 
initiatives to safeguard those rights on the ground and explore non-legal means to make those 
rights meaningful in their own local settings, considering the particular problems of their own 
constituencies. The description below resembles in some way Nedelsky’s idea of rights 
understood as triggers for a dialogue of democratic accountability – but in a caring relationship 
setting. An example is the “Through Our Eyes: Bringing the Residents’ Bill of Rights Alive”, led 
by the OARC. This program is intended to guide LTC home teams of staff members and 
residents to co-develop and co-facilitate education sessions about the LTCHA’s Residents’ Bill 
of Rights. It is emphasized that residents living with cognitive changes can participate in the 
development and delivery of the education. Participants are challenged to re-examine how rights 
education is developed, who is involved in the process, and the program ties all efforts back to 
the lived experience of residents. 1770  I asked the OARC’s executive director for background and 
context of this program and she pointed out that based on discussions from a focus group, it was 
evident that there was a disconnection between the lived experience of residents and the actual 
education about the Bill of Rights:  
There was so much education being poured into the annual mandatory core 
education for staff members, but behaviour, generally speaking, was not 
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changing. . . It’s because the training was theoretical, there was no personal 
connect to the information. And part of that is, again, culture change, where well-
meaning, professional caregivers do to a resident, as opposed to engaging with a 
resident.  So, we had a brainstorming session, and we thought if residents are 
invited to be part of the solution, then what does that look like?1771  
She elaborated:  
As soon as you can make that personal connection to a resident and their lived 
experience and how it feels to them to be treated in a certain way or to witness 
certain actions or behaviours or messages around them, that’s when the light bulb 
went off.1772     
The realization of rights of families and friends also present its own difficulties. Legal 
recognition of a particular type of participation mechanism or process does not always 
automatically produce meaningful collaboration and engagement. Legal recognition is best 
described as the beginning of an on-going dialogue to implement collaboration and engagement 
in response to the specific conditions in the home. The Family Councils Ontario (FCO) stated 
that the LTCHA is not a perfect piece of legislation but it provides an important framework and 
important powers to family caregivers through the Family Council.1773 However, the practical 
reality of organizing a Family Council cannot be underestimated.  According to the FCO, one of 
the challenges, is working with the administration of the home:  
Because Family Councils’ membership changes a lot, the home needs to be able 
to help Family Council come together and often that’s a difficult thing for the 
home, it’s not in anybody’s job description particularly. Often it’s a matter of the 
home putting up a poster saying if you want to have a Family Council, go ahead 
or contact the activation coordinator.1774  Often Family Councils will be talking 
about a particular care issue, or something within the home that they’re concerned 
about and the home may or may not be able to respond to that concern, or fix it.  
The communication then breaks down and it can become a real point of 
contention for both the council and the staff.1775 
The FCO also reflected on its mandate and role, and identified the need to work with the 
home in order support Family Councils properly. FCO explained that its mandate is to support 
Family Councils and family members. However, to better support family engagement in LTC 
homes, the organization has shifted its focus from solely engaging families to also supporting 
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LTC home staff to understand the great value of Family Councils and to help Family Councils 
come together.1776  Although the LTCHA is clear that the administration of the home must 
cooperate with the Family Council, it is evident that successful implementation of Family 
Councils requires more than just legal recognition. It is not a question of the administration of 
the home being unhelpful or obstructive (although that is possible too), families and friends can 
also have difficulties running a Family Council that accomplishes its legal mandate. I will return 
to the topic of Residents’ Councils and Family Councils later in the chapter.           
On its own, having strengthened mechanisms to promote a sense of inclusion and 
participation will not resolve the more pressing issues facing the sector today, such as extensive 
wait times, inadequate resources for those living with advanced dementia, and precarious care 
work. Far from it. More important, and perhaps even more difficult, is the task of teasing out the 
fundamental values that these processes are intended to nurture and examining what barriers 
exist to prevent them from functioning properly.  I will return to the theme of meaningful 
participation later in this chapter.            
9.3.4 Summary  
Care conceived as rights and entitlements can change the conversation about the needs of 
residents: instead of being labeled as passive care recipients being managed by their caregivers, 
residents are considered to be bearers of rights. One could conclude that the changes to 
regulation and governance still reflect the assumptions of a medical model of disability, but have 
incorporated elements that are consistent with Shakespeare’s interactional model of disability. 
The discussion here also draws on the work of Herring and Nedelsky in order to set out what 
care in LTC is like if we consider all of those who are in caring relationships. There is also clear 
skepticism towards formal law and government agencies as the protectors of residents' and 
formal caregivers’ rights and needs. In short, there is a clear gap between the promise of rights 
and their realization. This gap is created by the ways in which policy, financial and operational 
decisions are made and by whom. This leads me, in the next section, to take a step back and add 
some remarks about the governance of the sector.    
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9.4 The Significance of New Governance approaches   
While many regulatory requirements are indeed dedicated to describing how care is to be 
provided, another group of regulatory requirements is intended to create processes and 
procedures. While they may not have any immediate impact on the nursing care provided or 
activities of daily living of residents, these requirements can influence the “conditions of care” 
(as used by Armstrong and others) and caring relationships within the home. They go hand in 
hand with other changes to the governance of the sector, backed by various degrees of legal 
formality. The discussion below is also informed by the limits of protections offered by 
conventional law discussed in the previous section. While the precise issues addressed in the 
previous section may appear to be very different than the ones being addressed in this section, 
the common thread is how law is both a problem and solution at the same time. The law here sets 
parameters about governance in the form of processes and procedures. Here, I proceed from the 
assumption that it is prudent to examine whether participants in the sectors are actually using 
these strengthened or new procedures.  It is important to understand the inherent limitations but it 
is equally important to avoid the mistake of thinking that these processes are completely 
irrelevant.  
There are many changes to processes and procedures mandated by law that represent a re-
orientation of how problems in the sector are to be solved.  As noted in Chapter 2, to paraphrase 
various scholars in the regulation and governance literature such as Lobel, regulation is about 
problem-solving. I am not suggesting that there is a complete departure from state-centred 
approaches, because as Jason Solomon puts it, regulatory design rarely occurs on a blank 
slate.1777 I now turn to the question of what these processes mean for the governance of the 
sector, in particular, the changing boundaries between the public, private and non-profit bodies 
that make up the sector. The analysis here is informed by a larger scholarly debate about shifting 
relations of power and shifting boundaries between public and private that make up the state 
itself.1778 
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The governance-related changes will be analyzed with the arguments and counter-
arguments in the New Governance literature. The objective here is to use the prescriptions of 
New Governance scholars to categorize these changes and examine their significance in terms of 
problem-solving.  The discussion here is intended to contribute to the concept of problem-
solving as a continuous activity1779 by expanding on who are involved, how are they involved 
and why. I explore what types of problems are being addressed by these mechanisms. It should 
not be surprising that given the “quality of care” discourse (see Chapter 4), many of these 
mechanisms are linked to quality. 
I have described examples of the manifestation of New Governance approaches in the LTC 
sector elsewhere. I argued that these approaches are not about de-regulation; in fact, they are 
created and sustained by law. They are about strengthening or creating additional processes and 
procedures for participants—homes, residents, families, advocacy groups, industry organizations 
and government—to problem-solve challenges in the sector.1780 The government maintains and 
gives itself as much discretion as possible over structural issues in LTC, such as the capacity of 
the system, overall funding levels to the sector and working conditions. Here, I will expand on 
this point about problem-solving by adding more recent approaches that are consistent with New 
Governance principles. I will then point out what other developments in the sector deviate from 
New Governance principles. 
Despite a generally more prescriptive legal regime, it is evident that additional processes 
and procedures of various degree of legal formality, are in place to facilitate problem solving. 
This period is also marked by the appearance of new (or transformed) actors in the health care 
system, some are permanent organizations created by statutes or other instruments, but some are 
short-term bodies created to carry out particular tasks. All are located outside of the provincial 
government, but still work closely with the provincial government. Some of these processes and 
procedures concern the workings of internal organizations, while others are intended to facilitate 
relationships between stakeholders. These developments are significant for residents, their 
families and friends. Together, with the additional non-state actors, the processes and procedures 
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represent new ways of understanding and solving problems in the sector. The table below 
summarizes New Governance approaches and their corresponding examples in the sector: 
Table 29: Manifestation of New Governance principles in the LTC sector 
New Governance 
principle 
Examples in the LTC sector  
De-centralization   Implementation of regional health authorities (LHINs)  
 Behavioural Supports Ontario  
 Health Quality Ontario  
Participation of non-
state actors 
 Long-Term Care Task Force on Resident Care and Safety  
 Workplace Violence Prevention in Health Care Leadership Table 
 Ministry’s obligations to post information   
Flexibility and non-
coerciveness 
(softness in law) 
 HQO’s quality standards  
 Guidelines issued by professional associations, some financially 
supported by public funding  
Collaboration and 
collaborative process 
 Residents’ Councils and Family Councils 
 Home’s obligation to consult residents, families etc on its mandate  
 Requirements to post draft regulations  
 Consultation requirements with respect to licensing  
Fallibility, 
adaptability and 
dynamic learning 
 Quality Improvement Plans (submitted to HQO) including 
involvement of Residents’ Councils and Family Councils 
 Quality improvement and utilization review system 
 Quality indicators published by the HQO  
 Satisfaction surveys 
 Resident Quality Inspections 
Enforced self-
regulation 
 Enhanced legal protections for whistleblowers   
 Immunity for Residents’ Councils and Family Councils 
347 
New Governance 
principle 
Examples in the LTC sector  
 Formalized evaluation requirements for various programs 
mandated by the LTCHA  
 Mandatory reporting obligations imposed on homes and staff, 
volunteers and family and friends 
9.4.1 Who are the new (or transformed) problem-solvers?  
For Lobel, “the new model [New Governance] is better positioned to accept uncertainty 
and diversity, advancing iteratively toward workable solutions. The role of law is to promote 
practices that allow revision and improvement.”1781 Problem-solving responsibilities are more 
diffuse and not always clear. It is evident that in the LTC sector there is a gradual transfer of 
problem-solving responsibilities to localities and to the private sector, including to private 
businesses and non-profit organizations. The provincial government continues to retain 
regulatory functions and to set strategic directions for the health care sector, however operational 
decisions, such as managing performance relationships with providers, are also made locally.  In 
Chapters 5 through 8, I have made frequent references to the work of Health Quality Ontario 
(HQO); obviously it is one of the new problem-solvers. Next, I will highlight the work of the 
LHINs and Behavioural Supports Ontario (BSO). 
9.4.1.1 LHINs 
The establishment of the LHINs under the Local Health System Integration Act1782 is the 
most obvious example of decentralization. Not only are the LHINs managing accountability 
relationships with the homes, and in some cases, assisting MOHLTC to deal with compliance 
issues, they also play an important role in the delivery of health services, in the form of planning 
and co-ordination. The LHINs are now responsible for negotiating and executing Long-Term 
Care Home Service Accountability Agreements (LSAAs) with individual homes as per the Local 
Health System Integration Act. This process can be hailed as an example of New Governance as 
the process is decentralized and involves ongoing participation of non-state actors. The LSAA 
 
1781 Lobel, supra note 319 at 396. 
1782 Local Health System Integration Act, 2006, supra note 591. 
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Advisory Committee provides advice to and supports the development of the LSAA template 
agreement, as well as schedules and tools to ensure alignment with provincial strategic directions 
and streamline processes. The Committee comprises representatives from homes, industry 
associations, Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO), MOHLTC, LHINs, and various 
municipalities.1783 A Work Group has been established to support the Committee. This Work 
Group comprises representatives from the LTC sector, including leadership from various homes, 
industry associations, MOHLTC, LHINs, and various municipalities. Based on direction from 
the LHIN CEOs, the Work Group produces documents and recommendations.1784 
The LHINs are also involved in managing the performance of homes in terms of 
compliance. In the 2015 Auditor General report, one finding was that while inspection results for 
homes with longstanding problems were provided to LHINs, such results were not used by 
LHINs to monitor the performance of homes through their service accountability agreements. 
Instead, LHINs rely on the Program Director of MOHLTC to take actions whenever the Director 
considers it necessary to do so. The Ministry agreed that it should review the roles and 
responsibilities of the LHINs with regard to the use of inspection results in monitoring the 
performance of long-term-care homes.1785 At a standing committee meeting, the MOHLTC 
emphasized how a LHIN would be invited to the meeting with a home with significant non-
compliance issues: 
. . . we have a protocol whereby we are engaging with the LHIN locally prior to 
meeting with the licensee to talk about the issues that we’ve identified in that 
home, and talk about anything that the LHIN may be seeing on their side—any 
concerns that they may have. What we do is set up a meeting with the licensee. 
The LHIN is invited to that so that they can be a part of that discussion and then 
part of that quality improvement journey going forward, because they obviously 
have a real commitment and interest in well-being and making sure that those 
homes succeed. So we involve them at that level.1786   
9.4.1.2 Behavioural Supports Ontario (BSO) 
The extent of de-centralization also intensified on the program delivery front. Consider the 
example of Behavioural Supports Ontario (BSO), which is not managed centrally at the Ministry.  
 
1783 LHINs, LSAA Indicator and Schedules Education Session Fiscal 2018/19 (2017). 
1784 Ibid at 8. The group is called the LSAA Planning and Schedules Work Group. 
1785See Section 3.8 “Long-term-care Home Quality Inspection Program” of the Auditor General Report. Auditor 
General of Ontario, supra note 1588 at 386. 
1786 Ontario, Official Report Journal of Debates (Hansard) Wednesday 26 October 2016, supra note 1696 at 27. 
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As discussed in Chapter 6, one of the changes incorporated into the LTCHA is the responsive 
behaviour provisions.  These provisions obligate the home to take steps to understand the 
meanings behind residents’ behaviours and to address the needs of residents. More intense 
monitoring and documentation are also provided for.1787 However, the LTCHA does not spell out 
the particular entitlements, supports and services to be provided to residents with responsive 
behaviour or their formal and informal caregivers. The programming part (via fiscal transfer) 
comes in with the launch of the Behavioural Supports Ontario. In 2010, the Ministry announced 
$40 million in funding toward the development of an evidence and experience-based framework 
to enhance the availability of supports and services to persons living with responsive 
behaviours.1788 In 2016, Ontario increased base funding to Behavioural Supports Ontario to $54 
million.1789 Behavioural Supports Ontario provides services to individuals living in LTC homes, 
independent living settings and acute care environments.1790 According to the Ministry, the 
techniques and methods used as part of this initiative in LTC have helped contribute to lower 
rates of anti-psychotic drug use, of injury to staff and to lower use of restraints.1791 
The governance of BSO reflects the principle of de-centralization. When BSO was 
launched, leadership was provided by a Northern LHIN, Health Quality Ontario, the Alzheimer 
Society of Ontario, the Alzheimer Knowledge Exchange (AKE) (now called the brainXchange) 
and MOHLTC. As of April 2015, a provincial coordinating body to support and facilitate the 
work of the initiative re-emerged. The Provincial Coordinating Office is currently located in 
Northern Ontario.1792 One notable feature of the BSO committees and advisories is that while 
MOHLTC staff participate as members or make presentations at meetings, all the committees 
and advisories are chaired by staff from the LHINs, BSO, Health Quality Ontario or the health 
 
1787 Reg 79/10, supra note 811, ss 53 and 55. 
1788 Behavioural Supports Ontario, supra note 1150. 
1789 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, News release: Ontario Investing Additional $10 Million to Enhance 
Behavioural Supports Program (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2016); Ministry of Health and 
Long Term Care, supra note 613. 
1790 Michelle Grouchy, Tommy Wong & Nancy Cooper, “Implementation of Behavioural Supports Ontario (BSO): 
An Evaluation of Three Models of Care” (2017) 19:4 Healthcare Quarterly, online: 
<http://www.longwoods.com/content/25013> at 69. 
1791 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 1789. 
1792 Behavioural Supports Ontario, supra note 1150; Behavioural Supports Ontario, Behavioural Supports Ontario 
Annual Report 2016-17 (North Bay: Behavioural Supports Ontario, 2017) at 36–37. 
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sector.1793  But at the same time, BSO has reporting or information sharing obligations to 
MOHLTC.1794  At a standing committee meeting, a government official also claimed that “[t]he 
ministry maintains strong engagement with BSO stakeholders, including the BSO Provincial 
Coordinating Office and … the lead LHIN for BSO.”1795   
Further, according to the Ministry, as part of their mandate for local system integration and 
planning, LHINs are accountable for embedding and sustaining the BSO Framework and the 
management of the ongoing BSO allocation. Each LHIN has established “unique and locally 
appropriate service models.”1796 At a standing committee meeting, a government official insisted 
the BSO is flexible, local and constantly improving:  
We really left it to the LHIN[s] to design how this should be implemented on the 
ground in concert with their mandate… All of the LHINs have developed locally 
appropriate implementation plans, and I’ll also go further to say they’re constantly 
refining those. As the populations change or as the needs of their providers 
change, they’re constantly tweaking it.1797  
According to one study, there was wide variation in the allocation of funds, based on 
demographic and population health statistics related to the over 65 and "at risk" population in 
each LHIN. Each LHIN then determined its own implementation of the BSO program and 
rolled-out different models, training and support for BSO staff, and focused on different 
partnerships among health service providers and community agencies.1798 By 2015, three distinct 
BSO models were operating within the LTC sector.1799 
 While funding still comes from the MOHLTC (as central authority), decisions are also 
made locally. The LHINs have a lot of flexibility to determine how the BSO is structured. Each 
LHIN makes decisions according to “local” conditions. But the pitfall is that there are variations 
 
1793 Behavioural Supports Ontario, supra note 1792. The governance structure of the Behavioural Supports Ontario 
includes: Triple LHIN Senior Advisory, Steering Committee, Operations Committee, Systems Performance & 
Evaluation Advisory, Knowledge Translation & Communications Advisory, and Lived Experience Advisory. 
1794 Behavioural Supports Ontario, Behavioural Supports Ontario Annual Report 2015-16 (North Bay: Behavioural 
Supports Ontario, 2016); Behavioural Supports Ontario, supra note 1792 at 12–13. For example, throughout the 
fiscal year, all 14 LHINs submitted their quarterly activity tracker data to be collated by the Provincial Coordinating 
Office prior to submission to the MOHLTC. BSO Activity Tracker Data captures the work of BSO-aligned staff, 
such as number of referrals, number of residents supported and number of family members supported. 
1795 Official Report Journal of Debates (Hansard) Wednesday 26 October 2016, supra note 1696 at P-40. 
1796 Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, supra note 613. 
1797 Official Report Journal of Debates (Hansard) Wednesday 26 October 2016, supra note 1696 at P-40. 
1798 Grouchy, Wong & Cooper, supra note 1790 at 69. 
1799 Grouchy, Wong & Cooper, supra note 1790. 
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in program design across Ontario. These variations in turn have implications for the care that 
residents receive. I take no position as to which model is the most suitable. My point here is that 
decentralization, which is advocated by New Governance scholars, can also create 
inconsistencies. 
The involvement in health care delivery of bodies located outside of central government is 
not new in the health care system. Historically, provincial governments have delegated a wide 
range of powers over and responsibilities for governance to self-regulating health professionals 
in Canada. Just like HQO, the LHINs and BSO are situated somewhere between self-regulation 
and command-and-control. These bodies are publicly funded, receive their mandates from the 
government, and have the authority to solve some of the most pressing problems in the health 
care system. They are created by law and have specific legal authorities with respect to 
participants in the sector, but at the same time also use more flexible means (such as guidelines) 
to influence behaviour of homes. It is within this context of more diffuse problem-solving 
responsibilities that we need to analyze third way approaches, and therefore, it is within this 
context that the approaches described below should be understood. These non-state actors have 
their own mechanisms for engaging health care professionals, health facilities and users of the 
health care system. This has implications for how problems are solved in the sector, which will 
be my focus next.  
9.4.2 Experimentalism in Practice  
Problem-solving relies on industry participants’ own attempts at experimentalism from 
within a prescriptive legal framework. As explained in Chapter 2, experimentalism is a central 
premise of the New Governance literature. In a New Governance model, as Bach explains, 
“program improvements occur over time through the experimentalist, evaluative, and 
orchestration process, and baselines are continuously reset as experimentation and evaluation 
lead to better and better results.”1800 More importantly, the government’s role is conceived as a 
facilitator of the experimentalist enterprise, rather than as a centralized rule-maker.1801 It is 
obvious that government expects the participants in the sector to do more problem-solving on 
their own because it believes homes receive funding to provide care and the LTCHA, the 
 
1800 Bach, supra note 347 at 110. 
1801 Ibid. 
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Excellent Care of All Act and the accountability agreements provide the necessary directions for 
delivering quality care. As one industry representative remarked, “the ministry’s interest is only 
in providing a legislative framework and then ensuring that there’s compliance to that 
framework. Beyond that, they really don’t care. It’s all about here’s the law, what you have to do 
and we’re going to see whether you’re complying, yes or no.”1802 This remark is similar to the 
idea that conventional regulations are binary i.e., they specify fixed conditions of compliance in 
which an actor is either in compliance or not.1803 The government’s reliance on the LTCHA as 
the government’s answer to the problems in LTC sector is obvious.   
Experimentalism is supposed to occur as homes continue to work towards compliance with 
the LTCHA. What we also have here is a variety of means – some more formal legally than 
others - that prompt the participants in the sector to detect and resolve problems in LTC homes 
on their own through common techniques under the guise of continuous quality improvement. 
For example, through submission of QIPs, homes are encouraged to find out and implement best 
practices, to set appropriate targets for a number of quality indicators based on provincial targets, 
and to conduct their own program evaluations of the required programs as mandated by the 
LTCHA. Improvements to quality of care are expected to materialize through the introduction 
and repeated use of the right techniques, as predicted by experimentalism.  
The government’s role as “facilitator of the experimentalist enterprise”1804 is more residual 
in the case of LTC. Instead of telling homes directly which best practices should be adopted or 
assisting homes to meet legislative requirements, the government’s role is more indirect. To 
advance the government’s reform in the LTC sector, there are three main ways: development of 
quality standards by HQO, funding to professional organizations to disseminate best practices 
and the threat of more law being introduced in the event of non-compliance of existing 
legislation. As explained in Chapters 5 and 6, despite a highly prescriptive LTCHA, there are 
still areas where soft law overlaps and adds to formal law. The HQO is the latest provincial body 
created1805 to issue quality standards and other guidelines (such as patient engagement) as part of 
a larger initiative to carry out the provincial agenda in quality care. The ministry can request 
 
1802 Interviewee #10, supra note 1743. 
1803 Simon, supra note 321. 
1804 Lobel, supra note 319 at 377; Solomon, supra note 309 at 595. 
1805 The HQO is the reincarnation Ontario Health Quality Council. 
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quality standards in topic areas that support government priorities and provincial policy 
direction.1806 While not mandatory, these standards and guidelines also address problems facing 
the LTC sector, such as responses to individuals living with dementia. As well, each quality 
standard is accompanied by a plain-language patient reference guide for patients, caregivers, 
families, and the public.1807 
The government also funds organizations to disseminate best practices by revising or 
developing guidelines, to conduct pilot projects or to provide more training. In other words, the 
government also supports professional associations to develop solutions for their own members 
while allowing maximum flexibility. Consider the example of the Registered Nurses’ 
Association of Ontario (RNAO)’s Long-Term Care Best Practices Program. Funded by the 
MOHLTC,1808 this non-mandatory initiative supports LTC homes in the adoption of evidence-
based practices that support systematic and consistent approaches to providing quality care for 
residents.1809 This is how the linkage to formal law is described: “The LTC Best Practices 
Toolkit contains a variety of evidence-based resources and materials for implementing 
commonly used BPGs [Best Practices Guides] to assist homes in the work they are doing to meet 
the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care regulations.”1810 There are indications that the 
resources made available through this initiative are used by participating homes to experiment as 
well as to meet legal requirements. In 2015, the RNAO conducted a survey of Ontario LTC 
homes.1811 Respondents reported that the benefits of using RNAO resources included preparation 
for LTCHA quality inspections (41.5 per cent) and support in responding to LTCHA quality 
inspection findings (37.9 per cent).1812 Of the top three clinical concerns identified by 
 
1806 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1628 at 6. 
1807 Ibid at 4. 
1808 The RNAO receives funding from the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care for special projects. Funding 
($11.4M in 2017) is provided for a variety of projects, including Long-Term Care Best Practice Co-ordinators RNs 
and administration. Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Financial Statements for the year ending October 
2017 (Toronto: Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2017) at 14–15. 
1809 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, supra note 1633. 
1810 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Long Term Care Best Practices Initiative: working together towards 
excellence in Long Term Care (Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario). 
1811 Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Long-Term Care Best Practices Program Newsletter (Summer 2015) 
(Toronto: Registered Nurses Association of Ontario, 2015) at 7. The survey was largely completed by the LTCHs' 
directors of care, followed by administrators and leaders in other clinical and management roles. The response rate 
was 31 per cent. 
1812 Ibid. 
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respondents, two were related to required programs: falls prevention and management (67.3 per 
cent) and pain management (26.1 per cent).1813 More recently, the RNAO has also positioned its 
guidelines as a means to achieve compliance. In its submission on Bill 160, the RNAO 
recommends:  
Fines should only be imposed as a last measure because the sector is already 
under-resourced. Instead, at the written notice stage, the inspector should 
recommend that non-compliant homes use the Registered Nurses’ Association of 
Ontario’s Long-Term Care Best Practices Guidelines Program to help them 
achieve compliance. At a compliance order stage, or for repeated violations, the 
use of these guidelines should be mandatory.1814  
One could argue that initiatives led by non-state actors such as this are consistent with New 
Governance organizing principles.   
That said, the government is well aware that it might also need to be more than a 
“background institution”1815 and step in too. Therefore, the latest amendments to the LTCHA 
(2017) allow the Minister to issue policy or operational directives. The pre-emptive threat of 
more formal legal rules that can be introduced quickly is always in the background. As the 
LHINs begin to possess more powers as per the latest legislative amendments and are more 
involved in regulatory processes, it remains to be seen how quickly the government would resort 
to formal rules in the future. The availability of voluntary guidance with the threat of more 
formal law in the background is not necessarily a counter-argument to experimentalism. It 
remains true that these guidelines can duplicate formal law and may not even be implemented. 
As explained in previous chapters, the guidelines can fill in gaps and address matters that are not 
easily addressed in formal law or at least not currently addressed adequately.   
The need for experimentalism, for example in the form of industry-oriented guidance, also 
relates to how the government sees its role as the source of information. The lawyer representing 
homes explained that under the previous legislation, homes had compliance advisors, as opposed 
to inspectors.  When compliance issues arose, the homes had a compliance advisor to guide 
them. When the LTCHA came into force, compliance advisors were replaced with inspectors 
who no longer provide any advice to homes.  She speculated that the Ministry would not want an 
 
1813 Ibid at 8. 
1814 Legislative Library and Research Services, supra note 1703 at 22. 
1815 Simon, supra note 321 at 183. 
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inspector to make a finding that was contrary to advice provided by another Ministry inspector, 
so advice is not given.  A preferable approach is to have a representative within the Ministry who 
is not an inspector who could still act as a compliance advisor, so that homes could raise issues 
and ask questions of the Ministry – before and after issues of non-compliance arise.1816    
Matters that are clinical or medical in nature are obvious examples of the necessity of soft 
law. As the representative from OLTCC explained, LTC is an evidence-free zone:  
. . . we do practice in an evidence free environment. . . the guidelines that apply to 
so many of the medical conditions that we deal with are not based on the frail 
elderlies that account for four-fifths or more of the people we look after in long-
term care … the physicians and other care providers in long-term care really do 
need to become the experts in giving good medical care, and well-referenced 
resources, such as Choosing Wisely, are good supports to us as the experts in 
long-term care.1817   
However, other topics that require more contextual and purposive analysis also lend 
themselves to soft law. I have identified three areas where soft law is potentially helpful. First, 
issues that require careful consideration of gender and disability and other social locations may 
be addressed in soft law.  Compared to statutes, the RNAO guidelines surveyed include more 
discussion about how impairment and disability should be taken into consideration when nurses 
provide care. An obvious reason for this is the increasing emphasis on how dementia affects 
patient care. It is a positive development to direct health care providers to consider how 
impairments may become barriers to receiving care. Second, the guidelines do recognize the 
social and economic context in which patients / family members are located (e.g. reference to 
social determinants of health). But these guidelines only address the more structural issues 
indirectly, through organization and policy recommendations. The downside is that, LTC 
residents, or those with disabilities more generally, are described as vulnerable and may 
reinforce the image of residents as helpless and needing to be protected.  The objective of 
protection in turn leads to more interferences and interventions that may not be consistent with 
resident autonomy. Third, these guidelines include more references to how families might be 
involved in care. In the LTCHA, and HCCA, capable residents make health care decisions and 
substitute decision-makers make decisions for the incapable residents in accordance with the 
 
1816 Interviewee # 18, supra note 1761. 
1817 Interviewee # 4, supra note 1744. 
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principles of the HCCA. In reality, even for residents who can make autonomous decisions, there 
may be family members involved. Family members do not always agree and health care 
providers need to navigate the family dynamics and related legal issues, such as power of 
attorney. It is more useful to address the role of families in a principled way.          
9.4.3 Transforming into what – New Governance Processes and 
“Command-and-Control Regulation” in a Highly Regulated Sector  
In parallel with the more flexible and informal approaches, elements of the “old” 
command-and-control regime (as an ideal type positioned as the opposite of New Governance) 
remain in LTC. Below, Table 30 summarizes the elements of the “old” regime and their 
corresponding examples in LTC. The details of these examples are included in Chapters 5 to 8.  
It should be noted that some of these examples may belong to more than one category. The most 
obvious areas where “command-and-control” regulation continues to dominate are enforcement 
of and compliance with applicable law and mandatory reporting. These elements clearly reflect 
the old regime’s reliance on adversarial enforcement and public litigation but they could also be 
described as “top down” rules.  
Table 30: “Command-and-control” elements and examples in LTC 
Elements  Examples  
Top-down rules  Provision of care 
 Admission eligibility and prioritization requirements 
 Discharge rules 
Rights focused   Residents’ Bill of Rights 
 Consent to treatments and LTC admission 
 Zero tolerance of abuse and neglect  
Inflexible rules  Safety of residents, including use of restraints and confinement 
 Regulation of co-payments and other fees paid by residents 
Centralized system  Licensing of homes (including transfer and revocation of 
licences)  
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Elements  Examples  
 Funding of the system (including development of financial 
policies) 
Adversarial 
enforcement / public 
litigation 
 Long-term Care Quality Inspection Program 
 Mandatory reporting  
 Review and appeal processes   
 Agreements with homes  
Three observations can be made about this hybrid model. The key observation that can be 
made from the co-existence is that the boundaries between the old and the new approaches are 
blurry. Solomon explains how the idea of blurring boundaries pervades New Governance 
regulation and thought.1818 One could argue that the blurring of boundaries occurs as the old 
relies on the new to be implemented fully. All of the elements in the old, no matter how 
prescriptive, they are and even with the full force of law, still require other aspects of the new in 
order to achieve their regulatory objectives. By way of example, the provision of care 
requirements in the LTCHA are highly prescriptive but more specific guidance is also available 
in the form of guidelines produced by regulatory colleges, professional associations and 
institutes. The move towards greater transparency in the form of more disclosure of performance 
of the LTC system and homes against provincial benchmarks also augments the formal legal 
requirements. At the same time, the new also relies on the old to be in the background in order to 
have any meaningful effects or have similar normative justifications. Consider the example of 
quality improvement. While homes are not legally mandated to engage Residents’ Councils and 
Family Councils on the completion of the Quality Improvement Plans, the Residents’ Bill of 
Rights sets the tone for participation. In other words, it is not clear where old ends and the new 
begins.   
The second observation is that the regulatory changes that conform more closely to the 
‘old’ regime are those that require greater legal certainty because they deal with or engage some 
fundamental legal values that require careful interpretation at the system level, rather than being 
 
1818 Solomon, supra note 309 at 594. 
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left to individual decision-makers at the home level. These legal values include, but are not 
limited to equality, non-arbitrariness, fairness and fundamental justice. In any program delivery 
context, providers need discretion in order to make operational decisions. By the same token, the 
regulator also needs discretion in order to make decisions about carrying out its regulatory tasks 
effectively and efficiently. However, without sufficient guidance, decision-makers (whether they 
are providers or the regulator) may make arbitrary decisions that can be detrimental to the legal 
rights and entitlements of others. Sometimes clear rules and bright-line tests are especially 
needed in order to avoid inappropriate use of discretion in contexts involving significant power 
imbalances or vulnerable stakeholder groups. Under the LTCHA and the Health Care Consent 
Act, the rules about safety and security of residents may be considered highly prescriptive, 
however they also take away some possibility of misinterpreting or misusing discretion on the 
home’s part. Similarly, homes can also be subject to the wrath of inspectors. Very detailed rules 
about what inspectors must do in the event of non-compliance can help ensure fairness of the 
process and outcome of the inspection or enforcement decision. In other words, some issues are 
not suitable for a ‘command-and-control’-free approach.          
The last observation is that the changes that fit the command-and-control ideal type are in 
areas where the government has always regulated one way or the other – either directly through 
statutes or the Program Manual or contracts, or indirectly, by delegation to regulatory colleges. 
In other words, these areas are not new risks that the government has no experience in regulating. 
They are less amenable to new approaches since regulation is never ahistorical. That said, the 
interpretation of risk tends to change over time and it is possible to move from the old to the new 
and vice versa. In Chapter 5, I have demonstrated how the regulation of provision of care is 
highly prescriptive, but not uniformly so. Evidently the “how to regulate better” question1819 is 
always in the background. When the substantive ends of regulation do not change significantly 
but the risks to those ends appear to be clearer in the decision-maker’s mind, there is a tendency 
to tackle those known risks with the implementation of the most inflexible rules. The implication 
is that well-known risks are over-regulated even when the available evidence shows that the 
 
1819 Parker, supra note 68. Parker observes that much of the scholarly literature on regulation is focused on “how to” 
regulate markets, capitalism, and individuals better. 
359 
performance continues to improve. I will return to the question of using the idea of risk later in 
this chapter.         
In sum, the hybridity model in LTC looks like this: (1) the government continues to use 
command-and-control regulation to (a) manage risks that have always existed and appear to be 
well understood (such as the administration of drugs, the use of physical restraints and nutritional 
care), albeit the likelihood of the risks and the consequences of the risks are different now 
because the acuity levels of residents have increased over time, (b) maintain policy discretion 
over structural issues, and (c) preemptively give itself rule-making ability to go back and forth 
among various instruments; (2) the command-and-control elements take away discretion from 
decision-makers in order to protect certain fundamental legal values; and (3) New Governance 
approaches are added whenever there are inherent uncertainties about how best to solve 
problems. It is this last step where one could find more experimentation as envisioned by new 
governance scholars. The traditional regulation and new governance approaches are not 
necessarily merged into one integrated system where each element is necessary for the successful 
operation of the other. Rather, it is more apt to talk about several smaller, overlapping integrated 
systems in which law plays a slightly different role in each. The most integrated system governs 
provision of care requirements. There are extensive new governance practices – from soft law to 
benchmarking - to give content and meaning to formal law standards and public law norms. The 
least integrated system governs licensing and funding of homes. It is very much dominated by 
formal law, with guidelines adopted by reference in contracts. 
For LTC residents, and to a lesser extent, their families and friends, the hybrid model 
offers limitations and promises. The main limitation is that the substantive ends of the LTC 
systems are rarely questioned in any meaningful manner. Problem-solving tends to focus on how 
to find solutions to a pre-defined problem. Two examples will suffice. First, an aspect of the 
problem of residents’ safety is perceived to be contributed by the presence of residents with 
responsive behaviours. And the solution is to separate them. However, no one really questions 
what safety really means in this particular context. Second, the admission eligibility requirements 
are necessary because admission has to be fair and perhaps more importantly, the average 
resident stay should be as short as possible to reduce demands on the public purse. The solution 
is the development of rules that are very detailed and clear about which needs are prioritized. 
Transforming LTC into a last resort for those who are close to death (as opposed to a viable 
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living option on the continuum of housing) is rarely debated or challenged in a meaningful way. 
In this hybrid model where there are more choices with respect to instruments, it is not 
immediately apparent who is responsible for the implementation of these choices.  
The second limitation concerns the New Governance organizing principle of softness in 
law.1820 Some scholars suggest creating a more flexible and fluid policy environment that 
promotes "softer" processes that either replace or complement the traditional command-and-
control regulatory model.1821 The question is whether these guidelines, which almost inevitably 
cover clinical matters that are regulated in multiple ways, are actually consistent with and can 
keep up with evolving legal expectations. The guidelines are prepared by a large number of 
organizations; the development process may or may not include meaningful review and input 
from a legal   perspective. The elder law lawyer shared her extensive experience in various 
working groups and committees about a variety of guidelines in the health care sector. She noted 
that sometimes, guidelines are based on research in the form of literature review, which may 
include findings that are incorrect from a legal perspective. Alternatively, a guideline may derive 
from research conducted in a few select jurisdictions but any common tool developed could end 
up being incompatible with the law in a particular jurisdiction because the jurisdictional 
differences have not been taken into consideration.1822 The problem for any promotion of the 
greater use of soft law is that without careful consideration of its compatibility with Ontario law, 
there is a strong possibility that guidelines can actually disseminate the wrong information in the 
sense that it is not legally correct in a particular jurisdiction, which in turn may affect people’s 
understanding of their rights and obligations.  
A related concern is whether these guidelines can actually be implemented fully across the 
sector without additional funding. According to the OECD, monitoring of compliance is 
expensive for regulators, while adherence to norms and protocols can be costly for LTC 
providers.1823 It makes sense for both the Ministry and homes for exploring voluntary means to 
improve quality of care while meeting the expectations of the LTCHA and other statutes. One 
industry association representative confirmed that association members use the RNAO 
 
1820 Lobel, supra note 319 at 388. 
1821 Ibid. 
1822 Interviewee # 12, supra note 1699. 
1823 OECD / EU, supra note 478. 
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guidelines to implement the core programs of the LTCHA, as well as guidelines from 
accreditation agencies, policies from the Ministry and any education materials developed by the 
association.1824 One union representative expressed reservations about the utility of best practices 
advanced in these professional association guidelines. When I asked about the RNAO guidelines, 
the union representative explained:  
A lot of nurses know what the best practice standards are from the RNAO, many 
of them will have read them. . . The reality is, when acuity in long-term care goes 
up . . . The patient demands are higher but we don’t have the resources to provide 
and meet their demands. . . the government does not fund what it takes to 
implement them, because at the end of the day, what it truly takes to implement 
them is more people.1825   
Here, the question is identifying the conditions necessary for successful implementation of 
experimentalism, including the necessary funding of such initiatives.                  
The third limitation concerns the problem of how to preserve the more traditional legal 
tools such as rights in order to hold decision-makers accountable. Problem-solving does not 
necessarily mean less talk about rights. In fact, problem-solving requires protection of the 
following rights for individual residents and residents as a group: to receive and distribute 
information, to request accommodation and to be included in meaningful participation, which 
may require legal and non-legal representation in order to be effective. For Simon, one of the 
predispositions of Legal Liberalism is the priority of rights and he illustrates how problem-
solving is distinguished from claiming rights.1826 But I believe that claiming rights is also a part 
of problem-solving. This is because residents, family and friends would not be able to participate 
in problem-solving unless they also have the means to participate. I agree that many of the rights 
in the LTCHA are individualistic in nature and ignore the relational aspects of the reality of 
living in LTC. However, another set of rights in the LTCHA actually augments “interest in and 
capacity for active participation in decision making”.1827  Enforcing rights pertaining to 
participation is important for problem-solving because this contributes to defining problems 
correctly in the first place. “Part of the idea of problem solving is to focus attention on matters 
that are of practical importance to the participants and thus divert attention from merely abstract, 
 
1824 Interviewee # 16, supra note 620. 
1825 Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711. 
1826 Simon, supra note 321 at 136. 
1827 Ibid at 173. 
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moot, or academic disagreement. Defining issues in practical terms, however, is not the same as 
defining them narrowly.”1828 Having residents and families and friends (or their representatives) 
participate in the operations of the home can increase the chances of identifying matters that are 
meaningful to them. This does not imply residents and families and friends have exclusive right 
to define a problem.       
In the LTC sector, many accountability mechanisms exist to define relationships among 
homes, the Ministry, the LHINs and to a lesser extent, Health Quality Ontario. However, there is 
little discussion about how residents, families and friends can hold the homes, the Ministry, the 
LHINs and Health Quality Ontario accountable for problem-solving. I do not question that given 
the public interest involved in providing quality LTC, the Ministry and other bodies need to hold 
homes accountable for solving problems in their own homes. However, LTC residents and their 
families and friends also need to have the right to participate in problem-solving as a way to hold 
homes, as well as decision-makers, accountable. While not all problems that occur in homes are 
conducive to inputs from residents and families and friends, they need the right to receive and 
distribute information, to request accommodation of disabilities and to be included in meaningful 
participation so that they can decide how they want to be engaged in problem-solving. I will 
return to the issue of participation later in this chapter. 
9.4.4 Summary  
This section began with my reflections on the application of New Governance approaches 
in LTC, which remains a highly regulated sector. The variety of legal and non-legal instruments 
requires close study. Disability scholars have not paid enough attention to the nuances of the 
different types of legal and non-legal instruments, each of which brings different limitations and 
promises. Ignoring the nuances of the different types of legal and non-legal instruments will 
affect our ability to explicate and evaluate future law reform initiatives. I contend that the New 
Governance approaches in LTC are created and sustained by law. They are about strengthening 
or creating additional processes and procedures for participants—homes, residents, families, 
advocacy groups, industry organizations and government—to problem-solve challenges in the 
sector. Further, I made the following claims about problem-solving in LTC. Problem-solving 
 
1828 Ibid at 184. 
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responsibilities are also more diffuse and are not always clear. Problem-solving relies on industry 
participants’ own attempts at experimentalism from within a prescriptive legal framework. 
Despite the limitations of hybridity, the main promise is that this hybrid model offers more 
opportunities to be vigilant about the operations of their homes. There are simply more points to 
access information, and be consulted either formally (as required by law) or informally by the 
home or by other third parties. Problem-solving requires the following rights individually and 
collectively: to receive and distribute information, to request accommodation of disabilities and 
to be included in meaningful participation, which may require legal and non-legal representation 
in order to be effective. The next section will concentrate on unpacking what participation looks 
like at the individual and collective levels.        
9.5 Meaningful participation of residents and families: law and reality 
Chapter 2 makes the case for an empirical study of the processes and procedures – many of 
them mandated by law - that purport to promote inclusion and participation of disabled people 
and their families and friends. The normative justification for more emphasis on participation can 
be grounded in the notion of “nothing about us without us”.  As Michael Prince argues 
persuasively, “social inclusion is a flagship concept in disability politics, associated with the 
active participation of persons with disabilities in all life domains.”1829 I propose that 
participation can be analyzed at the individual as well as at the collective levels. Further, a gap in 
the literature surveyed is that it is short on prescriptions for participation techniques. 
In LTC, participation at the individual level usually means making decisions about health 
care and personal care activities such as eating and bathing. This decision-making ability is 
reserved for those who are deemed capable. Here, the focus is interrogating how those 
participation rights are exercised in practice and the barriers experienced by those who are 
deemed incapable.  As for collective participation, many of the new or enhanced legally-enabled 
processes are intended to give a voice to residents and their families and friends (but rarely to 
workers and volunteers) by permitting them to access certain kinds of information (such as 
inspection reports), to be consulted on certain issues (such as quality improvement) or to provide 
input into the process of a certain activity (such as development and implementation of 
 
1829 Prince, supra note 116 at 91. 
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satisfaction surveys). These mechanisms can be interpreted as ways to achieve social inclusion in 
LTC. To be certain, these rights are more about having a voice in the operations of the home 
rather than about having meaningful influence over regional or provincial policy-making.  
9.5.1 Allowing autonomous decisions where possible  
In Chapter 5, I explained how LTC residents may be able to make decisions about 
activities of daily living such as choice of clothing and dining as well as health care decisions. 
The notion of “choice” figures prominently in the LTCHA, from the admission process to 
matters of everyday living. Some scholars have called into question whether residents of LTC 
homes can actually make meaningful choices and assert their rights to exercise autonomy. As 
explained in Chapter 2, the debate about care challenges the “caring for” attitudes of 
professionals and other carers. As Morris explains, “[p]eople who are said to need caring for are 
assumed to be unable to exert choice and control.”1830 In theory, the incorporation of choice into 
the LTCHA reflects the criticisms of disability scholars. However, as explained in Chapter 4, 
care practices that have been reported to undermine the autonomy of LTC residents include the 
use of restraints,1831 involuntary confinement,1832 inappropriate uses of surveillance cameras,1833 
barriers to sexual expression,1834 rigid work routines within homes1835 and over-emphasis on 
avoidance of safety risks and standardization of care.1836  
In this section, I will focus on health care consent as a way to explain the notion of 
participation at the individual level. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, autonomy is an important 
value in our legal system. The ability to carry out the process of decision-making, as Hall 
explains, is essential to both autonomy and individual identity according to the modern 
guardianship paradigm.1837 The concept of autonomy figures prominently in landmark Supreme 
 
1830 Morris, supra note 197 at 54. 
1831 Fiona McDonald, “‘To Become Old is to Become Institutionalized and Imprisoned’: Comparing Regulatory 
Frameworks for the Use of Restraints in Long-Term Care Facilities” (2003) 12:1 Health L Rev 22. 
1832 Cathrael Kazin, "“Nowhere to Go and Chose to Stay": Using the Tort of False Imprisonment to Redress 
Involuntary Confinement of the Elderly in Nursing Homes and Hospitals” (1989) 137 Univ Pa Law Rev 903. 
1833 Lisa Minuk, “Why Privacy Still Matters: The Case against Prophylactic Video Surveillance in For-Profit Long-
Term Care Homes” (2006) 32 Queen’s LJ 224. 
1834 Emily Hayter, “Sexual Expression in Long-Term Care Homes: Capacity & Consent Special Topic: Aging” 
(2014) 35 Windsor Rev Legal & Soc Issues 54. 
1835 Armstrong & Daly, supra note 696; Armstrong & Daly, supra note 163. 
1836 Armstrong & Daly, supra note 771; Armstrong, supra note 1003. 
1837 Hall, supra note 1288 at 295. 
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Court of Canada decisions such as Carter, which guide lower courts and tribunals on a variety of 
health care-related decisions.   
A clear theme that emerged from my interviews with key informants is that while 
informed consent is a fundamental principle in health care decisions, this does not always work 
to the satisfaction of the resident (or patient), their families or health care providers. There is a 
concern that capacity, consent and substitute decision-making issues are not well understood in 
the health care sector generally. There may be a few contributing factors. First, there are different 
tests for legal capacity; some tests are in the Health Care Consent Act while others fall under the 
Substitute Decisions Act. Second, the law around capacity is very black and white: a person is 
either capable or incapable. As the disability rights lawyer I interviewed remarked:  
The legal structures … do not support people to engage in a variety of decision 
making relationships that could really enable them to exercise their legal capacity 
to a much greater extent than people do now.1838 
When a person is deemed incapable, then the substitute decision-maker makes decisions for the 
incapable person. The problem is that substitute decision-making and the law are not well 
understood outside of lawyers who practice in this area. For example, substitute decision-makers 
may not understand that they have an obligation to involve the incapable person in the 
decisions.1839 Third, incorrect assumptions may be made about the patient / resident’s capacity 
for making health care decisions. According to the representative from the OLTCC: 
What I observe sometimes happens is that in the admission process there is maybe 
a spouse, a child, or another family member, or designated substitute decision 
maker who goes through the admission process and that person may rightly have 
current power of attorney for finance and property, but it’s assumed that person is 
then the substitute decision making for healthcare decisions. The resident’s own 
ability to make those decisions is overlooked.  I think that all providers, but I 
think especially physicians, have become more and more aware in recent years 
that consent needs to be given at the time and it is situational, and the resident’s 
capacity needs to be judged and re-judged on an ongoing basis.1840   
Others have also pointed to the issue of capacity and consent in relation to the 
circumstances of older adults. For example, determination of capacity and consent for 
treatment/Do Not Resuscitate order is always one of the themes in Geriatric Long-Term Care 
 
1838 Interviewee # 13, (2017). 
1839 Ibid. 
1840 Interviewee # 4, supra note 1744. 
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Review Committee reports, but its prominence varies year over year. In the 2016 report, the 
Geriatric Long-Term Care Review Committee observes that:  
It is clear that organizational practices often do not reflect the law in regard to the 
use of advance directives, do not resuscitate orders and powers of attorney for 
personal care. The committee has identified a need for broad industry education in 
order to ensure the rights of elderly individuals and residents of long term care 
facilities. Healthcare providers in particular must be aware of their responsibilities 
and authorities and of the resources available to them when questions and conflict 
relating to consent and capacity arise.1841  
To be fair, health facilities are in a difficult situation in terms of providing the medical 
care to a patient who appears to languish and they often proceed from a point of view that the 
patient is not safe to remain in the community. According to the health law lawyer I interviewed, 
one possible scenario is that an older person living in their own home in the community requires 
multiple visits to the emergency room, for example, due to dehydration. The hospital staff 
provide the necessary acute care to the older person, but eventually, they may question whether 
the older person is able to live at home. Sometimes the hospital discharge planners will do a site 
visit to determine if any help will be required from an occupational health and safety perspective. 
But the point is that “people are allowed to assume risk . . . people generally have a lot of 
autonomy to make poor choices if they are capable.”1842 The health law lawyer explained that 
there are very few ways to deal with such situations:  
What are the options? Can they go home with family? Do they go to a retirement 
home which is a paid option? Long-term care is covered under OHIP.  … You can 
get relief from the co-payment. But if I’m capable, I can say no . . .  what’s going 
to become of this person? I get this question all the time.1843  
She further commented that the law does not provide many options if an incapable person 
refuses to enter a LTC home or decides to leave, even after consent is properly provided by the 
substitute decision-maker:  
. . . We would invoke other authorities ...  most people when they think of the 
Mental Health Act . . . think as a result of my mental disorder, I am either going to 
harm myself, or that I’m going to harm a third party. But the one that they don’t 
usually focus on … is serious physical impairment.  … Pearl [a pseudonym to 
represent an older woman] is wandering around in her night clothes in the winter 
at night, her house isn’t maintained, there’s no food in the fridge, the newspapers 
 
1841 Geriatric and Long term Care Review Committee, supra note 1693 at 13. 
1842 Interviewee # 1, supra note 1700. 
1843 Ibid. 
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are piling up and there’s a fire hazard. You might be able to rely on the Mental 
Health Act and make a pitch that Pearl’s situation meets the serious physical 
impairment category. . .  There’s consent for admission, but there’s no 
opportunity to detain her.  So that will be challenging.1844    
 
In sum, the law on consent and capacity is very complex. At the same time, 
application of the law does not always respond well to real life situations of individuals 
who experience the effects of aging and disability. I now turn to some of the ideas that 
emerged about access to justice from the lawyer interviewees. 
9.5.2 Access to justice  
This section examines of how potential rights violations may be pursued by LTC 
residents or their litigation guardians if they are incapable. In the disability literature, the pursuit 
of equality rights is a common theme. I build on this theme by attending to how difficult it is to 
assert rights. As I will demonstrate below, any difficulties associated with LTC residents 
asserting their rights should be understood as part of a larger problem with disabled people’s 
encounters with health and legal systems that do not adequately take into account the complexity 
of circumstances, needs and experiences of disabled people. A problem or issue may originate in 
the health care system, but then it migrates to the legal system. At the micro level, residents 
experience power dynamics when they are in caring relationships. In turn, these relationships are 
shaped by a multitude of institutional or systemic barriers, which have differential impacts on 
disabled people. The discussion here is intended to complement existing studies about access to 
justice.1845 While law is the solution to many potential harms associated with care (especially 
institutional care), law turns out also to be a problem for many residents because for those who 
require support to make decisions, the legal interventions available to them are usually blunt 
instruments. 
In this section, I focus on health care consent decisions. The small number of human 
rights cases concerning LTC residents does not allow us to make any definitive conclusions 
about using the tribunal as a way to redress discrimination claims. All cases engaged the 
enumerated ground of disability and none were initiated by the residents. Without a family 
 
1844 Ibid. 
1845 Lisa Ramano & Jane Meadus, Congregate Living and the Law as It Affects Older Adults (Toronto: Law 
Commission of Ontario, 2009). 
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member or advocate, it is very difficult for a LTC resident to initiate an application. The 
circumstances of a LTC resident or applicant also matter, as I will explain below.  
9.5.2.1 Lack of rights information and advice 
To recap, currently the following legal forums are available to LTC applicants and 
residents to adjudicate on a variety of matters related to LTC: Health Services Appeal and 
Review Board, Consent and Capacity Board (CCB), Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario and the 
Superior Court. These matters may be bought forward pursuant to the Long-Term Care Homes 
Act, 2007, Substitute Decisions Act, the Health Care Consent Act and the Human Rights Code. 
These matters include eligibility for LTC admission, incapacity finding, power of attorney, 
guardianship, and services received while in LTC. The review and appeal procedures are clearly 
spelled out in statutes, supplemented by the rules of procedures issued by each tribunal.    
A clear concern expressed by the lawyer interviewees is the lack of awareness of rights 
and lack of (or limited) availability of legally correct rights information and support being 
provided to individuals (or their representatives) who may choose to pursue remedies in the legal 
system.  As explained in Chapter 7, the Health Care Consent Act provides for a mechanism to 
protect those who may be found to be incapable of making decisions in one or more domains. 
One indication of whether people are utilizing this review right is the number of applications to 
CCB. In 2016-2017, the CCB received a total of 7,770 applications. Three types made up the 
majority of the applications: 46% related to a review of involuntary status under the Mental 
Health Act, 26% related to a review of a finding of incapacity with respect to treatment, LTC 
admission or personal assistance, and 21% related to a review of a Community Treatment Order 
under the Mental Health Act.1846 Table 31 shows the number of annual applications to the CCB 
concerning findings of incapacity, divided into three categories i.e., treatment (T), LTC 
admission (A) and personal assistance (PA).1847 I have included both Form A applications 
(application to the Board to Review a Finding of Incapacity under Subsection 32(1), 50(1) or 
65(1) of the Health Care Consent Act) and Deemed Form A applications (some applications 
trigger a deemed application, such as Form C - Application to the Board to Appoint a 
 
1846 Consent and Capacity Board, Annual Report 2016-2017 (Toronto: Consent and Capacity Board, 2017) at 16. 
1847 The statistics is provided by the Consent and Capacity Board. The interpretation of the statistics does not 
represent the view of the Consent and Capacity Board. 
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Representative under Subsection 33(2), 51(2) or 66(2) of the Health Care Consent Act).1848  Both 
types of applications are included because they represent how often the CCB is asked to 
adjudicate on capacity matters. It should be noted that the CCB also adjudicates other Health 
Care Consent Act matters, such as application for permission to depart from wishes under 
subsection 36(1), 53(1) or 68(1) of the Health Care Consent Act. They are omitted from the table 
below for presentation reasons.  
Table 31: Annual applications to the Consent and Capacity Board (capacity-related) 
 
A few preliminary observations can be made. The total number of applications regarding 
findings of incapacity has increased steadily: from 1,087 in 2006-2007 to 2,032 in 2016-17. This 
increase can be attributed to the increase in applications regarding treatment. This is consistent 
with the CCB’s overall caseload trend. In the past five years, applications have increased, on 
average, 6% annually and hearings have increased, on average, 10.2% annually.1849 Despite the 
overall increase in case load, the annual number of applications regarding LTC admission is 
actually on a downward trend, from 141 in 2006-2007 to 64 in 2016-2017, with small 
fluctuations in some years. The number of Form A applications may be a better indication of 
how people are aware of the right to challenge a finding of incapacity, as Form A applications 
are initiated by the persons deemed by the evaluators to be incapable. The number is even lower: 
from 71 in 2006-07 to 31 in 2016-17. This is surprising given the number of LTC admissions 
 
1848 Some applications trigger a mandatory review of capacity to make one’s own decisions about treatment, 
admission to a care facility, and personal assistance services under sections 37.1, 54.1 and 69.1 of the HCCA (the 
"Deemed Form A applications"). The Consent and Capacity Board has to be satisfied that the person is incapable 
first before a representative is appointed.   
1849 Consent and Capacity Board, supra note 1846 at 15. 
Application type 2006/2007 2007/20082008/20092009/20102010/20112011/20122012/20132013/20142014/15 2015/16 2016/17
A (T) 833 860 833 990 1024 1231 1252 1467 1584 1674 1858
A (A) 71 71 78 47 52 51 54 45 46 42 31
A (PA) 2 2 2 3 10 9 4 5 2 3 1
Deemed A (T) 82 56 80 73 89 78 78 73 65 80 103
Deemed A (A) 70 50 42 49 48 34 35 56 26 36 33
Deemed A (PA) 29 7 18 18 18 19 13 13 6 1 6
Total (T) 915 916 913 1063 1113 1309 1330 1540 1649 1754 1961
Total (A) 141 121 120 96 100 85 89 101 72 78 64
Total (PA) 31 9 20 21 28 28 17 18 8 4 7
Total (T, A and PA) 1087 1046 1053 1180 1241 1422 1436 1659 1729 1836 2032
370 
each year (37,639 in 2016-17).1850 One possible explanation is that very few LTC admissions are 
consented to by substitute decision-makers because almost all LTC applicants are capable of 
consenting to their own admissions. This seems to be implausible since we know people are 
being admitted older and sicker (including significant cognitive decline). Another explanation 
may be that almost all capacity assessments are done correctly in a legal sense and therefore very 
few people decide to challenge findings of incapacity. This does not seem to be plausible either 
because if this is the case, the applications regarding incapacity for treatment decisions should 
not be increasing. A more plausible explanation is that people simply do not know they can 
challenge such findings.          
It is true that access to the CCB is free and a hearing can occur in seven days anywhere 
(including in hospitals and in LTC homes) so that access to justice should not be a problem. But 
the picture is more complex. The availability of legal advice was a concern that came up in the 
interviews.  The Consent and Capacity Board can appoint counsel for an unrepresented 
applicant, and in fact, one of the changes to the Health Care Consent Act was to allow the 
Consent and Capacity Board to direct Legal Aid Ontario - instead of the Public Guardian and 
Trustee Office – to arrange for representation.  The applicant may qualify for Legal Aid, but this 
is unlikely because the financial cutoff is set so low.1851 There are other factors. As the elder law 
lawyer explained, “a lot of seniors, even poor seniors, may have a little bit of savings and they’re 
not going to use it to retain a lawyer for the purpose of challenging an incapacity finding.”1852  
The trigger for launching an application to the Consent and Capacity Board is an 
awareness of review and appeal rights. Such rights are not meaningful if there is no clear 
communication with the individual about the significance of a finding of incapacity and how to 
challenge such finding. The new requirement in the Health Care Consent Act about providing 
information about the consequences of findings of incapacity for LTC admission is a necessary 
step in the process to ensure the assessment process is not abused or misused. This means that 
the relationship between the health care provider (assessor) and the patient is critical. Both the 
 
1850 The CIHI publishes sources of admission for residents admitted into continuing care facilities. The admission 
number includes transfers from other LTC homes i.e., not just new admissions. Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, supra note 558, ch Table 4.  
1851 Legal Aid Ontario, “Will legal aid pay for my lawyer?”, (2019), online: Getting legal help 
<https://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/getting/eligibility.asp>. 
1852 Interviewee # 12, supra note 1699. 
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health law lawyer and elder law lawyer raised questions about how rights information is 
communicated to patients (if at all) and both compared LTC admission decisions with the mental 
health system.1853  For the elder law lawyer, in reality, nothing really works the way it is 
supposed to under the law. She emphasized that there is a deeper, long-standing problem with 
the process of requesting consent from patients and evaluating capacity. Health care providers 
may not have received training on the legal test for capacity nor understand the definition of 
capacity. There is also the question of whether regulatory colleges are willing to pursue 
complaints about a regulated professional’s alleged misconduct in requesting consent, given the 
more grievous complaints received by regulatory colleges. She was also careful to point out that 
the evaluator of capacity may be subject to other pressures too, for example, the need for 
vacating a hospital bed and family members’ problems with coping with the care needs of an 
older disabled adult living in the community. In sum, she explained that only a small number of 
cases reach the Consent and Capacity Board because: 
 you’ve got to have somebody who is pretty savvy to figure out what’s going on 
or something that’s so blatant . . . With the assistance of counsel, the blatant cases 
may be diverted from the formal review process and resolved.1854  
This is not limited to older, disabled adults. The disability rights lawyer I interviewed explained 
the experience of her clients in health care settings. Her clients were not told in any meaningful 
way from their perspective that a capacity assessment was being done. They were not provided 
with documentation related to the assessment or to the finding of incapacity. They were not 
informed of the implications of the finding of incapacity and the process for challenging such a 
finding.1855   
It is suggested that family dynamics may also play a role in the background. The health 
law lawyer explained that there is an inherent tension here. The actual circumstances of an older 
disabled adult makes her access to justice more complicated. This is because the person most 
likely to help the older disabled person with all kinds of things such as driving them to 
appointments and making sure their fridge is full and their living environment is clean, may also 
be the person who is going to consent to LTC admission. She may try to persuade the older 
 
1853 Interviewee # 1, supra note 1700; Interviewee # 12, supra note 1699 at 12. 
1854 Interviewee # 12, supra note 1699. 
1855 Interviewee # 13, supra note 1838. 
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disabled person not to challenge that finding because she is worried that the older disabled 
person will remain in her home and it is creating a safety risk.1856  
I’ve seen some tense situations where inherent conflicts are over the norm. And 
I’m not saying that people are not earnest and may not want her there for the right 
reasons.  And guess what?  Maybe she should be there and maybe the finding is 
going to be, no, she is eligible to be admitted to long-term care and there is valid 
consent and she is incapable.1857     
Family members may not have an accurate understanding of consent and the substitute 
decision maker’s role. As explained in Chapter 7, the substitute decision-maker may give 
consent to LTC admission on behalf of the incapable person. This authority to consent does not 
include the authority to detain the incapable person in the LTC home. As an example, the 
meaning of giving consent to LTC admission may not be well understood.  
I am certain the adult kids think or the spouse thinks by virtue of having the 
power to make the legal decision to give the consent, that that means that the 
individual must go to long-term care, and must stay. . . I don’t even think if you 
asked 100 people who consented to the admission of their person to long-term 
care, that they would appreciate that the incapable person could then walk out the 
door, whether there are other measures available to then act to keep them safe 
such as the Mental Health Act.1858   
Therefore, the unproclaimed amendment to the Health Care Consent Act that would require the 
placement co-ordinator (i.e., the employees of LHINs) to ensure the substitute decision-maker 
provides consent in accordance with the HCCA1859 could make a difference in terms of 
safeguarding the rights of incapable LTC applicants.       
Another concern is the barriers faced by older disabled adults. According to the health 
law lawyer, there are other barriers in place. The actual circumstances of an older disabled adult 
make her access to justice more complicated. Adjudication under the Substitute Decisions Act is 
even more complicated. As noted in Chapter 7, the Substitute Decisions Act governs power of 
attorney and guardianship. Unlike health care decisions, disputes about powers of attorney will 
have to be heard in the Superior Court – possibly a barrier to access to justice, especially given 
 
1856 Interviewee # 1, supra note 1700. 
1857 Ibid. 
1858 Ibid. 
1859 A number of provisions in the HCCA have not been proclaimed yet. The unproclaimed Section 40(1)(b) states: 
“the person responsible for authorizing admissions to the care facility shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
person’s admission is not authorized unless the person responsible for authorizing admissions is of the opinion that 
the substitute decision-maker has given consent on the person’s behalf in accordance with this Act.” 
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the contrasting framework under the Health Care Consent Act that establishes the Consent and 
Capacity Board:  
The issue here is who decides under a power of attorney for personal care if a 
person is incapable for shelter and nutrition decisions?  … Adult son says, well, 
you’re incapable to make that decision. I’m now invoking.  I’m now your attorney 
for such a decision. And there is no real review. . . What does she do?  Go look up 
the Substitute Decisions Act and find her way? Going to court costs a lot of 
money and takes a lot of time. . . There is no mandatory rights advice, rights 
information, or assistance of any kind.1860   
Another way that family relations may affect a resident or applicant occurs when there are 
multiple powers of attorney:  
. . . if you have dueling adult children swapping out powers of attorney (the 
documents), which unfortunately we do see.  Let’s say we’re siblings and our 
mother gave you authority for decision-making.  I go and visit her and slip her the 
piece of paper to sign, naming me instead.  Or maybe she says, I’m really tired of 
your sibling acting for me, and I’m going to move it over to you.  She signs it.  
My clients in the homes and the hospitals sometimes get stuck between dueling 
adult children or other substitute decision-makers.1861   
The health law lawyer explained that occasionally, one or both parties with competing powers of 
attorney may threaten to sue the home or hospital if their version is not followed.1862 The 
problem is if the mother is incapable, the parties will have to go to court to resolve the dispute, 
and that’s costly.1863 The point is that if the older adult has any relations, her rights need to be 
understood within the context of all the influences she may be subject to. Some of her 
relationships are enabling; some maybe not. The law offers the means to protect incapable 
individuals from disabling relationships but is silent on the promotion of enabling relationships. 
This helps explain caring relationships and some of the pitfalls that can occur in real life. 
9.5.2.2 Other disabled people’s experience with access to justice 
Because there are so few cases of LTC residents using formal legal mechanisms to assert 
their rights, I borrow insights about other disabled people’s experience. The disability rights 
lawyer provides the context in which people with disability have to assert their capacity to make 
decisions, including challenging findings of incapacity in legal, quasi-legal and non-legal 
 
1860 Interviewee # 1, supra note 1700. 
1861 Ibid. 
1862 Ibid. 
1863 Ibid. 
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forums. This context is important for this project because the experience shows that it is a more 
far-reaching problem. People with disabilities encounter barriers in a variety of situations. Some 
of those reasons are related to very direct discrimination, or assumptions being made about 
people’s capacity to make their own decisions. In particular, many assumptions are made that if 
someone has an intellectual or mental health disability, or any kind of disability related to their 
cognitive functioning, then they cannot make their own decisions and others need to step in. 
Barriers may also exist simply because the right accommodations are not put in place.  Others 
may assume those with communication disabilities cannot make their own decisions. However, if 
proper accommodations around communication were in place, they would be able to 
communicate their decisions readily and their decision-making capacity would not even be an 
issue.  Another example of a communication accommodation barrier is failure to incorporate 
clear language, or plain language accommodation. To initiate a legal process at a tribunal or 
court, one may have to fill in forms or receive notices that are written in very complex legal 
language.  A person with an intellectual disability may not understand the content of the forms or 
notices simply because of the inaccessible language. If the form or notice is written in plain 
language, the person with a disability may be able to understand the actions required of him or 
her.1864 
The lesson learned here is that the common techniques used to enhance procedural 
protections, such as review mechanisms and notice requirements, are not always going to be 
useful for people with disabilities unless accommodations are in place so that the information is 
meaningful to those who experience cognitive and other types of disability. In Chapter 7, I 
explained how the processes under the HCCA and SDA have changed. Some processes are 
indeed consistent with the objectives of the AODA, for example, the SDA refers to an 
“accessible copy” of the notice of resignation of the resigning attorney. From the perspective of 
autonomous decision-making, these processes are indeed necessary to protect the autonomy of 
the person. In fact, the LTCHA is also filled with notice requirements and disclosure of 
information obligations, either to individual residents or to residents as a collective. It is 
reasonable to assume that without proper accommodation, some residents will not be able to 
understand the information that is legally mandated to be provided and to take necessary actions.  
 
1864 Interviewee # 13, supra note 1838. 
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When asked whether the AODA could be a means to removing some the communication 
barriers faced by people with disabilities since information and communication standards are in 
place, the disability rights lawyer expressed reservations. She explained that the AODA 
establishes a minimum standard around accessibility in certain areas of life and that it places 
requirements on certain organizations to implement those minimum standards. If anyone checks 
whether an organization is complying with the information communication standard, or any one 
of the standards under the AODA and the organization is not complying, there is no legal 
recourse for the individual. It is entirely the responsibility of the Ontario Government to 
implement and enforce the minimum standards that are set out in the accessibility standards. In 
her opinion, the Ontario Government can do that with a great degree of political will, or a very 
small degree of political will and there’s really not a lot of accountability in that process.1865 This 
remark is consistent with my interpretation of the Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions, which also 
confirm the self-reporting regime of the AODA. In the four decisions regarding appeals of fines 
imposed by the Director, the Licence Appeal Tribunal noted that the Act and its standards rely 
on self-reporting for compliance. In other words, the Accessibility Directorate of Ontario can 
only monitor compliance with the obligations set out in the Act when an organization files its 
accessibility report. Reporting is a key mechanism by which the Accessibility Directorate of 
Ontario measures compliance.1866 The nature of enforcement of the AODA illustrates the 
limitations of AODA as a tool on its own to bring about specific changes for people with 
disability. On the other hand, the fact that there are piecemeal efforts to introduce information 
requirements more aligned with the intent of the AODA in other statutes probably means that the 
norms around accessibility are becoming more entrenched in the sense that they are more 
difficult to remove (at least from a “law on the books” perspective).  
9.5.2.3 Intervention in the form of support for autonomous decision-making  
It should be emphasized that some issues will have no clear legal solutions and we need 
to resist the temptation to turn to law immediately. As Herring explains, our society has built up 
 
1865 Ibid. 
1866 8677 v. Director under the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities, supra note 975; 8635 v Director under 
the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2014 (available on http://canlii.ca/t/g90w7); 8647 v Director 
under the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities, 2014 (available on http://canlii.ca/t/g8kh1); 8750 v Director 
under the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005, 2014 CanLII 46587 ON LAT (available on 
http://canlii.ca/t/g8kj0). 
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a wide range of structures and forms of assistance to accommodate the needs of adult working 
people.1867 The question here is a lack of appreciation of similar accommodations for disabled 
people so that they, too, can make claims for autonomy and decision-making capacity. While 
rights have always been conceived as a means to keep a person free from unwanted intrusion or 
interference, the safeguarding of individual autonomy requires interventions in some cases. As 
explained in Chapter 7, the Office of Public Guardian and Trustee (OPGT) may be appointed by 
the court as the guardian of an incapable person, and about 51% of OPGT’s property 
guardianship clients (or 5,600) are 60 years old and over.1868 The appointment of the OPGT as 
guardian is not simply the inevitable result of an impairment or a lack of family members.  
Therefore, examining OPGT guardianship is a useful way to explore how lack of support can be 
an environmental barrier to autonomy for disabled people.  
The disability rights lawyer referred to clients under OPGT guardianship and explained 
the circumstances that contributed to them remaining under OPGT guardianship:  
we have encountered a number of situations where clients are under OPGT 
guardianship and so there’s already been a finding of incapacity against them and 
they are desperately struggling to get out of OPGT guardianship and it’s very, 
very challenging for them to do so. There’s many, many barriers in place. . . the 
most readily understood barrier is that most of the clients, at least who we interact 
with, that are under OPGT guardianship, are on ODSP [Ontario Disability 
Support Program], so they don’t have a lot of money. Capacity assessments are 
very expensive, generally. The OPGT does provide a subsidy, they have 
discretion about whether to provide that subsidy or not. You can apply for it and 
our clients do, but, first of all, it’s not always given, secondly, it’s not usually 
enough to cover the full cost of the capacity assessment. If our clients do not have 
the funds to cover the assessment they basically have to wait until they save up 
enough money to do that.1869  
The other issue is that while there are some assessors who understand disability accommodation 
from a disability rights point of view, there are not many:  
. . . there must be disability accommodations in place to enable that person to 
really demonstrate their level of capacity and decision making, … we’ve had to 
 
1867 Herring, supra note 190 at 11–12. 
1868 The Ministry of the Attorney General stated that there are nine datasets contain statistics covering the OPGT’s 
clients and their operations. They are all related to public guardianship. The percentage here comes from “Property 
guardianship client by age and gender||CSV” dataset. “Property guardianship for incapable adults | Ontario.ca”, 
online: <https://www.ontario.ca/data/property-guardianship-incapable-adults>. No public information about the 
personal guardianship was available.  
1869 Interviewee # 13, supra note 1838. 
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find very creative ways of explaining that to assessors, getting them to agree to 
have those accommodations in place and demonstrating to them how the person 
can make decisions with the supports and services that they need in place … And 
the OPGT itself is a barrier … it’s very difficult for our clients to get any kind of 
meaningful communication with their OPGT representatives.1870 
The OPGT represents the state’s responsibility towards its citizens in a concrete way. The 
problem is that we may be willing to intervene in the name of protection in the form of taking 
over decision-making for the person deemed incapable, but less willing to intervene to provide 
support that allows for autonomous decision-making. The disability rights lawyer pointed to the 
importance of having the necessary supports in place, such as stable housing, access to health 
care, and disability services and supports, so that her clients under OPGT guardianship can be 
stable enough to demonstrate to the OPGT that they can be independent decision-makers again. 
There is a systemic problem with the way that the OPGT approaches its role as guardian of 
property. OPGT representatives have very high caseloads and tend to crisis manage clients. It is 
very difficult for clients to have meaningful conversations with their OPGT representatives. 
OPGT representatives are not well trained in working with people with disabilities to connect 
them with the right community supports to enable them to develop their decision-making 
capacity and enable them to create situations in their lives that can support their capacity.1871  
One could argue that for some disabled people, there is a need for extra protection and support so 
that they can lead lives of an equal quality to other disabled and non-disabled people.1872  
It is not my intention to argue that any legal reform will be straightforward.1873 Some of 
the legal constructs such as capacity and consent are so ingrained in our health care system, legal 
system and our everyday language that wholesale legal reform will have significant implications 
well beyond LTC and the health care system. I do not suggest that the state no longer has any 
obligation to protect us when we become incapable or where we otherwise pose a danger to 
ourselves and others. I also do not suggest that current legal safeguards such as notice 
requirements are completely irrelevant or simply too abstract for LTC residents and similarly 
situated persons. The small number of successful challenges of findings of incapacity with 
 
1870 Ibid. 
1871 Ibid. 
1872 Shakespeare, supra note 106 at 21. 
1873 Law Commission of Ontario, Legal Capacity, Decision-making and Guardianship Final Report (Toronto: Law 
Commission of Ontario). 
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respect to LTC admission illustrate that the checks and balances are still being used. But I do 
suggest that it is easy to overlook the legal rights of LTC residents, and by extension, individuals 
who experience disadvantages in relation to disability, age and gender. There is no shortage of 
policy prescriptions and commentary on this subject.1874 If one accepts the proposition that 
caring for another can amount to an exercise of power,1875 it is necessary to attend to the 
realization of legal rights (even in their current individualistic form). Unfettered exercise of 
power can easily lead to the harms that disability scholars have pointed out in the context of 
institutional care. The existing rights are justifiable if understood as the result of an ongoing 
struggle for striking an uneasy balance between the state’s protective function and individual 
autonomy.    
9.5.3 Co-regulation: What does participation look like in LTC? 
In this section, I concentrate on describing the collective dimension of participation in 
LTC, rather than individual participation at point of care, such as those described in the previous 
section. In particular, I will focus on two related issues: enforcement and compliance and 
continuous quality improvement. I concentrate on these issues because they have not been dealt 
with in recent research on participation,1876 and information about participation and engagement 
is available. As well, the current policy work on patient engagement1877 serves as an interesting 
backdrop to the existing mechanisms in LTC.         
In LTC, and possibly true for other parts of the health care system, there are only a few 
organizations that represent service users or clients: Ontario Association of Residents’ Councils 
(OARC), Family Council of Ontario (FCO), Concerned Friends of Ontario Citizens in Care 
Facilities (Concerned Friends) and regional organizations such as regional networks of Family 
 
1874 Ibid; Law Commission of Ontario, A Framework for the Law as It Affects Older Adults: Advancing Substantive 
Equality (Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2012). 
1875 Herring, supra note 190 at 6. 
1876 Barken & Lowndes, supra note 705. 
1877 Mandate letters are issued to provide direction and highlight priorities for government agencies. Health Quality 
Ontario received a mandate letter on May 1, 2015 that helped clarify its role in key areas of the health system.  In his 
mandate letter to Health Quality Ontario, the former Minister of Health and Long-Term Care Dr. Eric Hoskin stated 
that “I am deeply committed to creating a health care system with patients and not just for patients. My goal is to 
have Ontario recognized globally for its commitment to patient engagement.” Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care, Mandate Letter from the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care to the Health Quality Ontario (Toronto: 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2015). 
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Councils.1878 They participate in different ways, partly because their memberships have different 
legal rights to participation. As explained in Chapter 7, Residents’ Councils are mandatory and 
empowered by the LTCHA to perform certain functions and exercise rights within the home. 
Family Councils are optional, but where they exist, the LTCHA confers certain powers and 
assign functions to them. Families and friends may have certain rights to participate if they are 
substitute decision-makers or have power of attorney.  
One theme that emerged from the interviews is that the concept of co-regulation is a useful 
way to describe the involvement of residents, families and friends. The concept of co-regulation 
connects well to the regulatory techniques as well as the relationships of those involved in 
regulating. In Chapter 8, I discussed the formal legal reporting requirements, such as reporting 
obligation of abuse of residents for everyone except residents, that are part of monitoring of 
compliance in homes. These reporting requirements help the Ministry to identify potential 
incidents of non-compliance and possible quality problems in homes. The respective roles of 
residents, families and friends in co-regulating are described below. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the Ministry’s enforcement and compliance activities have always been subject to intense 
scrutiny and to criticisms from all sides. Compliance is intended to be one of the solutions to the 
problem of quality care. It is interesting to see how compliance is a problem of itself. If problem-
solving is a discursive process, how do participants provide feedback to each other? “Each 
stakeholder brings a different type of local information and feedback to the process of creating 
interim regulatory goals and to the assessment of the feasibility of the goals.”1879 I will first 
explain how different participants provide feedback to the regulator, then how some participants 
use their own expertise to provide feedback to consumers, and finally, how participants provide 
feedback to the homes (the regulated).  
9.5.3.1 Providing Feedback to the Regulator to Reformulate the Regulatory Goals 
In previous chapters, I have compared how the current compliance and enforcement regime 
becomes even more prescriptive over time as the LTCHA becomes more precise in terms of the 
 
1878 Family Councils Ontario, “Education and Networking”, online: <https://fco.ngo/education-and-
networking/family-council-networking>. An example is the Champlain Region Family Council Network. 
Champlain Region Family Council Network, “About the CRFCN”, online: 
<https://www.champlainfamilycouncils.ca/about>. 
1879 Alexander, supra note 339 at 128. 
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range of powers and objectives of the regime. The legal requirements are given operational 
meaning by administrative decisions made by the Ministry, such as training, human resources 
and communication. From a problem-solving perspective, I will explain how the two user 
organizations provide feedback to the Ministry.      
Compliance and enforcement can be described as the “human face” of regulation.1880 One 
such human dimension of enforcement is the training of inspectors. Both the FCO and the OARC 
have reported on the work they have done to support the on-going transformation of the Long-
Term Care Quality Inspection Program (LQIP). Their involvement in the LQIP is just one of the 
many Ministry, or Ministry-related, advisory groups and consultation tables that they are 
involved in.  For the FCO, they worked with the Ministry on the Inspector Protocol on Family 
Councils and addressed concerns about inspectors’ interviews with Family Council members.  
The FCO agreed that the inspectors have responded really well to some of the issues that they 
brought forward, such as families’ difficulties with talking about suspected abuse and neglect 
issues or families being shy. The inspectors have really tried to learn how to speak with families 
better and have also been able to offer various ways of having a Family Council involved in the 
inspection process, for example through having an online survey.1881   
Similarly, the OARC also referred to its on-going relationship with the compliance and 
enforcement branch of the Ministry and provided examples of OARC’s involvement in inspector 
training. The OARC emphasized to inspectors the importance of the Residents’ Council 
interview and “digging deeply” through their questions and observations to protect residents’ 
dignity and respect.1882 The Executive Director elaborated on how residents may experience 
inspection of their home:  
It was identified through their [MOHLTC’s] own metrics and evaluations, that 
there needed to be a little bit more sensitivity to residents, more positive relational 
… words used, phrases used, etcetera. Because sometimes, when inspectors go 
into the homes, there’s a sense of intimidation. And sometimes residents 
themselves and staff members are unsure of what to say and what not to say.1883  
 
 
1880 Morgan & Yeung, supra note 75 at 10. 
1881 Interviewee # 2 and 3, supra note 1773. 
1882 Ontario Association of Residents’ Councils, OARC in Action (June) (Toronto: Ontario Association of Residents’ 
Councils, 2015). 
1883 Interviewee # 14, supra note 1762. 
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She reported that at a recent inspector training, there were inspectors who were fully 
recommitted to looking at the inspections from a resident’s perspective.1884      
9.5.3.2 Providing Feedback to Consumers about Regulatory Outcomes 
The process of providing feedback is not always unidirectional i.e., from third party 
associations to the regulator. One of the regulatory tasks is to communicate performance of the 
system. According to Windholz, monitoring regulatory regime performance and adjusting 
accordingly is one of the regulatory tasks.1885 This task is shared with the third-party associations 
also. The key here is a third-party association providing feedback to consumers, in addition to 
providing feedback to the regulator. In some ways, this may represent a solution for the scarce 
resources issues on the regulator’s end.1886  However, there are no clear and transparent ways for 
third party associations to be accountable to consumers.  
The Concerned Friends of Ontario Citizens in Care Facilities represents another way of 
being involved in the co-regulation of the sector. As a non-profit organization run by volunteers, 
Concerned Friends is involved in both individual and systemic advocacy work.1887 The presence 
of advocacy groups in the health care system is not new. Some of its work can be described as 
filling in knowledge gaps of the current compliance and enforcement system.  Concerned Friends 
receives electronic copies of every inspection report.  Its volunteers review each report and 
maintain a database with the results of the inspections for each home.  In the case of the RQIs, 
they do a more detailed analysis which allows them to track and compare over time the most 
frequent areas of non-compliances.1888 On its website, the Concerned Friends provides 
information about the number of Written Notifications, Voluntary Plans of Correction and 
 
1884 Ibid. 
1885 Windholz, supra note 50 at 227. 
1886 Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, “Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation” (2010) 32:2 Law & Policy 181. 
Black explains that regulating according to a risk-based framework exposes the reality that there will be a limit to 
the resources that can be spent on controlling certain types of risk creators (e.g., low-impact firms) or on firms in 
certain cases (e.g., medium/high impact but low risk). 
1887 Concerned Friends of Ontario Citizens in Care Facilities, “The Work We Do”, online: 
<http://www.concernedfriends.ca/our-work>. 
1888 Concerned Friends of Ontario Citizens in Care Facilities, “How the Inspection Process Works”, online: 
<http://www.concernedfriends.ca/look-long-term-care-homes/how-inspection-process-works>. See also Long Term 
Care Task Force on Resident Care and Safety, supra note 562. 
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Compliance Orders issued as a result of RQIs.1889 In addition, in its newsletters, the Concerned 
Friends publishes a list of high-risk homes regularly. The Board of Directors of Concerned 
Friends provided the rationale for doing the work that they have been doing and explained what 
type of information and assistance that families and friends of LTC applicants or residents 
require. It is apparent from the interview that greater transparency and accountability in LTC is 
an important driving force in the work of Concerned Friends.  
. . . the way we summarize it is we’re looking for trends, so year on year, are 
certain areas of the province getting better or worse? Are certain areas, in terms of 
the types of issues that arise, like safety or resident rights, whatever it may be, are 
they improving or getting worse?1890  
Further:  
what we did was out of everything we picked the top homes that had the most 
director’s referrals that were unresolved in that year. It’s just based purely on fact. 
We didn’t want to publish anything inflammatory, but we just wanted for people 
to know and to hold the homes a little bit accountable, and the Ministry 
accountable.1891  
They were careful to point out that they also publish the names of homes that have no 
compliance orders and have done well in the RQIs so that a more balanced picture is 
presented.1892 But they also commented that the Ministry should be disseminating information: 
“In some ways we feel kind of like we’ve been doing this work that the Ministry should be 
doing.”1893   
One could argue that the Concerned Friends uses its knowledge of what friends and 
families need to (or wish to) know about LTC to disseminate information about the sector in the 
form of advice about individual homes or interpretation of trends and emerging issues in the 
sector.  Recall that regulation is about behaviour change or modification.1894 And the concept of 
co-regulation is used to capture a variety of regulatory models that sit between the extremes of 
government regulation and self-regulation. In co-regulation, government and private parties 
 
1889 Concerned Friends of Ontario Citizens in Care Facilities, “Inspection Results”, online: 
<http://www.concernedfriends.ca/look-long-term-care-homes/inspection-results>. 
1890 Interviewee # 5 and 6, (2017). 
1891 Ibid. 
1892 Ibid. 
1893 Ibid. 
1894 Windholz, supra note 50 at 8; Black, supra note 6. 
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share responsibility for the development and implementation for the regulatory regime.1895 The 
Concerned Friends is co-regulating the sector in the sense of assuming some regulatory tasks (in 
this case, making information about enforcement and compliance more transparent) and of 
holding the regulator accountable.  I am not suggesting that the Concerned Friends has the same 
power and responsibilities as the Ministry as the regulator. But one of the regulatory tasks is to 
inform and educate.1896 While the Concerned Friends does not have any legal recognition of its 
status (unlike Family Councils and Residents’ Councils),1897 it operates in a more flexible and 
informal way to attempt to influence the behaviour of homes. The problem is that we do not 
know how to evaluate the impact of this type of feedback on the operation of homes over the 
longer term.               
9.5.3.3 Providing Feedback to the “Regulated” to Influence Behaviour 
One of the claims of New Governance scholars is that participating individuals, 
organizations and institutions can hold each other accountable to achieve interim regulatory 
goals because they are armed with better information.1898 In Chapter 7, I explained how the 
LTCHA created or strengthened procedures and processes for inclusion of residents and friends. 
Together, they allow users to provide feedback directly to the home. On the one hand, these 
procedures and processes to some extent empower residents and friends to hold homes 
accountable for certain aspects of the operation. Additional space for problem-solving is made 
possible. One could even go as far as arguing that residents, families and friends now have a 
responsibility to monitor the operations of the home. On the other hand, these new or 
strengthened procedures and processes do not guarantee that their advice and recommendations 
will be accepted by the home. One implication is that once these mechanisms are in place, they 
may be used for other purposes that go beyond the scope of the LTCHA. Quality improvement is 
 
1895 Windholz, supra note 50 at 162–164; Dennis D Hirsch, “The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, 
Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation” (2010) 34 Seattle U L Rev 439 at 465. 
1896 Windholz, supra note 50 at 227. 
1897 But its work is acknowledged in a formal way too. For example, the Task Force on Resident Safety noted that 
the Concerned Friends continues to analyze every MOHLTC inspection report, and post information about trends 
and areas of non-compliance. This work provides helpful information to families of residents in LTC homes. Long 
Term Care Task Force on Resident Care and Safety, Third Progress Report on An Action Plan to Address Abuse and 
Neglect in Long-Term Care Homes (October 2013 – October 2014) (Toronto: Long Term Care Task Force on 
Resident Care and Safety, 2014) at 8. 
1898 Alexander, supra note 339 at 131. 
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an example of how mechanisms can be used for a different purpose than the one for which they 
were originally designed.   
Quality improvement is an area where we have some indication as to how Family Councils 
and Residents’ Councils are included. The percentage of homes that described involving their 
Residents’ Councils and Family Councils in the development of their 2016/17 QIPs increased to 
92%, compared with 72% of homes in the 2015/16 QIPs.1899 According to HQO, “This is an 
important way for residents and their families to be involved, and will facilitate the movement 
toward patient/resident-centred care in Ontario.”1900  
However, the percentages provided by Health Quality Ontario tell us very little about the 
experiences of homes, residents, and families in the development of these Quality Improvement 
Plans, aside from whether homes are involving the Councils. One industry association 
representative had not heard any positive or negative comments from association members about 
their experience with engaging Residents’ Councils and Family Councils in the completion of 
Quality Improvement Plans.1901 When I asked the interviewees from OARC and FCO about their 
members’ respective experiences with Quality Improvement Plans and quality improvement in 
general, they both suggested that the picture is more complex. The OARC interviewee suggested 
that it is an “ongoing conversation to convince administrators and leadership teams that it is 
valuable to invest in the Residents’ Council for the purposes of implementing quality 
improvement.”1902 The interviewees from FCO reported that it has not done any survey with 
Family Councils but remarked:  
it’s really different from home to home. Some homes really involve the Family 
Council formally, and it works out really well. Those families are invited to the 
strategic planning retreats where they look at everything. They look at quality 
improvement and their vision and it’s wonderful. And then there are other homes 
where they stood in the hallway and asked families and then indicated that they 
had Family Council involvement in their Quality Improvement Plans.1903  
 
1899 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1470 at 6. 
1900 Ibid at 24. 
1901 Interviewee #10, supra note 1743. 
1902 Interviewee # 14, supra note 1762. 
1903 Interviewee # 2 and 3, supra note 1773. 
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The OARC has attempted to communicate to homes the importance of engaging Residents’ 
Councils in quality improvement.1904 The OARC interviewee elaborated on homes’ responses to 
those efforts:  
It really is a mixed reception . . . Residents’ Councils have often been viewed 
within the homes as almost frivolous activities that are plugged into the activity 
calendar, like tea socials, a nice opportunity for residents to get together and chat. 
But the dynamic nature of the Residents’ Council in terms of influencing the 
operation of the home, to build quality, that is sometimes a difficult message for 
some administrators to grasp. We have seen a shift over the years. Absolutely, we 
are seeing more and more homes embrace the idea of utilizing the Residents’ 
Council.1905  
Again, she linked this back to the requirements in the LTCHA:  
The Long-Term Care Homes Act specifically says that the licensee is to consult 
with, take the advice of, report results back to the Residents’ Council. The home 
is to have a program in place that analyzes the quality improvement in the care, 
services, accommodation, everything that affects a resident. And all of those 
results are to be communicated back to the Residents’ Council on an ongoing 
basis.1906  
 
But this process is more than just meeting legislative requirements:  
 
Quality needs to be driven from a resident’s perspective. . . They [residents] see 
things, hear things, experience things that management and team members, staff 
members, just don’t have the ability to tap into. So, encouraging homes to work 
very, very closely with the resident population through the Residents’ Council is 
paramount in having Quality Improvement Plans that are meaningful. Again, 
there’s a lot of activity going on, but if it doesn’t change the residents’ lived 
experience in a positive way, then it’s futile.1907   
This leads us to a more general question of whether these procedures and processes have 
any benefits. In the next section, I will consider the limitations of the new or strengthened 
participatory mechanisms. In particular, since these mechanisms are now firmly in place (at least 
legally), what factors may limit their usefulness?     
 
1904 Ontario Association of Residents’ Councils, 2014-15 Annual Report (Toronto: Ontario Association of Residents’ 
Councils, 2015) at 10. 
1905 Interviewee # 14, supra note 1762. 
1906 Ibid. 
1907 Ibid. 
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9.5.4 Flourishing Participation Rights but Dwindling Benefits? Limitations 
of (New) Participatory Mechanisms  
In the pages above, I have described how interviewees interpreted their organizations’ 
participation and provided justifications for their activities. Together, they provide another layer 
for understanding participation and inclusion in areas where the disability literature has devoted 
less attention. Some may question whether these mechanisms actually have any influence over 
how problem-solving occurs. Some may discount the symbolic value of these mechanisms. It is 
more accurate to conclude that non-state actors have very different experiences in influencing 
problem-solving in LTC homes and at the provincial level. To conclude the analysis on changes 
to governance, I will explore the limitations of applying and developing New Governance 
approaches.     
The techniques of participation require a closer look. New Governance approaches utilize 
local and informal networks of private and public stakeholders who are involved in complex, but 
collaborative, institutional relationships. Further, the "relational" nature of the collaborative 
networks is assumed to result in mutual trust and cooperation.1908 To recap, one of the challenges 
is developing outsider groups’ capacity to engage effectively and thus participate as equals in the 
deliberative process.1909 As well, a process that purports to include marginalized stakeholders 
and work towards win-win solutions might instead re-inscribe existing power dynamics to the 
detriment of the client group.1910 The research conducted here shows how these concerns 
documented in the literature are exemplified in my case study. In the remaining section, I will 
explain what participation looks like in LTC. 
9.5.4.1 Responding to information generated by users 
The utility of some mechanisms of participation (as currently conceived), specifically in 
terms of improvement to quality of care, is a matter of contention. From a New Governance 
perspective, participation is not an end in itself. New governance privileges continued and 
sustained collaboration, which is expected to produce key information, unique insights, and key 
 
1908 Alexander, supra note 339 at 126–127. 
1909 Sturm, supra note 351 at 269. 
1910 NeJaime, supra note 352 at 356–357. 
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innovations.1911 In LTC, many of the participatory processes intended to generate information for 
quality improvement are generally consistent with the idea of problem-solving as a discursive 
process. The challenge is to ascertain whether the information collected or generated is useful, 
and for whom. 
One criticism is that while LTC homes collect a great deal of information—to meet 
legislative requirements and as part of their accountability to government— homes have 
typically focused their efforts on data collection, not on using the data to identify issues and 
improve performance.1912 Consider the annual satisfaction survey. According to the Canadian 
Institute for Health Information, LTC facilities across Canada use many different types of survey 
tools to capture feedback on quality of care. A standardized, common survey tool is key to 
improving performance through comparative reporting.1913 According to one industry association 
representative, there are many variants of non-professional satisfaction surveys used across 
Ontario. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain reliable, sector-wide comparative data. The 
association has urged the government to implement one questionnaire, or one methodology, for 
resident satisfaction data and to have that data collected by an independent third party, as 
opposed to by individual homes doing the data collection.1914 Another industry association 
representative expressed a similar concern. In a nutshell, the system as a whole does not benefit 
from any of the information that it has collected:  
You have everything from large organizations that use external processes, pay 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to do their satisfaction surveys and then you 
have homes that just build and administer a survey. The sector as a whole is not 
able to do anything with the outcomes of these surveys to respond to common 
resident and family issues because the data is not comparable from one 
organization to the other.1915   
However, the need for standardization of satisfaction surveys may conflict with the intent 
of the LTCHA’s requirements about surveys. The results of the survey, as well as the process of 
conducting the survey, are intended as a means of fostering inclusion and participation of 
residents and families independently. As the interviewee from the OARC explained:  
 
1911 Alexander, supra note 339 at 131. 
1912 Long Term Care Task Force on Resident Care and Safety, supra note 562 at 46. 
1913 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Patient-Reported Experience Measures: Long-Term Care (Ottawa: 
Canadian Institute for Health Information). 
1914 Interviewee # 16, supra note 179. 
1915 Interviewee # 10, supra note 1743. 
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When homes are found non-compliant with regards to the annual satisfaction 
survey, it’s because they have not understood or not articulated or not engaged in 
the three separate components of working with the Residents’ Council. . . In some 
corporations . . . they have a survey . . . that is exactly the same across the entire 
organization. But the LTCHA is specific in terms of each home needs to provide 
the opportunity for residents to create questions that are very specific to them. . . . 
So, the Residents’ Council needs to have the opportunity to review the existing 
survey and create questions or add to it, or take away from it, so that it reflects the 
current wishes of the residents who are living there.1916  
That said, the interviewee also acknowledged the rationale for standardized questions:  
Our encouragement to homes is yes, you can have a standard kind of corporate 
survey, but as long as there is an opportunity for a few questions to be uniquely 
written per site, then they would be legislatively compliant, right?1917  
Furthermore, residents are entitled to participate in the whole process, from providing feedback 
and input about the dissemination of the survey to working with the home to come up with plans 
to address any areas identified for improvement based on the information collected.1918 The issue 
here is that while the law is clear that residents (through the Residents’ Councils) have the right 
to influence the content and process of the surveys, it would take some creative negotiation 
between each home and each Residents’ Council to come up with a solution that satisfies the 
system’s need to have reliable and comparable data while at the same time allows residents to 
have a voice locally so that the survey is meaningful to them. 
A more fundamental tension is that these formalized participation mechanisms are now 
tasked to do things that were not generally done by health care users until recently. According to 
one industry association representative, many Family and Residents’ Councils are involved in 
fundraising, event planning and peer support. She offered possible explanations as to why 
Family Councils may not be involved in quality improvement:  
A lot of them operate still on that peer support basis. They’re not interested in 
clinical quality outcomes, measuring the number of bed sores or the number of 
falls. They’re interested in improving quality of life and improving the experience 
of living in a long-term care home. In addition, both Family and Residents’ 
Councils are often in flux as membership turnover reflects the frailty of the 
population in long term care homes.1919 
 
1916 Interviewee #14, supra note 1762. 
1917 Ibid. 
1918 Ibid. 
1919 Interviewee #10, supra note 1743. 
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 The FCO representatives expressed a similar view about why some family members may not 
participate:  
Quality improvement can be very, very boring. And it’s hard to figure out how a 
family would be involved in some of it. Some of it’s very detailed and very 
practical, that I’m not sure what involvement a family would have around that, 
other than to learn about it.1920  
Further, the FCO representatives explained, “Family Council members are changing all the time. 
They may not understand the difference between an inspection and accreditation. There’s still 
that knowledge gap with families.”1921     
9.5.4.2 Collaboration and enabling relationships      
While this research has adopted the position that the interests of the parties involved in 
caring relationships are interdependent, I do not suggest that all caring relationships are enabling. 
Conflicts are not uncommon in LTC and some of the interviewees have shared their experiences 
of conflicts. The conflicts may be between health care providers and home, between health care 
providers and families, between residents, or between families and home. For example, one 
union representative explained that:  
. . . there have been some circumstances where there’s limitations put on a family 
member visiting and the circumstances that they do. Because sometimes family 
members have their own issues and so it’s tough, it’s a difficult area . . . it’s got to 
be a safe workplace and even family members need to be held accountable for 
their actions, right?1922  
Complex power dynamics may be in place. Conflicts are also present in policy-making forums. 
The question is whether changes by way of New Governance mechanisms can actually foster 
collaboration.      
One limitation of these legally-enabled participation mechanisms is that they do not always 
produce enabling relationships and collaboration within the home. Consider the example of 
Family Councils. The interviewees representing Family Councils provided an account of some of 
the challenges associated with supporting Family Councils and gave examples of when formal 
mechanisms are not enough. When asked whether a Family Council can help de-escalate a 
 
1920 Interviewee # 2 and 3, supra note 1773. 
1921 Ibid. 
1922 Interviewee # 15, supra note 1714. 
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situation or try to problem solve a little bit, the interviewees pointed out that the picture is more 
complex:  
That can happen. Sometimes it just makes it worse, because it can just become a 
spiral of complaints. And it really depends on the capacities of the Family Council 
members, whether they have the ability, the skill set, the knowledge and the 
willingness to undertake that conflict resolution approach, or whether they just let 
it spiral into something that’s not productive.1923  
It should be noted that while FCO has a variety of tools about how to run a Family Council,1924 
the interviewees noted that they would like to offer more support, such as community mediation. 
They also highlighted the potential negative impact on staff when a Family Council gets into a 
vortex of complaints:  
Staff feel targeted by the Family Council. And they try to avoid Family Councils. 
It gives the Family Council a bad name so that the staff who feel really scarred by 
whatever was said will be very hesitant to step up and help another Family 
Council. Even if those Family Council members that were originally there all step 
back from the council and another one is established, they’re very hesitant, 
because they’ve already been scarred . . . it’s hard to get beyond that.1925  
But the interviewees rejected the idea that the LTCHA should be amended to prohibit family 
members of former residents from participating in Family Councils. Rather, they argued that 
each Family Council should be able to decide on membership, otherwise many Family Councils 
would lose some of their long-time members.1926 
9.5.4.3 How to Augment Participation? 
To conclude the analysis, I will provide my final thoughts on the conditions necessary for 
New Governance. In the literature, scholars have debated why New Governance experiments 
succeed or not and how these experiments can be perfected to achieve normative goals, including 
distributive justice. Here, my focus is on exploring how some of the intrinsic factors of 
participants and their circumstances may be implicated in their participation. I then add to the 
discussion about conditions necessary for meaningful participation and why existing “patient 
engagement” activities are not enough to accommodate the needs of those in caring relationships.     
 
1923  Interviewee # 2 and 3, supra note 1773. 
1924 Family Councils Ontario, “Resources”, online: <https://www.fco.ngo/resources>. 
1925 Interviewee # 2 and 3, supra note 1773. 
1926 Ibid. 
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The demographics of residents and their family and friends also present challenges that the 
law cannot necessarily solve. It becomes a question of whether we should maintain the status quo 
(the law as it stands) while exploring which resources and supports are required to allow these 
legally mandated mechanisms to continue to function for as long as possible. For example, 
residents are increasingly entering LTC homes when they are older and have more impairments, 
including cognitive impairments. One industry association representative explained:  
People are being kept home longer and longer and longer . . . the length of stay in 
LTC is shortening to such an extent that homes are increasingly becoming a 
hospice for frail, elderly individuals with dementia.1927  
Some associations in the sector have begun to re-think the viability of Residents’ Councils, 
considering the range of engagement activities currently available in different parts of the health 
care system. For example, one of the industry associations, AdvantAGE Ontario, proposed to the 
government that instead of mandating that each home must ensure a Residents’ Council is 
established, every home will make reasonable efforts to ensure a Residents’ Council is 
established. The rationale is that homes are not capable of ensuring they have a Residents’ 
Council; they can only encourage the establishment of one. Nor are homes able to guarantee how 
active a Residents’ Council will be.1928 
The Change Foundation’s report, Enhancing Care, Enhancing Life: Spotlight on Residents’ 
Councils and Family Councils in Five Long-Term Care Homes in Ontario, is a recent example of 
empirical research that has been undertaken on the councils. One of the report’s findings was that 
many residents struggled with cognitive impairment, and these residents were not sure about how 
residents’ councils functioned, were unclear about how the councils engaged with other 
residents, administration and family members, and had difficulty participating in face-to-face 
meetings.1929 The report also noted that administrators and family members observed the 
difficulties of engaging these residents.1930 “In the end, the home can report they have a 
Residents’ Council, as the legislation requires, but the capacity of the Residents’ Council to carry 
 
1927 Interviewee #10, supra note 1743. 
1928 AdvantAGE, Advancing Senior Care Recommendations to Change the LTCHA and Its Regulation (February 
2017) (Toronto: AdvantAGE, 2017) at 16. 
1929 Change Foundation, Enhancing Care, Enhancing Life: Spotlight on Residents’ Councils and Family Councils in 
Five Long-Term Care Homes in Ontario (Toronto: Change Foundation, 2017) at 36. 
1930 Ibid. 
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out its mandate may be limited.”1931 The report argued that mandating one specific model—a 
Residents’ Council—may not be the best practice for engagement. Instead, it may make more 
sense to provide a range of engagement options for residents, families and home administrators 
to consider.1932       
The OARC provided a counter argument to this recommendation. When asked about its 
reaction to the Change Foundation’s report, the OARC interviewee emphasized the importance 
of having a protected space for residents:  
We are very pleased with the legislation that protects the sanctity of a private 
meeting for residents and only residents. . . . But the idea that Residents’ Councils 
may not be the best way or the only way to get a resident’s voice is something 
that . . . our organization strives to protect that notion.1933 
 The OARC actually encourages Residents’ and Family Councils to work together, but also 
insists that having a “residents only” meeting is essential.1934 The interviewee explained the 
rationale:  
Residents have told us, time and time again, that having other people in their 
meeting changes the dynamic. It often creates an environment where there is less 
sharing amongst each other. . . . there needs to be that sanctity about private 
meeting for residents only, and they get to invite whoever they wish to have come 
into their meeting.1935  
She also explained that the solution is not opening up the legislation, but “equipping that 
Residents’ Council, that core group of people, with what they need to make decisions.”1936  
The challenge of empowering a Residents’ Council so it remains representative of all 
residents in the home does not appear to be insurmountable if different meeting formats, Council 
governance structures, and appropriate supports can be put into place. When asked about the 
priority of including the voices of residents who are living with cognitive changes,1937 the 
interviewee reiterated the importance of having the necessary supports in place to allow 
 
1931 Ibid. 
1932 Ibid at 37. 
1933 Interviewee # 14, supra note 1762. 
1934 Ibid. 
1935 Ibid 
1936 Ibid. 
1937 The Ontario Association of Residents’ Councils’ 2015-17 strategic plan included four priorities, the other 
priorities were: respected community partners and strong community awareness, dynamic and sustainable growth 
and pursuit of excellence in governance. Ontario Association of Residents’ Councils, 2015-16 Annual Report 
(Toronto: Ontario Association of Residents’ Councils, 2016) at 12. 
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Residents’ Councils to be the voice of all residents, and working with other organizations to 
bring education to residents:  
The core group of residents who are actively involved in their Council need to be 
equipped with tools and knowledge so that they can build relationships with 
people who have dementia. It’s not automatic, they need to have that education . . 
. so that the Council can be confident and the administrator can be confident that 
the decisions made in that Council represent, to the best of their ability, everyone 
who lives in the home.1938  
In addition to residents learning how to build relationships with those residents living with 
cognitive changes, others in the home also need to learn how to support Residents’ Councils:  
The assistants to Residents’ Councils . . . received little to no education on how to 
facilitate a very complex group. One of our education modules is on facilitation 
techniques where we talk about exactly that, group dynamics and how to help 
navigate through conflict resolutions and difficult personalities. And very 
practical information around sound systems, speakers, microphones and various 
ways and techniques that you can implement, so that people who have issues with 
hearing comprehension, vision, et cetera, that their needs are met and participate 
to the best of their ability.1939   
The point is that now that the legal rights are firmly in place, the next hurdle is to identify 
the variety of forms of participation that are not predicated on assumptions about independence 
and capacity. Shakespeare reminds us that disability should be understood in terms of a 
continuum.1940 This is a respectful way of describing the diversity of residents living in LTC 
today in terms of how impairments affect them. We could argue strongly that the Residents’ 
Councils can perform functions just like other patient advisory groups in other parts of the 
system. Yet it must be acknowledged that for residents with significant cognitive and other types 
of impairments, their participation may not look like anything familiar to us: rational individuals 
deliberating freely in an organized fashion without any assistance. These residents may 
communicate very differently and most likely require supports. It is possible that in some smaller 
homes, it is not even possible to have a sufficient number of cognitively well residents to be the 
core group that forms the Residents’ Council. Some Residents’ Councils may not perform all the 
functions that they are legally permitted to do. To put it differently, in reality there will always 
be Residents’ Councils that do not conform to the legal image of a Residents’ Council. This does 
 
1938 Interviewee # 14, supra note 1762. 
1939  Ibid. 
1940 Shakespeare, supra note 106 at 5. 
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not negate the fact that the ongoing existence of such mechanisms helps to change the language 
we use to describe the legitimate role of residents in the operations of their homes. The range of 
powers and functions of the Residents’ Council is broad enough to accommodate residents at 
both ends of the disability continuum. Some Residents Councils will be very active and 
organized at some point, but later, may switch to a less active mode. The home is put in a 
difficult position when the Residents’ Council is on hiatus because it could be found in non-
compliance with the LTCHA. Rather than making the Residents’ Council non-mandatory or 
merging it with the Family Council, the solution may be to clarify when a home has met its 
obligation in ensuring that a Residents’ Council is established. Without the legal mandate, it is 
easy to reduce Residents’ Councils to optional social activities offered at the discretion of the 
home.         
Engagement with residents’ families and friends comes with its own set of difficulties and 
the need for support in this area is also pressing. As mentioned earlier, patient engagement is a 
longer-term trend in the health care system and patient engagement activities occur across a 
spectrum of approaches.1941 Health Quality Ontario has released the Ontario Patient Engagement 
Framework1942 and published a variety for tools for health care providers and “patients” (which 
include patients, residents and families).1943 The justification for patient engagement is 
instrumental in nature and grounded in the promotion of continuous quality improvement:  
Ontario’s Patient Engagement Framework is designed to inspire action towards 
the ultimate goal—a strong culture of engagement that drives continuously 
towards better care and better health for Ontarians. With patients and caregivers 
as partners, there is no limit to the quality of care that Ontario can achieve.1944  
Health Quality Ontario’s tools address barriers to participation to various degrees. By way of 
example, a guide about patient and family advisory councils makes a case for diversity on 
councils:  
As publicly funded agencies, health care organizations also have an obligation 
and responsibility to reduce barriers so that all Ontarians can access high quality 
care that is appropriate to their needs. For the people who may face the highest 
challenges in navigating the health system (e.g., vulnerable or marginalized 
 
1941 Health Quality Ontario, Ontario’s Patient Engagement Framework: Creating a Strong Culture of Patient 
Engagement to Support High Quality Health Care (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2017). 
1942 Ibid. 
1943 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1477. 
1944 Health Quality Ontario, supra note 1941 at 6. 
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populations), this means making clear efforts to involve those with these lived 
experiences in decisions that affect their care.1945  
The guide also suggests that health care organizations ask themselves questions about any 
barriers that might prevent people from participating, such as child care or elderly care, meeting 
times, accessible meeting places for people with disabilities, spoken or sign language 
interpretation, transportation costs, and culturally and religiously appropriate food.1946 
While tips and tools for reaching out to those who face barriers to participation are helpful, 
the reality of being in a caring relationship1947 makes participation impossible for some. This 
needs to be part of a larger policy conversation about supporting those who are in caring 
relationships. The interviewees from FCO explained the problem eloquently:  
I think there is this feeling, or there is this myth that family caregivers should be 
involved in all this stuff without really understanding that often family caregivers 
are a sandwich generation. They may have young kids, as well as being a 
caregiver to their mom or dad, or whoever. And they have limited time and focus 
and their hearts are broken, because they have to deal with whatever level of care 
there is for the person they are caring for. So I think it is all well to say family 
engagement, but without looking at the reality of that and figuring out how do you 
have that engagement really? So there needs to be all different creative ways.1948  
To this observation, I would add that families and friends of residents are not always “young” in 
terms of chronological age, active, and independent (in the sense of not requiring any 
assistance).1949 The point here is that if meaningful participation of those in caring relationships 
is considered an integral part of problem-solving, we must be mindful that the system’s ability to 
harness their knowledge and expertise is curtailed by the reality of caring and other care and 
work responsibilities.     
This speaks to a more general point about supporting families and friends of LTC 
residents.  In the disability studies literature, some scholars object to or hesitate to engage in 
 
1945 Health Quality Ontario, Creating and Sustaining Patient and Family Advisory Councils – Recruiting for 
Diversity (Toronto: Health Quality Ontario, 2017) at 7. 
1946 Ibid at 8. 
1947 Herring, supra note 190 at 10. 
1948 Interviewee # 2 and 3, supra note 1773. 
1949 In one Canadian study of individuals between 45 to 85 years of age, 38.2% of participants report only providing 
care, 8.1 report only receiving care, and 6.2% are both caregivers/receivers. This study does not include individuals 
who live in LTC homes. See Debra Sheets et al, “Chapter 6: Caregiving and Care Receiving” in The Canadian 
Longitudinal Study on Aging (CLSA) Report on Health and Aging in Canada: Findings from Baseline Data 
Collection 2010-2015 (Hamilton: Canadian Longitudinal Study on Aging, 2018) 74. 
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discussion about carers’ rights or promotion of the interests of carers. Their objections reflect a 
deep resentment of the disability community being perceived as a ‘burden’ on society.1950 The 
tension here is to recognize the inter-dependencies of both parties in a caring relationship without 
reducing one party to mere burden of care. The feminist political economy literature proposes a 
range of promising practices in LTC, including conditions that allow families and friends the 
option of participating or not in care.1951 FCO is also doing research to examine the role and 
scope of available support services in LTC. The goal of this research is to understand how 
families are being supported and to explore ways that FCO can improve these services.1952 One 
finding is that families that received regular care from a Social Work/Social Service Worker 
found that it had positive impacts on both their residents and themselves. These families 
accessed counselling services, support groups, workshops and other formal and informal 
supports. These services in turn helped family members to manage caregiver burnout and to 
better support their residents.1953 
Currently, the LTCHA is silent on providing support to informal caregivers other than the 
provisions about powers and rights of Family Council and detailing the obligations of substitute 
decision-makers. Devoid of their socio-legal context and the reality of caregiving in our case, 
participation mechanisms are unlikely to significantly advance the interests of residents and 
families and friends. The challenge is to identify the ways in which law can support the 
implementation of promising practices identified in the literature or community-based research. 
As well, it is important to identify situations where the law should not intervene.      
While the legally mandated mechanisms have definitely given a voice to residents and their 
family and friends, the limitations of law are also apparent.  On the one hand, it is important to 
acknowledge that not all residents or their families and friends can participate simply because 
they have the legal right to participate and be included in different decisions. On the other hand, 
we need to re-think the purpose of different types of engagement. The key concern is whether the 
appropriate supports can be provided so that disabilities and impairments are not barriers to 
 
1950Herring, supra note 190 at 5–6; Soldatic & Meekosha, supra note 116 at 204–205. 
1951 Armstrong & Daly, supra note 696 at 125–126. 
1952 Family Councils Ontario, “Supporting Families Research”, (2018), online: Updates and Events 
<https://www.fco.ngo/updates-and-events/updates/supporting-families-research-project>. 
1953 Family Councils Ontario, Supporting Families in Long Term Care Results from a Research Project (Toronto: 
Family Councils Ontario, 2018) at 8. 
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meaningful participation.  This discussion also invites disability studies scholars to continue to 
theorize the involvement of families and friends of disabled people in a respectful way while 
being vigilant against resurfacing the concept of of disabled people as mere “passive recipients 
of care”. 
9.5.5 Summary 
If we accept that relationality is one of the markers of care, as argued by Herring,1954 then it 
is obvious why it is imperative to examine mechanisms that purport to enable and empower 
parties in caring relationships. Meaningful participation entails seeking out the needs and wishes 
of those in caring relationships, in particular residents. Participation – if properly understood and 
supported - can be a crucial concept in refurbishing institutional care. One of the strengths of 
Ontario’s system is that participation in health care and activities of daily living decisions are a 
matter of right for residents. In particular, residents (or LTC applicants) do enjoy a range of 
procedural rights to ensure autonomy is respected in health care consent and guardianship 
matters.  However, the insights offered by the key informants and through data collected by the 
Consent and Capacity Board raise questions as to how those procedural rights are exercised in 
practice.       
Since participation is a central organizing concept in New Governance, I have examined 
how participation is regulated in LTC. I concentrated on participation in regulatory tasks because 
this area has received less attention in the literature and remains under-theorized. I conclude this 
section with my thoughts on how to augment participation of residents and families and friends. 
New Governance approaches, including participation of non-state actors, are not panaceas. One 
of the debates in the literature is the conditions that are most likely to influence the realization of 
New Governance approaches. The key concern is whether the appropriate supports can be 
provided so that disabilities and impairments are not barriers to meaningful participation for 
those who are willing to participate.  Since this dissertation is based on the assumption that the 
interests of those in caring relationships cannot be considered in isolation, it follows that 
participation of families and friends is worth exploring. The reality of being in a caring 
relationship serves as a concrete example of how the larger social context constrains 
 
1954 Herring, supra note 112 at 20. 
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participation of family and friends. This brings us to the last category of implications – the law’s 
role in creating solutions for the broader structural issues. Since law is a tool that is at the 
disposal of the state, we can understand the relationship between state and citizens by looking at 
tools used (and those rarely used).   
9.6 Law’s response to caring: An on-going struggle to define state / 
citizen relationships 
In the previous sections, I have explained the law is used to construct care within the 
home. The state’s responsibility is to define what care means, to specify how to provide it, by 
whom and to reduce any potential of harm. One could also find expression of state 
responsibility in how the law creates or strengthens mechanisms to give residents and their 
families a role to play in problem- solving at the home level. I have also explained how 
problem-solving occurs in the area of quality improvement as understood by the government. 
In this last part of the dissertation, I will explain how the government deploys legal rules to 
delineate its responsibilities in LTC. The provincial government never really played the role of 
the provider state in LTC and its role is evolving. This section will present my observations and 
analysis regarding how these regulatory changes shape the balance of responsibilities among 
users of LTC (residents and families), homes and the state. I draw on the work of feminist 
political economy as well as on Herring’s work on the markers of care. The discussion here 
focuses on the following aspects: access to LTC, choice in LTC and a risk-based approach to 
regulation and enforcement. 
9.6.1 Few substantive changes to regulation in terms of entitlement, 
delivery and conditions of care 
My main argument here is that while LTC (an institution created by law) can potentially 
play an important role in creating a safety net for a specific group of older adults (mostly older 
women with disabilities and illnesses), there are also obvious institutional gaps that from a 
gender perspective, have implications for those who require care. Filling in the gaps is a 
collective problem from an equality perspective. In the previous section, I explained how 
problem-solving occurs in the area of quality improvement as understood by the government. 
Now I turn to the government’s role in problem-solving some of the structural issues in the 
sector. I look at how the government problem-solves the reallocation of dependency. 
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9.6.1.1 Access to LTC 
In some ways, LTC is fulfilling its role as an institution, in terms of managing some of 
the common vulnerabilities generally associated with aging, in particular those vulnerabilities 
that emerge closer to the end of life. As Herring puts it, a central role for the state must be to 
ensure that the dependency needs of individuals are met. Thus, care cannot be dismissed as a 
private activity of no interest to the state.1955 Although more older Ontarians, including those 
who depend on care as well as those who provide care, express their preference for aging at 
home and for receiving home and community care over institutional care,1956 some will not be 
able to reside safely in the community. One of my interviewees provided a more balanced view 
about transitioning out of or remaining in LTC. He pointed out that for those who want to return 
home to live with a spouse or a family member, often there can be a smooth transition through 
the LHIN Homecare Services. Since over 90% of the doctors who give care in long-term care are 
family physicians themselves, often they can provide continuity of care or work with colleagues 
to give care. He cautioned that: 
 Sometimes it can be an inappropriate discharge, but the patient or the resident is 
expressing their own autonomy with this decision, that it can be a relatively 
unsafe world for some people out there. At least in long-term care, they have their 
Residents’ Bill of Rights and they have the assurance of medical care and care 
standards. Whereas in a community setting they don’t have that same sort of 
established protection.1957  
LTC is meeting the housing, health care, and personal care needs (but not always 
adequately, judging by the intense scholarly and media attention to the sector) of a very specific 
group of older women who are disabled and/or diagnosed with illnesses such as dementia. 
However, the interpretation of their needs is probably best described, to use Nancy Fraser’s term, 
as subject to a thinner and narrower definition of need. As such, LTC reallocates, to some extent, 
the responsibility for dependency from individuals and the family to homes created and regulated 
under public authority. This reallocation is important not just for this particular group of older 
women, but also for their informal and formal caregivers (if any). The issues of wait times and 
projections of LTC needs have been written about extensively in scholarly and public policy 
 
1955 Ibid at 3. 
1956 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 562 at 174. 
1957 Interviewee # 4, supra note 1744. 
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documents, but the focus here is an exploration of how different individuals may be affected by 
wait times differently, although there is a common set of admission criteria and prioritization 
scheme applicable to everyone. Formal equality is not the problem here.  
From the perspective of equality of access to LTC, the government has come closer to 
recognizing the relevance of age to economic insecurity and deprivation that older Ontarians 
may experience, but the necessary attention to the complex intersection of age, disability, and 
other grounds — and the resulting disadvantages and privileges — is still lacking. Indeed, there 
are piecemeal efforts to address the affordability of the LTC system by way of price control, 
better disclosure of fees, and prohibition of bed-holding fees to make access more equitable for 
those “deserving” of state-funded care. It is instructive to consider the social and economic 
context in which these residents may find themselves.  
The economic characteristics of older Canadian women help contextualize the cost of 
care on residents. The key is that how the cost for LTC is allocated to individuals needs to be 
examined with a gender lens. There has been a long-term decrease in low income rate among 
seniors (65 years old or older) since the late 1970s.1958  Although the prevalence of low income 
among seniors has dropped significantly, a gender gap in low income rates is evident among the 
senior population.1959 From 1995 to 2013, the low-income rate increased by 8.1 % among senior 
women and 6.4 % among senior men.1960 More importantly, senior women not living in an 
economic family were the most vulnerable to being in a low-income situation. The prevalence of 
low income has risen the most among this group of seniors over the last two decades.1961 
There are some obvious gaps in the LTC system that impact not just those who reside 
there but also those who are waiting from the community. As noted earlier, there are some 
nuances in the wait time data that are concerning. Not only has the median wait time for LTC 
placement steadily increased, some groups appear to have to wait longer. I am not suggesting 
that the eligibility criteria and prioritization scheme impose adverse differential treatment on 
 
1958 Statistics Canada, Low Income in Canada - A Multi-line and Multi-index Perspective (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 
2012) at 29. 
1959 Chantal Collin & Hilary Jensen, A Statistical Profile of Poverty in Canada (PRB 09-17E) (Ottawa: Library of 
Parliament, 2009) at 15. 
1960 Statistics Canada, supra note 25 at 20. 
1961 Ibid at 21. 
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older women or racial or religious minorities that amount to discrimination. However, it is worth 
exploring the impact of longer wait times from the perspective of reallocating responsibility for 
dependency. 
9.6.1.2 Growing pressure for LTC solutions 
It is worth exploring the circumstances of those who apply to LTC homes in the 
community. While a lot of media attention is on Alternative Level of Care patients (or “bed 
blockers” as portrayed in the media), about 42% of residents entered LTC homes from the 
community in 2016-17. More importantly, about 29 % of residents did not have home care at the 
time of admission. This percentage has remained fairly stable in the past 5 years. It is reasonable 
to assume that for those without home care, their informal (unpaid) or paid caregivers were 
providing care that they need. Since they were waiting to enter LTC, it is extremely unlikely that 
they did not have any care needs. 
 Table 32: Sources of entry to LTC in Ontario (percentages) 1962 
 
Sources of Entry 
2012- 
13 
2013- 
14 
2014- 
15 
2015- 
16 
2016- 
17 
Hospital 37.5 36.5 37.0 35.5 35.4 
Residential care 22.4 22.3 22.6 23.8 22.2 
Home 39.8 40.9 40.0 40.3 42.0 
With home care 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.4 13.1 
Without home care 28.8 29.3 27.8 27.9 28.8 
Other or unknown source of entry 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
In particular, the timeliness of this reallocation of dependency will have implications for 
older Ontarians and their caregivers (who themselves may also be older Ontarians requiring 
care), possibly mediated by gender and other factors. Unpaid caregivers often assist with 
housework, groceries and meal preparation etc, and in many cases, help the care recipient 
navigate the health care system and advocate on their behalf.1963 In a more recent longitudinal 
 
1962 I compiled this table by reviewing the Continuing Care Reporting System (CCRS) Quick Stats which include 
data on demographics, clinical and functional characteristics, treatments and medications, resource utilization, and 
admissions and discharges. The data is from the tab “Table 4 Source of admission for residents admitted into 
continuing care facilities”. The Canadian Institute for Health Information publishes the data annually. 
1963The Healthy Aging survey was conducted by Statistics Canada. The survey was not repeated. See Statistics 
Canada Government of Canada, “Canadian Community Health Survey - Healthy Aging (CCHS)”, (26 March 2008), 
online: <http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&Id=47963>. 
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study on aging, results of a subsample of participants who report providing care, receiving care, 
or both caregiving/receiving are available. Women make up a greater proportion of those who 
report caregiving (53.9% of the subsample study participants), receiving care (57.7% of the 
subsample study participants), and both caregiving/receiving (64.0% of the subsample study 
participants) than men.1964 Caregiving can entail substantial economic, social, physical, and 
psychological costs, which caregivers often bear.1965  
The troubling implication about the changes to the admission criteria is that making it 
more difficult to get into LTC homes, or delaying LTC admission until applicants are closer to 
death, will increase the burden on caregivers unless more support for care recipients and their 
caregivers — in the form of home care or other support — is made available. In a 2016 report 
entitled The Reality of Caring, Health Quality Ontario noted that over a five-year period (2009–
10 to 2013–14), long- stay home care patients were becoming collectively older and were 
increasingly affected by cognitive impairment, functional disability, and frail health. The report 
also found that family members and other unpaid caregivers were generally more distressed the 
more cognitively impaired, functionally disabled, and in frail health the patients were. Higher 
rates of distress were also associated with providing more hours of care.1966 Equally important, 
informal care provided in an inadequate manner jeopardizes the care recipient’s physical or 
mental health. Excessive demands on informal caregivers may prompt harmful neglect or violent 
behavior.1967 That is not to say the abused person is the real cause of abuse.1968 It should also be 
noted that care recipients may also experience distress. In the longitudinal study on aging, care 
receivers (20.3%) and those who are both caregivers/receivers (19.5%) report dissatisfaction 
with life at nearly twice the rate of caregivers (10.6%).1969 It is important to be mindful of the 
perils of “aging at home” for older disabled adults and their informal caregivers, especially when 
access to LTC is very difficult. 
 
1964 Sheets et al, supra note 1949 at 75. 
1965 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 562 at 174–175. 
1966 Health Quality Ontario, The Reality of Caring: Distress among the caregivers of home care patients (Toronto: 
Health Quality Ontario, 2016) at 11. 
1967 Schneider et al, supra note 481 at 223. For a more detailed discussion about abuse and caregiver distress, see 
Herring, supra note 112 at 275–279. 
1968 Herring, supra note 112 at 276. 
1969 Sheets et al, supra note 1949 at 82. 
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One could argue that a gap in LTC (as an institution) is that some of the changes in law 
appear to be gender-neutral but may have a disproportionate negative impact on women that 
warrants further research. The intention here is not to categorize care as “dyadic and one 
directional” — that is, one person, often female, caring for another person, typically frail.1970 
Rather, we need to explore how assumptions about care are embedded into LTC regulation. LTC 
is perceived to be a very expensive type of publicly funded care and the admission process is a 
way of dividing, sorting, and classifying disabled people — mostly older, disabled women — co- 
opting some as eligible for LTC while repositioning others as suitable to continue to age in the 
community. Those who are eligible are further divided into crisis and non-crisis and the wait 
time for a bed can have consequences, not just for LTC applicants, but also for their families and 
friends who step into the role of informal caregivers as explained above. The changes to the 
eligibility criteria for LTC may reflect assumptions that the most expensive type of state support 
should only be made available when informal care and much cheaper forms of home care have 
been exhausted. Also, with additional information and other consumer protection measures, 
residents and their families are expected to make the right “choice” about LTC and to be able to 
advocate for themselves.  
One could argue that while laws governing care are still predominantly gender-neutral, 
caregiving experience is shaped by assumptions about care and gender and disability. In a review 
of advice literature about care (caregiver guidebooks), Chivers explains that the female caregiver 
is “expected to sacrifice her own financial and physical wellbeing rather than pass any ‘burden’ 
on to the state, she is also expected to take care of herself and the family members so that no 
further complications arise”.1971 In a critical review of the research literature on gender 
differences in dementia care, Bartlett et al. argue that gender is a key factor structuring the lives 
of those living with dementia. They also point out that there are gender differences in the 
caregiving experience.1972 Interrogating the effectiveness of LTC as an institution in terms of 
reallocating responsibility for dependency will depend on whether we can unpack assumptions 
 
1970 Sally Chivers, “Cripping Care Advice: Austerity, Advice Literature, and the Troubled Link between Disability 
and Old Age” in Katie Aubrecht, Christine Kelly & Carla Rice eds, Aging / Disability Nexus (Vancouver: UBC 
Press 2020). 
1971 Ibid. 
1972 Bartlett et al, supra note 116. 
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about care and measure the impact of law through a gender lens.  The language of choice and 
autonomy illustrates how choice is elevated in law, which will be addressed later. 
While the discussion above clearly presented a critical view of the provincial 
government’s role in controlling access to LTC through the establishment of admission criteria 
and managing capacity of the system, it should be noted what constraints are faced by the 
provincial government. As noted in Chapter 4, the Ontario government does not operate or own 
LTC homes. Any expansion of (or mere maintenance of) LTC capacity will rely on the co-
operation of home operators. One strand of research in the feminist political economy literature 
is the relationship between quality of care and non-profit delivery, which includes municipal 
homes.1973 To extend this debate, I suggest that we need to consider whether the state has any 
role to play in promoting non-profit delivery. Reflecting on the appropriate role of municipalities 
in LTC is a useful way to explore the tensions inherent in the state’s responsibility towards its 
citizens. 
9.6.1.3 Creating LTC capacity  
The provincial government uses its power to legislate to mandate each municipality to 
operate at least one LTC home (with some exceptions).1974 From a quality of care perspective, 
this would appear to be consistent with the research findings in the feminist political economy 
literature. But viewed from a municipal lens, the picture is more complex. I asked two 
interviewees, representatives from an industry association and the Association of Municipalities 
of Ontario, about the challenges of running municipal homes. It is not surprising that they both 
reported challenges such as higher labour costs due to arbitration awards and the highly 
prescriptive nature of the LTCHA and other reporting requirements.1975  The perspectives from 
the Association of Municipalities of Ontario revealed more fundamental questions and tensions 
about the appropriate role of the municipal government in LTC delivery.  
 
1973 McGregor & Armstrong, supra note 719; Margaret J McGregor et al, “Complaints in for-Profit, Non-Profit and 
Public Nursing Homes in Two Canadian Provinces” (2011) 5:4 Open Med e183. 
1974 This requirement applies to any Southern municipality that is an upper or single-tier municipality and Northern 
municipality that has a population of more than 15,000. Municipalities may operate joint homes. Long-Term Care 
Homes Act, 2007, supra note 425, ss 119–124. 
1975 Interviewee # 16, supra note 620; Interviewee # 17, supra note 620. 
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By way of background, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario released a number of 
policy documents about the municipal role in providing services to seniors.1976 An important 
theme in the Association of Municipalities of Ontario’s 2019 paper is municipal flexibility with 
respect to the types of seniors’ services that municipal governments provide.1977 In a 2016 paper 
about age-friendly communities and seniors’ services, the Association of Municipalities of 
Ontario urged the provincial government to engage the municipal sector in policy and program 
decisions as partners.1978 The Association of Municipalities of Ontario interviewee explained that 
no consensus exists across the whole municipal sector about whether this mandatory requirement 
should exist at all.1979 The nature of LTC is a matter of contention:  
We always had debates in the municipal sector about what the appropriate 
municipal role should be in service delivery ... Health is a very contentious policy 
field area, especially in the municipal sector. Municipalities are involved in 
delivery, and funding, and we’re the employers in health services that includes 
long-term care, ambulance services, public health, etc ... Many people are viewing 
long- term care as healthcare and palliative care - a little different from the 
residential care that it used to be when it was first established.1980  
In another 2019 document, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario explains its position: 
“Given the evolution of long-term care into complex health care service, property tax base is 
neither a sufficient nor a fair source to top-up provincial funding for what is essentially is an area 
of provincial jurisdiction.”1981 The interviewee explained that:  
we [Association of Municipalities of Ontario] don’t always think it’s appropriate 
that a municipality should have to fund healthcare services because that’s an area 
of provincial jurisdiction under the constitution. So, with long-term care homes, 
they’re funded primarily by the province through the funding that we receive, but 
municipalities have to top-up that funding. We contribute more than what the 
provincial funding costs, especially when it comes to capital redevelopment cost 
we’re responsible for that as well. So, there’s not a consensus because it’s viewed 
as healthcare.1982 
 
1976 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Coming to a Crossroad: The Future of Long Term Care in Ontario 
(Toronto: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2009); Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Coming of Age: 
The Municipal Role in Caring for Ontario’s Seniors (Toronto: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2011). 
1977 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, A Compendium of Municipal Health Activities and Recommendations 
(Toronto: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2019) at 9. 
1978 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Strengthening Age-Friendly Communities and Seniors’ Services for 
21st Century Ontario (Toronto: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2016). 
1979 Interviewee # 17, supra note 620. 
1980 Ibid. 
1981 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Long-Term Care: Municipal Challenges in Ontario (Toronto: 
Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2019). 
1982 Interviewee # 17, supra note 620. 
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Besides concerns about funding,1983 the Association of Municipalities of Ontario also cites other 
challenges such as increased regulatory burden, need to improve provincial-municipal 
conversations about LTC and seniors’ services, recruitment issues and governance.1984 The 
Association of Municipalities of Ontario’s most recent position is that it is not advocating for 
municipal governments to get out of the LTC home business. However, communities have 
different populations, existing services, and assets. Accordingly, local municipal governments 
each face different challenges.1985 The interviewee was also careful to point out that the 
Association of Municipalities of Ontario was not advocating for the municipal sector to get out 
of LTC, and he reiterated that some municipalities wished to remain involved in the delivery of 
LTC:  
Many [municipalities] do this because they know they’re responding to the needs 
of vulnerable residents in their communities. As well, there are high community 
expectations of long-term care . . . they have a very high standard of care so it 
really meets the need in the community where other for profit, nonprofit operators 
might not be able to meet.1986 
Some of the issues referenced by the Association of Municipalities of Ontario could be 
solved by additional provincial funding or by modifying some aspects of the regulatory 
framework to better reflect the distinctions of different types of homes. For example, monitoring 
and compliance of municipal homes could be streamlined to reflect the additional oversight and 
accountability mechanisms of municipal homes (e.g. oversight of the responsible municipal 
Ombudsman and Auditor). But the fundamental unease (at least among some municipalities) 
with being involved in LTC delivery is more difficult to resolve. The question is whether one 
level of government should continue to mandate another level of government to deliver a service 
that is arguably of better quality than other providers when there is no clear consensus as to the 
distribution of collective responsibility for LTC among different levels of government. Allowing 
municipalities to choose whether they wish to operate LTC homes may exacerbate unequal 
access to services based on geographic locations, although for-profit and other non-profit homes 
may be able to fill in the gap. However, the practical reality of operating a municipal LTC home 
may be in tension with the objective of equal access regardless of geographic location. 
 
1983 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, supra note 1977 at 11. 
1984 Ibid at 10–13. 
1985 Ibid at 9. 
1986 Interviewee # 17, supra note 620. 
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9.6.2 Illusion of “choice” and autonomy 
The language of choice and autonomy further obscures questions about the role of the 
state in the LTC system.1987 Autonomy, the usual argument that people should be free to develop  
and live out their own version of the good life, is closely linked to the claim that people are 
responsible for the choices they make.1988 Recall that in the feminist political economy literature, 
it is argued that choices “involve how the system is structured, how funding is allocated, who is 
eligible for care, and who is available to provide that care.”1989 Scholars have been asking 
important questions about what exercising choice means for residents in LTC.1990 Following the 
scholarly debate that takes a more critical and nuanced view of choices in LTC, I add that the 
ability to make a choice is unevenly distributed due to factors such as age, gender, race, 
ethnicity, disability and class.1991  
9.6.2.1 Making choices  
The problem of LTC placement wait times illustrates the practical restrictions on choices, 
despite promises made in laws governing LTC admission. At face value, the LTCHA provides 
many choices in accommodation; it appears that applicants should share the responsibility for 
extended wait times, for example, because they decide to choose a religious or cultural home 
instead of choosing as many homes as possible.1992 But the reality of making accommodation 
choices can be rather different.  
The exercise of choice of accommodation may be even more restricted for those affected 
by poverty. Late life poverty is not only systemic, it is unequally distributed.1993 Those who are 
eligible for co-payment reduction, for example, cannot choose semi-private or private rooms. 
The elder law lawyer explained why applicants or their families may choose certain homes. She 
reflected on her clients’ experience to illustrate the practical difficulties of choosing a home 
when they were pressured by the hospitals:  
 
1987 Lai, supra note 637. 
1988 Herring, supra note 112 at 21. 
1989 Armstrong & Daly, supra note 163 at 11. 
1990 Ibid at 13. 
1991 Lai, supra note 637. 
1992 Ibid. 
1993 Grenier, Griffin & McGrath, supra note 23 at 17. 
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A client’s husband had dementia. . . He was fairly violent. But when she was 
there, he was calm. . . Her commitment to her husband was that she was going to 
be with him [at the LTC home] every day so that they could help take care of him, 
because she didn’t want to see him restrained or anything else. She was blind in 
one eye. This was such a terrible case. She couldn’t drive. And they [hospital] 
wanted him to go to a home that was about 40 kilometres away. She’s poor. She 
could not get there.1994  
Further,  
[t]here are different reasons why you’d be attracted to different homes. But in 
some cases, people need to apply to certain places because of accessibility. . . But 
there are good reasons why people pick places, particularly poor people, because 
they can’t get from here to there.1995  
The lack of alternatives is captured by her comment:  
The systems don’t work well in terms of your rights to choose because there 
aren’t enough of the long-term care home beds out there. And so we’ve got these 
huge long waiting lists now. It’s a terrible situation.1996 
In other words, in the LTC context, the formal right to choose is simply a poor substitute for 
substantive equality. 
Even without the hardest cases such as those explained by the elder law lawyer, access to 
LTC is also a problem not simply because the system’s capacity does not match the demand. Part 
of the problem lies in the processes of application and admission, despite the procedural 
safeguards in place (see Chapter 8). Herring reminds us that “The typical presentation of an 
unencumbered, free, rational decision maker is simply a fiction.”1997 Unsurprisingly, the LTCHA 
is intended to protect individuals from undue influences while empowering them with more 
information. The Concerned Friends also commented that “access to long term care is very 
difficult.”1998 Since the Concerned Friends receives calls from people who are looking for LTC 
homes, it is in a position to explain how applicants experience the application and admission 
process. When I asked the interviewees whether they were aware that applicants would be 
pressured into selecting LTC homes that have the shorter waitlists, they responded:  
Basically, they’re [applicants] told: here’s the list of homes in your geographic 
area, tour them, here’s some considerations you might want to think, and then 
 
1994 Interviewee # 12, supra note 1699. 
1995 Ibid. 
1996 Ibid. 
1997 Herring, supra note 245 at 22. 
1998 Interviewee # 5 and 6, supra note 1890. 
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pick five, and we really highly encourage you to pick at least one shortlist home, 
if not more. And so, that’s the only information they’re given. And they’re given 
a very tight deadline, especially for those who apply from hospital.1999  
The issues facing those applying to LTC while remaining in hospitals are not new. Jane Meadus 
of the Advocacy Centre for the Elderly has written on the “choices” being offered to those 
remaining in hospitals and how hospital policies are inconsistent with the applicable law.2000 
The Concerned Friends interviewees elaborated on the reality of making LTC decisions.  
Caregivers who are not experts feel very worried, anxious, that they’re going to 
make a decision in haste that they’re not comfortable with. So they often ask us . . 
. what should I do? . . . because everyone’s standards and everyone’s expectations 
are so different, we can give some general information about homes maybe to stay 
a little bit clear from, but, in general, it’s only the feeling that you get once you 
get there and you have to go and look at all these items. So we can give them lots 
of advice about what to look for, but the time pressure of choosing is very 
high.2001  
They agreed that more information would be helpful to LTC applicants and their families:  
people are still confused, or maybe there’s a lack of communication with their 
particular [placement] coordinator. It might be just coordinator to coordinator. 
And I know some are amazing, really amazing and others are just doing the bare 
minimum. So, yeah, I think information would help . . . hopefully this new 
[Ministry] website will help in terms of people having enough information to 
make decisions about it. . . I think having something that clearly walks them 
through the process, because oftentimes, even if they’re not giving a time pressure 
and they’re in the community, a lot of people don’t really understand what the 
process is.2002 
9.6.2.2 Deciding without choices? 
Another way of illustrating the issue of lack of choice in accommodation is to examine 
the experience of younger disabled people. LTC is frequently associated with aging in public 
discourses. What is missing is how and why some younger disabled people come to reside in 
LTC. This topic is important for my research for the following reasons. First, it shows how aging 
affects caring relationships, for example, between aging parents and their disabled children. 
Second, it illustrates how LTC may be a mismatch of impairment and the social environment. 
 
1999 Ibid. 
2000 Jane Meadus, Discharge from Hospital to Long-Term Care:  Issues in Ontario - Updated in February 2014 
(Toronto: Advocacy Centre for the Elderly, 2014). 
2001 Interviewee # 5 and 6, supra note 1890. 
2002 Ibid. 
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Third, it provides an example of how the rhetoric of choice (enshrined in law) is used to 
legitimize structural problems in the health care system.  The presence of younger disabled 
people is indicative of law as an inadequate response to a particular type of caring relationship. 
LTC has become a forum where tensions about aging and disability surface.          
I decided to focus on younger people with intellectual disabilities because of the 
availability of information about their experiences and the history of institutionalization in 
Ontario. This is not to say other younger residents with other types of illnesses or impairments 
do not require attention.  By way of example, the Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada has 
argued that the LTCHA “does not contain any provisions that would facilitate the development 
and delivery of age-appropriate care within long-term care homes.”2003 Further, “Although only a 
minority of people younger than age 65 with MS require care in a long-term care home . . . Too 
often, they are placed with much older individuals in settings designed for frail, elderly people. 
This can result in a significantly reduced quality of life, which can lead to depression and mental 
health problems.”2004 As one elder law lawyer remarked:  
There are also people 18 and over in long-term care. . . I always remember one of 
the women who was my client.  She was in her 40s.  She had MS. Her husband 
had been taking care of her at home, but then they just couldn’t manage.  It was 
awful.2005   
Clearly, aging affects familial caring relationships. As explained in Chapter 4, younger 
people with intellectual and other disabilities may end up in LTC homes because they have 
nowhere else to go. There is a consensus among interviewees2006 that sometimes LTC homes 
serve as the last resort care setting for younger disabled adults and such an arrangement is 
inappropriate for many reasons. As representatives from a community living organization 
explained, a person with intellectual disability may have been living with their elderly parents 
and eventually, they need to move into a retirement home or LTC home because of their own 
 
2003 Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada (Ontario Division), The Need for Age-Appropriate Long-Term Care: MS 
Society of Canada Views on Bill 140, Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2006 (Toronto: Multiple Sclerosis Society of 
Canada (Ontario Division), 2007) at 2. 
2004 Ibid at 3; Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada (Ontario Division), Finding My Place: Age-appropriate housing 
for younger adults with multiple sclerosis (Toronto: Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada (Ontario Division), 2006). 
2005 Interviewee # 12, supra note 1699. 
2006 Interviewee # 7 and 8, (2017); Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711; Interviewee # 13, supra note 1838; 
Interviewee # 15, supra note 1714. 
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health or capacity problems, and a decision has to be made so that the adult child could move at 
the same time.2007 A government guideline also reaches a similar conclusion:  
People with developmental disabilities often rely on family caregivers throughout 
their lifetime. These family members with caregiving responsibilities may also be 
aging and facing their own health issues. The Aging Project found that caregiver 
burden was as predictive of admission to LTC home as was frailty.2008  
The disability lawyer also confirmed that she had encountered a number of situations where 
people with disabilities were living with their families, such as parent(s). The aging parent(s) 
experienced some kind of health crisis and required hospitalization. From there, another family 
member may become the substitute decision-maker for the parent according to the hierarchy in 
the Health Care Consent Act (section 20) or become the attorney if there is a power of attorney. 
The substitute decision-maker or attorney may consent to LTC admission for the parent.2009  The 
substitute decision-maker or attorney may then decide to sell the family home.  
The problem becomes what happens to that person with the disability who was 
living with the parent in the family home? With family dynamics in the 
background, questions may arise, such as who gets to be the power of attorney, 
who gets to make those decisions, and do they take into account the wishes of the 
person with the disability, or the other family members. There is an absence of a 
good, accessible, legal, or quasi-legal process to handle or resolve those kinds of 
dispute. Going to court is not really an accessible, or practical option in those 
kinds of situation.2010 
Aging also affects more formal caring relationships. The representatives from the 
Community Living Association summarized the lack of flexibility to support aging with 
intellectual disability. Organizations have different capacities to deal with the changing needs of 
their clients. A person with an intellectual disability may have been living in supportive housing 
such as a group home, but without additional support, the home may not be able to adapt to his 
or her changing needs due to aging, coupled with health issues not adequately addressed. This 
may necessitate consideration of LTC as a living arrangement.2011 It is challenging to manage his 
or her changing needs because in the developmental services sector, the funding for the 
 
2007 Interviewee # 7 and #8, supra note 2006. 
2008 Ministry of Community and Social Services, Guidelines For Supporting Adults With A Developmental Disability 
When Applying To, Moving Into And Residing In A Long-Term Care Home (Toronto: Ministry of Community and 
Social Services, 2017). 
2009 Interviewee # 13, supra note 1838. 
2010 Ibid. 
2011 Interviewee # 7 and 8, supra note 2006. 
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individual basically remains the same once an agency accepts the individual into a formal 
support arrangement.2012 Further, the health care system needs to intervene more to help support 
the health needs of people with intellectual disability while the community living sector 
continues to focus on supporting the daily activities of people with intellectual disability.2013   
A clear concern that emerged from the interviews is the lack of choice in housing and 
community support options for those younger disabled adults and I would argue that this is an 
affront to autonomous decision-making.  The interviewees representing the community living 
associations considered the findings of the Ombudsman report, waitlists for formal residential 
support and stories from families and pointed out that “people start looking for what the 
alternatives are.  And long-term care is one door that’s open to people and you can see people 
will try to get through that door, even if it’s not really the appropriate place for them to go.”2014  
The disability rights lawyer also expressed similar frustrations with a system that does not 
address some very challenging needs that people have:  
The Ministry will say, well we don’t have anywhere, that’s the most appropriate 
setting for the person, like there’s nowhere else for them to go. How could it be 
that’s the most appropriate setting when that setting doesn't even have the 
mandate to manage that person’s disabilities, or provide disability services to that 
person.2015  
She remarked, “I’ve had clients who, given the option of living in a hospital or a long term care, 
or being homeless, will choose to be homeless. I don’t think that that is a meaningful choice. 
But, you know, some people do make that choice.”2016  
The bottom line is that autonomy for some younger disabled people (or their substitute decision-
makers if they are incapable), as it appears in this scenario, is reduced to choosing between 
physical survival in an inappropriate setting and homelessness. One could argue that admission 
to a LTC home is not the result of arbitrary state interference and therefore, the state is absolved 
of any responsibility. However, I contend that it is an inaction of the government that makes the 
assertion of autonomy impossible for some younger disabled adults. While the legal rules about 
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consent may have been followed, the fundamental value of being able to choose one’s destiny is 
sacrificed.  
The problem is not so much about the impairments, illnesses or disabilities of these 
younger residents. Rather, it is the mismatch between what LTC is resourced and mandated to do 
and the needs and preferences of these younger residents.  In earlier chapters, I have argued that 
the impairment and loss of functionalities due to age-related illness and health conditions drive 
how care is structured legally. By referencing certain impairments, it is easy to lose sight of the 
diverse range and extent of impairments experienced by residents and to exclude those who do 
not have the specified impairments. One disability rights lawyer reflected on the experiences of 
some of her clients with intellectual disabilities or addiction disabilities [alcohol and drug 
addictions] who ended up in LTC.  She pointed out that people were placed in inappropriate 
settings because those were the only places where their behaviours could be managed:  
staff in long term care facility don’t have training around mental health and 
addiction or intellectual disabilities because the facility is not, no fault to the 
facility, set up to provide those kinds of services. The facility was not actually 
providing any services other than basic needs such as food, hygiene and shelter to 
those individuals.2017  
A union representative interviewee expressed strong reservations about LTC homes’ ability to 
provide quality care for all residents:  
the homes were not built thinking about what kind of residents truly were going to 
be in them. How do you mix and keep busy and keep good quality of care for a 
40-year-old developmentally handicapped adult in the same facility, perhaps 
sharing the same bedroom, as a 92-year-old man who is just a frail, elderly man?  
When you put all that together and you look at the things that trigger more 
aggressive responsive behaviours, that’s when the challenges come.2018  
Another union representative remarked that the lack of staffing simply exacerbated the situation:  
. . . when you look at long term care facilities and you look at a lot of the closures 
in psychiatric hospitals and downsizing and downloading and you look at the 
closing of facilities that supported people with developmental disabilities, a lot of 
those people wound up in long term care facilities. And they have significant 
behaviours and again, when you’ve got a 12 to one staff ratio you don’t have the 
resources to deal with that stuff.2019 
 
2017 Ibid at 13. 
2018 Interviewee # 11, supra note 1711. 
2019 Interviewee # 15, supra note 1714. 
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The point here is not that younger disabled people should never be allowed to live in LTC 
homes. Indeed, program eligibility criteria based on chronological age could be highly 
problematic too because it could be a form of age discrimination and therefore may offend the 
Charter and/or the provincial human rights codes. But of course, as the Supreme Court states in 
Withler: “a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground is not by itself sufficient to 
found a violation of s. 15(1).”2020  As well, ageism is clearly no more acceptable than disablism. 
Assumptions made about younger disabled people can also be used to worsen their situation. For 
example, incorrect assumptions about their capacity for making decisions can be detrimental to 
their autonomy. I do not suggest that disabled people of different ages can never share space 
(including living space) together as beneficiaries of a public benefit scheme. Otherwise, we are at 
risk of creating a distinction that discriminates by “perpetuating the group’s disadvantage or by 
stereotyping the group”.2021  
The lessons here are as follows. First, the admission eligibility requirements in the 
LTCHA have been tightened to ensure that only the highest acuity candidates for LTC are 
prioritized for admission by the government’s narrow criteria. It is evident that the 
“appropriateness” of particular LTC admissions is debatable and we know that for the younger 
disabled residents, LTC may not be appropriate for them but these eligibility requirements do 
nothing to prevent a system from assigning them to care / housing options that are not 
appropriate for them. Second, for a LTC system that emphasizes “choice” and “consent”, it is 
concerning that the ability to make choices and consent to LTC admission is severely constrained 
by structural issues (in our case, problems created by the developmental services system as well 
as the health care system). Third, while I agree that it is not possible to have a single policy 
solution that attends to all the needs of beneficiaries of a program, we need to be mindful of the 
implications of a program that is singularly focused on the needs of people with very specific 
impairments. While it may be positive for those with behavior issues that additional resources 
have been made available (e.g. Behavioural Supports Ontario, infra), this also means that needs 
stemming from other impairments have not been adequately addressed. In a LTC system where 
patient-centred or resident-centred care is emphasized in hard and soft law, the lack of 
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responsiveness to younger disabled residents’ needs, values, cultural backgrounds and beliefs, 
and preferences clearly demonstrates the mismatch between residents and their environment.    
Finally, addressing the needs of these younger disabled adults is also a means of relieving 
the pressures in the system, and it is achievable. One interviewee representing medical directors 
encouraged me to take a look at the people who are discharged back to the community:  
They are, in my experience, usually younger individuals with something like an 
acquired brain injury or a severe neuropsychiatric illness or drug and alcohol 
abuse that has caused difficulties, for example. Their condition has been stabilized 
in long-term care and they can go into a supportive living arrangement in the 
community, which is often more suitable for them, because, again, they’re young 
people and they don’t like being in long-term care, because they’re in care with 
what they view as a bunch of old people . . . So, though their numbers are few, 
when you look at their lifespan, the number of years that they’re out of long-term 
care then becomes significant and they’re living a relatively more independent life 
in the community.2022   
The interviewees representing the community living associations also agreed that some agencies 
can show some creativity in terms of how they support a person:  
Some of the more progressive organizations plan around the individual.  And I 
think that can accommodate a person’s needs as they age better than, we have this 
group home model or we have this model of support, and the person doesn’t fit 
into it.  So, those progressive agencies are better suited to change with the needs 
of the individual, where the more traditional agencies, it’s more static and a 
person’s increased needs don’t necessarily match with the model that they’re 
being provided with.2023   
To be fair, the issue of adults with developmental disabilities living in LTC has received 
some attention and work is being done. This is likely to be prompted by the Ombudsman report 
and the human rights case Cole v Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care).2024 In 2013, Mr. Cole 
filed an Application with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (Tribunal) against the Ministry 
of Health and Long-Term Care (Ministry), through his litigation guardian, Audrey Cole (his 
mother).  Mr. Cole alleged that the funding limit in the regulation discriminated against him and 
other people with complex disability-related needs because they are denied the level of services 
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that they require to remain outside of institutional care.2025 On August 16, 2016, Mr. Cole and the 
Ministry entered into a settlement agreement. The Ministry acknowledged that the previous 
regulation, with its rigid caps, “had the potential to create hardship and disadvantage for 
individuals with intellectual and developmental disability living in community settings or long-
term care homes.” The Ministry also agreed to recommend that CCACs [Community Care 
Access Centres] be granted discretion to exceed the nursing caps in the regulation for those with 
“complex care needs”.2026  
By way of example, the Ministries of Community and Social Services and Health and 
Long-Term Care have developed a guideline to help adults with developmental disabilities who 
are applying to, moving into and residing in a home. This document provides information about 
the developmental services sector, how to apply to LTC homes, and processes that impact LTC 
home residents.  For the purpose of this dissertation, I should highlight the principles articulated 
in the guideline: Flexibility and Choice, Inclusion, Access and Co-Ordination, and Health and 
Independence.2027 Not surprisingly, the government’s position is that people choose to live in 
LTC: “In some cases, a person with a developmental disability or their substitute decision- 
maker (SDM), if any, may feel that a LTC home may be an appropriate place if the individual 
meets the eligibility criteria . . . It is an individual’s choice or that of their SDM, if any, to move 
into a LTC home (for those who meet the eligibility criteria and receive a bed offer).”2028  Based 
on the findings from the interviews, it is questionable whether this group of residents actually has 
much choice in consenting to LTC admission. But the document makes it clear that the different 
providers from the development services sector and the health care system must work together 
on the identification and provision of developmental services and supports in LTC homes.2029 It 
remains to be seen as to whether such a guideline can actually help people with developmental 
disabilities to assert their rights to demand services to accommodate their disabilities.       
 
2025 Ibid. 
2026 Ibid. 
2027 Ministry of Community and Social Services, supra note 2008. 
2028 Ibid. 
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9.6.3 Law without enforcement (or with too much enforcement)? 
This last section will analyze enforcement as a function of the state to protect residents 
from risks of harm. And I will link enforcement to some of the logics of the safety and security 
provisions of the LTCHA (see Chapter 6). It is probably uncontroversial to claim that in LTC the 
importance of enforcement cannot be under-estimated and enforcement may take many 
forms.2030 The choices made with respect to enforcement are illustrative of the responsibilities of 
the state towards those in caring relationships. 
The previous chapters have touched on the state’s responsibilities under the Charter and 
various statutes. But the courts have been very cautious about holding the government liable 
for any harm suffered by those in institutional care. In Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta 
Society, the Supreme Court makes it clear that no matter how vulnerable LTC residents are, the 
provincial government does not owe them a fiduciary duty:  
Vulnerability alone is insufficient to support a fiduciary claim. Since the 
government, as a general rule, must act in the interest of all citizens, governments 
will owe fiduciary duties only in limited and special circumstances. The interest 
affected must be a specific private law interest to which the person has a 
pre‐existing distinct and complete legal entitlement, and the degree of control 
exerted by the government over the interest in question must be equivalent or 
analogous to direct administration of that interest.2031  
There is no comparable case to Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society involving 
Ontario LTC residents yet. However, there are similarities between those who were 
institutionalized because of their intellectual and other disabilities prior to de-institutionalization 
and current LTC residents in the sense that to various degrees, the respective institutions are 
funded and controlled by the government. The Ontario cases concerning the facilities Huronia, 
Rideau and Southwestern were settled so we could not say for certain if or how the courts would 
have decided on the claims of fiduciary duty since the Ontario facilities were funded and directly 
operated by the provincial government. It is reasonable to conclude that it would be difficult for 
LTC residents to make a case against the Ontario government in private law. Thus, it is even 
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more important to decipher how the relationship between the state and residents (as citizens) is 
constructed in the enforcement of relevant statutes. 
I suggest that regulatory aspects of social programs are under-explored in disability 
studies but can actually illustrate the state’s responsibility towards its (disabled) citizens. 
Scholars in disability studies have written extensively about how policy and program design 
pertaining to social programs affects disabled people. Points of contention include the state’s 
responsibility in defining who are “deserving” and who are not and the techniques used. 
Borrowing insights from other disciplines, such as feminist political economy and regulation 
literature, is a step towards more nuanced understanding of the regulatory aspects of caring.  
The Ontario government frequently refers to the fact that there is a LTCHA and that the 
government enforces compliance with the LTCHA. The government clearly accepts its 
responsibility in regulatory matters. But a closer look at how the government carries out its 
regulatory responsibility can tell us something important about the state / citizen relationship. 
The Long-Term Care Quality Inspection Program has been subject to extensive and widely 
divergent commentary, and I do not aspire to resolve it here. In Chapter 8, I described how the 
range of enforcement tools and sanctions have expanded. Earlier in this chapter, I examined how 
stakeholders participated in giving feedback for the purpose of making improvements to the 
LQIP. The earlier analysis concerns the techniques of participation and engagement. The concern 
here is what the law can tell us about what the perceived risks in LTC are, who are responsible 
for reducing those risks (or the impact of the consequences) and how. In particular, the notion of 
‘risk-based’ has been used by the government to describe its approach to enforcement, and this 
section attempts to unpack this notion. The notion of “risk-based” is also embedded in the design 
of the LTCHA. This provides a way to show how “risk-based” approach is used to define the 
government’s accountability, including resources allocation. This section begins with a 
discussion on the role of risk in enforcement, followed by an examination of the limitations of a 
risk-based approach. 
9.6.3.1 The role of risk 
For Julia Black, risk plays four roles in regulation: “providing an object of regulation; 
justifying regulation; constituting and framing regulatory organizations and regulatory 
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procedures; and framing accountability relationships.”2032 Governments have to consider how to 
rationalize or stabilize decision-making on questions such as: which risks should be selected for 
attention, the nature of that attention and how much should be applied; and who should be 
involved in making those decisions.2033 To do so, governments and regulators attempt to develop 
decision-making principles and procedures to render risk calculable and commensurable.2034  
Risk’s role as “constituting and structuring regulatory processes and accountability 
relationships”2035 is most evident in the new inspection program. It is not surprising that given 
the volume of rules that homes must comply with, the Ministry needs to determine its regulatory 
objectives and risk appetite as a regulator. Three related roles of legal rules can be identified 
here. Legal rules are adopted in response to previous regulatory failures – and Ontario has no 
shortage of those in LTC – and to provide a “political defence to charges of either over- and 
under-regulation.”2036 The changes to the sanctions available to the Ministry fit into this category 
and the language of risk helps to legitimize a more adversarial approach. Further, legal rules 
about how inspections are to be conducted such as actions to be taken in the event of non-
compliance are used to improve consistency in the regulator’s assessment of homes across a 
widely varying, regulated population.2037 As well, legal rules are used by the government to 
attempt to define the terms by which the government should be made accountable.2038 The 
changes to the intensity of the annual comprehensive inspections based on risk are essentially 
about managing the parameters of blame. Black explains the issue eloquently: “In the context of 
risk, regulators are asking, implicitly or explicitly, … that they should not be expected to prevent 
every negative occurrence in the regulatory system … and that they should not be blamed for all 
those that occur.”2039 I am not suggesting that the recent “risk-focused” approach is used by the 
Ministry to completely shift blame to the homes, but that it is used to articulate and define what 
level of risks of non-compliance is tolerable given the resources available to the Ministry. 
 
2032 Julia Black, “The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes” in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge, eds, 
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Unsurprisingly, very divergent views about the Ministry’s compliance and enforcement 
efforts emerged from the interviews. It is clear that the interviewees all have identified 
shortcomings with the LQIP and they were concerned for different reasons. It is also evident that 
they interacted with the Ministry in different ways and had different experiences in the evolution 
of the LQIP since its inception. 
One could conclude that the narrative of risk in the development of regulations about 
safety and security and inspections gives rise to questions that are both normative and 
instrumental in nature. The key informant interviews provide some indications as to the 
limitations of how the government selects which risks to address, how much attention should be 
given to those risks and how they should be responded to. The interviews are intended to 
generate questions about the current risk-based approach. 
9.6.3.2 Limitations of a risk-based approach 
The first limitation is that safety in a home is constructed predominantly in terms of risks 
that will harm the physical or bodily integrity of residents. Such a construction limits the 
government’s responsibility towards residents in that the welfare of workers has not been 
addressed explicitly as integral to the safety of residents. In a caring relationship, Herring argues, 
the interests and identities of the two people become intermingled. Thus, it becomes impossible 
to consider the welfare or rights of any one party in isolation.2040 It follows that discussion about 
resident safety cannot be complete without including consideration of the safety of formal and 
informal caregivers. The intertwined nature of caregiving is evident when the interviewees 
discussed safety in LTC homes. One could argue that a clear gap in approaching safety in LTC 
homes is that resident safety and worker safety are addressed separately, often at different policy 
tables, and then are regulated by distinct statutes and regulators. While the measures in the form 
of legal rules to protect resident safety are extensive (as discussed in Chapter 7 and section 
9.3.1), the right to a safe workplace is more circumscribed. One interviewee described the daily 
occurrences of physical or verbal assaults experienced by his union members in LTC and 
remarked, “unfortunately, a lot of the incidents of patient to staff violence, you don’t hear about 
them in the public like you would if it was the reverse.”2041 He further explained that his union’s 
 
2040 Herring, supra note 112 at 4. 
2041 Interviewee # 15, supra note 1714. 
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‘Dignity 4.0, Time to Care Campaign’ is about allowing staff to have enough time to care for 
residents so that not only would residents not be neglected, but the safety of residents and staff 
would also be improved.2042 Further, she explained that her union has tried to promote a culture 
of safety for a long time, and said,  
We at ONA [Ontario Nurses’ Association] try to have the same people involved 
in many of these discussions and at many of these tables so we’re messaging 
things the same way. . . but let’s be clear, some of the solutions are the same, 
we’re just talking about it at a different table. . . All of that stuff costs money and 
the question becomes, at what point government can’t ignore the fact any more, 
they just got to fund it properly.2043  
There are indications that the issue of safety for residents and staff will be addressed in a more 
integrated manner. Recent initiatives including the Workplace Violence Prevention in Health 
Care Leadership Table2044 and reporting of workplace violence prevention initiatives in annual 
Quality Improvement Plans2045 show that the safety risk of workers is finally being selected for 
attention and responded to in the LTC sector.  
The second limitation is that the risk-based approach has not eliminated the need to have 
a consensus about the purpose of the inspection results. Stakeholders offer different 
understandings of what the Ministry should be doing in terms of the inspection results. The 
views of the Concerned Friends represent one perspective as to what the Ministry should be 
doing with the results of inspections. The Concerned Friends also wanted to see improvement: 
“we want homes to improve, we don’t want to just see people publicly shamed, we want the 
improvement to come out of it.”2046 They elaborated on what they perceived to be as the 
limitations of the Ministry’s approach to enforcement and compliance. In particular, they 
observed that until recently (2016), there was a small subset of homes that got compliance orders 
repeatedly, yet the issues were still not resolved. They said,  
we weren’t seeing a director’s referral come after that to say you have to resolve a 
issue. . . where’s the enforcement policy? Why is this small subset of homes 
getting away with not being compliant? So actually it was only last year really 
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when we saw a huge increase in director’s referrals where there were outstanding 
compliance issue.2047   
They also noted that they supported the Ministry’s new measures of enforcement, including 
financial penalties, and that they have advocated for such measures for a long time.2048 In sum, 
one could argue that the Ministry was aware of problems in that small subset of homes as evident 
by the issuance of compliance orders but did not use that knowledge to get those homes to 
comply.   
Another theme is the Ministry’s role in resolving problems in the homes identified 
through inspections. At a standing committee meeting, one government official emphasized that 
“[t]his is not just about assigning blame or identifying error; this is a solutions-based inspection 
process.”2049 Another government official also stated that the Ministry would meet with the home 
and the LHINs are also involved to discuss the issues.2050 The Concerned Friends also supported 
developing a closer working relationship between the Ministry and the LHINs on compliance 
issues.2051 But one industry association is more skeptical about whether the Ministry is actually 
trying to problem-solve:  
They probably bring them in and say how come this is happening and the person 
will say this is why it’s happening.  They’ll say well you have to comply, what’s 
your plan, you have to fix that.2052  
The lawyer representing homes did not object to the idea of having meetings where the Director 
and others from the Ministry meet with the LHIN and the home in question, but noted that the 
process could be more meaningful:  
. . . . having this type of a meeting in the context of a referral to the Director (after 
findings of non-compliance have already been made against a home) is 
consequential as opposed to collaborative  . . . In such a meeting, the Director – 
who may or may not involve the LHIN – gives a directive to the home in terms of 
what it must do to come into compliance.  Why not have discussions with the 
home before it gets to a point where a referral to the Director is necessary? Why 
not have guidance and advice available to homes from the outset of an issue?  I 
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think that that would change what is perceived as an adversarial process to a more 
collaborative process.2053     
Another concern that emerged is that users (other than the Ministry) may not be able to 
utilize the results of the RQIs. A common theme is the utility of the inspection reports. The 
OARC reported that there is frustration among some Residents’ Councils about the inspection 
reports because the language used is vague and legalistic. The OARC supported and worked with 
the Ministry’s project to create executive summaries for the inspection reports so that residents 
can truly understand and have meaningful discussions around the inspection reports.2054 The 
Concerned Friends also reported similar frustrations among families and friends. They advised 
people how to find inspection reports and other LTC information on three different websites but 
people may not understand the information because of the language written. They also supported 
the Ministry’s efforts to update the relevant websites so that the information about the home 
actually mean something to users.2055  The OLTCC also felt that the inspection reports are not 
very helpful in the way they are currently written. It is very hard for the public to determine from 
the reports why inspections are done and why there are written notifications and compliance 
orders.2056          
The third limitation is that emergent and systemic risks that require difficult policy 
discussions and funding commitments have taken a back seat. The Ministry focuses on risks that 
occur at individual sites (i.e., homes) by using more command-and-control2057 type of legal rules 
and then adopts more adversarial inspection strategies in specific sites. One industry association 
representative pointed out the strengths and limitations of the Ministry’s approach to inspection. 
She recognized that the Ministry’s system is a very robust system to detect incidents of non-
compliance and identify individual homes where non-compliance poses high risks: 
So they [Ministry] have a very robust inspection system . . . the tool has built-in 
algorithms to detect non-compliance. . . probably after 7 years of experience with 
the tool, it’s probably proving to be very effective in identifying homes where 
there is a high risk of non-compliance that potentially could result or actually 
results in harm so that’s a good thing.2058  
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Another union representative also questioned the value of the compliance system but from a 
different angle. From a practical perspective, the RQI happens once a year and it is “like finding 
a needle in a haystack”.2059 But more fundamentally, he believed that the problem is not 
inadequate enforcement; but rather, that the lack of a standard of care for residents is the root of 
residents suffering in LTC.2060 
However, it is not clear if the RQI data (cumulated over a seven-year period) is being 
used by the Ministry to anticipate and address system-wide issues. On the one hand, the Ministry 
claimed that it was looking at what the data can tell beyond performance of individual homes. At 
a standing committee hearing, one government official claimed: “I think the other critical piece 
is that the information from our inspections is being fed into policy development options in the 
licensing and policy area of our division.”2061  On the other hand, one industry association 
representative expressed reservations about how data is used for addressing systemic issues:  
. . . what happens in one home and the results of that inspection is completely 
independent of what happens in another home . . . What the ministry has been 
doing is it provides us with totals [of different sanctions issued]. [This data] also 
tells you which category, which area, which line, which provision in the Act has 
the highest number of non-compliances.  They’re able to count these non-
compliances, but … these counts don’t give us a true picture of what is going 
on.2062  
She used a metaphor to illustrate her point:  
the data is still looking at the trees and it’s not looking at the forest. If you have 
eight rural homes that are closed to admission because inspections identified non-
compliance associated with high risks, not all of the issues may be related to the 
operator. From a system perspective, it begs the question: is this a predictor 
potentially of future collapse of small rural homes?  The ministry is not asking 
those policy questions.  The ministry branch in charge of inspections doesn’t 
involve itself in asking those policy questions.  The ministry only cares that the 
homes are in compliance because its focus is on the safety of the individuals in 
the home … they don’t have tools that explore root causes of non-compliance and 
how the sector as a whole can benefit from the outcomes of the compliance 
program . . . and where we could work together to actually improve 
performance?2063  
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I am not suggesting that the more systemic risks are not addressed at all. For example, in 
a 2017 consultation paper on aging, the government asked questions about the future of rural and 
smaller homes,2064 so this can be an indication that the government is fully aware of the risk of 
rural homes and plans to take action in the near future. The government has also introduced a 
small homes sustainability fund.2065 The question is whether the current ‘risk-based’ approach 
can help policy-makers to find a right balance between acting on systemic risks and controlling 
risks at individual homes.2066 Another way of looking at this is that dealing with immediate 
problems can occupy so much attention and resources that risks that may materialize in the 
future fail to be dealt with.2067      
The final limitation is the nature of the responses in the form of legal rules to the risks 
identified as threats to the safety and security of residents. Many additional requirements 
imposed on homes are procedural in nature, such as having the necessary policies and procedures 
in place, annual evaluation of various policies and programs, more documentation, and regular 
reporting. A number of interviewees expressed reservations about the current inspection system. 
From the perspective of client advocacy, one interviewee who is a lawyer explained her 
reservation about the Ministry’s inspection system in the context of a discussion about the 
requirement for home to have policies and forms: “But the inspection system, there’s definitely 
value in it, but it doesn’t work the way people think it works. . . They only look at the 
surface.”2068 She used the example of her own research on health care consent forms and tools2069 
to illustrate the problem of a ‘check-box’ mentality on the Ministry’s part:  
We reviewed 100 sets of forms. Not a single set were completely correct. And the 
Ministry just goes, oh, well, we don’t have to deal with the substance. We’re only 
looking at the surface. So, even in the inspection systems, they’re not really 
 
2064 Government of Ontario, Aging with Confidence: Ontario’s Action Plan for Seniors (Toronto: Government of 
Ontario, 2017). The paper asks the following questions: “What can be done to ensure it is viable for smaller long-
term care homes to stay in their community rather than amalgamated into larger facilities? What is a reasonable 
distance for family to have to travel to visit with their loved ones in long-term care?” 
2065 Ontario Long-Term Care Association, Seniors in need of long-term care to benefit from landmark 2018 Budget 
(Toronto: Ontario Long-Term Care Association, 2018). 
2066 Black & Baldwin, supra note 1886. Black and Baldwin explain that which risks to focus on is a political—not a 
technical—issue and judgments have to be made on such matters as the right balance between acting on systemic 
risks and controlling individual risks. 
2067 Baldwin & Black, supra note 83 at 578. 
2068 Interviewee # 12, supra note 1699. 
2069 Judith Wahl, Mary Jane Dykeman & Tara Walton, Health Care Consent, Advance Care Planning, and Goals of 
Care Practice Tools: The Challenge to Get It Right (Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2016). 
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looking at the content of things. They don’t look at the content of consent. They 
see that residents consent. They just say, oh, there’s consent on the chart, fine.2070  
An industry association representative also questioned the current emphasis on processes in 
homes and explained: “they’re [Ministry] not inspecting for outcomes of care.  They just care 
about the processes in the homes and that the processes will not result in harm.”2071 She 
identified a more fundamental issue of the LTCHA:  
If you think of how Donabedian’s model of quality is, you have structure, process, 
and outcome. What the legislation does is it provides structure and process. 
Structure is the law, process is the regulations and they’re hoping it gives the 
outcomes. But the only outcome they’re looking for is compliance with the 
legislation. They’re not looking for the care outcomes, although they say they 
are.2072              
This last part draws on scholarly debates about ‘risk’ and ‘risk-based’ regulation, which are used 
frequently in public policy discussions but rarely questioned. The analysis here is intended to 
provide a new angle to illustrate the state / citizen relationship. It is hard to argue with the 
observation that the safety and security of residents are prioritized by measures that are intended 
to minimize certain types of risks. In other words, in the LTC setting, to minimize risk is to 
reduce harm that is easily recognized and can be measured and controlled. The risks are not 
necessarily new, for example, the use of physical restraints is not new in LTC (or other parts of 
the health care system), but our understanding of whether and how to respond to those risks have 
changed. Not interfering in abusive or harmful situations can leave residents without protection 
and therefore the legislative intent of the new legal framework is to keep residents free from 
harm inflicted by workers, volunteers, and other residents. As well, the new inspection program 
was outlined to demonstrate how the Ministry intends to monitor and enforce homes’ compliance 
wtih these rules in response to the ‘risks’ posed by the homes. I have outlined the relationship 
between the notion of ‘risk’ and legal rules. The analysis here is not intended to reject a risk-
based approach to regulation in LTC, but to suggest that careful considerations of its limitations 
are needed in law reform initiatives.  
 
2070 Interviewee # 12, supra note 1699. 
2071 Interviewee #10, supra note 1743. 
2072 Ibid. 
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9.6.4 Summary  
The last part of the analysis concentrates on the broader structural issues of the LTC 
sector.  The issue of funding, as a critical factor that determines care conditions, has been subject 
to much scholarly and public debate. I built on the insights from the feminist political economy 
literature. The structural problems of the sector are evident in the following issues: access to 
LTC, illusion of choice and autonomy, and enforcement and compliance. It is evident that LTC 
presents a dilemma to the state: the provincial government is expected to be responsible for LTC 
because the residents are considered to be “vulnerable” or “dependent” and more importantly, 
“deserving” but there are few regulatory and non-regulatory tools available to address the 
structural issues. While the provincial government accepts, perhaps reluctantly, its responsibility 
towards LTC residents, it also attempts to use different techniques to limit its own responsibility. 
On paper, some of the legal rules could respond to potential harms in care and indeed advance 
the rights of LTC residents. However, it is more likely that the legal rules simply create an 
appearance of unwarranted legitimacy and are in fact means to avoid the reality of LTC today.    
9.7 Summary of the claims and theoretical contributions  
The regulation of “care” in LTC has been used as a point of entry to examine the potential 
implications of changes to regulation and governance introduced by the LTCHA and 
amendments to statutes such as the Health Care Consent Act. I share disability scholars’ 
concerns about the dark side of care but accept the possibility of refurbishing institutional care 
for a very specific group of older disabled adults who are also living with serious illnesses 
including dementia.  Social regulation is integral to refurbishing institutional care but over-
regulation of caring relationships may actually undermine concepts such as autonomy.  The 
discussion above should not be construed as an uncritical acceptance of the current legal 
framework or as a call for more regulation. Rather, the limitations identified in this research 
invite us to re-think strategies for law reform in this area. Equally important, the gaps in the 
current legal framework encourage us to explore how debates about disability, gender and aging 
can be extended.  
9.7.1 Summing up: A regulatory perspective on care in LTC 
Before proceeding to the theoretical contributions of this case study, I will synthesize the 
claims made in this chapter.  Informed by a mixed methodology that included document review, 
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doctrinal analysis and key informant interviews, this dissertation sought to test the hypothesis 
that the changes to LTC regulation and governance made in Ontario between 2004 and 2018 – if 
properly understood and implemented – are significant for persons with disabilities. To begin, I 
established that four themes emerged from a comparison of the current and previous regulatory 
frameworks applicable to the LTC sector.  
The first theme is that the core of the changes to improve care is premised on the notion 
that residents’ medical and clinical needs must be met by highly prescriptive requirements (i.e., 
what must be done and how). There are indications that “rights” and choices are built into the 
legal framework and that therefore, individual residents have some control over how care is 
delivered – at least from a “law on the books” perspective. Quality of care is also supported by 
ad hoc accommodation of certain types of disability. The second theme is that the new legal 
framework emphasizes resident safety and security as integral to care. Our understanding of risk 
of harm is central to the law’s response to residents’ impairments. The law permits more intense 
monitoring, documentation of and interference with the person under certain restricted 
circumstances to keep the resident free from harm inflicted by workers, volunteers and other 
residents but could also interfere with the autonomy of residents. The third theme is that 
inclusion and participation are enabled by a variety of rights, duties and safeguards enshrined in 
the Charter, the Ontario Human Rights Code as well as in statutes including the LTCHA, the 
Health Care Consent Act and Substitute Decisions Act. At the individual level, participation and 
inclusion mean that capable residents may exercise control over admission to or being confined 
in LTC, over treatments and over personal care. The law has not changed significantly but there 
are some procedural changes that purport to protect autonomy. At the collective level, the new or 
formalized mechanisms allow LTC residents and their families and friends to have some 
influence over the activities in their respective homes but not over policy-making at the regional 
or provincial level. The fourth theme concerns the nature and rationale of the state’s relationship 
with citizens. The changes enhance the state’s ability to exercise discretion over LTC policy 
decisions to ensure system sustainability while distancing itself from some of the operational and 
financial decisions. A more robust compliance system holds those in charge of providing care 
accountable for actual or perceived harm. To protect residents as consumers, the state facilitates 
transactions and exchanges in the LTC market in order to reflect the inherent power dynamics in 
a home.          
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Then I explored the consequences of these changes for residents and those around them. 
Not all of the changes have significant consequences as many of them are simply changes in 
legal form. The discussion in this chapter focuses on the few substantive regulatory and 
governance changes. The Ontario LTC system is primarily preoccupied with the physical 
survival of residents, in particular, safety and security of residents. This preoccupation leads to 
the myriad of ways through which care is regulated – some in the form of command-and-control 
type rules and soft law for homes and some through creation of residents’ rights and 
entitlements.  I contend that many of the changes actually have taken into account the criticisms 
of care, including the harm that can result from care. In fact, some governance changes in fact 
are consistent with concepts such as “choices”, “control”, “empowerment” and “autonomy”. The 
main problem, I contend, is that the legal mechanisms were designed without careful 
consideration of how the actual circumstances of residents, connected to the intermeshing of 
disability, gender and age will impact their proper implementation. The result is that some LTC 
applicants and residents cannot benefit from the protections offered by law. I have demonstrated 
that legally-enabled participation – for residents as well as families - is contingent upon having 
the necessary supports in place. The sum of these claims reinforces the conclusion that the 
regulatory changes are significant for residents because they formalize and strengthen a number 
of procedural and substantive rights, entitlements and protections in caring relationships. 
However, the actual immediate impact of these changes in terms of promoting substantive 
equality for those living in LTC is minimal in terms of the state’s attention to differences – in our 
case the actual circumstances and needs shaped by age, gender and disability – in the design of a 
regulatory regime.      
9.7.2 Theoretical contributions 
This case study demonstrated how the insights of disability scholarship (in law as well as 
in the social sciences) could inform policy debates about our collective responses (including law) 
to impairments, illnesses, and other differences in later life. At the same time, this case study also 
touches on topics that have traditionally received less attention in disability studies, such as the 
experiences of those who have chronic illness and of older people.2073 While this dissertation 
 
2073 Shakespeare, supra note 106 at 6–7. 
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touches upon a few strands of debates in disability and legal scholarship, I contend that my case 
study has made contributions in the following areas. 
9.7.2.1 Dementia as disability  
Scholars such as Carol Thomas and Tom Shakespeare have noted the growing trend of 
identifying ‘dementia’ with ‘disability’, which is fuelled by the expansion of dementia-related 
activism and research.2074 My case study contributes to the debate about regarding dementia as 
disability as it follows Shakespeare’s interactional model of disability to illuminate some of the 
long-standing issues in disability, including physical harm suffered by disabled people in care 
relationships and the role of over-medicalization in care. I expand Shakespeare’s interactional 
model by focusing on how law mediates the interplay of many different factors that results in 
disability. The weakness of Shakespeare’s model is that it never really explains in detail how that 
interplay occurs. Law ought to be an important focus in research on dementia as disability 
because law can be described as an extrinsic factor that also modifies other extrinsic factors, for 
example the social environment by mandating certain accommodations such as communication. 
Law also plays the role of acknowledging or neglecting the intrinsic factors of people living with 
dementia by defining, emphasizing, and responding to certain aspects of dementia, such as 
behavioural issues. For many in LTC, their impairments are profound and an anti-discrimination 
human rights approach alone is inadequate to respond to their needs. This is a concrete study to 
examine how the law shapes the life of a sub-group of people with cognitive impairments such as 
dementia (especially those exhibiting aggressions and deemed to be a safety risk) in a particular 
setting.  
This study challenges us to find more respectful ways to theorize how the law responds to 
the impairment effects of people living with dementia. For Boyle, the presence of dementia is 
used to justify the denial of human rights to cognitively disabled, older people. In particular, 
erroneous assumptions about their capacity have led to them being detained in institutions 
against their wishes.2075 Not everyone living with dementia resides in an institutional setting, but 
 
2074 Carol Thomas & Christine Milligan, “Dementia, Disability Rights and Disablism: Understanding the Social 
Position of People Living with Dementia” (2018) 33:1 Disability & Society 115; Tom Shakespeare, Hannah Zeilig 
& Peter Mittler, “Rights in Mind: Thinking Differently About Dementia and Disability” (2019) 18:3 Dementia 1075. 
2075 Boyle, supra note 212 at 512. 
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some do, and institutions will continue to exist in the foreseeable future even if more state 
support for community care becomes available. This is true for Canada well as for other OECD 
countries. While a Marxist / realist perspective may conclude that a regulatory regime that 
permits confining and restraining residents corresponds neatly to the proposition that capitalist 
economies have no use for people who live with dementia and therefore they must be 
“warehoused” in residential care institutions,2076 there is no clear theoretical explanation as to the 
variety of residential settings, including the range of substantive and procedural safeguards in 
place to protect residents. Some safeguards are related to security and safety of the person while 
others concern autonomous decision-making. By examining how legal safeguards for LTC 
residents evolved in one jurisdiction, albeit within a relatively short period of time (13 years), 
this study provides an empirical account of the implication of the changes within the context of 
other legal developments, such as Charter jurisprudence and human rights legislation.  
My case study reflects the benefits of looking across different areas of law in order to 
identify the rights and entitlements of those who live with cognitive impairments and need care. 
In a recent book about dementia and care in the UK, Rosie Harding observes that dementia has 
not yet been studied in-depth in the socio-legal literature. This is because dementia raises 
problems in a range of intersecting areas of law, including health law, tort law, property law and 
human rights law, and there is a need to look laterally across these areas of law.2077 In particular, 
by attending to how law constructs the social and physical environment and caring relationships 
in residential care, I have added to our knowledge about the need for recognition of the rights of 
people living with cognitive impairment such as advanced dementia, and why such recognition is 
fraught with tensions in our current legal system (and by extension, jurisdictions that maintain a 
more individualistic approach to rights and a binary understanding of capacity).   
9.7.2.2 Incorporation of caregivers’ perspective in disability research   
Equally important, this study builds on more recent work on care that is inclusive of the 
perspectives of formal and informal (unpaid) caregivers. Earlier rejection of the concept of care 
by disability scholars and activists meant a strict theoretical separation from care research.  More 
recent disability scholarship looks for mutual learning between research on care and research on 
 
2076 Thomas & Milligan, supra note 2074. 
2077 Harding, supra note 275 at 2. 
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disability.2078 I have contributed to this debate about care by attending to how law constructs 
caring relationships and by explaining why a binary understanding of “helper” / “helped” and 
caregiver / recipient is an obstacle to identifying common theoretical ground. Herring’s idea that 
the interests of those involved in caring relationships are inter-mingled is demonstrated 
empirically by my exploration of workplace violence issues in LTC.  Herring’s work provides a 
strong justification for state support for informal carers (such as families) such as combining 
caring responsibilities with paid employment.  
I extended the debate by focusing on support for formal carers in terms of safety and 
security of health care providers. Recall that one of the markers of care is an acceptance of 
responsibility.2079 My account of workplace violence suggests that assuming a responsibility to 
care for another can be harmful for all parties involved in a caring relationship if the right 
supports and protections are not in place. The Ontario case study shows that devoid of the socio-
economic contexts of caring (such as gender and immigration status of health care providers), 
legal protections, such as whistleblower protections and mandatory reporting, are unlikely to be 
effective. Harding reflects on the emergence of “carers” as social and legal subjects.2080 She is 
right to point out that “new regulatory instruments have defined and delineated the socio-legal 
‘carer’ as part of a legally recognized relational network with the cared-for.”2081  My case study 
adds to the growing body of work that examines the complex effects of regulatory instruments 
on formal and informal carers, who are supported (albeit minimally) and regulated in order to 
address different forms of risk and harm.            
9.7.2.3 Participation in Care  
Finally, this case study contributes to the debates about the conditions necessary for 
successful New Governance experiments by focusing on a novel context, that of LTC. I used 
New Governance literature to study various governance mechanisms within a home from the 
perspective of caring relationships. Recall that participation is one of the organizing principles in 
the New Governance model.2082 My contribution is to explore whether participation mechanisms 
 
2078 Kröger, supra note 156; Hughes et al, supra note 186; Watson et al, supra note 196. 
2079 Herring, supra note 112 at 19–20. 
2080 Harding, supra note 275 at 38. 
2081 Ibid at 50. 
2082 Lobel, supra note 319. 
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such as those mandated by the LTCHA have the potential to reconcile dependence and autonomy 
in caring relationships in LTC. The significance of participation is that it involves LTC residents 
– regardless of how dependent they are on others to meet their needs – in problem-solving 
around certain aspects of LTC living.  
Factors such as gender, poverty and sexual orientation have been examined in New 
Governance studies. One of the challenges is developing outsider groups' capacity to engage 
effectively and thus participate as "equals" in the deliberative process.2083  I provided a concrete 
example as to how the accommodation of impairment / disability is a condition necessary for the 
implementation of participation mechanisms. More crucially, this study demonstrates what 
participation may have to look like for those with profound impairments and disabilities. The 
deliberative process of residents may not look like anything familiar to us. Providing support to 
residents with profound impairments may not allow them to participate in conventional 
deliberations. Rather, the mechanisms of participation are intended to facilitate residents making 
claims about using their lived experiences in making decisions at the home level and to a lesser 
extent, in provincial policy-making. Such participation is a way for LTC residents to exercise 
autonomy collectively beyond expressing “choices” when they receive care.     
I close this chapter with a quote from the health law lawyer I interviewed: “there are only 
so many tools in the toolbox and some of them are a bit blunt.  They’re blunt instruments.”2084  
The toolbox is a good metaphor that captures the range of legal devices available to change the 
behavior of participants in the LTC sector in order to pursue various public policy objectives. 
This dissertation essentially is a close look at the toolbox and what the tools mean for those who 
use the tools and who attempt to change the tools (or to use them creatively) because some of 
them are either ineffective, unjust or actually become the source of problems.  I have added 
equality (especially in relation to disability, gender and age) as the normative value that guides 
my own assessment of the potential implications of the toolbox. It is my hope that by taking a 
hard look at LTC in Ontario today, we are better positioned to problem-solve the issues in the 
sector. The next (and final) chapter will conclude this dissertation with some brief final words 
about the future of researching regulation and governance in LTC and other public benefit 
 
2083Sturm, supra note 351 at 269.  
2084 Interviewee # 1, supra note 1700. 
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schemes from a legal and public policy perspectives.  Through this work, I hope to re-invigorate 
the debate about how regulation and governance recognize the particular circumstances 
connected to disabled Canadians and people around them.  
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10 Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
The concern that inspires this dissertation is the recognition of law’s promise and 
limitations in removing barriers to inclusion of disabled Canadians in the social, economic and 
political domains.  I looked at an unlikely place to study disability and the law: institutional care. 
In some ways, institutional care is a deserted place from both theoretical and practical 
perspectives. It is shunned by disability scholars due to the history of institutionalization and on-
going struggle against different forms of incarceration.2085 It is also feared by the general public 
because as one of interviewees insightfully remarked: 
A large part of the public really think that long-term care is a very threatening and 
unpleasant place to be. . . we all probably fear our own aging and vulnerability, 
and that we, ourselves, might end up as these individuals and what life is like 
when you do become dependent on other people for your most basic care 
needs.2086   
There is a growing body of work in the social sciences that informs our understanding of LTC 
(as a form of institutional care mainly for older adults) and I hope I have demonstrated that LTC 
is a topic worthy of critical legal research. This dissertation also contributes to existing 
scholarship by going beyond framing LTC strictly as a population aging issue. Indeed, there is a 
strong case for bringing aging, disability and gender into the analysis.     
In this chapter, I will begin by summarizing the arguments advanced in the previous 
chapters, followed by a discussion of the limitations – methodological and doctrinal – of this 
research. The last part will present my suggestions for future research. 
10.2  Summary of findings  
This dissertation has examined the changes to the regulation and governance of LTC 
homes in Ontario between 2004 and 2018.  The implementation of a new legal framework, the 
 
2085 Ben-Moshe et al, supra note 159; Johnson & Traustadottir, supra note 17; G Allan Roeher Institute: Information 
Services & G Allan Roeher Institute: Library, Deinstitutionalization in Canada: An Annotated Bibliography 
(Downsview, Ont: G. Allan Roeher Institute, 1990); Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, “Freeing our people: 
Updates from the long road to deinstitutionalization”, online: 
<https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/monitor/freeing-our-people-updates-long-road-
deinstitutionalization>. 
2086 Interviewee # 4, supra note 1744. 
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LTCHA and its regulation, along with other changes in statutes and case law provided an 
opportunity to compare the new and previous regulatory regimes. But as the previous chapters 
demonstrated, what is “new” is not necessarily in the sense of never have been implemented. 
Chapters 5 to 8 presented my examination of the changes, divided up into four themes as 
informed by my literature review. Chapters 5 to 7 demonstrated how the law articulates 
expectations about what care is and how it is supposed to be delivered. There are indications that 
“rights” and choices are built into the legal framework, and that therefore, individual residents 
have some control over how care is delivered. Disability is being accommodated in care 
delivery: personal assistance, social environment and program design. The new legal framework 
also emphasizes resident safety and security as integral to care.  The changes have important 
ramifications for the autonomy of residents and the caring relationship. Three dimensions of 
inclusion and participation have been explored: the equality guarantee under the Charter, 
autonomy in decision-making at the individual level, and collective rights to participate in the 
operation of home. The new or formalized participation mechanisms allow LTC residents and 
their families and friends to have some influence over the activities in their respective homes. 
Chapter 8 shifted the focus to explore the nature and rationale of the state’s relationship with 
citizens by examining the control of the supply and demand for beds, enforcement and 
compliance in LTC homes and the corporate and business activities within the home.  
Chapter 9 offered some preliminary observations about the implications of the changes 
for older women who comprise the majority of LTC residents. I also explored, to a lesser extent, 
the implications of these for other parties in a caring relationship. I made a case for careful 
examination of the strengthened processes and procedures mandated by law as they represent a 
re-orientation of how problems will be solved in the LTC sector. These changes to regulation and 
governance – if properly understood and implemented - are significant for persons with 
disabilities. They afford more procedural protections to residents in caring relationships and 
allow residents to make claims for inclusion and participation in making decisions about their 
own care and influencing conditions within the home. However, there is a gap between the 
promise of law and the reality of those who require support in order to enjoy the protections 
conferred by law.                          
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10.3  Limitations of the research (doctrinal and methodological)  
There are three main sets of limitations from a doctrinal perspective. First, while it is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore the changes in private law (e.g. tort and contract), 
it is plausible that concerns about liability risks play a critical role in how homes make decisions 
about their operations, such as the prioritization of safety risks of residents. I also have not 
considered remedies in private law (e.g. damages) and how such remedies may be available (or 
not) to LTC residents and their families. It is worth exploring the potential of using private law 
remedies to redress infringement of residents’ rights in the Canadian context.2087 Empirical 
examination of private law remedies should include careful consideration of availability of 
support to exercise legal capacity i.e., of the support that a person receives when he or she is 
making decisions with legal consequences and such support must respect the rights, will and 
preferences of the person.2088 Another limitation of this research is that criminal law cases are 
outside of the scope of the legal analysis. Specifically, I excluded consideration of criminal cases 
involving LTC residents (as victims or offenders or both).2089 While reported criminal law cases 
are few, and scholarship on criminal law cases involving persons in congregate setting is 
limited,2090 these cases may shed some light on the most serious failures in care. They are likely 
to expose the limitations of using criminal law to respond to harm in the context of caring 
relationships. To examine cases where one or more resident with cognitive impairment is 
involved, one possible line of inquiry would be to borrow insights from disability scholarship 
about criminal responsibility, in particular, scholarly debates about recognizing people with 
disabilities as possessing equal criminal culpability as those without disabilities.2091 Finally, the 
disciplinary cases from regulatory colleges (and any subsequent appellate level decisions) 
 
2087 There is scholarship on the use of private law in the American context. For example, see Kazin, supra note 
1832; Jennifer L Troyer & Herbert G Thompson, “The Impact of Litigation on Nursing Home Quality” (2004) 29:1 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 11; James A Brickley, Susan F Lu & Gerard J Wedig, “Malpractice Laws 
and Incentives to Shield Assets: Evidence from Nursing Homes” (2017) 14:2 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 
301; Richard J Mollot, “Residential Care in the United States: a Persistent Struggle for Quality, Dignity and 
Independence” in Helen Meenan, Nicola Rees & Israel Doron, eds, Towards Human Rights in Residential Care for 
Older Persons: International Perspectives (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016) 167 at 178–180.  
2088 de Bhailís, supra note 1280 at 2. The author discusses the application of the Article 12 of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).  
2089 For example, see R v Lamsen, 2014 ONCJ 670; R v Letford, 2016 ONCJ 616; R v Brooks, 2017 ONSC 439.  
2090 Grant & Benedet, supra note 227. 
2091 Anna Arstein-Kerslake, “Introduction to Criminal Responsibility” in Eilionóir Flynn et al, eds, Global 
Perspectives on Legal Capacity Reform: Our Voices, Our Stories (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019) 19. 
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involving regulated professionals working in LTC have not been considered. These cases could 
potentially be a useful source of information as to why certain caring relationships fail and the 
law’s response to such failure. Consideration of such cases may also illuminate the tensions in 
balancing individual and systemic accountability in the regulation of caring relationships.          
The limitations in my research methodology are as follows.  First, although this research 
has incorporated perspectives that are not normally captured in LTC studies in the feminist 
political economy literature (such as the perspectives of lawyers practicing in health law), this 
study did not benefit from the insights from those who are directly involved in LTC i.e., 
individual residents, their family members and friends, home administrators and paid caregivers. 
The analysis is limited to the perspectives of policy-makers such as industry associations and 
unions derived from key informant interviews and the examination of the grey literature. Second, 
the scope of my document review is restricted to publicly available documents produced by the 
province. However, some of these documents I examined are not readily accessible to the general 
public (such as compendium to a bill and government responses to standing committees) and my 
study has already made a contribution by examining those documents. This dissertation referred 
to a few reports produced by the Government of Canada. A close study of relevant federal 
government documents would probably reveal a broader and more nuanced narrative about aging 
in Canada2092 and could inform my understanding of how Ontario’s approach to demographic 
challenges is situated within the Canadian policy context. Third, some of the government 
information is more difficult to verify unless one could submit a freedom of information request 
and succeed in getting the relevant records. For example, the statistics about complaints and 
critical incidents in LTC in Ontario is from official documents such as Hansard and Auditor 
General reports. There is no way that I can ascertain the accuracy of the statistics.         
 
2092 For example see Special Senate Committee on Aging, Canada’s Aging Population: Seizing the Opportunity 
(Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 2009); Canada, Department of Finance, Economic and Fiscal Implications of Canada’s 
Aging Population (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2012); Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2011 
Federal Disability Report - Seniors with Disabilities in Canada (Ottawa: Human Resources and Skills Development 
Canada, 2011); Employment and Social Development Canada, Government of Canada — Action for Seniors report 
(Ottawa: Employment and Social Development Canada, 2014);  Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, 
Getting Ready: For a New Generation of Active Seniors (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 2017). 
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10.4  Suggestions and justifications for future research  
I conclude this dissertation by outlining three areas that deserve further research that 
integrates both legal analysis and public policy perspectives. Many interesting questions remain 
unanswered and my suggestions stem from the belief that law is pervasive in all areas of life and 
there are benefits to bringing law – not necessarily progressive or regressive - into any social 
policy discussion. First, there is a growing body of literature on LTC that is comparative in 
nature.2093 The latest research studies provide a rich background on policy choices that different 
jurisdictions make or reject and include “on the ground” explorations of the implications of such 
choices. To explore the possibility of importing promising practices from other jurisdictions, it is 
worth exploring how law may both facilitate and constrain the successful adoption of such 
practices.2094 A more purposeful and nuanced legal analysis of the LTC systems in other 
jurisdictions could illuminate the possibility of allowing these practices to flourish outside of 
their current locales.  Israel Doron and colleagues are correct to conclude that every country has 
its own legal ‘story’ with regard to its regulation of the residential LTC of older persons.2095 The 
challenge is to build a conceptual bridge between the ‘legal story’ and analysis from other 
disciplines, such as gerontology,2096 so that promising practices are also legally sound when 
transplanted to other jurisdictions.  
Second, if welfare goals and institutions will increasingly rely on regulation,2097 what 
makes social regulation possible?  For future research, a good starting point would be to assess 
institutional designs involving fiscal transfers, social regulation and economic regulation.  The 
challenge for researchers is to reflect on the relations among fiscal transfer, social regulation and 
economic regulation in any institutional design over time.  Future research should be directed 
 
2093 For example see Armstrong et al, supra note 171; Daly & Szebehely, supra note 739; Choiniere et al, supra note 
515; Laxer et al, supra note 716; Harrington et al, supra note 515; Daly et al, supra note 672. 
2094 For example, the style of law and legislation is mainly characterised by the 'legal family' it belongs to: civil or 
common law. See Ulrich Karpen, “Comparative Law: Perspectives of Legislation” (2012) 6:2 Legisprudence 149. 
2095 Israel Doron, Nicola Rees & Helen Meenan, “Conclusion: From ‘Residential Care’ to ‘Ageing with Dignity’” in 
Helen Meenan, Nicola Rees & Israel Doron, eds, Towards Human Rights in Residential Care for Older Persons: 
International Perspectives (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016) 211 at 211. 
2096 For example, see Elias S Cohen, “Editorial: Law and Aging, Lawyers and Gerontologists” (1978) 18:3 
Gerontologist 229; Nina A Kohn, Maria Teresa Brown & Israel Doron, “Identifying Connections between Elder 
Law and Gerontology: Implications for Teaching, Research, and Practice” (2017) 25:1 The Elder Law Journal 69. 
2097 Levi-Faur, supra note 20 at 608. 
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toward exploring how economic regulation and fiscal transfer make social regulation possible, 
rather than simply making general pronouncements about the need for publicly funded care.   
Third, it should be clear that broad-based rejection or uncritical acceptance of regulation 
(and by extension, law) as a tool to advance the rights of disabled people is misplaced. Work by 
disability studies scholars casts light on the darker motivations and actions of actors involved in 
regulating the lives of disabled people – within and outside of institutions. A good example is the 
variety of legal capacity regulatory regimes.2098 However, regulation is here to stay and the 
challenge is to conduct empirical research on the multiple (sometimes conflicting) objectives of a 
particular regulation and its implications. Benefit schemes that confer rights or entitlements to 
forms of care (home care,2099 for example) provide a fertile ground for unpacking assumptions 
about aging, disability and gender often buried in complex and opaque legal rules. Making this 
less visible layer apparent is a promising way to enable disabled Canadians who require support 
to demand progress towards substantive equality, despite their dependency on the state to meet 
their care needs. This is important as we are all in different types of caring relationships over the 
life course.             
People who cannot “take care of themselves” are perceived to be a burden on families, 
friends and the government. It must be acknowledged that our ability to “take care of ourselves” 
is subject to disadvantages and privileges due to disability, gender, age and other factors 
accumulated over a life time. I hope that for older disabled adults, one day LTC will become a 
safe place where any resident could still look after herself - in the sense of being autonomous in 
making decisions that matter to her - with the necessary support and assistance so that her age, 
impairment, illness or other personal characteristics will not prevent her from full participation 
and inclusion in Canadian society, even in later life. The toolbox that we have should be one of 
our collective responses to the call for more appropriate LTC, driven by a firm commitment to 
substantive equality.         
  
 
2098 Anna Arstein-Kerslake, Restoring Voice to People with Cognitive Disabilities: Realizing the Right to Equal 
Recognition Before the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
2099 The Ontario government was also making changes to the home and community services sector. See Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care, Ontario Boosting Nursing, Personal Support in Major Expansion of Home Care 
(News release October 5, 2017) (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2017). 
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Appendix A: Detailed Comparison of the Current and Previous 
Frameworks 
Legal 
Instruments  
Current Legal Regime  
Since 2010 
Previous Legal Regime (up to 2010) 
Hard Law (statutes 
and LGIC 
regulations)  
Long-Term Care Homes Act, 
2007, SO 2007, c8. 
O Reg 79/10. 
 
Excellent Care for All Act 2010, 
SO 2010, c 14. 
 
O. Reg. 187/15: Annual Quality 
Improvement Plan.  
 
Local Health System Integration 
Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c.4. 
 
O Reg. 264/07 
 
O Reg. 279/07 
 
O Reg. 456/16 
Nursing Homes Act, RSO 1990, c N.7 
 
RRO 1990, Reg 832: GENERAL. 
 
Homes for the Aged and Rest Homes 
Act, RSO 1990, c H.13 (excluded 
from the review – substantially the 
same as the Nursing Homes Act)  
 
RRO 1990, Reg 637: GENERAL  
 
Charitable Institutions Act, RSO 
1990, c C.9 (excluded from the 
review– substantially the same as the 
Nursing Homes Act)  
 
RRO 1990, Reg 69: GENERAL  
Soft Law 
(Guidelines with 
various degree of 
legal formality and 
agreements made 
under specific 
statutory authority)  
A Guide to the Long-Term Care 
Homes Act, 2007 and Regulation 
79/10 – Note: The Guide covers 
parts of the LTCHA and its 
regulation 
 
MOHLTC Inspection Protocols 
(31)  
 
LHIN-Ministry Memorandum of 
Understanding  
 
LHIN-Ministry Accountability 
Agreement  
 
Long-Term Care Home Service 
Accountability Agreement (L-
SAA) 
 
Long Term Care Home Manual – 
Note: The Manual repeats the 
requirements in statutes and adds 
more requirements 
 
MOHLTC-CCAC 
Client Services Policy Manual 
(chapters relevant to admission) 
 
Ministry’s agreements with individual 
homes (excluded from the review – 
not publicly available)  
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Appendix B: Interviewees and topics 
Note: Not all topics were addressed in-depth by interviewees. Interviewees may decide not to 
address particular topics.   
Interviewee Description Topics 
1 
Health law lawyer 
(anonymous)  
Consent to admission, consent to treatment, secure 
unit provisions in the Long-Term Care Home Act 
2 
Lorraine Purdon, Executive 
Director, Family Councils 
of Ontario 
Family Council provisions in the LTCHA, 
implementation of the new inspection program, 
FCO’s current initiatives to support family councils 
such as the 60-minute consultations, the Change 
Foundation’s report family councils and residents’ 
councils 
3 
Samantha Peck, Director, 
Communications and 
Education, Family Councils 
of Ontario 
Family Council provisions in the LTCHA, 
implementation of the new inspection program, 
FCO’s current initiatives to support family councils 
such as the 60-minute consultations, the Change 
Foundation’s report family councils and residents’ 
councils 
4 
Dr. Fred Mathers, President, 
Ontario Long Term Care 
Clinicians 
Documentation requirements, treating incapable 
residents, zero tolerance of abuse and neglect of 
residents policy, safety of staff, discharge of 
residents, Resident Quality Inspections, resources 
for homes (soft law) 
5 
Lois Dent, Board Member, 
Concerned Friends of 
Ontario Citizens in Care 
Facilities 
Implementation of the Long-term Care Task Force 
on Care and Safety Action Plan, Concerned 
Friends’ on-going review of inspection results and 
compliance order, residents and families asserting 
choices and preferences and wait times 
6 
Jordanne Holland, Board 
Member, Concerned Friends 
of Ontario Citizens in Care 
Facilities 
Implementation of the Long-term Care Task Force 
on Care and Safety Action Plan, Concerned 
Friends’ on-going review of inspection results and 
compliance order, residents and families asserting 
choices and preferences and wait times 
7 
Keith Dee, Director of 
Membership, Community 
Living Ontario 
Younger residents in LTC homes, alternatives for 
people with disabilities who are at risk of 
institutionalization, Cole v Ontario (Health and 
Long-Term Care) updates 
8 
Gord Kyle, Director of 
Policy, Community Living 
Ontario  
Younger residents in LTC homes, alternatives for 
people with disabilities who are at risk of 
institutionalization, Cole v Ontario (Health and 
Long-Term Care) updates 
9 
Union representative 
(anonymous)  
Health and safety of frontline workers in LTC 
homes, legal protections for front-line workers such 
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Note: Not all topics were addressed in-depth by interviewees. Interviewees may decide not to 
address particular topics.   
Interviewee Description Topics 
as whistleblower protections in LTC homes, 
implementation of the new Inspection Program 
10 
Industry association 
representative (anonymous) 
Implementation of the Long-term Care Task Force 
on Care and Safety Action Plan, Auditor General’s 
report on the Inspection Program, responsive 
behaviour provisions in the LTCHA and 
Behavioural Support Ontario, Homes’ relationships 
with the Family Councils and Residents’ Councils 
such as involvement of the Councils’ in quality 
improvement plans and satisfaction surveys, 
Guidelines or check lists developed by 
organizations such as the Accreditation Canada, 
Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI), Choosing 
Wisely Canada, and the Registered Nurses 
Association of Ontario (RNAO) for topics such as 
fall prevention, infectious diseases etc. 
11 
Beverly Mathers, Chief 
Executive Officer, Ontario 
Nurses’ Association 
ONA’s Workplace Violence Prevention campaign 
and what homes do if a resident engages in behavior 
(including responsive behaviour) that harms another 
resident or a staff member, Implementation of the 
Long-term Care Task Force on Care and Safety 
Action Plan (2012), Legal protections for front-line 
workers such as whistleblower protections in long-
term care homes, Resources available to nurses 
such as CNO’s practice guidelines and RNAO’s 
Long-Term Care Best Practices Program. 
12 
Judith Wahl, Elder law 
lawyer  
Challenging finding of incapacity and access to the 
Consent and Capacity Board, Eligibility 
requirements and admission wait times,  
Residents’ Bill of Rights, Responsive behaviour 
provisions (s.53 to s.55) and discharge (s.145) in 
Regulation 79/10 
13 
Disability rights lawyer 
(anonymous) 
Challenging finding of incapacity, access to the 
Consent and Capacity Board, Power of attorney and 
People with disabilities who are at risk of 
institutionalization (or re-institutionalization) 
14 
Dee Lender, Executive 
Director, Ontario 
Association of Residents’ 
Councils 
implementation of the Long-Term Care Home 
Quality Inspection Program, Quality Improvement 
Plans and annual satisfaction surveys, OARC’s 
Through Our Eyes: Bringing the Residents’ Bill of 
Rights Alive, Residents asserting choices and 
preferences, The Change Foundation’s Report 
entitled “Enhancing Care, Enhancing Life: 
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Note: Not all topics were addressed in-depth by interviewees. Interviewees may decide not to 
address particular topics.   
Interviewee Description Topics 
Spotlight on Residents’ Councils and Family 
Councils in Five Long-Term Care Homes in 
Ontario” 
15 
Andy Savela, Director of 
Health Care, Unifor  
Unifor’s Dignity 4.0 Time to Care campaign, 
Health and safety of frontline workers in long-term 
care homes, Legal protections for front-line workers 
such as whistleblower protections in long-term care 
homes, Implementation of the Long-Term Care 
Home Quality Inspection Program (LQIP). 
16 
Industry association 
representative (anonymous) 
ADVANCING SENIOR CARE - 
Recommendations to Change the LTCHA and Its 
Regulation, Homes’ relationships with the Family 
Councils and Residents’ Councils such as 
involvement of the Councils’ in quality 
improvement plans and satisfaction surveys , 
Guidelines or check lists developed by 
organizations such as the Accreditation Canada, 
Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI), Choosing 
Wisely Canada, and the Registered Nurses 
Association of Ontario for topics such as fall 
prevention, infectious diseases etc. 
17 
Michael Jacek, Senior 
Advisor, Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario 
Follow-up questions to Strengthening Age-Friendly 
Communities and Seniors’ Services for 21st 
Century Ontario (recommendations specific to long-
term care), Service Accountability Agreements, 
Issues with the implementation of Long-Term Care 
Homes Act, 2007 in municipal homes, Follow-up 
questions to AMO’s submission on Bill 160 
Strengthening Quality and Accountability for 
Patients Act, 2017 and Long Term Care Home 
Quality Inspection Program    
18 
Lisa Corrente, Partner, 
Torkin Manes LLP 
Intensive Risk-Focused and Risk-focused Resident 
Quality Inspections (RQIs), Reporting of critical 
incidents and complaints, Additional enforcement 
tools provided by Bill 160 (An Act to amend, repeal 
and enact various Acts in the interest of 
strengthening quality and accountability for 
patients), Interpretation of the Residents’ Bill of 
Rights, Admission to “locked units” or “dementia 
units” and the common law duty to restrain 
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Appendix C: Codes used in NVivio 
Node and child nodes  Description 
Caring Conditions Includes a number of child codes. This code is intended to 
include working conditions of health care workers. But not just 
about caregivers. This is supposed to illustrate the 
interdependencies of workers and care recipients. 
Legal protections for 
caregivers 
 
whistleblower protection, union's role, why these protections 
effective or not effective 
Responsive behaviour 
 
what this terms means, why it is used in the LTC context, why 
it is contested, what this term means for different people 
Violence and safety 
 
how workers get assaulted, why, employer’s response, how 
LTC is different than other settings, how long term care is 
compared 
Workload and 
demands 
 
how many residents a caregiver has to take care, how pressed of 
time the caregiver feels 
Public Inquiry Public Inquiry into the Safety and Security of Residents in the 
Long-Term Care Homes System 
Residents’ rights and 
entitlements 
Includes a number of child codes. Rights and entitlements in the 
LTCHA and other legal instruments 
Access to justice 
 
how do residents assert their rights when they are infringed, 
pros and cons of different forums, how do they get information 
about their rights, who can help them to assert their rights, what 
are the barriers to access to justice 
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Node and child nodes  Description 
Accommodation of 
disability and 
differences in care 
 
Whether disabilities are being accommodated in the delivery of 
care. 
Autonomy 
 
Whether residents being able to make decisions. Choice: where 
to live, whether to live in LTC, treatment decisions, choices of 
homes, lack of housing options 
Informal caregivers 
and families 
 
Support for informal caregivers to participate in different 
aspects of the home. Relationship between home and informal 
caregivers. The proper role of the informal caregivers and 
families in the lives of applicants and residents. Family 
dynamics that affect the well-being of applicants / residents. 
Mismatch of 
environment and 
resources and needs of 
residents 
 
Balancing the needs of different residents: residents may have 
different triggers, there are different types of residents (e.g. 
aggressive, frail etc) Mix of residents not suited for LTC: long 
term care residents with mental health issues, developmental 
issues, MS etc all mixed up in LTC   Lack of alternatives for 
those who exhibit violent and difficult behaviour 
Participation of 
residents 
 
what the law means when residents have to be engaged, 
consulted or informed, what kind of support required, how 
participation looks like 
State responsibilities Include responsibilities of the state towards the sector, 
caregivers, residents, and others in the health care system 
Collaboration 
 
Any discussion about working with stakeholders etc 
Enforcement and including different understanding of the priority of enforcement 
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Node and child nodes  Description 
compliance 
 
in LTC policy, the purpose, shortcomings, achievements to 
date, what this means for homes, what enforcement means for 
residents and families and friends, what it cannot accomplish, 
what enforcement is not 
Funding of the sector 
and setting priorities 
 
what the government should be doing about funding the sector, 
what other levels of government should be doing, what is the 
province’s duty to maintain the health care system. what is the 
government's role in co-ordinating the different pieces in the 
health system and the social services system. 
Law as a tool 
 
what are the options offered by law, why do we use law, why is 
it limited, why law and why not 
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Appendix D: Detailed Comparison of the Compliance Regime under 
the Nursing Homes Act and the Long-Term Care Homes Act 
The table below summarizes the key aspects of the previous and current regime: 
 Nursing Homes Act  LTCHA 
Powers of 
Inspectors  
 May inspect premise or records, 
demand the production for 
records or other things, question 
persons (subject to the person’s 
right to have counsel or some 
other representative), conduct 
examination or tests3  
Similar scope of powers with the 
following exceptions: 
 Power to exclude any person when 
questioning a person (new) 
 Power to question a person not 
subject to the person’s right to 
have counsel 
 What constitutes as obstruction is 
broadened to include destruction of 
records and failure to produce and 
assist4   
Inspection 
process  
 The review of resident care, 
programs, and services included: 
Programs and Services Review, 
Indicator Identification and 
Analysis, including focused 
audits, In-Depth Review of 
Resident Care and Review of 
Staffing5 
 The procedures are included in 
each of the inspection protocols 
 
3 Nursing Homes Act, RSO 1990, c N.7, s 24(2) - (12). 
4 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, SO 2007, c 8, s 147, 151. 
5 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Long-Term Care Homes Program Manual (Toronto: Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, 2007) at Tab 1101-01, page 4. 
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Inspector’s 
obligation to 
meet with 
Residents’ 
Council and 
Family 
Council  
 None  
 But the Program Manual refers to 
interviews with residents and 
families   
 Yes – during annual inspection if 
requested or permitted to do so by 
the Council6 
Reporting 
(during and 
after 
inspection)  
 Interim Summary Report  
 Final Summary Report7  
 Posting of inspection report and 
making it available to residents 
and others8 
 All inspection reports and 
summary of the annual inspection 
must be provided to the Residents’ 
Council and Family Council9 
 Additional posting requirements10 
 More reports and information that 
the director is required to publish, 
such as direction regarding 
suspension of admission, a 
licensee’s written plan of 
compliance, administrative 
monetary penalties, convictions 
and fines11   
Informal 
actions to 
address non-
 Statement of Unmet Standards or 
Criteria (which lists the standard 
 All non-compliance must be 
documented14  
 
6 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 4, s 145. 
7 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 5 at Tab 1101-02, pages 1-6. This is not referenced in the 
Nursing Homes Act. 
8 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 3, s 24(13); RRO 1990, Reg. 832: General, s 98(2) [Reg. 832]. 
9 Long-Term Care Homes Act, supra note 4, s 149. 
10 Ibid, ss 79(3)(k) – (m). 
11 Ibid, s 173. 
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compliance or criteria number, content, and 
examples observed)12 
 Corrective Action Plan13   
 
Stopping non-
compliant 
activities, 
remedying 
any damages 
created and 
addressing 
harm / risk 
 Written notice of non-
compliance15 
 Suspension of admission of 
residents16 
 Revocation or suspension of 
licence17  
 Interim management18  
 Ministry may take over the home 
operation under the Health 
Facilities Special Orders Act19   
 
 Written notification 
 Written request to prepare a 
written plan for correction to be 
implemented voluntarily 
 Referral from inspector to the 
director for further actions  
 Compliance orders  
 Work and activity orders 
 Recovery of costs 
 Money withheld or to be paid back 
to the government   
 MOHLTC / home entering into 
agreements (instead of an order) 
 Mandatory Management Order20 
 
14 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 4, s 149(3). 
12 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 5 at Tab 1101-02, page 1. This is not referenced in the 
Nursing Homes Act. 
13 Ibid at Tab 1101-02, page 1–2. This is not referenced in the Nursing Homes Act. 
15 Reg. 832, supra note 8, s 97; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 5 at Tab 1103-01, page 1. 
16 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 3, s 20.1(17); Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 5 at Tab 1103-
01, page 4–6. 
17 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 3, s 15; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 5 at Tab 110301, 
page 1. It should be noted that the Nursing Homes Act did not refer to suspension of licence, only revocation or 
refusal of issuance of licence.   
18 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 3, s 19(2). 
19 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 5 at Tab 1103-01, page 2. Before 2010, in the Health 
Facilities Special Orders Act the definition of “health facility” included a nursing home.   
20 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 4, ss 152–156, 176. 
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Sanctions  Prosecution 
 Individual: first offense with 
maximum fine of $25,000 or 
imprisonment of maximum of 12 
months or both and subsequent 
offence with  maximum fine of 
$50,000 or imprisonment of 
maximum of 12 months or both21 
 Corporation: first offense with 
maximum fine of $50,000 and 
subsequent offence with  
maximum fine of $200,00022  
 Administrative monetary penalty 
(less than $100,000)23. For 
example,  the administrative 
penalty for a second failure to 
comply with the Residents’ Bill of 
Rights is $5,000 and for a third 
failure the amount is increased to 
$10,00024 
 Prosecution 
 A new offence for failing to 
comply with an order but this new 
offence may not result in 
imprisonment or probation25  
 Higher fines: Individual: first 
offense with maximum fine of 
$100,000 and subsequent offence 
with  maximum fine of $200,000 
(certain exceptions apply)26    
 Re-inspection fee for each 
subsequent inspection to determine 
compliance of an order: $500 (the 
first one is free)27 
 
21 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 3, s 36(1). 
22 Ibid, s 36(2). 
23 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 4, s 156.1. 
24 O Reg 79/10, s 292.2. 
25 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 4, s 162.2(1)-(2). 
26 Ibid, s 182(1). 
27 O Reg 79/10, supra note 24, s 299.1. 
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 Corporation: first offense with 
maximum fine of $200,000 and 
subsequent offence with  
maximum fine of $500,00028 
 Same prison terms  
 Revocation of licence29  
 Suspension of licence (by director 
or Minister)30 
 Interim management31  
Guidance or 
considerations 
about 
imposing 
sanctions   
 Criteria for issuing written notice 
(e.g. risk to health, safety, 
welfare, security, or rights of 
residents and  corrective actions 
not taken) and grounds for 
suspension of admission in the 
Program Manual32 
 Factors to be taken into account 
when deciding actions to be taken: 
severity of non-compliance 
including severity of the harm or 
risk of harm, scope of non-
compliance and history of 
compliance or any factors that the 
director considered relevant33   
What cannot 
be used as 
defence  
 None  Due diligence, honest and 
reasonable belief not a defence34 
 Sufficiency of the funding 
provided to a home from any 
 
28 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 4, s 182(4). 
29 Ibid, s 157. 
30 Ibid, s 157 and 158.1. 
31 Ibid, s 157(4) to (8). 
32 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, supra note 5 at Tab 1103-01, page 1–5. 
33 O Reg 79/10, supra note 24, s 299. 
34 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 4, s 159(1), 162.2(3). 
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source must not be considered in 
any review or appeal35 
Review and 
appeal  
 Licensing decisions could be 
appealed to the Health Services 
Appeal and Reveal Board and 
then division court  
 Rules about who can participate 
at hearings (e.g. residents and 
employees who request party 
status) 
 Hearing may be delayed if the 
home satisfies the Appeal Board 
that the licensee has not been 
given a reasonable opportunity to 
comply and health, safety or 
welfare of the residents would not 
be adversely affected36 
    
 Orders and notices - Review by 
director and then appeal to the 
Health Services Appeal and 
Review Board and then divisional 
court37 
 No reference to participation of 
residents or employees at 
hearings38 
 Specific timelines for notices and 
beginning of hearing unless parties 
agree to a postponement39    
 Evidentiary rules40    
 Crown has the option to elect to 
have a prosecution heard by a 
judge rather than a justice of the 
peace41 
 
 
35 Ibid, s 171. 
36 Nursing Homes Act, supra note 3, s 15. 
37 Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, supra note 4, ss 163–170. 
38 Ibid, s 167. 
39 Ibid, ss 168(1) – (3). 
40 Ibid, s 173.1. 
41 Ibid, s 182(5.2). 
